Sovereign Debt Puzzles

Literature Cited

1. Acharya VV, Rajan RG. 2013. Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector. Rev. Financ. Stud. 26:61526–60
   [Google Scholar]
2. Acharya VV, Rajan RG, Shim J. 2022. When is debt odious? A theory of repression and growth traps Work. Pap., New York Univ. Sch. Bus.
   [Google Scholar]
3. Aguiar M, Amador M. 2011. Growth in the shadow of expropriation. Q. J. Econ. 126:2651–97
   [Google Scholar]
4. Aguiar M, Amador M 2014. Sovereign debt. Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 4 G Gopinath, E Helpman, K Rogoff 647–87. New York: Elsevier
   [Google Scholar]
5. Aguiar M, Amador M. 2021. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
   [Google Scholar]
6. Aguiar M, Amador M, Gopinath G. 2009. Expropriation dynamics. Am. Econ. Rev. 99:2473–79
   [Google Scholar]
7. Aguiar M, Gopinath G. 2006. Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account. J. Int. Econ. 69:164–83
   [Google Scholar]
8. Aguiar M, Gopinath G. 2007. Emerging market business cycles: The cycle is the trend. J. Political Econ. 115:169–102
   [Google Scholar]
9. Alfaro L, Kanczuk F. 2005. Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: a quantitative approach. J. Int. Econ. 65:2297–314
   [Google Scholar]
10. Anderson RW, Gilbert CL, Powell A. 1989. Securitization and commodity contingency in international lending. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 71:523–30
    [Google Scholar]
11. Arellano C. 2008. Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies. Am. Econ. Rev. 98:3690–712
    [Google Scholar]
12. Arslanalp S, Tsuda T. 2014. Tracking global demand for advanced economy sovereign debt. IMF Econ. Rev. 62:3430–64
    [Google Scholar]
13. Asonuma T, Trebesch C. 2016. Sovereign debt restructurings: preemptive or post-default. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 14:1175–214
    [Google Scholar]
14. Bardozzetti A, Dottori D. 2014. Collective action clauses: How do they affect sovereign bond yields?. J. Int. Econ. 92:2286–303
    [Google Scholar]
15. Becker T, Richards A, Thaicharoen Y 2003. Bond restructuring and moral hazard: Are collective action clauses costly?. J. Int. Econ. 61:1127–61
    [Google Scholar]
16. Beers D, Jones E, McDaniels K, Quiviger Z. 2022. BoC-BoE sovereign default database: What's new in 2022? Staff Anal. Note 2022-11, Bank Canada Ottawa, Can: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2022/08/staff-analytical-note-2022-11/
    [Google Scholar]
17. Benjamin D, Wright MLJ. 2009. Recovery before redemption: a theory of delays in sovereign debt renegotiations SSRN Work. Pap. 1392539
    [Google Scholar]
18. Bolton P, Buchheit L, Gourinchas P-O, Gulati M, Hsieh C-T et al. 2020. Born out of necessity: a debt standstill for COVID-19 Policy Insight 103, Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
    [Google Scholar]
19. Bolton P, Fu X, Panizza U, Gulati M. 2023. The Greek retrofit of 2012: a case study Unpublished manuscript, Imp. Coll. London:
    [Google Scholar]
20. Bolton P, Jeanne O 2009. Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: the role of seniority. Rev. Econ. Stud. 76:3879–902
    [Google Scholar]
21. Bolton P, Panizza U, Gulati M. 2021. Legal air cover. J. Financ. Regul. 7:2189–216
    [Google Scholar]
22. Bolton P, Rosenthal H. 2002. Political intervention in debt contracts. J. Political Econ. 110:51103–34
    [Google Scholar]
23. Borensztein E, Levy Yeyati E, Panizza U 2007. Living with Debt Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, Inter-American Dev. Bank
    [Google Scholar]
24. Borensztein E, Mauro P. 2002. Reviving the case for GDP-indexed bonds Policy Discuss. Pap. PDP/02/10 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
25. Borensztein E, Panizza U. 2008. The costs of sovereign default Work. Pap. WP/08/238 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
26. Boudreau M, Gulati M. 2014. The IMF's imperiled priority. Duke J. Const. Law Public Policy 10:1119–48
    [Google Scholar]
27. Bradley M, de Fontenay E, de Lira Salvatierra I, Gulati M 2018. Pricing sovereign debt: foreign versus local parameters. Eur. Financ. Manag. 24:2261–97
    [Google Scholar]
28. Bradley M, de Lira Salvatierra I, Weidemaier M, Gulati M. 2022. A silver lining to Russia's sanctions-busting clause?. Va. Law Rev. 108:326–42
    [Google Scholar]
29. Bradley M, Gulati M. 2013. Collective action clauses for the Eurozone. Rev. Finance 18:62045–2102
    [Google Scholar]
30. Brautigam D, Hwang J. 2020. China-Africa loan database research guidebook China Africa Res. Initiat., Sch. Adv. Int. Stud., Johns Hopkins Univ. Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
31. Broner F, Martin A, Ventura J. 2010. Sovereign risk and secondary markets. Am. Econ. Rev. 100:41523–55
    [Google Scholar]
32. Buchheit LC. 1991. Moral hazards and other delights. Int. Financ. Law Rev. April:10–11
    [Google Scholar]
33. Buchheit LC. 2006. The default interest rate clause. How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, pp. 36–41. London: Euromoney Publ.
    [Google Scholar]
34. Buchheit LC, Gulati M 2013. The gathering storm: restructuring a sovereign's contingent liabilities. Sovereign Financing and International Law: The UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Lending and Borrowing, ed. C Esposito, Y Li, JP Bohoslavsky 287–94. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
35. Buchheit LC, Gulati M. 2023. Enforcing comparable treatment in sovereign debt workouts. Cap. Mark. Law J. 18:171–77
    [Google Scholar]
36. Buchheit LC, Karpinski E. 2006. Grenada's innovations. J. Bank. Law Regul. 21:1227–30
    [Google Scholar]
37. Buchheit LC, Karpinski E. 2007. Belize's innovations. Butterworths J. Int. Bank. Financ. Law May:278–80
    [Google Scholar]
38. Buchheit LC, Pam J. 2004. Uruguay's innovations. J. Bank. Law Regul. 19:128–31
    [Google Scholar]
39. Buckley R. 1989. Debt exchanges revisited: lessons from Latin America for Eastern Europe. Northwest. J. Int. Law Bus. 18:3655–84
    [Google Scholar]
40. Bulow J, Rogoff K. 1988. The buyback boondoggle. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 2:675–98
    [Google Scholar]
41. Bulow J, Rogoff K. 1989. Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?. Am. Econ. Rev. 79:43–50
    [Google Scholar]
42. Bulow J, Rogoff K. 1992. Sovereign debt repurchases: no cure for overhang. Q. J. Econ. 106:1219–35
    [Google Scholar]
43. Carletti E, Colla P, Gulati M, Ongena S. 2016. Pricing contract terms in a crisis: Venezuelan bonds in 2016. Cap. Mark. Law J. 11:4540–55
    [Google Scholar]
44. Carletti E, Colla P, Gulati M, Ongena S. 2021. The price of law: the case of the Eurozone collective action clauses. Rev. Financ. Stud. 34:125933–76
    [Google Scholar]
45. Caselli F, Faralli M, Manasse P, Panizza U. 2021. On the benefits of repaying Disc. Pap. 16539, Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
    [Google Scholar]
46. Chamon M, Klok E, Thakoor V, Zettelmeyer J. 2022. Debt-for-climate swaps: analysis, design, and implementation Work. Pap. WP/22/162, Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
47. Chari A, Leary R 2021. Contract provisions, default risk and bond prices: evidence from Puerto Rico. Sovereign Debt Diplomacies P Penet, JF Zendejas 304–30. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
48. Choi S, Gulati M. 2004. Innovation in boilerplate contracts: an empirical examination of sovereign bonds. Emory Law J 53:1930–96
    [Google Scholar]
49. Choi S, Gulati M. 2006. Contract as statute. Mich. Law Rev. 104:51129–73
    [Google Scholar]
50. Choi S, Gulati M. 2016. The pricing of non-price terms in sovereign bonds: the case of the Greek guarantees. J. Law Finance Account. 1:11–40
    [Google Scholar]
51. Choi S, Gulati M, Posner E. 2012. The evolution of contract terms in sovereign bonds. J. Legal Anal. 4:1131–79
    [Google Scholar]
52. Choi S, Gulati M, Posner E. 2013. The dynamics of contract evolution. New York Univ. Law Rev. 88:11–45
    [Google Scholar]
53. Choi S, Gulati M, Scott R. 2017. The black hole problem in commercial boilerplate. Duke Law J. 67:11–60
    [Google Scholar]
54. Choi S, Gulati M, Scott R. 2018. Variation in boilerplate: Rational design or random mutation?. Am. Law Econ. Rev. 20:11–45
    [Google Scholar]
55. Choi S, Gulati M, Scott R. 2021. Investigating the contract production process. Cap. Mark. Law J. 16:4414–31
    [Google Scholar]
56. Chung K, Papaioannou M. 2021. Do enhanced collective action clauses affect sovereign borrowing costs?. J. Bank. Financ. Econ. 1:1559–87
    [Google Scholar]
57. Collard F, Habib M, Panizza U, Rochet JC. 2022. Debt sustainability with involuntary default. Discuss. Pap. 17357 Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
    [Google Scholar]
58. Collard F, Habib M, Rochet JC. 2015. Sovereign debt sustainability in advanced economies. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 13:3381–420
    [Google Scholar]
59. Consiglio A, Zenios SA. 2015. The case for contingent convertible debt for sovereigns Work. Pap. WP 15-13, The Wharton Financ. Inst. Cent. Philadelphia:
    [Google Scholar]
60. Cordella T, Powell A. 2021. Preferred and non-preferred creditors. J. Int. Econ. 132:103491
    [Google Scholar]
61. Corsetti G, Maeng SH. 2023. Debt crises, fast and slow Res. Pap. 2023/15, Robert Schuman Cent. Adv. Stud., Eur. Univ. Inst. Italy:
    [Google Scholar]
62. Coyle J. 2022. Contractual waivers of foreign sovereign immunity. Transnational Litigation Blog Sept. 20. https://tlblog.org/contractual-waivers-of-foreign-sovereign-immunity/
    [Google Scholar]
63. Das U, Papaioannou M, Trebesch C. 2012. Sovereign debt restructurings 1950–2010: literature survey, data, and stylized facts Work. Pap. WP/12/203, Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
64. Dornbusch R. 1988. Comments and discussion on Bulow & Rogoff: The buyback boondoggle. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 1988:2699–704
    [Google Scholar]
65. Eaton J, Gersovitz M. 1981. Debt with potential repudiation: theoretical and empirical analysis. Rev. Econ. Stud. 48:2289–309
    [Google Scholar]
66. Eichengreen B, Hausmann R, Panizza U. 2022. Yet it endures: the persistence of original sin. Open Econ. Rev. 34:1–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-022-09704-3
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
67. Eichengreen B, Mody A. 2004. Do collective action clauses raise borrowing costs?. Econ. J. 114:495247–64
    [Google Scholar]
68. Eichengreen B, Portes R. 1989. Dealing with debt: the 1930s and the 1980s. Dealing with the Debt Crisis I Husain, I Diwan 69–86. Washington, DC: The World Bank
    [Google Scholar]
69. Enderlein H, Trebesch C, von Daniels L 2012. Sovereign debt disputes: a database on government coerciveness during debt crises. J. Int. Money Finance 31:2250–66
    [Google Scholar]
70. Feld LP, Kalb A, Moessinger M-D, Osterlof S. 2017. Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules and no-bailout clauses. J. Int. Money Finance 70:319–43
    [Google Scholar]
71. Flandreau M. 2022. Pari passu lost and found: the origins of sovereign bankruptcy 1798–1873. Work. Pap. 186, Inst. New Econ. Think. New York:
72. Flandreau M, Pietrosanti S, Schuster C. 2022. The puzzle of sovereign debt collateral Discuss. Pap. 17286, Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
    [Google Scholar]
73. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2021. Responding to risks of COVID debt distress. Roundtable Rep., Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Consens. Build. Inst. New York: https://ny.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Roundtable_Report_Responding_to_Risks_of_Covid_Debt_Distress_July2021.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
74. Galindo AJ, Panizza U. 2018. The cyclicality of international public sector borrowing in developing countries: Does the lender matter?. World Dev. 112:119–35
    [Google Scholar]
75. Gao P, Lee C, Murphy D. 2019. Municipal borrowing costs and state policies for distressed municipalities. J. Financ. Econ. 132:2404–26
    [Google Scholar]
76. Gelpern A, Gulati M. 2006. Public symbol in private contract. Washington Univ. Law Q. 84:71627–1716
    [Google Scholar]
77. Gelpern A, Gulati M, Zettelmeyer J. 2019. If boilerplate could talk: the work of standard terms in sovereign bond contracts. Law Soc. Inq. 44:3617–46
    [Google Scholar]
78. Gelpern A, Horn S, Morris S, Parks B, Trebesch C 2022. How China lends: a rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments. Econ. Policyeiac054
    [Google Scholar]
79. Gelpern A, Panizza U. 2022. Enough potential repudiation: economic and legal aspects of sovereign debt in the pandemic era. Annu. Rev. Econ. 14:545–70
    [Google Scholar]
80. Gelpern A, Setser B, Heller B 2015. Count the limbs: designing robust aggregation clauses in sovereign bonds. Too Little Too Late M Guzman, J Ocampo, J Stiglitz 109–43. New York: Columbia Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
81. Gelpern A, Zettelmeyer J. 2020. CACs and doorknobs. Cap. Mark. Law J. 15:198–114
    [Google Scholar]
82. Georgieva K, Pazarbasioglu C 2021. The G20 Common Framework for debt treatments must be stepped up. IMF Blog Dec. 2. https://blogs.imf.org/2021/12/02/the-g20-common-framework-for-debt-treatments-must-be-stepped-up/
    [Google Scholar]
83. Ghosh TA, Nochiyil DV. 2011. The European sovereign debt crisis Rep. PGP_CCS_P11_095, Indian Inst. Manag. Bangalore India: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/18253
    [Google Scholar]
84. Gibson R, Habib M, Ziegler A. 2014. Reinsurance or securitization: the case of natural catastrophe risk. J. Math. Econ. 53:79–100
    [Google Scholar]
85. Gill I. 2022. It's time to end the slow-motion tragedy in debt restructurings. World Bank Blog Mar. 1. https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/its-time-end-slow-motion-tragedy-debt-restructurings
    [Google Scholar]
86. Gourinchas P-O, Jeanne O 2013. Capital flows to developing countries: the allocation puzzle. Rev. Econ. Stud. 80:41484–1515
    [Google Scholar]
87. Gousgounis M, Gulati M, Buchheit LC. 2021. Nailing the flag to the mast—promises of super-priority in public debt. Cap. Mark. Law J. 16:4474–81
    [Google Scholar]
88. Griffith-Jones S, Sharma K 2006. GDP-indexed bonds: making it happen Work. Pap. 21, Dep. Econ. Social Affairs, United Nations New York:
    [Google Scholar]
89. Grossman H, van Huyck J. 1988. Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: excusable default, repudiation, and reputation. Am. Econ. Rev. 78:51088–97
    [Google Scholar]
90. Gulati M. 2020. Do judgements trump CACs?. Credit Slips Febr. 10. https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/02/do-judgements-trump-cacs.html#comments
    [Google Scholar]
91. Gulati M, Panizza U, Weidemaier M, Willingham G. 2020. When governments promise to prioritize public debt: Do markets care?. J. Financ. Regul. 6:141–74
    [Google Scholar]
92. Gulati M, Schragger R. 2023. Muni bonds and access to bankruptcy: Do investors care?. Fordham Urban Law J. 50:43
    [Google Scholar]
93. Gulati M, Scott R. 2013. The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
94. Hamilton JD. 2018. Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Rev. Econ. Stat. 100:5831–43
    [Google Scholar]
95. Haseler S. 2012. Trustees versus fiscal agents and default risk in international sovereign bonds. Eur. J. Law Econ. 34:3425–48
    [Google Scholar]
96. Heppke-Falk KH, Wolff GB. 2008. Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations: evidence for the German Länder. Kyklos 61:3425–46
    [Google Scholar]
97. Horn S, Reinhart CM, Trebesch C. 2021. China's overseas lending. J. Int. Econ. 133:1–32
    [Google Scholar]
98. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2013. Sovereign debt restructuring: recent developments and implications for the fund's legal and policy framework Work. Pap., Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
99. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2021a. Fund support for debt- and debt-service-reduction operations IMF Staff Rep., Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
100. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2021b. Review of the debt sustainability framework for market access countries IMF Policy Pap., Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
101. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2021c. Review of the debt sustainability framework in low income countries: proposed framework IMF Policy Pap., Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
102. Kahan M, Klausner M. 1997. Standardization and innovation in corporate contracting (or “the economics of boilerplate”). Va. Law Rev. 83:4713–70
     [Google Scholar]
103. Kamstra M, Shiller RJ. 2009. The case for trills: giving the people and their pension funds a stake in the wealth of the nation Discuss. Pap. CFDP 1717, Cowles Found. Res. Econ., Yale Univ. New Haven, CT:
     [Google Scholar]
104. Kissner A. 2022. Unexpected trading dynamics in sovereign-guaranteed debt. JDSupra.com July 20. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/unexpected-trading-dynamics-in-6845640/
     [Google Scholar]
105. Klingen C, Weder B, Zettelmeyer J. 2013. How private creditors fared in emerging debt markets, 1970–2000 Work. Pap. WP/04/13, Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
106. Lang VF, Presbitero A. 2018. Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions. J. Dev. Econ. 130:1–16
     [Google Scholar]
107. Lucas R. 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
     [Google Scholar]
108. Lyons B. 1996. Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm contracts. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 12:427–52
     [Google Scholar]
109. Manuelides Y. 2017. GDP-linked bonds: a commentary on a term sheet. Cap. Mark. Law J. 12:2125–40
     [Google Scholar]
110. Meyer J, Reinhart C, Trebesch C. 2022. Sovereign bonds since Waterloo. Q. J. Econ. 137:31615–80
     [Google Scholar]
111. Mitchener KJ, Trebesch C. 2023. Sovereign debt in the twenty-first century. J. Econ. Lit. 61:2565–623
     [Google Scholar]
112. Moldogaziev T, Kioko S, Hildreth W. 2017. Impact of bankruptcy eligibility requirements and statutory liens on borrowing costs. Public Budg. Finance 37:447–73
     [Google Scholar]
113. North D, Weingast B. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England. J. Econ. Hist. 49:4803–32
     [Google Scholar]
114. Oxf. Econ 2022. Default likely in El Salvador, but only after the 2024 election. Rep., Oct. 25, Resource Hub, Oxf. Econ. Oxford, UK: https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/resource/default-likely-in-el-salvador-but-only-after-the-2024-election/
     [Google Scholar]
115. Panizza U. 2008. Domestic and external public debt in developing countries. Discuss. Pap. 188, UN Conf. Trade Dev. Geneva:
     [Google Scholar]
116. Panizza U. 2022a. Do countries default in bad times? The role of alternative detrending techniques. Discuss. Pap. 17216, Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
     [Google Scholar]
117. Panizza U 2022b. Long-term debt sustainability in emerging market economies: a counterfactual analysis Work. Pap. HEIDWP07-2022, Int. Econ. Dep., Grad. Inst. Int. Dev. Stud. Geneva:
     [Google Scholar]
118. Panizza U, Gulati M. 2021. Make-wholes in sovereign bonds. Cap. Mark. Law J. 16:3267–99
     [Google Scholar]
119. Panizza U, Sturzenegger F, Zettelmeyer Z. 2009. The economics and law of sovereign debt and default. J. Econ. Lit. 47:365–98
     [Google Scholar]
120. Parikh S, He Z. 2017. Failing cities and the red queen phenomenon. Boston Coll. Law Rev. 58:1599–670
     [Google Scholar]
121. Ratha D, De S, Kurlat S. 2018. Does governing law affect bond spreads?. Emerg. Mark. Rev. 36:60–78
     [Google Scholar]
122. Reinhart C, Sbrancia B. 2015. The liquidation of government debt. Econ. Policy 30:291–333
     [Google Scholar]
123. Reinhart C, Trebesch C. 2016. Sovereign debt relief and its aftermath. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 14:1215–51
     [Google Scholar]
124. Rivetti D. 2022. Achieving comparability of treatment under the G20's Common Framework Equitable Growth Finance Inst. Note, World Bank Washington, DC: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/426641645456786855/pdf/Achieving-Comparability-of-Treatment-under-the-G20-s-Common-Framework.pdf
     [Google Scholar]
125. Rogoff K. 2022. Issues in the theory of sovereign debt and post-COVID workouts. J. Policy Model. 44:4804–11
     [Google Scholar]
126. Schlegl M, Trebesch C, Wright MLJ. 2019. The seniority structure of sovereign debt NBER Work. Pap. 25793
     [Google Scholar]
127. Scott R, Choi S, Gulati M. 2022. Contractual landmines SSRN Work. Pap. 4178649
     [Google Scholar]
128. Shleifer A. 2003. Will the sovereign debt market survive?. Am. Econ. Rev. 92:285–90
     [Google Scholar]
129. Smith C, Warner J. 1979. On financial contracting: an analysis of bond covenants. J. Financ. Econ. 7:2117–61
     [Google Scholar]
130. Sturzenegger F, Zettelmeyer 2007. Creditors’ losses versus debt relief: results from a decade of sovereign debt crises. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 5:2–3343–51
     [Google Scholar]
131. The Economist 2009. Ecuador's winning strategy. The Economist, June 17. https://www.economist.com/news/2009/06/17/ecuadors-winning-strategy
     [Google Scholar]
132. Tomz M, Wright MLJ. 2007. Do countries default in “bad times”?. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 5:2–3352–60
     [Google Scholar]
133. Tomz M, Wright MLJ. 2013. Empirical research on sovereign debt and default. Annu. Rev. Econ. 5:247–72
     [Google Scholar]
134. Uribe M, Schmitt-Grohé S. 2017. Open Economy Macroeconomics Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
135. Waibel M. 2011. Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 81 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
136. Weidemaier M. 2008. Disputing boilerplate. Temple Law Rev 82:11–54
     [Google Scholar]
137. Weidemaier M. 2014. Sovereign immunity and sovereign debt. Ill. Law Rev. 2014:67–101
     [Google Scholar]
138. Weidemaier M. 2020. Judgements > CACs. Credit Slips Febr. 12. https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/02/judgments-cacs.html
     [Google Scholar]
139. Weidemaier M, Gulati M. 2018. Differing perceptions: market practice and the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity. Law Soc. Inq. 43:1496–526
     [Google Scholar]
140. Weidemaier M, Gulati M 2020a. Andy Hessick: Judgements 1, CACs 0. Clauses and Controversies podcast epis. 17, Nov. 20. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ep-17-ft-andy-hessick/id1528208049?i=1000497785599
     [Google Scholar]
141. Weidemaier M, Gulati M 2020b. Yannis Manuelides: Why not use GDP-linked bonds?. Clauses and Controversies podcast epis. 18, Nov. 16. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ep-18-ft-yannis-manuelides/id1528208049?i=1000498846213
     [Google Scholar]
142. Weidemaier M, Gulati M 2022a. Necessity and the Covid-19 pandemic. Cap. Mark. Law J. 15:3277–83
     [Google Scholar]
143. Weidemaier M, Gulati M 2022b. Vladimir Werning: Argentina's never-ending GDP warrant saga. Clauses and Controversies podcast epis. 76, June 13. https://soundcloud.com/clauses-controversies/ep-76-ft-vladimir-werning
     [Google Scholar]
144. Weidemaier M, Gulati M. 2023. The perils of (bond contract) faith. Financial Times Febr. 17. https://www.ft.com/content/9eb73f7d-df21-43ba-b707-20b1bf61397d
     [Google Scholar]
145. Weidemaier M, Makoff G. 2023. Mass sovereign debt litigation: a computer-assisted analysis of the Argentina bond litigation in the U.S. federal courts 2002–2016. UC Davis Law Rev. 56:11233–305
     [Google Scholar]
146. Weidemaier M, Panizza U, Gulati M. 2022. About that SriLankan Airlines guaranteed bond. Financial Times, June 9. https://www.ft.com/content/024656d1-9f3b-4ba9-a38a-7d2f753cc84b
     [Google Scholar]
147. White M. 2002. Sovereigns in distress: Do they need bankruptcy?. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 2002:287–319
     [Google Scholar]
148. Zettelmeyer J, Trebesch C, Gulati M. 2013. The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy. Econ. Policy 28:75513–63
     [Google Scholar]