1932

Abstract

Over the past 25 years, social science research in diverse fields has shifted its best explanations of innovation from () atomistic invention and development by individuals, corporate or natural, to networked learning; () market-based innovation focused on material self-interest to interaction between market and nonmarket practices under diverse motivations; and () property rights exclusively to interaction between property and commons. These shifts have profound implications for how we must think about law and innovation. Patents, copyrights, noncompete agreements, and trade secret laws are all optimized for an increasingly obsolete worldview. Strong intellectual property impedes, rather than facilitates, innovation when we understand that knowledge flows in learning networks, mixing of market and nonmarket models and motivations, and weaving of commons with property are central to the innovation process.

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2017-10-13
2024-04-25
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