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Abstract

Traditionally, competition law and practice serve to preserve competition, with a focus on the maximization of consumer welfare. This has been criticized as conflicting with society's overarching goal of achieving greater (environmental) sustainability. Consequently, various jurisdictions have recently reformed their laws and guidance allowing them to account for sustainability benefits in the assessment of cooperation between competitors, with potentially considerable implications for how firms can jointly develop and introduce more sustainable technologies and products. This has opened a new research frontier in the long-standing tradition of marrying the theory of industrial organization with the field of environmental and resource economics. The consideration of sustainability benefits in competition analysis also requires both the transfer and adaptation of measurement techniques. We summarize recent developments and sketch potential research opportunities.

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2023-10-05
2024-04-27
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