1932
0
  1. Home
  2. A-Z Publications
  3. Annual Review of Psychology
  4. Volume 71, 2020
  5. Article

Annual Review of Psychology

Volume 71, 2020

New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning

Abstract

The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

Keyword(s): argument, Bayes’ theorem, fallacies, inference, logic, nonmonotonicity, persuasion, probability, reasoning, world knowledge
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132
2020-01-04
2024-04-20
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/psych/71/1/annurev-psych-010419-051132.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Adams EW. 1998. A Primer of Probability Logic Stanford, CA: CSLI Publ.
  2. Ali N, Chater N, Oaksford M 2011. The mental representation of causal conditional inference: causal models or mental models. Cognition 119:403–18
     [Google Scholar]
  3. Anderson JR. 1991. Is human cognition adaptive?. Behav. Brain Sci. 14:471–517
     [Google Scholar]
  4. Aumann RJ. 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Stat. 4:1236–39
     [Google Scholar]
  5. Baratgin J, Douven I, Evans JStBT, Oaksford M et al. 2015. The new paradigm and mental models. Trends Cogn. Sci. 19:547–48
     [Google Scholar]
  6. Baratgin J, Politzer G. 2010. Updating: a psychologically basic situation of probability revision. Think. Reason. 16:253–87
     [Google Scholar]
  7. Bennett J. 1989. 1964. Rationality Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publ.
  8. Bhatia J-S, Oaksford M. 2015. Discounting testimony with the argument ad hominem and a Bayesian congruent prior model. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 41:1548–59
     [Google Scholar]
  9. Bonnefon J-F. 2009. A theory of utility conditionals: paralogical reasoning from decision-theoretic leakage. Psychol. Rev. 116:888–907
     [Google Scholar]
  10. Bonnefon J-F. 2012. Utility conditionals as consequential arguments: a random sampling experiment. Think. Reason. 18:379–93
     [Google Scholar]
  11. Bonnefon J-F, Hilton DJ. 2004. Consequential conditionals: invited and suppressed inferences from valued outcomes. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 30:28–37
     [Google Scholar]
  12. Bonnefon J-F, Sloman SA. 2013. The causal structure of utility conditionals. Cogn. Sci. 37:193–209
     [Google Scholar]
  13. Bovens L, Hartmann S. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  14. Byrne RM. 1989. Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition 31:61–83
     [Google Scholar]
  15. Carnap R. 1945. On inductive logic. Philos. Sci. 12:72–97
     [Google Scholar]
  16. Chater N. 1996. Reconciling simplicity and likelihood principles in perceptual organization. Psychol. Rev. 103:566–81
     [Google Scholar]
  17. Chater N. 2018. The Mind Is Flat London: Allen Lane
  18. Chater N, Oaksford M. 1999. The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning. Cogn. Psychol. 38:191–258
     [Google Scholar]
  19. Chater N, Oaksford M, eds. 2008. The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  20. Cheng PW. 1997. From covariation to causation: a causal power theory. Psychol. Rev. 104:367–405
     [Google Scholar]
  21. Claidière N, Trouche E, Mercier H 2017. Argumentation and the diffusion of counter-intuitive beliefs. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 146:1052–66
     [Google Scholar]
  22. Clark HH. 1996. Using Language Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  23. Coenen A, Nelson JD, Gureckis TM 2018. Asking the right questions about the psychology of human inquiry: nine open challenges. Psychon. Bull. Rev. In press. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1470-5
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
  24. Coletti G, Scozzafava R. 2002. Probabilistic Logic in a Coherent Setting Dordrecht, Neth.: Kluwer
  25. Cook J, Lewandowsky S. 2016. Rational irrationality: modeling climate change belief polarization using Bayesian networks. Top. Cogn. Sci. 8:160–79
     [Google Scholar]
  26. Copeland DE. 2006. Theories of categorical reasoning and extended syllogisms. Think. Reason. 12:379–412
     [Google Scholar]
  27. Copeland DE, Radvansky GA. 2004. Working memory and syllogistic reasoning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Exp. Psychol. 57A:1437–57
     [Google Scholar]
  28. Corner A, Hahn U, Oaksford M 2011. The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. J. Mem. Lang. 64:133–52
     [Google Scholar]
  29. Crupi V, Nelson JD, Meder B, Cevolani G, Tentori K 2018. Generalized information theory meets human cognition: introducing a unified framework to model uncertainty and information search. Cogn. Sci. 42:1410–56
     [Google Scholar]
  30. Cruz N, Baratgin J, Oaksford M, Over DE 2015. Reasoning with ifs and ands and ors. Front. Psychol. 6:192
     [Google Scholar]
  31. Cruz N, Over DE, Oaksford M, Baratgin J 2016. Centering and the meaning of conditionals. Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society A Papafragou, D Grodner, D Mirman, JC Trueswell 1104–9 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc.
     [Google Scholar]
  32. Cummins DD. 2014. The impact of disablers on predictive inference. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 40:1638–55
     [Google Scholar]
  33. Cummins DD, Lubart T, Alksnis O, Rist R 1991. Conditional reasoning and causation. Mem. Cogn. 19:274–82
     [Google Scholar]
  34. Douven I. 2012. Learning conditional information. Mind Lang 27:239–63
     [Google Scholar]
  35. Douven I, Elqayam S, Singmann H, van Wijnbergen-Huitink J 2018. Conditionals and inferential connections: a hypothetical inferential theory. Cogn. Psychol. 101:50–81
     [Google Scholar]
  36. Douven I, Mirabile P. 2018. Best, second-best, and good-enough explanations: how they matter to reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 44:1792–813
     [Google Scholar]
  37. Douven I, Schupbach JN. 2015a. Probabilistic alternatives to Bayesianism: the case of explanationism. Front. Psychol. 6:459
     [Google Scholar]
  38. Douven I, Schupbach JN. 2015b. The role of explanatory considerations in updating. Cognition 142:299–311
     [Google Scholar]
  39. Douven I, Verbrugge S. 2013. The probabilities of conditionals revisited. Cogn. Sci. 37:711–30
     [Google Scholar]
  40. Edgington D. 1995. On conditionals. Mind 104:235–329
     [Google Scholar]
  41. Elqayam S, Evans JStBT. 2011. Subtracting “ought” from “is”: descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behav. Brain Sci. 34:233–48
     [Google Scholar]
  42. Elqayam S, Thompson VA, Wilkinson MR, Evans JStBT, Over DE 2015. Deontic introduction: a theory of inference from is to ought. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 41:1516–32
     [Google Scholar]
  43. Eva B, Hartmann S. 2018. Bayesian argumentation and the value of logical validity. Psychol. Rev. 125:5806–21
     [Google Scholar]
  44. Evans JStBT. 2017. Belief bias in deductive reasoning. Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing Phenomena in Thinking, Judgment and Memory RF Pohl 165–81 New York: Routledge. , 2nd ed..
     [Google Scholar]
  45. Evans JStBT, Barston JL, Pollard P 1983. On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Mem. Cogn. 11:295–306
     [Google Scholar]
  46. Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Harper CNJ, Johnson-Laird PN 1999. Reasoning about necessity and possibility: a test of the mental model theory of deduction. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 25:1495–513
     [Google Scholar]
  47. Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Over DE 2003. Conditionals and conditional probability. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29:321–35
     [Google Scholar]
  48. Evans JStBT, Neilens H, Handley SJ, Over DE 2008. When can we say “if”?. Cognition 108:100–16
     [Google Scholar]
  49. Evans JStBT, Thompson V, Over DE 2015. Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning. Front. Psychol. 6:398
     [Google Scholar]
  50. Farmer JD, Patelli P, Zovko II. 2005. The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial markets. PNAS 102:2254–59
     [Google Scholar]
  51. Fernbach PM, Erb CD. 2013. A quantitative causal model theory of conditional reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 39:1327–43
     [Google Scholar]
  52. Fodor JA. 1975. The Language of Thought New York: Thomas Crowell
  53. Friston KJ. 2009. The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13:293–301
     [Google Scholar]
  54. George C. 1995. The endorsement of the premises: assumption-based or belief-based reasoning. Br. J. Psychol. 86:93–111
     [Google Scholar]
  55. Gilio A, Over D. 2012. The psychology of inferring conditionals from disjunctions: a probabilistic study. J. Math. Psychol. 56:118–31
     [Google Scholar]
  56. Goldman AI. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  57. Hahn U. 2011. The problem of circularity in evidence, argument, and explanation. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 6:172–82
     [Google Scholar]
  58. Hahn U, Hansen JU, Olsson EJ 2018. Truth tracking performance of social networks: how connectivity and clustering can make groups less competent. Synthese In press. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01936-6
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
  59. Hahn U, Harris AJL, Corner AJ 2009. Argument content and argument source: an exploration. Informal Log 29:337–67
     [Google Scholar]
  60. Hahn U, Hornikx J. 2016. A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation. Synthese 193:1833–73
     [Google Scholar]
  61. Hahn U, Oaksford M. 2007. The rationality of informal argumentation: a Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies. Psychol. Rev. 114:704–32
     [Google Scholar]
  62. Hahn U, Oaksford M, Bayindir H 2005. How convinced should we be by negative evidence?. Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society B Bara, L Barsalou, M Bucciarelli 887–92 Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum
     [Google Scholar]
  63. Hahn U, Oaksford M, Harris AJL 2013. Testimony and argument: a Bayesian perspective. Bayesian Argumentation F Zenker 15–38 Dordrecht, Neth.: Springer
     [Google Scholar]
  64. Hall S, Ali N, Chater N, Oaksford M 2016. Discounting and augmentation in causal conditional reasoning: causal models or shallow encoding. PLOS ONE 11:12e0167741
     [Google Scholar]
  65. Harman G. 1965. The inference to the best explanation. Philos. Rev. 64:88–95
     [Google Scholar]
  66. Harman G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  67. Harris AJL, Corner A, Hahn U 2013. James is polite and punctual (and useless): a Bayesian formalisation of faint praise. Think. Reason. 19:414–29
     [Google Scholar]
  68. Harris AJL, Hahn U, Madsen JK, Hsu AS 2016. The appeal to expert opinion: quantitative support for a Bayesian network approach. Cogn. Sci. 40:1496–533
     [Google Scholar]
  69. Harris AJL, Hsu AS, Madsen JK 2012. Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem. Think. . Reason 18:311–43
     [Google Scholar]
  70. Hartmann S, Rafiee Rad S 2012. Updating on conditionals = Kullback-Leibler distance + causal structure Paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, San Diego, Nov 15–17
  71. Hattori M. 2016. Probabilistic representation in syllogistic reasoning: a theory to integrate mental models and heuristics. Cognition 157:296–320
     [Google Scholar]
  72. Hattori M, Oaksford M. 2007. Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation detection in causal induction: model comparison and rational analysis. Cogn. Sci. 31:765–814
     [Google Scholar]
  73. Heit E, Feeney A. 2005. Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12:340–44
     [Google Scholar]
  74. Heit E, Rotello CM. 2010. Relations between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 36:805–12
     [Google Scholar]
  75. Hilton DJ. 1995. The social context of reasoning: conversational inference and rational judgment. Psychol. Bull. 118:248–71
     [Google Scholar]
  76. Hilton DJ, Kemmelmeier M, Bonnefon J-F 2005. Putting ifs to work: goal-based relevance in conditional directives. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 134:388–405
     [Google Scholar]
  77. Hinterecker T, Knauff M, Johnson-Laird PN 2016. Modality, probability, and mental models. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 42:1606–20
     [Google Scholar]
  78. Howard RA, Matheson JE. 1981. Influence diagrams. Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis Vol. 2 RA Howard, JE Matheson 719–62 Menlo Park, CA: Strateg. Decis. Group
     [Google Scholar]
  79. Howson C, Urbach P. 1989. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach LaSalle, IL: Open Court
  80. Jeffrey RC. 2004. Subjective Probability: The Real Thing Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  81. Johnson-Laird PN. 1983. Mental Models Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  82. Johnson-Laird PN, Byrne RMJ. 2002. Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychol. Rev. 109:646–78
     [Google Scholar]
  83. Karaaslan H, Hohenberger A, Demir H, Hall S, Oaksford M 2018. Cross-cultural differences in informal argumentation: norms, inductive biases and evidentiality. J. Cogn. Cult. 18:358–89
     [Google Scholar]
  84. Kemp C, Tenenbaum JB. 2009. Structured statistical models of inductive reasoning. Psychol. Rev. 116:20–58
     [Google Scholar]
  85. Khemlani SS, Johnson-Laird PN. 2012. Theories of the syllogism: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 138:427–57
     [Google Scholar]
  86. Khemlani SS, Johnson-Laird PN. 2017. Illusions in reasoning. Minds Mach 27:11–35
     [Google Scholar]
  87. Kim NS, Keil FC. 2003. From symptoms to causes: diversity effects in diagnostic reasoning. Mem. Cogn. 31:155–65
     [Google Scholar]
  88. Klauer KC. 1999. On the normative justification for information gain in Wason's selection task. Psychol. Rev. 106:215–22
     [Google Scholar]
  89. Klauer K, Beller S, Hutter M 2010. Conditional reasoning in context: a dual-source model of probabilistic inference. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 36:298–323
     [Google Scholar]
  90. Krzyżanowska KH, Collins PJ, Hahn U 2017. Between a conditional's antecedent and its consequent: discourse coherence versus probabilistic relevance. Cognition 164:199–205
     [Google Scholar]
  91. Lewis DK. 1976. Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. Philos. Rev. 85:297–315
     [Google Scholar]
  92. Lombrozo T. 2016. Explanatory preferences shape learning and inference. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20:748–59
     [Google Scholar]
  93. Lombrozo T, Vasilyeva N. 2017. Causal explanation. Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning M Waldmann 415–32 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  94. Manktelow KI, Over DE. 1991. Social roles and utilities in reasoning with deontic conditionals. Cognition 39:85–105
     [Google Scholar]
  95. Mercier H. 2011. On the universality of argumentative reasoning. J. Cogn. Cult. 11:85–113
     [Google Scholar]
  96. Mercier H, Sperber D. 2011. Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behav. Brain Sci. 34:57–74
     [Google Scholar]
  97. Mercier H, Sperber D. 2017. The Enigma of Reason Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
  98. Mercier H, Zhang J, Qu Y, Lu P, Van der Henst J 2015. Do Easterners and Westerners treat contradiction differently?. J. Cogn. Cult. 15:45–63
     [Google Scholar]
  99. Millikan RG. 2006. Styles of rationality. Rational Animals? S Hurley, M Nudds 117–26 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  100. Nelson JD, Divjak B, Gudmundsdottir G, Martignon L, Meder B 2014. Children's sequential information search is sensitive to environmental probabilities. Cognition 130:74–80
     [Google Scholar]
  101. Oaksford M, Chater N. 1991. Against logicist cognitive science. Mind Lang 6:1–38
     [Google Scholar]
  102. Oaksford M, Chater N. 1994. A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. Psychol. Rev. 101:608–31
     [Google Scholar]
  103. Oaksford M, Chater N. 2007. Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  104. Oaksford M, Chater N. 2012. Dual processes, probabilities, and cognitive architecture. Mind Soc 11:15–26
     [Google Scholar]
  105. Oaksford M, Chater N. 2013. Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm. Think. Reason. 19:346–79
     [Google Scholar]
  106. Oaksford M, Chater N. 2017. Causal models and conditional reasoning. Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning M Waldmann 327–46 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  107. Oaksford M, Chater N, Larkin J 2000. Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 26:883–99
     [Google Scholar]
  108. Oaksford M, Hahn U. 2004. A Bayesian analysis of the argument from ignorance. Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 58:75–85
     [Google Scholar]
  109. Oaksford M, Hahn U. 2013. Why are we convinced by the ad hominem argument? Bayesian source reliability and pragma-dialectical discussion rules. Bayesian Argumentation: The Practical Side of Probability F Zenker 39–58 New York: Springer Sci.
     [Google Scholar]
  110. Oaksford M, Hall S. 2016. On the source of human irrationality. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20:336–44
     [Google Scholar]
  111. Oberauer K, Wilhelm O. 2003. The meaning(s) of conditionals: conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29:680–93
     [Google Scholar]
  112. Ohm E, Thompson VA. 2004. Everyday reasoning with inducements and advice. Think. Reason. 10:241–72
     [Google Scholar]
  113. Over DE. 2009. New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Think. Reason. 15:431–38
     [Google Scholar]
  114. Over DE, Hadjichristidis C, Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Sloman SA 2007. The probability of causal conditionals. Cogn. Psychol. 54:62–97
     [Google Scholar]
  115. Pearl J. 1988. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufman
  116. Pearl J. 2000. Causality Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  117. Peng K, Nisbett RE. 1999. Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. Am. Psychol. 54:741–54
     [Google Scholar]
  118. Pfeifer N, Kleiter GD. 2009. Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic. J. Appl. Log. 7:206–17
     [Google Scholar]
  119. Pfeifer N, Kleiter GD. 2011. Uncertain deductive reasoning. The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St. B. T. Evans K Manktelow, DE Over, S Elqayam 145–66 Hove, UK: Psychol. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  120. Politzer G. 2016. Deductive reasoning under uncertainty: a water tank analogy. Erkenntnis 81:479–506
     [Google Scholar]
  121. Politzer G, Baratgin J. 2016. Deductive schemas with uncertain premises using qualitative probability expressions. Think. Reason. 22:78–98
     [Google Scholar]
  122. Politzer G, Carles L. 2001. Belief revision and uncertain reasoning. Think. Reason. 7:217–34
     [Google Scholar]
  123. Politzer G, Over DE, Baratgin J 2010. Betting on conditionals. Think. Reason. 16:172–97
     [Google Scholar]
  124. Preston J, Epley N. 2005. Explanations versus applications: the explanatory power of valuable beliefs. Psychol. Sci. 16:826–32
     [Google Scholar]
  125. Ragni M, Kola I, Johnson-Laird PN 2018. On selecting evidence to test hypotheses: a theory of selection tasks. Psychol. Bull. 144:779–96
     [Google Scholar]
  126. Rai TS, Holyoak KJ. 2014. Rational hypocrisy: a Bayesian analysis based on informal argumentation and slippery slopes. Cogn. Sci. 38:1456–67
     [Google Scholar]
  127. Richerson PJ, Boyd R. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  128. Rips LJ. 1994. The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  129. Rips LJ. 2001. Two kinds of reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 12:129–34
     [Google Scholar]
  130. Rozenblit L, Keil F. 2002. The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. Cogn. Sci. 26:521–62
     [Google Scholar]
  131. Salmon WC. 1967. Carnap's inductive logic. J. Philos. 64:725–39
     [Google Scholar]
  132. Singmann H, Klauer KC, Beller S 2016. Probabilistic conditional reasoning: disentangling form and content with the dual-source model. Cogn. Psychol. 88:61–87
     [Google Scholar]
  133. Singmann H, Klauer KC, Over DE 2014. New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model. Front. Psychol. 5:316
     [Google Scholar]
  134. Skovgaard-Olsen N, Collins P, Krzyżanowska K, Hahn U, Klauer KC 2019. Cancellation, negation, and rejection. Cogn. Psychol. 108:42–71
     [Google Scholar]
  135. Skovgaard-Olsen N, Singmann H, Klauer KC 2017. Relevance and reason relations. Cogn. Sci. 41:1202–15
     [Google Scholar]
  136. Sloman SA, Fernbach P. 2017. The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone New York: Riverhead
  137. Sperber D, Wilson D. 1986. Relevance: Communication and Cognition Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell
  138. Stanovich KE. 2011. Rationality and the Reflective Mind Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  139. Stenning K, Cox R. 2006. Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 59:1454–83
     [Google Scholar]
  140. Stephens RG, Dunn JC, Hayes BK 2018. Are there two processes in reasoning? The dimensionality of inductive and deductive inferences. Psychol. Rev. 125:218–44
     [Google Scholar]
  141. Stevenson RJ, Over DE. 1995. Deduction from uncertain premises. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Exp. Psychol. 48A:613–43
     [Google Scholar]
  142. Stevenson RJ, Over DE. 2001. Reasoning from uncertain premises: effects of expertise and conversational context. Think. Reason. 7:367–90
     [Google Scholar]
  143. Tomasello M. 2014. A Natural History of Human Thinking Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
  144. Trouche E, Johansson P, Hall L, Mercier H 2016. The selective laziness of reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 40:2122–36
     [Google Scholar]
  145. Trouche E, Sander E, Mercier H 2014. Arguments, more than confidence, explain the good performance of reasoning groups. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143:1958–71
     [Google Scholar]
  146. Van Eemeren FH, Grootendorst R 2004. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  147. Vidal M, Baratgin J. 2017. A psychological study of unconnected conditionals. J. Cogn. Psychol. 29:769–81
     [Google Scholar]
  148. Vul E, Goodman N, Griffiths TL, Tenenbaum JB 2014. One and done? Optimal decisions from very few samples. Cogn. Sci. 38:599–637
     [Google Scholar]
  149. Walton DN, Reed C, Macagno F 2008. Argumentation Schemes Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  150. Wason PC. 1968. Reasoning about a rule. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 20:273–81
     [Google Scholar]
  151. Wolf AG, Rieger S, Knauff M 2012. The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision. Think. Reason. 18:417–40
     [Google Scholar]
  152. Zhao J, Osherson D. 2010. Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule. Think. Reason. 16:288–307
     [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132
Loading
New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning
Annual Review of Psychology 71, 305 (2020); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article

Most Cited Most Cited RSS feed

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error