Three important aspects of development—per capita income, state capabilities, and (the absence of) political violence—are correlated with each other at the country level. This article discusses the causes of such development clusters and highlights two explanations: common economic, political, and social drivers and complementarities (two-way positive feedbacks). It also draws out preliminary policy implications of these patterns of development and proposes topics for further research.


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