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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 16, 2024

Protests

Abstract

Citizens have long taken to the streets to demand change, expressing political views that may otherwise be suppressed. Protests have produced change at local, national, and international scales, including spectacular moments of political and social transformation. We document five new empirical patterns describing 1.2 million protest events across 218 countries between 1980 and 2020. First, autocracies and weak democracies experienced a trend break in protests during the Arab Spring. Second, protest movements also rose in importance following the Arab Spring. Third, protest movements geographically diffuse over time, spiking to their peak before falling off. Fourth, a country's year-to-year economic performance is not strongly correlated with protests; individual values are predictive of protest participation. Fifth, the United States, China, and Russia are the most overrepresented countries in academic studies. We discuss each pattern's connections to the existing literature and anticipate paths for future work.

Keyword(s): information technology, JEL D74, JEL P00, JEL P50, movements, political participation, protests
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082423-032519
2024-08-22
2024-12-12
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082423-032519
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Protests
Annual Review of Economics 16, 519 (2024); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082423-032519
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082423-032519
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082423-032519
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  • Article Type: Review Article

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