1932

Abstract

We argue that implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has contributed significantly to the reduction of systemic risk in the United States. However, Dodd-Frank also introduced burdensome rules that have little to do with systemic risk. This article evaluates the trade-off between capital regulation and regulation of scope in the context of Dodd-Frank, with a particular emphasis on the Volcker Rule. Recent regulatory reforms aimed at rolling back Dodd-Frank are evaluated and discussed.

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2018-11-01
2024-04-14
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