1932

Abstract

In this article, I use the concept of constitutional dictatorship as a heuristic, as a way of thinking more explicitly about constitutional violence than is customary in comparative constitutional law. Constitutional dictatorship is an epic concept. It is capable of illuminating—and retelling—epic histories of constitutional law, of alerting us to commonalities in constitutional practices of domination—and thus of violence—that would otherwise remain shrouded in legal orientalism. The analysis aspires to make constitutional law strange again. To this end, I trace and narratives of constitutional dictatorship from colonialism to the coronavirus pandemic. Arguing against emergency scripts, I relate the idea of “emergency” to the everyday and both to coloniality. Mine is a rudimentary conceptual history—a —of constitutional dictatorship. I think of the empirical vignettes about crisis government in the colony/postcolony on which my comparative historical analysis is based as prolegomena to a critical theory of constitutional dictatorship.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-040721-102430
2021-10-13
2024-06-18
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/lawsocsci/17/1/annurev-lawsocsci-040721-102430.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-040721-102430&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Ackerman B. 2004. The emergency constitution. Yale Law J 113:1029–91
    [Google Scholar]
  2. Ackerman B. 2010. The Decline and Fall of the American Republic Cambridge, MA: Belknap
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Ackerman B. 2019. Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law Cambridge, MA: Belknap
    [Google Scholar]
  4. Alford R. 2017. Permanent State of Emergency: Unchecked Executive Power and the Demise of the Rule of Law Montreal/Kingston, Can: McGill-Queens Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  5. Alviar García H, Frankenberg G 2019. Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Comparative Analysis and Critique Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    [Google Scholar]
  6. Anderson G. 2019. The French exception. New Left Rev 116/117 229–38
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Arato A. 2000. Good-bye to dictatorships?. Soc. Res. 67:925–55
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Balkin JM. 2008. Constitutional hardball and constitutional crises. Quinnipiac Law Rev 26:579–98
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Balkin JM. 2018. Constitutional crisis and constitutional rot. See Graber et al. 2018 13–28
  10. Barber SA. 2014. Constitutional Failure Lawrence: Univ. Press Kans.
    [Google Scholar]
  11. Barros R. 2002. Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Barthélemy J. 1917. Le Droit public en temps de guerre. Rev. Droit Public 24:146–51
    [Google Scholar]
  13. Bartoloni-Tuazon K. 2014. For Fear of an Elective King: George Washington and the Presidential Title Controversy of 1789 Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  14. Basu A. 2015. Violent Conjunctures in Democratic India. Cambridge Stud. Contentious Politics Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Beckmann MN. 2010. Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953–2004 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  16. Benjamin W 2006. 1940. On the concept of history. Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938–1940 H Eiland, MW Jennings 389–400 Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  17. Benton L, Ford L. 2016. Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850 Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  18. Benton L, Ford L. 2021. Empires and the rule of law: arbitrary justice and imperial legal ordering. The Cambridge Companion to the Rule of Law J Meierhenrich, M Loughlin 101–17 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  19. Bermeo N. 2016. On democratic backsliding. J. Democr. 27:15–19
    [Google Scholar]
  20. Bessner D. 2017. The ghosts of Weimar: the Weimar analogy in American thought. Soc. Res. 84:4831–55
    [Google Scholar]
  21. Blackett RJM. 2017. The Captive's Quest for Freedom: Fugitive Slaves, the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, and the Politics of Slavery Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  22. Blackstone W 1979. 1765. Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1. Of the Rights of Persons, intro SN Katz. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  23. Brands H. 2010. Latin America's Cold War Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
    [Google Scholar]
  24. Calabresi SG, Yoo CS. 2012. Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  25. Caldwell LK. 2000. Is Leviathan manageable?. Public Adm. Rev. 60:72–74
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Carey JM, Shugart MS 1998. Executive Decree Authority Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  27. Cetina KK, Schatzki TR, von Savigny E 2001. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory London: Routledge
    [Google Scholar]
  28. Chakravarty A. 2015. Investing in Authoritarian Rule: Punishment and Patronage in Rwanda's Gacaca Courts for Genocide Crimes Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  29. Chanock M. 1985. Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  30. Cheesman N. 2015. Opposing the Rule of Law: How Myanmar's Courts Make Law and Order Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  31. Chen W, Fu H 2020. Authoritarian Legality in Asia: Formation, Development, and Transition Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  32. Chua LJ, Lee JJG. 2021. Governing through contagion. Covid-19 in Asia: Law and Policy Contexts VV Ramraj 115–32 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Cofre L. 2020. Chile and COVID-19: a constitutional authoritarian temptation. VerfBlog May 19. https://verfassungsblog.de/chile-and-covid-19-a-constitutional-authoritarian-temptation/
    [Google Scholar]
  34. Cohen JL. 2004. Whose sovereignty? Empire versus international law. Ethics Int. Aff. 18:1–24
    [Google Scholar]
  35. Collins JM. 2016. Martial Law and English Laws, c. 1500–c. 1700 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  36. Comaroff J, Comaroff JL 2006. Law and Disorder in the Postcolony Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  37. Conlin MF. 2019. The Constitutional Origins of the American Civil War Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  38. Cover RM. 1983. Foreword: Nomos and narrative. Harvard Law Rev. 97:4–68
    [Google Scholar]
  39. Crocker TP. 2020. Overcoming Necessity: Emergency, Constraint, and the Meanings of American Constitutionalism New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  40. Czarnota A, Krygier M, Sadurski W 2022. Constitutional Populism Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. In press
    [Google Scholar]
  41. Darwin J. 2009. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  42. De R. 2018. A People's Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic Princeton, NJ:: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  43. DiClerico RE. 1987. James Wilson's presidency. Pres. Stud. Q. 17:301–17
    [Google Scholar]
  44. Drinóczi T, Bień-Kacala A. 2020. COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: extraordinary situation and illiberal constitutionalism. Theory Pract. Legis. 8:171–92
    [Google Scholar]
  45. Dwyer P, Nettelbeck A 2018. Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World London: Palgrave Macmillan
    [Google Scholar]
  46. Dyzenhaus D 2001. The permanence of the temporary: Can emergency powers be normalized?. The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill R Daniels, P Macklem, K Roach 21–38 Toronto, Can: Univ. Tor. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  47. Dyzenhaus D. 2006. The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  48. Dyzenhaus D. 2009. The puzzle of martial law. Univ. Tor. Law J. 59:11–64
    [Google Scholar]
  49. Dyzenhaus D, Thorburn M 2016. Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  50. Edel A. 2020. Putin's constitutional tsarism. New York Review of Books July 9
    [Google Scholar]
  51. Edling MM. 2003. A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  52. Elkins Z. 2018. Is the sky falling? Constitutional crises in historical perspective. See Graber et al. 2018 49–65
  53. Ellmann S. 1992. In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency Oxford, UK: Clarendon
    [Google Scholar]
  54. Erman S. 2019. Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  55. Fanon F. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth, transl. R Philcox New York: Grove
    [Google Scholar]
  56. Farrier J. 2019. Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial: Congressional Lawsuits and the Separation of Powers Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  57. Fatovic C. 2009. Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  58. Fatovic C, Kleinerman BA 2013. Introduction: extra-legal measures and the problem of legitimacy. Extra-Legal Power and Legitimacy C Fatovic, BA Kleinerman 1–23 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  59. Ferejohn F, Pasquino P. 2004. The law of the exception: a typology of emergency powers. Int. J. Const. Law 2:2210–39
    [Google Scholar]
  60. Finlason WF. 1866. A Treatise on Martial Law as Allowed by the Law of England in Time of Rebellion London: Stevens & Sons
    [Google Scholar]
  61. Finn JE. 1991. Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law New York: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  62. Flyvbjerg B. 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  63. Flyvbjerg B, Landman T, Schram S 2012. Important next steps in phronetic social science. Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis B Flyvbjerg, T Landman, S Schram 285–97 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  64. Fraenkel E. 2017. 1941. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship, intro J Meierhenrich Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  65. Frankenberg G. 2014. Political Technology and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: Normalizing the State of Exception Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
    [Google Scholar]
  66. Geddes B, Wright J, Frantz E. 2018. How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  67. Gerstle G, Isaac J 2020. States of Exception in American History Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  68. Gicquel J. 1997. Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques Paris: Montchrestien
    [Google Scholar]
  69. Ginsburg B. 2016. Presidential Government New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  70. Ginsburg T, Huq AZ. 2018. How to Save a Constitutional Democracy Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  71. Ginsburg T, Simpser A 2014. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  72. Golaknath v. State of Punjab 1967. AIR 1643, 2 SCR 762
  73. Graber MA. 2010. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  74. Graber MA. 2018. What's in crisis? The postwar constitutional paradigm, transformative constitutionalism, and the fate of constitutional democracy. See Graber et al. 2018 665–90
  75. Graber MA, Levinson S, Tushnet M 2018. Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  76. Greene A. 2018. Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: Constitutions in an Age of Crisis London: Bloomsbury
    [Google Scholar]
  77. Greitens SS. 2020. Surveillance, security, and liberal democracy in the post-COVID world. Int. Organ. 74:S1E169–90
    [Google Scholar]
  78. Gross O. 2018. The normal exception. See Graber et al. 2018 585–605
  79. Gross O, Ní Aoláin F 2006. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  80. Guha R. 2001. The dictator's defence: Indira Gandhi and the Indian “emergency. .” In An Anthropologist Among the Marxists and Other Essays182–94 Delhi: Perm. Black
    [Google Scholar]
  81. Hamilton A. 2009. 1788. The Federalist No. 70: the executive department further considered. The Federalist Papers intro. I Shapiro 354–60 New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  82. Hannoum A. 2010. Violent Modernity: France in Algeria Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  83. Heinig HM, Kingreen T, Lepsius O, Möllers C, Volkmann U, Wißmann H. 2020. Why constitution matters—Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft in Zeiten der Corona-Krise. JuristenZeitung 75:861–72
    [Google Scholar]
  84. Hewlett N. 2010. Reviving the French exception? Sarkozy, authoritarian populism and the Bonapartist tradition. The End of the French Exception? Decline and Revival of the “French Model,” ed. T Chafer, E Godin 39–54 London: Palgrave Macmillan
    [Google Scholar]
  85. Hobson JM. 2012. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  86. Honig B. 2009. Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  87. Hopkins BD. 2020. Ruling the Savage Periphery: Frontier Governance and the Making of the Modern State Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
    [Google Scholar]
  88. Howell WG. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  89. Howell WG, Jackman SP, Rogowski JC. 2013. The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  90. Howell WG, Moe TM. 2020. Presidents, Populism, and the Crisis of Democracy Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  91. Hussain N. 2003. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  92. Isaac J 2020. Constitutional dictatorship in twentieth-century American political thought. States of Exception in American History G Gerstle, J Isaac 225–53 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
  93. Jacobsohn GJ. 2003. The Wheel of Law: India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  94. Jaffrelot C. 2021. Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  95. Jaffrelot C, Anil P. 2020. India's First Dictatorship: The Emergency, 1975–1977 London: Hurst
    [Google Scholar]
  96. Jordan WD. 1973. Familial politics: Thomas Paine and the killing of the king, 1776. J. Am. Hist. 60:294–308
    [Google Scholar]
  97. Kahn PW. 1999. The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  98. Kahn PW. 2003. Comparative constitutionalism in a new key. Mich. Law Rev. 101:2677–705
    [Google Scholar]
  99. Kalhan A 2010. Constitution and “extraconstitution”: colonial emergency regimes in postcolonial India and Pakistan. Emergency Powers in Asia VV Ramraj, AK Thiruvengadam 89–120 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  100. Kalyvas A. 2007. The tyranny of dictatorship: when the Greek tyrant met the Roman dictator. Political Theory 35:412–42
    [Google Scholar]
  101. Kato D. 2015. The tragic legality of racial violence: reconstruction, race and emergency. Constellations 22:199–217
    [Google Scholar]
  102. Kato D. 2016. Liberalizing Lynching: Building a New Racialized State Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  103. Keefe PR. 2018. Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland London: William Collins
    [Google Scholar]
  104. Kelly D. 2016. Carl Schmitt's political theory of dictatorship. See Meierhenrich & Simons 2016 217–44
  105. Kelly D 2017. From king's prerogative to constitutional dictatorship as reason of state. Commerce and Peace in the Enlightenment B Kapossy, I Nakhimovsky, R Whatmore 300–36 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  106. Khosla M. 2020. India's Founding Moment: The Constitution of a Most Surprising Democracy Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  107. Klare KE. 1998. Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism. S. Afr. J. Hum. Rights 14:146–88
    [Google Scholar]
  108. Kolsky E. 2010. Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  109. Komireddi K. 2020. Is India still a democracy?. New Statesman Jan. 6. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2020/01/india-still-democracy
    [Google Scholar]
  110. Kostal RW. 2005. A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  111. Landau D. 2013. Abusive constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Rev 47:189–260
    [Google Scholar]
  112. Lazar NC. 2009. States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  113. Lee SJ. 2016. European Dictatorships: 1918–1945 London: Routledge, 4th ed..
    [Google Scholar]
  114. Levinson S. 2006. Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It) Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  115. Levinson S, Balkin JM. 2010. Constitutional dictatorship: its dangers and its design. Minn. Law Rev. 94:1790–866
    [Google Scholar]
  116. Levitsky S, Way LA 2016. Durable authoritarianism. The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism O Fioretos, TG Falleti, A Sheingate 208–22 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  117. Lieber F, Lieber GN. 2019. To Save the Country: A Lost Treatise on Martial Law intro. W Smiley, JF Witt New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  118. Loevy K. 2016. Emergencies in Public Law: The Legal Politics of Containment Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  119. Loveman B. 1993. The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. Pittsbg. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  120. Machiavelli N. 1997. 1531. Discourses on Livy, transl. intro. J Conaway Bondanella, P Bondanella Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  121. Mahoney J, Thelen K 2010. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  122. Mamdani M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  123. Massoud MF. 2013. Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  124. McConnell MW. 2019. James Wilson's contributions to the construction of Article II. The Life and Career of Justice James Wilson RE Barnett 23–50 Washington, DC: Georgetown Cent. Const.
    [Google Scholar]
  125. McCormick JP 2004. From constitutional technique to Caesarist ploy: Carl Schmitt on dictatorship, liberalism, and emergency powers. Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism P Baehr, M Richter 197–220 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  126. Meierhenrich J. 2006. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda; 2003. Elect. Stud. 25:627–34
    [Google Scholar]
  127. Meierhenrich J. 2008. The Legacies of Law: Long-Run Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa,1652–2000 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  128. Meierhenrich J. 2013. The practice of international law: a theoretical analysis. Law Contemp. Probl. 76:1–83
    [Google Scholar]
  129. Meierhenrich J. 2016. Fearing the disorder of things: the development of Carl Schmitt's institutional theory, 1919–1942. See Meierhenrich & Simons 2016 171–216
  130. Meierhenrich J. 2018. The Remnants of the Rechtsstaat: An Ethnography of Nazi Germany Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  131. Meierhenrich J 2020. Exceptional constitutionalism: the Weimar Constitution in the English-speaking world. Weimar International: Reichsverfassung: Verfassungsgebung im Internationalen Kontext T Kleinlein, C Ohler 199–220 Tübingen, Ger: Mohr
    [Google Scholar]
  132. Meierhenrich J. 2021. The Violence of Law: The Formation and Deformation of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 1994–2019 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  133. Meierhenrich J. Forthcoming. Lawfare: A Genealogy Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  134. Meierhenrich J, Simons O 2016. The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  135. Meierhenrich J, Tushnet M Forthcoming. The Dual American State: A Critical Legal History.
    [Google Scholar]
  136. Mignolo WD 2018. The decolonial option. On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis WD Mignolo, CE Walsh 103–244 Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  137. Mitterrand F. 1964. Le Coup d'État permanent Paris: Plon:
    [Google Scholar]
  138. Moore SF. 1986. Social Facts and Fabrication: “Customary” Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  139. Mortenson JD. 2019. Article II vests the executive power, not the royal prerogative. Columbia Law Rev 119:1169–272
    [Google Scholar]
  140. Negretto G, Sánchez-Talanquer M. 2021. Constitutional origins and liberal democracy: a global analysis, 1900–2015. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 115:2522–36
    [Google Scholar]
  141. Nelson E. 2014. The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  142. Nichols R. 2020. Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  143. Nicolini D. 2013. Practice Theory, Work, and Organization: An Introduction Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  144. Ninet AA. 2013. Constitutional Violence: Legitimacy, Democracy and Human Rights Edinburgh, UK: Edinb. Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  145. Oakeshott M. 1975. On Human Conduct Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  146. Ophir A 2010. The politics of catastrophization: emergency and exception. Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions D Fassin, M Pandolfi 59–88 New York: Zone Books
    [Google Scholar]
  147. Paine T. 2015. 1776. Common Sense and the American Crisis I, intro R Beeman London: Penguin
    [Google Scholar]
  148. Pierson P. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  149. Platon S. 2020. From one state of emergency to another—emergency powers in France. VerfBlog April 9. https://verfassungsblog.de/from-one-state-of-emergency-to-another-emergency-powers-in-france/
    [Google Scholar]
  150. Plys KVM. 2020. Brewing Resistance: Indian Coffee House and the Emergency in Postcolonial India Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  151. Poole T. 2015. Reasons of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  152. Poole T 2016. Constitutional reason of state. Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law D Dyzenhaus, M Thorburn 179–98 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  153. Posner EA, Vermeule A. 2010. The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  154. Pouliot V 2015. Practice tracing. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool A Bennett, JT Checkel 237–59 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  155. Prakash G. 2019. Emergency Chronicles: Indira Gandhi and Democracy's Turning Point Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  156. Prakash SB. 2020. The Living Presidency: An Originalist Argument against Its Ever-Expanding Powers Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  157. Prantl H. 2021. Not und Gebot: Grundrechte in Quarantäne Munich, Ger: C.H. Beck
    [Google Scholar]
  158. Przeworski A. 1995. Sustainable Democracy Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  159. Rabe SG. 2015. The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  160. Radin M. 1930. The intermittent sovereign. Yale Law J 39:514–30
    [Google Scholar]
  161. Ramraj VV 2008. Emergencies and the Limits of Legality Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  162. Ramraj VV. 2017. The elusive quest for precision in a messy pluralist reality. Transnatl. Leg. Theory 8:373–80
    [Google Scholar]
  163. Rasmussen DC. 2021. Fears of a Setting Sun: The Disillusionment of the Founders Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  164. Reynolds J. 2017. Empire, Emergency and International Law Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  165. Roberts C. 2019. From the state of emergency to the rule of law: the evolution of repressive legality in the nineteenth century British Empire. Chicago J. Int. Law 20:1–61
    [Google Scholar]
  166. Rossiter CL. 1948. Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  167. Rossiter CL. 1949. Constitutional dictatorship in the Atomic Age. Rev. Politics 11:395–418
    [Google Scholar]
  168. Sadurski W. 2019. Poland's Constitutional Breakdown Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  169. Saint-Bonnet F. 2001. L'État d'exception Paris: PUF
    [Google Scholar]
  170. Sajó A, Uitz R. 2017. The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  171. Sanders R. 2017. Human rights abuses at the limits of the law: legal instabilities and vulnerabilities in the “global war on terror. .” Rev. Int. Stud. 44:2–23
    [Google Scholar]
  172. Sarat A 2010. Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  173. Schaffer F. 1998. Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  174. Schelling TC. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  175. Scheppele KL. 2004. Constitutional ethnography: an introduction. Law Soc. Rev. 38:389–406
    [Google Scholar]
  176. Scheppele KL 2010. Exceptions that prove the rule: embedding emergency government in everyday constitutional life. The Limits of Constitutional Democracy JK Tulis, S Macedo 124–54 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  177. Scheppele KL 2017. Constitutional coups in EU law. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism M Adams, A Meuwese, EH Ballin 446–78 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  178. Scheuerman WE. 2000. The Economic State of Emergency. Cardozo Law Rev 21:1869–94
    [Google Scholar]
  179. Schlesinger AM Jr. 1973. The Imperial Presidency Boston: Houghton Mifflin:
    [Google Scholar]
  180. Schmitt C. 2014. 1921. Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle, transl M Hoelzl, G Ward Cambridge, UK: Polity
    [Google Scholar]
  181. Scott JC. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  182. Sessions JE. 2011. By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  183. Siddique O. 2013. Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  184. Sidney A. 1996. 1680. Discourses Concerning Government TG West. Indianapolis: Lib. Fund
    [Google Scholar]
  185. Singh A. 2020. Democracy is dying in India, and Trump shouldn't be on Modi's side. CNN Opinion March 22. https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/15/opinions/akanksha-singh-trump-modi/index.html
    [Google Scholar]
  186. Skach C. 2005. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  187. Smiley W, Witt JF. 2019. Introduction. See Lieber & Lieber 2019 1–70
  188. Solnick SL. 1998. Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  189. Stasavage D. 2020. Democracy, autocracy, and emergency threats: lessons for COVID-19 from the last thousand years. Int. Organ. 74:Suppl. 1E1–E17
    [Google Scholar]
  190. Straumann B. 2016. Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  191. Tayler L. 2016. France's emergency powers: the new normal. Just Security Aug. 2. https://www.justsecurity.org/32236/frances-emergency-powers-normal/
    [Google Scholar]
  192. Thénault S. 2007. L'état d'urgence (1955–2005): de l'Algérie coloniale à la France contemporaine. Mouv. Soc. 1:63–78
    [Google Scholar]
  193. Thomson S, Ip EC. 2020. COVID-19 emergency measures and the impending authoritarian epidemic. . J. Law Biosci. 7:lsaa064
    [Google Scholar]
  194. Tir J, Jasinski M. 2008. Domestic-level diversionary theory of war: targeting ethnic minorities. J. Confl. Resolut. 52:641–64
    [Google Scholar]
  195. Tushnet M. 2004. Constitutional hardball. John Marshall Law Rev 37:523–53
    [Google Scholar]
  196. Tushnet M 2013. Authoritarian constitutionalism. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes T Ginsburg, A Simpser 36–50 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  197. Varshney A. 2020. What we can learn from India's improbable democracy. Boston Review Aug. 10. http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/ashutosh-varshney-what-we-can-learn-indias-improbable-democracy
    [Google Scholar]
  198. Watkins FM. 1937. Constitutional dictatorship: a study in the use of emergency powers under the Weimar Constitution PhD Diss., Harvard Univ. Cambridge, MA:
    [Google Scholar]
  199. Watkins FM. 1939. The Failure of Constitutional Emergency Powers under the German Republic Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  200. Watkins FM 1940. The problem of constitutional dictatorship. Public Policy CJ Friedrich, S Mason 324–79 Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  201. West TG. 1996. 1989. Foreword. Discourses Concerning Government A Sidney, pp. xv–xxxvi Indianapolis: Lib. Fund
    [Google Scholar]
  202. White M. 1987. Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution New York: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  203. Whiting SH. 2017. Authoritarian “rule of law” and regime legitimacy. Comp. Political Stud. 50:1907–40
    [Google Scholar]
  204. Whittier JG. 1889. 1850. Ichabod. The Writings of John Greenleaf Whittier, Vol. 4. Personal Poems, Occasional Poems, The Tent on the Beach61–63 London: Macmillan and Co.
    [Google Scholar]
  205. Whittier JG. 1889. 1880. The lost occasion. The Writings of John Greenleaf Whittier, Vol. 4. Personal Poems, Occasional Poems, The Tent on the Beach63–66 London: Macmillan and Co.
    [Google Scholar]
  206. Wilson J. 1988. 1787. Speech, Pennsylvania Convention, 24 November 1787. Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the “Other” Federalists, 1787–1788 CA Sheenan, GL McDowell 71–87 Indianapolis: Lib. Fund
    [Google Scholar]
  207. Witt JF. 2018. A lost theory of American emergency constitutionalism. Law Hist. Rev. 36:551–91
    [Google Scholar]
  208. Witt JF. 2021. American Contagions: Epidemics and the Law from Smallpox to Covid-19 New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  209. Wrong M. 2021. Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad London: Fourth Estate
    [Google Scholar]
  210. Zakaria F. 1997. The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Aff 76:22–43
    [Google Scholar]
  211. Zuckerman I. 2006. One law for war and peace? Judicial review and emergency powers between the norm and the exception. Constellations 13:522–45
    [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-040721-102430
Loading
  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error