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Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volume 20, 2024

Revolutions and Law

Abstract

Two broad thematic perspectives can be distinguished in the literature that broaches the revolutions–law nexus. One considers how actors’ relations to, and usages of, legal statutes and constitutional provisions affect the dynamics of revolutionary conjunctures (law in revolutions). The other examines how the dynamics and modalities of revolutionary processes affect the content of law and the configuration of the legal order (revolutions in law). Subsumed to the law in revolutions perspective are five main topics: the use of constitutional provisions as instruments of revolutionary subversion, legally framed defensive strategies, constitutional devolutions, legitimation problems, and the courts’ stances. The revolutions in law perspective encompasses reflections on the status of law in revolutionary paradigms, the impacts of revolutionary events as acts of foundation, shifting conceptions of constituent power, and the issue of continuities coexisting with ruptures. Cutting across these two perspectives are challenges and pitfalls that studies of revolutions and law can hardly ignore: the reification of analytical and descriptive categories, the confusion of normative and positive standpoints, and the reliance on unconditional claims. Studies overcome these challenges when they document and analyze the processes whereby actors engage law as they make decisions and pursue courses of action.

Keyword(s): constitution, devolution, institutions, law, legitimacy, revolution
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2024-10-17
2025-04-17
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