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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 28, 2025

Expert Knowledge in Democracies: Promises, Limits, and Conflict

Abstract

The article reviews recent literature on bureaucratic experts as political actors in democracies, with a focus on their complex, sometimes conflictive relationships with politicians. First, we present the central promises of expertise for democratic governance: its alleged objectivity, responsiveness to the common good, and effectiveness. Then, we look into two criticisms of this optimistic and apolitical view: Expertise is neither as unbiased nor as effective as claimed. Building on a more political understanding of experts’ power in democracies, we then discuss two topics that illustrate experts’ relationships with politicians: () the conditions and political dynamics that cause changes in technical policy areas’ influence, preferences, and institutional arrangements (or even experts’ demise) and () how challenging experts’ power is for democracy and elected politicians. We conclude with suggestions for future research and a call to find more common ground between the literatures focusing on experts and politics.

Keyword(s): bureaucracy, democracy, expertise, experts, technocracy
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2025-06-17
2025-06-18
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