1932

Abstract

The growth in economic sanctions has been matched by a surge in scholarly research. This article reviews the current state of scholarship on economic sanctions to see where the literature has advanced since Baldwin's and where there is need for further research. Over the past few decades, sanctions scholarship has made its greatest strides in investigating the effects and effectiveness of economic coercion attempts. This vein of research suggests that economic coercion is more effective than previously believed—but at the same time, the policy externalities of sanctions are far greater than previously understood. There remain many fruitful areas of research. Scholars need to consider how to better measure the deterrent effects of economic sanctions over time. Claims that there are different national styles of economic statecraft need to be tested to determine whether these styles are enduring or ephemeral. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, international relations scholars need to consider the systemic implications of increased sanctioning behavior. Scholars need to assess when and how sanctions affect the broader global political economy.

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2024-07-29
2025-02-13
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