1932

Abstract

To what extent are Internet users resilient to online censorship? When does censorship influence consumption of information and when does it create backlash? Drawing on a growing literature on Internet users’ reactions to censorship, I posit that awareness of censorship, incentives to seek out information, and resources to circumvent censorship are essential to resilience to censorship. I describe how authoritarian regimes have adapted their strategies of censorship to reduce both awareness of censorship and demand for uncensored information.

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2020-05-11
2024-12-04
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