1932

Abstract

Many of the questions that are central to political science involve understanding either the causes or consequences of policy change. Scholars have relied on both data-driven and model-driven approaches to characterize the content and direction of policy. This review briefly describes several prominent measures from each approach, and it highlights important limitations that scholars continue to face in the hope of prompting continued contributions to this difficult, but essential, task.

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2017-05-11
2024-06-24
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