1932

Abstract

Contemporary advances in the field of political economy, particularly those concerning the subject of delegated authority, can provide a unifying framework for analyzing the behavior and political context of criminal prosecutors in the United States. This perspective, which focuses on the extent of conflict between an official's motives and those of other actors, and the degree to which information is unevenly distributed among those actors, is well suited for studying prosecutors—the vast majority of whom are elected but whose accountability is frequently called into question. We apply this perspective to three areas in the existing literature on prosecutors: plea bargaining, courtroom communities, and public corruption prosecution.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458
2009-12-01
2025-02-08
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/lawsocsci/5/1/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Adelstein RP. 1978. The plea bargain in theory: a behavioral model of the negotiated guilty plea. South. Econ. J. 44:488–503 [Google Scholar]
  2. Alchian AA, Demsetz H. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Am. Econ. Rev. 62:777–95 [Google Scholar]
  3. Alschuler AW. 1968. The prosecutor's role in plea bargaining. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 36:50–112 [Google Scholar]
  4. Arnold RD. 1993. Can inattentive citizens control their elected representatives?. Congress Reconsidered LC Dodd, BI Oppenheimer 401–16 Washington, DC: CQ, 5th. [Google Scholar]
  5. Ashworth S. 2005. Reputational dynamics and political careers. J. Law Econ. Organ. 21:441–66 [Google Scholar]
  6. Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. 1989. Electoral accountability and incumbency. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics P Ordeshook 121–48 Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press [Google Scholar]
  7. Baker GP. 1992. Incentive contracts and performance measurement. J. Polit. Econ. 100:598–614 [Google Scholar]
  8. Baker S, Mezzetti C. 2001. Prosecutorial resources, plea bargaining, and the decision to go to trial. J. Law Econ. Organ. 17:149–67 [Google Scholar]
  9. Banks JS. 1989. Agency budgets, cost information, and auditing. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 33:670–99 [Google Scholar]
  10. Bar-Gill O, Gazal Ayal O. 2006. Plea bargains only for the guilty. J. Law Econ. 49:353–64 [Google Scholar]
  11. Barro RJ. 1973. The control of politicians: an economic model. Public Choice 14:19–42 [Google Scholar]
  12. Becker GS. 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J. Polit. Econ. 76:169–217 [Google Scholar]
  13. Besley T, Coate S. 2003. Elected versus appointed regulators: theory and evidence. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 1:1176–206 [Google Scholar]
  14. Bibas S. 2004. Plea bargaining outside the shadow of the trial. Harvard Law Rev. 117:2463–547 [Google Scholar]
  15. Boylan RT. 2005. What do prosecutors maximize? Evidence from the careers of U.S. attorneys. Am. Law Econ. Rev. 7:379–402 [Google Scholar]
  16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
  17. Bresler K. 1994. Seeking justice, seeking election, and seeking the death penalty: the ethics of prosecutorial candidates’ campaigning on capital convictions. Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 7:941–58 [Google Scholar]
  18. Canes-Wrone B, Herron MC, Shotts KW. 2001. Leadership and pandering: a theory of executive policymaking. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 45:532–50 [Google Scholar]
  19. Canes-Wrone B, Shotts KW. 2007. When do elections encourage ideological rigidity?. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 101:273–88 [Google Scholar]
  20. Carpenter DP. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  21. Davis AJ. 2007. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  22. Davis KC. 1969. Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry Baton Rouge: La. State Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  23. Dunahoe AW. 2005. Revisiting the cost-benefit calculus of the misbehaving prosecutor: deterrence economics and transitory prosecutors. N.Y. Univ. Annu. Rev. Am. Law 61:45–110 [Google Scholar]
  24. Easterbrook FH. 1983. Criminal procedure as a market system. J. Legal Stud. 12:289–332 [Google Scholar]
  25. Eisenstein J. 1978. Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political and Legal Systems Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  26. Eisenstein J. 2008. The U.S. attorney firings of 2006: main justice's centralization efforts in historical context. Seattle Univ. Law Rev. 31:219–64 [Google Scholar]
  27. Eisenstein J, Flemming RB, Nardulli PF. 1988. The Contours of Justice: Communities and their Courts Boston: Little, Brown [Google Scholar]
  28. Eisenstein J, Jacob H. 1977. Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts Boston: Little, Brown [Google Scholar]
  29. Epstein D, O'Halloran S. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  30. Fearon JD. 1999. Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation B Manin, A Przeworski, S Stokes 55–97 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  31. Feeley MM, Lazerson MH. 1983. Police-prosecutor relationships: an interorganizational perspective. Empirical Theories About Courts KO Boyum, L Mather 216–43 New York: Longman [Google Scholar]
  32. Ferejohn J. 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50:5–25 [Google Scholar]
  33. Flemming RB, Nardulli PF, Eisenstein J. 1992. The Craft of Justice: Politics and Work in Criminal Court Communities Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press [Google Scholar]
  34. Friedman LM. 1979. Plea bargaining in historical perspective. Law Soc. Rev. 13:247–59 [Google Scholar]
  35. Gans HS. 1913. The public prosecutor: his powers, temptations and limitations. Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 47:120–33 [Google Scholar]
  36. Glaeser E, Kessler D, Morrison Piehl A. 2000. What do prosecutors maximize? An analysis of the federalization of drug crimes. Am. Law Econ. Rev. 2:259–90 [Google Scholar]
  37. Gordon SC. 2009. Assessing partisan bias in federal public corruption prosecutions. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. In press [Google Scholar]
  38. Gordon SC, Huber GA. 2002. Citizen oversight and the electoral incentives of criminal prosecutors. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 46:334–51 [Google Scholar]
  39. Gordon SC, Huber GA. 2007. The effect of electoral competitiveness on incumbent behavior. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 2:107–38 [Google Scholar]
  40. Gordon SC, Huber GA, Landa D. 2007. Challenger entry and voter learning. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 101:303–20 [Google Scholar]
  41. Grossman GM, Katz ML. 1983. Plea bargaining and social welfare. Am. Econ. Rev. 73:749–57 [Google Scholar]
  42. Heidenheimer AJ. 1989. Problems of comparing American political corruption. Political Corruption: A Handbook AJ Heidenheimer, M Johnston, VT LeVine 573–84 New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction [Google Scholar]
  43. Heumann M. 1978. Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  44. Holden M Jr. 2000. The competence of political science: “progress in political research” revisited. Presidential address, Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., 1999. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 94:1–19 [Google Scholar]
  45. Holmstrom B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econ. 10:74–91 [Google Scholar]
  46. Holmstrom B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econ. 13:324–40 [Google Scholar]
  47. Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econ. Organ. 7:24–52 [Google Scholar]
  48. Huber GA. 2007. The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  49. Huber GA, Gordon SC. 2004. Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48:247–63 [Google Scholar]
  50. Huber GA, Gordon SC. 2007. Directing retribution: on the political control of lower court judges. J. Law Econ. Organ. 23:386–420 [Google Scholar]
  51. Kagel JH, Roth AE. 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  52. Kaufman H. 1960. The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  53. Kessler DP, Piehl AM. 1998. The role of discretion in the criminal justice system. J. Law Econ. Organ. 14:256–76 [Google Scholar]
  54. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)
  55. Landes WM. 1971. An economic analysis of the courts. J. Law Econ. 14:61–107 [Google Scholar]
  56. Lewis DE. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  57. Maskin E, Tirole J. 2004. The politician and the judge: accountability in government. Am. Econ. Rev. 94:1034–54 [Google Scholar]
  58. McCubbins MD, Noll RG, Weingast BR. 1987. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. J. Law Econ. Organ. 3:243–77 [Google Scholar]
  59. McCubbins MD, Schwartz T. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols versus fire alarms. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 28:165–79 [Google Scholar]
  60. McDonald W. 1982. Police-Prosecutor Relations in the United States Washington, DC: Natl. Inst. Justice [Google Scholar]
  61. Medwed DS. 2004. The zeal deal: prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction claims of innocence. Boston Univ. Law Rev. 84:125–83 [Google Scholar]
  62. Meier KJ, Holbrook TM. 1992. “I seen my opportunities and I took 'em”: political corruption in the American states. J. Polit. 54:135–55 [Google Scholar]
  63. Miceli TJ. 1990. Optimal prosecution of defendants whose guilt is uncertain. J. Law Econ. Organ. 6:189–201 [Google Scholar]
  64. Moe TM. 1984. The new economics of organization. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 28:739–77 [Google Scholar]
  65. Moe TM. 1985. Control and feedback in economic regulation: the case of the NLRB. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 79:1094–116 [Google Scholar]
  66. Moley R. 1926. Politics and crime. Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 125:78–84 [Google Scholar]
  67. Myers MA, Talarico S. 1987. The Social Contexts of Criminal Sentencing New York: Springer [Google Scholar]
  68. Padgett JF. 1985. The emergent organization of plea bargaining. Am. J. Sociol. 90:753–800 [Google Scholar]
  69. Patty JW, Gailmard S. 2007. Slackers and zealots: civil service, policy discretion, and bureaucratic expertise. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51:873–99 [Google Scholar]
  70. Perry SW. 2006. Prosecutors in State Courts, 2005 Washington, DC: U.S. Dep. Justice, Off. Justice Programs http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/psc05.htm [Google Scholar]
  71. Pritchard D. 1986. Homicide and bargained justice: the agenda-setting effect of crime news on prosecutors. Public Opin. Q. 50:143–59 [Google Scholar]
  72. Ramseyer JM, Rasmusen EB. 2003. Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  73. Rasmusen EB, Raghav M, Ramseyer JM. 2009. Convictions versus conviction rates: the prosecutor's choice. Am. Law Econ. Rev. In press [Google Scholar]
  74. Reinganum JF. 1988. Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion. Am. Econ. Rev. 78:713–28 [Google Scholar]
  75. Reitz KR. 1993. Sentencing facts: travesties of real-offense sentencing. Stanford Law Rev. 45:523–73 [Google Scholar]
  76. Richman D. 2003. Prosecutors and their agents, agents and their prosecutors. Columbia Law Rev. 103:749–832 [Google Scholar]
  77. Richman D. 2008. Political control of federal prosecutions—looking back and looking forward Columbia Public Law Legal Theory Work. Pap. 09160, Columbia Law Sch. [Google Scholar]
  78. Rogoff K. 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. Am. Econ. Rev. 80:21–36 [Google Scholar]
  79. Schulhofer SJ. 1988. Criminal justice discretion as a regulatory system. J. Legal Stud. 17:43–82 [Google Scholar]
  80. Scott KM. 2007. U.S. attorneys who have served less than full four-year terms, 1981–2006 Congr. Res. Service Rep. RL33889 [Google Scholar]
  81. Shavell S. 1979. Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. Bell J. Econ. 10:55–73 [Google Scholar]
  82. Shotts KW, Wiseman AE. 2009. The politics of investigations and regulatory enforcement by independent agents and cabinet appointees. J. Polit. In press [Google Scholar]
  83. Spence M, Zeckhauser R. 1971. Insurance, information, and individual action. Am. Econ. Rev. 61:380–87 [Google Scholar]
  84. Ulmer JT. 1997. Social Worlds of Sentencing: Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines Albany: State Univ. N.Y. Press [Google Scholar]
  85. US Dep. Justice 2007. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2007 Washington, DC: Exec. Off. US Atty http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2007/07statrpt.pdf [Google Scholar]
  86. Volden C. 2002. A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 46:111–33 [Google Scholar]
  87. Whitford AB. 2002. Bureaucratic discretion, agency structure, and democratic responsiveness: the case of the United States Attorneys. J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 12:3–27 [Google Scholar]
  88. Zacharias FC. 2001. The professional discipline of prosecutors. N.C. Law Rev. 79:721–78 [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458
Loading
  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error