INTRODUCTION

Race is a prominent thread in the American political fabric and is part of the original tapestry of the American political system. The social construction of race in the United States evolves directly from government's interest in defining and expanding the boundaries of blackness, initially for purposes of enslavement and later for purposes of exclusion. Many states went to great lengths to define the amount of “Negro” blood—e.g., one eighth, one sixteenth, “any ascertainable amount of Negro blood”—that legally classified an individual as black.¹ The state-supported and legally codified definition of “who was black” resulted in the construction of a group that varied wildly in phenotype, skin color, and physical characteristics.

Homer Plessy of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), born free in New Orleans, was one-eighth black and thus was defined as black by Louisiana law. Walter White, Field Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from 1931 to 1955, was not phenotypically black, but was defined as black in Georgia, had been raised in a black community in Atlanta, and was subject to the laws and customs of Jim Crow, despite his appearance.² These are but two of the millions of individuals who were legally and socially constructed as black. This legal and social construction of black America had many consequences. Blacks were excluded as a group, and membership in that group defined their place in American society. The ability to be judged as an individual and to succeed as an individual was trumped by one's membership in the excluded group. Individuality was the exception, being viewed simply as a member of a group was the rule. Thus, it is no accident that the race and politics literature has paid attention to the question of identity, and its influence on the political behavior and attitudes of black Americans.

In 1966, Matthews & Prothro's seminal book, The Negroes and the New Southern Politics, was published. This path-breaking work examined the attitudes and behaviors of blacks within the changing political and social landscape of the South, and the reactions and attitudes of whites to the activities of blacks. One data source was surveys conducted among black and white residents of 24 counties in the 11 states of the old Confederacy during the spring of 1961. Among the prerequisites for black leadership, Matthews & Prothro (1966, p. 446) named “an interest in and identification with other members of the race.” These authors asked two distinct but related questions to measure what they called “closeness to other Negroes.”³ Theirs is the earliest use of this measure that we are able to identify (we welcome the identification of earlier work if we are in error). Were Matthews & Prothro measuring racial identity? Or were they measuring identification with others of their own race? Or was their notion of identification a proxy for a feeling of closeness with other blacks? We think the latter two are the case, but their use of “closeness” led other scholars to theoretically consider other concepts that might explain black political attitudes and behavior, e.g., group consciousness, sometimes referred to as black consciousness (Verba & Nie 1972, Shingles 1981, Tate 1993, Allen et al. 1989, Bobo & Gilliam 1990), linked fate (Dawson 1994), and race as a descriptive category to stand in place of identity.

This article asks several questions. How is identity defined, and is there consensus on a definition? What effect does racial identity have on political beliefs and preferences? Are racial identity and group consciousness the same concepts? Finally, does the influence of racial identity on the politics of blacks work the same way for Latinos, Asian-Americans, and other groups? The questions will not be resolved in this short article, but we hope to shed some light on the various concepts that political scientists use as indicators of identity and to delineate them as best we can.

First, we examine the concepts of group membership, group identity and racial identity, and group consciousness. For each of these we discuss theoretical definitions, research using the various definitions, and issues of measurement. We show that these concepts are distinct and build on each other, rather than being interchangeable. Scholars using these concepts have not been as careful to distinguish among them and have assumed too easily that they mean the same thing.

Second, we explore the concept of linked fate, which evolved from the concept of group consciousness and is central in the race and politics literature. It was developed in research on African-Americans, but a number of scholars have attempted to determine whether it exists within other racial and ethnic minority groups such as Latinos and Asian-Americans, and if so, whether the effect of linked fate in those groups is similar to the effect identified in blacks.

Third, we address the very important question of whether we are in danger of overextrapolation—taking concepts developed in research on one group and grafting them onto other groups. Measures that political scientists developed in the African-American politics literature when the black-white paradigm was dominant are routinely applied to the study of other racial minority groups. Is this appropriate? We also call for vigilance in continuing to reexamine the measures we use.

We conclude by recognizing that group membership, group identity, and group consciousness are three separate and distinct concepts. They should not be used interchangeably, nor should any one of them be substituted for another. Yet, they are interconnected, and scholars need to recognize the nuances of each and the separate spheres they inhabit.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND GROUP IDENTITY

Although identification (how one describes herself) and ascription (how others may describe her) are not mutually exclusive, we should make a distinction between the two concepts (Conover 1988, Fearon 1999, Lee 2007). The concept of ascription is also called group membership. Group membership refers to the assignment of an individual into a particular group based on characteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held intersubjective definitions. American institutions, such as the courts (Davis 1991) and the census (Nobles 2000), along with state laws, have played a role in the reification and codification of such membership criteria. This societal and legal definition of group membership is different from the feelings or preferences of the individuals themselves. Thus, group membership is based on a subjective assignment of people, particularly in the case of racial group membership, that is arbitrary and, at times, flexible.

Much of the political science research demonstrates an awareness of the need to account for group-based differences in public opinion and political behavior. Consequently, we often find that categories such as race, gender, and class are utilized as controls in empirical tests to separate out the differences among groups. Although it is essential to understand differences among racial groups, one should not intuit broader social and cultural values from the descriptive categories themselves. Unfortunately, much of the research in the social sciences uses race as a proxy in this way (Betancourt & Lopez 1993). Our concern is not with the use of race (group membership) as a control or for descriptive purposes, but with the singular interpretation of race as a causal mechanism.

Identity

Group identification refers to an individual's awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a psychological attachment to that group based on a perception of shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members (Jackman & Jackman 1973, Gurin et al. 1980, Miller et al. 1981, Conover 1988, Chong & Rogers 2005, Garcia Bedolla 2005). This definition encompasses most of the definitions found in the literature, yet it remains specific enough to be conceptually and methodologically pertinent and useful. Group identity has been conceptualized within the context of social identity theory (SIT) in psychology and sociology. According to SIT, an individual's identity is primarily derived from her group membership. Even subtle and seemingly meaningless distinctions between groups of individuals have been found to foster intergroup bias (see Rabbie & Horwitz 1969, Tajfel et al. 1971). Intersubjective distinctions between groups provide the basis for comparison of one's own group (in-group) with members of another group (out-group), and the tendency to view one's own group favorably relative to other groups could become the basis for discrimination against out-groups (Tajfel & Turner 1979, Tajfel 1981).

Political scientists have taken special interest in SIT, finding that the cognitive and motivational determinants of identity also contain much of the substance of intergroup politics. SIT is also used to explain the influence of political identities on attitude formation (see Huddy 2001 for a discussion of the literature on political identity). Scholars have found that individuals adopt identities to associate themselves with political parties or to characterize their own issue positions (Duck et al. 1995, Abrams 1994).⁴ In addition, some have found that “American identity” is multidimensional but most closely associated with the core values of equality and individualism (Citrin et al. 1990, 2000). They also argue that political attitudes are a function of the specific components of American identity to which an individual subscribes (Schatz et al. 1999).

Although it is clear that the SIT framework has been particularly powerful in explaining the existence of in-group bias, some scholars see an emerging danger. Huddy (2001) argues that such a focus has detracted from explicit theory development and discussions of the meaning of identity in “real world” situations. She argues that the application of laboratory notions of identity to the real (i.e., political) world are complicated by the presence of multiple identities, the probabilistic nature of identity, and the general subjectivity in the meaning of identities. The discussion of group identity (racial identity) in the American context in the next section suggests that Huddy's concern is a good characterization of the problem.

Racial Identity

Scholars studying group identity in the U.S. context have largely focused on the racial identity of African-Americans. Some scholars conceptualize black racial identity as an awareness of and identification with a racial group based on feelings of in-group closeness (Matthews & Prothro 1966, Broman et al. 1988, Harris 1995).⁵ Other scholars argue that black identity is a multidimensional construct consisting in part of the physical, psychological, sociopolitical, and cultural elements of life for blacks in the United States (Allen et al. 1989, Demo & Hughes 1990, Phinney 1990, Thompson 2001, Harris-Lacewell & Junn 2007). Some scholars working within the SIT framework suggest that racial and ethnic identities in the American public are generally subordinate to broader national identities (Sears et al. 1994, Sears & Henry 1999), whereas others argue that racial and ethnic identities predominate in the development of attitudes and behaviors (Sidanius et al. 1997, Gibson & Gouws 1999). We side with those scholars who argue that racial identity is a multidimensional construct, yet we agree that “closeness [emphasizes] the facet of black identity that most closely resembles classic definitions of group identity” (Harris 1995).

Major demographic changes in the United States, many of which are related to the immigration of nonwhite populations, are altering the ways in which scholars think about the study of racial identity (Jaret & Reitzes 1999). Some of the research on Latino racial identification finds that those wishing to integrate into mainstream American society are more likely to racially self-identify as white (Darity et al. 2005, Basler 2008). Other scholars argue that Latinos contest traditional notions of racial identity in the United States by bringing a variety of racial classification systems with them from their home countries (Rodriguez 2000, Garcia Bedolla 2005). In addition, it is important to note that the racial diversity of the Latino population leads to differing degrees and forms of racial discrimination, which in turn may affect Latino racial identity (Golash-Boza 2006).

The study of racial identity among Asian-Americans and American Indians is a nascent area of research. Yet, it is the emerging research on these two groups, along with the work on Latino racial identity, that may provide the greatest opportunity to move forward on the conceptualization and operationalization of racial identities. By moving beyond the black-white paradigm of racial identity in the United States, we may be able to discover more appropriate means for defining and measuring this concept. Much of the literature on Asian-Americans and American Indians is related to racial discrimination, race relations, or governance ideology (Bee 1999, Saito 2001, Oliver & Wong 2003). These studies are essential for our understanding of the unique positions these groups hold in the American political sphere, but they are not structured to analyze the formation and nuances of racial identity within these groups. Nevertheless, some scholars have attempted to conceptualize Asian-American and American Indian racial identities and the relationship between an individual's identity and her group's position in the U.S. racial hierarchy (Espiritu 1994, Kibria 2000, Garroutte 2001, Kim 2001, Lien 2001b).

In order to move toward a better understanding of the relationship between racial identities and political behavior, one of the major issues that must be addressed is the problem of measurement (Chong & Rogers 2005, Lee 2008). Despite the recognition of the necessity to incorporate an individual's perception of the group's social status into measures of racial identity, a specific measure (or set of measures) is not easily agreed on. One reason is that individuals view racial identity in different ways. Some respondents may base their definition of their own racial identity on racial group membership (“Society says I am black; therefore, I am black”), whereas others may view racial identity in terms of common culture, interests, and linked fate. It is highly probable that individuals view racial identity as a combination of both group membership and various forms of connection to other members of the group. Another reason why racial group identification is difficult to measure is that context, e.g., home versus work, can make a difference in meaning and levels of intensity of identification (Jaret & Reitzes 1999).

Given the variety of definitions and components of those definitions, multiple measures are appropriate. These measures should take into account the dynamic nature of identity; it varies across groups, across space, and across time. Consequently, scholars must be willing to explore whether separate measures are needed for different racial groups (Lee 2008). This means that scholars need to make explicit the definitions they are using and how their measures relate to their definition. Even if various measures are needed for different groups, we do not see a fundamental conflict in this approach. In either case, we find that contemporary measures of racial identity are a direct legacy of the pioneering “closeness” measures in the early work on black politics by scholars such as Matthews and Prothro.

GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AND LINKED FATE

Group consciousness is not group identity. Group identification is a psychological sense of belonging or attachment to a social group. Group consciousness is in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests (Jackman & Jackman 1973, Gurin et al. 1980, Miller et al. 1981, Conover 1988, Chong & Rogers 2005, McClain & Stewart 2006). Members of socially stratified groups, e.g., race, gender, or class, may develop a sense of group consciousness. We are concerned, however, only with racial consciousness here.

Measures of Racial Consciousness

The concept of racial consciousness is not new, and social scientists, for the most part, have employed a consistent definition and understanding of the concept. Eight decades ago, Brown (1931) maintained that race consciousness was a form of group consciousness and defined it as “the tendency toward sentiment and ideological identification with a racial group.” In keeping with the notion that group consciousness arises from an awareness of similarity (identification) with other group members, Brown mentions that those who are race-conscious feel that their personal identity is inextricably linked with the group. Finally, Brown (1931, p. 95) incorporates the political aspect of group consciousness, making the case that race-conscious members of a subordinate group do not believe that their group will or should remain subordinated but instead want to see the group's social and political status improved. Similarly, Ferguson (1938, p. 32) defines race consciousness as “a collective sentiment in which race becomes the object of loyalty and idealization…. Race consciousness is essentially a characteristic of minority groups, more specifically, of oppressed minority groups, and takes the form of a feeling of solidarity among group members.” Any contemporary student of race and politics will note that the elements mentioned by these two scholars are reflected in present-day work that tries to connect identity to political participation among racial minorities.

Neither Brown (1931) nor Ferguson (1938) was able to directly measure group consciousness. Ferguson, however, attributes the use of the capital “N” in “Negro” and “C” in “Colored” to the positive effects of this group consciousness. Brown (1931) notes that race-conscious individuals could be characterized by their “excessive sensitivity,” translating harm done to any group member as harm to the group as a whole. The development of survey research techniques made it possible for subsequent scholars to empirically identify the presence of group consciousness in various segments of the American public, especially among African-Americans.

Verba & Nie (1972, p. 158) observed the number of times black respondents spontaneously referred to race in answering a series of open-ended questions about the conflict within their community and about the problems they faced in personal life, in their community, and in the nation. The authors use this number as an indicator of group consciousness. Shingles (1981) uses this same measure in his effort to analyze the link between group consciousness and political behavior. In one of the most widely cited articles on racial group consciousness and its effects on political behavior, Miller et al. (1981) developed an alternative means to measure group consciousness that has had a major influence on the way scholars operationalize the concept almost three decades later. Miller et al. suggest that group consciousness has four elements: (a) “group identification”; (b) “polar affect,” a preference for members of one's own group and dislike for those of the out-group; (c) “polar power,” an expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group's current status, power, or material resource in relation to those of an out-group; and (d) “individual versus system blame,” the belief that a group's social status is attributable to individual failings or to structural inequities, respectively. Miller and colleagues attempt to capture the notions of identification and ideology of group standing as part of the definition of group consciousness. More recently, Harris-Lacewell & Junn (2007) incorporate two additional measures to group consciousness, asking respondents how important their race is in their ideas about politics, and whether it is more important to be “Black, both Black and American, or American,” perhaps engaging in DuBois' (2007 [1903]) notion of double consciousness.

Scholars have taken multiple paths in an effort to quantify racial group consciousness. Items used to measure group consciousness include but are not limited to the following: identification as a racial minority; a feeling of closeness to in-group members; a belief that one's fate is linked to that of the group; a perception that the group is discriminated against; and a view that group members should collectively respond to systematic inequality. A number of scholars have used Miller et al.'s (1981) seminal index of group consciousness, maintaining that because group consciousness has multiple dimensions, it is best to measure it with multiple measures (Lien 1994, Sanchez 2006). At times, only some of the measured dimensions are statistically significant in explaining political behaviors. How should we interpret findings where only some dimensions are explanatory, when theoretically group consciousness is viewed as consisting of a combination of factors? The literature is muddled on whether each dimension is both necessary and sufficient to make a case for the effect of group consciousness. Perhaps, as a sophisticated and parsimonious alternative, racial group consciousness may best be operationalized through the measure of linked fate (Chong & Rogers 2005, Lee 2007). This measure appears to capture the complex decision algorithms (heuristic processes) used by most voters (Downs 1957, Huckfeldt et al. 1999, Lau & Redlawsk 2001), incorporates the feelings of in-group identification and an awareness of sharing a similar status with other group members, and helps us to understand better the links between group membership, identification, and political behavior and attitudes.

Linked Fate as a Measure of Racial Group Consciousness

Linked fate is a cognitive heuristic also grounded in SIT. A heuristic is a simple process, triggered by cues—such as race, gender, or partisan affliation—that replaces complex algorithms (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002).⁶ Linked fate is generally operationalized by an index formed by the combination of two questions. First, respondents are asked: “Do you think what happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” If there is an affirmative response, the respondent is then asked to evaluate the degree of connectedness: “Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?” Dawson (1994) clearly illustrates the means by which the linked-fate heuristic serves as a central mechanism to group consciousness. The linked-fate heuristic, which Dawson refers to as the “black utility heuristic” for African-American political behavior, leads an individual to use the social standing of the group as a proxy for the wellbeing of the individual. Group consciousness and linked fate for African-Americans derive from a common and specific history and a set of shared experiences (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994, 2001). African-Americans, for example, have historically been treated as members of a group, rather than as individuals, and consequently individual black Americans see their own fate as inextricably linked to the fate of their racial group. We see a strong and consistent link between the work of early scholars, such as Brown (1931), and contemporary scholars concerned with racial group consciousness.

Lee (2005, p. 12) contends, “If the prevailing view in opinion research is right—namely, that political opinions are shaped by our primary political predispositions (including group consciousness) and our interpretation of information environments (the content and whether it is trustworthy)—then such a collectively defined linked fate heuristic should significantly determine our political worldview.” This phenomenon is generally what we see among African-Americans. There is a relationship between racial group identification and political behavior, with racial consciousness as the link between the two (Miller et al. 1981, Allen et al. 1989). In a political world where the electorate is faced with ambiguous and poorly defined problems, incomplete information about alternatives and their consequences, and limited time, skills, and resources, some individuals simplify the calculus of political decision making by relying, to some degree, on the status of their racial group. Linked fate best captures the critical cognitive components of racial group consciousness.

Group Consciousness Dominance?

Seminal studies conducted between the 1960s and the 1970s (Olsen 1970, Verba & Nie 1972, Shingles 1981) clarified the role of group consciousness in the political behavior of African-Americans: It politically mobilized them. These studies initially found that whites participated at higher rates than African-Americans, but when controls for socioeconomic status were introduced, African-Americans actually had higher rates of participation. One explanation for blacks' higher participation rates was the presence of group consciousness (Olsen 1970, Verba & Nie 1972, Miller et al. 1981, Dawson 1994).

Group consciousness has been the principal framework in the study of the political behavior of African-Americans for several decades. Some argue that support for the power of group consciousness, however, might be waning, as some recent research finds the effects of the concept more mixed (Chong & Rogers 2005, Junn 2006). There are at least three reasons why these results might be mixed.

First, scholars have not used consistent measures of racial consciousness. As mentioned above, scholars have employed a grab-bag of measures of racial consciousness: whether the respondent identifies as a member of an “ethnic community” (Olsen 1970), the number of times the respondent spontaneously mentions race (Verba & Nie 1972, Shingles 1981), four components of group consciousness (Miller et al. 1981), six components (Harris-Lacewell & Junn 2007). Leighley & Vedlitz (1999) operationalize group consciousness through measures of “closeness” and “intergroup distance” and find varied results with regard to the effects of group consciousness on participation. Marschall (2001) uses “ethnic community theory” and measures group consciousness through measures of trust. The range of measures is bound to result in disparate findings and a lack of consensus on the effect of racial group consciousness on political participation.

Second, scholars currently working on the influence of black racial consciousness are reaching conclusions that differ from those of earlier work. It is possible that the power of group consciousness to predict black political participation might not be a constant but may actually wax and wane over time. Racial consciousness among blacks may decline under certain conditions—for example, when members of the middle class distance themselves from lower-class blacks or when race is perceived to be less important than economic conditions in determining African-Americans' life chances (Allen et al. 1989, Bobo et al. 1990, Dawson 1994, Gay 2004). Although Miller et al. (1981, p. 495) expected group consciousness to be relatively steady because group membership and identification were assumed to be stable, they understood that “a sense of group consciousness may also vary from individual to individual, over time, and across strata, depending on the existing social conditions.” Group consciousness is contextual. It is important for scholars to understand better the contexts that activate and those that might limit or stymie the development of group consciousness.

Finally, an increasing body of literature is examining the extent to which group consciousness influences the behavior of other minority groups, particularly Latinos, Asian-Americans, and, to a lesser extent, Arab-Americans. The literature on black political participation leans heavily on group consciousness and linked fate as useful and powerful motivating factors (Dawson 1994, 2001; Brown & Shaw 2002; Simien 2005; McClain & Stewart 2006; Junn & Masuoka 2008). Scholars studying the political behavior and attitudes of nonblack racial minority groups, however, suggest that the relationship of group consciousness to political behavior “should be treated as a hypothesis rather than an assumption,” for “making the connection from shared classification in a racial category to group-based political behavior is neither simple nor obvious for nonblack minorities, particularly those whose population growth is attributed to new immigration” (Junn & Masuoka 2008, p. 729). This claim runs counter to the conventional wisdom on how group consciousness works and is suggestive of its limits when applied to nonblack racial minority groups. We explore this question further in the next section.

GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG NONBLACK MINORITIES: DANGER OF EXTRAPOLATION?

In an attempt to move beyond the traditional black-white paradigm, an emerging literature tests the effects of racial consciousness and linked fate on levels of political participation and public opinion among Latinos and Asian-Americans. Yet, maybe we should take a step back to consider the implications of employing concepts intricately intertwined with the oppressive history of blacks in the United States, and measures developed during a time of civil rights activism, civil strife, and racial conflict between white and black Americans. Does group consciousness activate Asian-American and Latino identity and political participation in ways similar to that identified among African-Americans? Mindful of Junn & Masuoka's (2008) caution, we feel it appropriate to consider the question of whether scholars can, or should, extend the extant measures of group consciousness to other racial and ethnic groups. We do not believe that these measures should be rejected out of hand, but scholars should acknowledge potential problems in their transference and be systematic in testing whether these measures are measuring the latent characteristic of other groups as they have (do) for African-Americans.

Initial findings on the presence of group consciousness among nonblack minorities are promising. Many Asian-Americans do feel a sense of linked fate with other Asian-Americans, but there is variation within and among national-origin groups (Lien 2001a, Masuoka 2006). Latinos are more likely than Asian-Americans (but less likely than African-Americans) to have a sense of linked fate (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008). The findings on the perception of linked fate among the various Latino and Asian-American national-origin groups or the effects of pan-ethnic identity on political behavior, however, are inconsistent (Lien 1994, Jones-Correa & Leal 1996, Leighley & Vedlitz 1999, Marschall 2001, Stokes 2003, Wong et al. 2005, Sanchez 2006). The same problems we identified for the study of group consciousness in African-Americans apply to the study of group consciousness in Asian-Americans and Latinos, and there are four additional challenges specific to the study of these nonblack populations.

First and foremost, the intersection between pan-ethnic identities and group consciousness for Latinos and Asian-Americans may not mirror the relationship identified for African-Americans. Second, scholars need to recognize that pan-ethnic identities are problematic and complex.⁷ Members of pan-ethnic groups are tied together (and sometimes tie themselves together) by a label, but within each pan-ethnic category there are differences in ethnicity, culture, immigration status, citizenship, country of origin, and national history. The intersections of these diverse characteristics and politics are bound to produce multiple combinations and permutations of interests and ideologies. A number of political scientists recognize that members of these socially constructed pan-ethnic groups may have multiple group identifications with various attachments to each of them. They suggest that these various levels of attachment might be reflected in a mixture of levels of group consciousness and behaviors (Lien 1994, 2001a; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez & Masuoka 2008). Third, in moving beyond the black-white paradigm, it is essential to consider the multidimensionality of identity: national origin, pan-ethnic group identity, and shared racial minority status. Fourth, there are analytic costs associated with the single assumption of a false equivalency across groups.⁸ At least three inferential claims are made when scholars graft measures developed for African-American political behavior onto other racial minority groups.

Kim (2001, p. 40) contends that the problem with thinking about racial groups in isolation is that “it imputes mutual autonomy to respective racialization processes that are in fact mutually constitutive of one another.” Although we sometimes need to look at groups collectively, there are times when it is appropriate and necessary to look at them separately. First, in thinking about the intersection of political (and cognitive) psychology and racial minority groups, we want to recognize that members of various ethnic groups have been socialized differently and have different (although linked) histories. Consequently, the cues that trigger specific heuristic processes are likely to be different for the various groups. In assuming that the racial cues and U.S.-constructed identities affect all groups in the same way, we detach racial minority groups not only from their historical experiences in the United States but also from their unique perceptions and interpretations of that experience. This is not to deny that stereotypes, images, and racial ideologies have been transmitted globally (Marx 1998, Winant 2001, Anderson 2005). Scholars have found that some portion of Latino and Asian populations do use race (as constructed in the United States) as a heuristic (deFrancesco Soto & Merolla 2006, Garcia 2004), but we should remain cognizant that the continual flow and integration of black, Latino, and Asian immigrants might render this finding more the exception than the rule.

Second, the notion of racial group consciousness is grounded in the idea that subordinate populations are likely to develop consciousness in the face of systematic inequality. Scholars studying group consciousness among nonblack racial groups sometimes make the assumption that all racial minorities see themselves as members of a subordinate group, who should act collectively to improve their social standing (or at least, scholars imply that actual inequality is sufficient to incite group consciousness within minority groups). Our understanding of group consciousness is that in addition to the racial hierarchy and social stratification that exists, group members are aware of and perceive inequality in society. Research has found that a large proportion of Asian-Americans and Latinos feel that they have never been discriminated against because of their racial or ethnic background (McClain & Stewart 2006). Many Latinos, for example, see themselves as white despite their varying phenotypes (Darity et al. 2005). Latinos and Asian-Americans, as well as Arab-Americans, may not see themselves in the same subordinate social position as African-Americans. Historical circumstances in the United States established the condition where race was a primary factor in determining African-American life chances. The extent to which this is true for nonblack minorities, as well as the contexts in which such a feeling might develop among nonblack minorities, needs to be examined more thoroughly. We need not reinvent the theoretical wheel, but instead carefully consider how American youth (generational replacement) as well as immigrants might perceive a United States divorced from Jim Crow and, instead, married to the idea of colorblindness, which might impede the perception of systematic inequalities and, consequently, racial group consciousness.

The final inferential claim is undergirded by a faulty identity-to-politics link (Lee 2008). Political scientists assume that individuals of the same group, ascribed or self-identified, share common political goals and interests. Although black Americans vary in their ideological standing, group members are generally working toward the social, economic, and political promotion of the group (Dawson 2001, Brown & Shaw 2002). This African-American paradigm of political behavior has dominated the race and politics literature, and some think it works in the same fashion for other racially stratified groups in the United States (Junn 2006). Yet, the research suggests otherwise. Wong et al. (2005) find that among Asian-Americans, group identity and group consciousness are not highly correlated. Junn & Masuoka (2007) demonstrate that Asian-American identity must be primed in order for it to have an effect on political behavior. Pan-ethnic identity among Latinos and Asian-Americans is politically mobilized sporadically and, once mobilized, is temporary (Bowler et al. 2006, McClain & Stewart 2006). These results indicate that scholars should be cautious in developing expectations about the behavior of Asian-Americans and Latinos on the basis of past research on African-Americans.

CONCLUSION

We have clarified some aspects of the way we use the concepts of group membership, group identity, and group consciousness. First, it is clear that these are different concepts and should not be assumed to be interchangeable. In fact, we have shown that group membership is the foundation for notions of group identity, from which, in turn, group consciousness can arise, as demonstrated most prominently in the concept of linked fate. Each one of these indicators might have a relationship to political behavior, but we should avoid the tendency to conflate the three and assume an underlying commonality of meaning.

Second, we need to take seriously the problem of the wholesale transference of concepts developed in the substantial research on black Americans onto other groups without questioning their applicability. We are not saying that these concepts are not useful for research on other groups; we are simply saying that researchers need to be systematic in testing whether they do apply, and if so, under what conditions. We applaud the exploration but urge caution.

Third, although we see group membership, group identity, and group consciousness as moving along a continuum, we throw out the provocative question: Is group membership always a prerequisite for group identity? We have no answer, and maybe it is a nonquestion. SIT suggests that group membership is essential for the formation of group identity. Yet, this certainly is a question we raised in our own discussions about the three concepts as we were writing this article.

We warned that we might raise more questions than we are able to answer in this short piece. Group membership appears to be changing constantly, causing ripple effects in identification and group consciousness. How will these concepts evolve as the United States, and its official population survey organization, the U.S. Census Bureau, provides for the checking of multiple racial boxes? Although the proportion of the population that chooses the multiple identities is quite small, as the United States becomes more diverse and multiracial, will this phenomenon complicate the meaning and measurement of group membership, group identity, and group consciousness? Clearly, this is something we need to contemplate, even if the issue might not present itself for several decades.

disclosure statement

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.