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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 10, 2018

Prosocial Motivation and Incentives

Abstract

This review explores the role of incentives in providing goods and services that have significant social returns not captured in private returns, and where outcomes and performances are not easy to measure. We discuss how the presence of prosocial motivation among agents involved in the provision of these goods and services changes the design of incentives. The review also emphasises how heterogeneous prosocial motivation puts a premium on selection of agents in this context. We also discuss alternative theories of prosocial motivation.

Keyword(s): JEL D23, JEL D73, JEL H41, JEL J41, JEL L31, motivated agents, prosocial behavior, public services
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-063016-103739
2018-08-02
2024-04-18
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