Bank Supervision

Literature Cited

1. Abbassi P , Iyer R , Peydró J-L , Soto PE. . 2020 Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review Disc. Pap. 26/2020 Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main; Ger:.
   [Google Scholar]
2. Agarwal S , Lucca D , Seru A , Trebbi F. . 2014; Inconsistent regulators: evidence from banking. Q. J. Econ. 129 2 889 938
   [Google Scholar]
3. Altavilla C , Boucinha M , Peydro J-L , Smets F. . 2020 Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: big data evidence from 15 credit registers Work. Pap. 2349 Eur. Cent. Bank, Frankfurt am Main; Ger:.
   [Google Scholar]
4. Ampudia M , Beck T , Beyer A , Collard J-E , Leonello A . et al. 2019 The architecture of supervision Work. Pap. 2287 Eur. Cent. Bank, Frankfurt am Main; Ger:.
   [Google Scholar]
5. Bach GL. . 1949; Bank supervision, monetary policy and governmental reorganization. J. Finance 4 4 269 85
   [Google Scholar]
6. Bach GL. . 1950; A further note on bank supervision and monetary policy. J. Finance 5 4 421 24
   [Google Scholar]
7. Bank Int. Settl. (BIS) 2020 Research protocol project on measuring the effectiveness of macroprudential policies using supervisory bank-level data implemented by five Asia-Pacific central banks Work. Pap. BIS; Basel, Switz:.
   [Google Scholar]
8. Barth JR , Dopico LG , Nolle DE , Wilcox JA. . 2002; Bank safety and soundness and the structure of bank supervision: a cross-country analysis. Int. Rev. Finance 3 3–4 163 88
   [Google Scholar]
9. Basel Comm. Bank. Superv 2004 International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework Bank Int. Settl., Basel; Switz: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf
   [Google Scholar]
10. Bassett WF , Lee SJ , Spiller TP. . 2015; Estimating changes in supervisory standards and their economic effects. J. Bank. Finance 60 21 43
    [Google Scholar]
11. Bassett WF , Marsh WB. . 2017; Assessing targeted macroprudential regulation: the case of the 2006 commercial real estate guidance for banks. J. Financ. Stab. 30 209 28
    [Google Scholar]
12. Beck T , Silva-Buston C , Wagner W. . 2022; The economics of supranational bank supervision. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. In press
    [Google Scholar]
13. Berger AN , Davies SM. . 1998; The information content of bank examinations. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 14 2 117 44
    [Google Scholar]
14. Berger AN , Davies SM , Flannery MJ. . 2000; Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: Who knows what when?. J. Money Credit Bank. 32 641 67
    [Google Scholar]
15. Berger AN , Kyle MK , Scalise JM. . 2001; Did U.S. bank supervisors get tougher during the credit crunch? Did they get easier during the banking boom? Did it matter to bank lending?. Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't F Mishkin 301 56 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press;
    [Google Scholar]
16. Bisetti E. . 2020 The value of regulators as monitors: evidence from banking SSRN Work. Pap. 3081537
    [Google Scholar]
17. Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst 2009 The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: overview of results Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst. Washington, DC: https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
18. Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst 2017 SR 17-6/CA 17-1: Overview of the Federal Reserve's supervisory education programs Aug. 2 Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst.; Washington, DC: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1706.htm
    [Google Scholar]
19. Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst 2021 107th annual report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst.; Washington, DC: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2020-ar-overview.htm
    [Google Scholar]
20. Boot AWA , Thakor AV. . 1993; Self-interested bank regulation. The Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association , Vol. 83, No. 2 206 12 Pittsburgh, PA: Am. Econ. Assoc.;
    [Google Scholar]
21. Borio CEV. . 2003 Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation? Work. Pap. 128 Bank Int. Settl.; Basel, Switz:.
    [Google Scholar]
22. Brunnermeier MK , Crockett A , Goodhart CAE , Persaud A , Shin HS. . 2009 The fundamental principles of financial regulation Cent. Econ. Policy Res.; London:
    [Google Scholar]
23. Calzolari G , Colliard J-E , Loranth G. . 2019; Multinational banks and supranational supervision. Rev. Financ. Stud. 32 8 2997 3035
    [Google Scholar]
24. Candelon B , Sy ANR. . 2015 How did markets react to stress tests? Work. Pap. WP/15/75 Int. Monet. Fund; Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
25. Carletti E , Dell'Ariccia G , Marquez R. . 2020; Supervisory incentives in a banking union. Manag. Sci. 67 1 455 70
    [Google Scholar]
26. Cerulli G , Fiordelisi F , Marques-Ibanez D. . 2021 The burden of bank supervision Work. Pap. Nat. Res. Counc; Italy, Rome:
    [Google Scholar]
27. Cole RA , Gunther JW. . 1998; Predicting bank failures: a comparison of on- and off-site monitoring systems. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 13 103 117
    [Google Scholar]
28. Curry TJ , Fissel GS , Ramirez CD. . 2008; The impact of bank supervision on loan growth. North Am . . J. Econ. Finance 19 2 113 34
    [Google Scholar]
29. Deli Y , Delis MD , Hasan I , Liu L. . 2019; Enforcement of banking regulation and the costs of borrowing. J. Bank. Finance 101 April 147 60
    [Google Scholar]
30. Delis M , Staikouras PK. . 2011; Supervisory effectiveness and bank risk. Rev. Finance 15 3 511 43
    [Google Scholar]
31. Delis M , Staikouras PK , Tsoumas C. . 2017; Formal enforcement actions and bank behavior. Manag. Sci. 63 4 959 87
    [Google Scholar]
32. Dewatripont M , Tirole J. . 1994 The Prudential Regulation of Banks. The Walras-Pareto Lectures Cambridge, MA: MIT Press;
    [Google Scholar]
33. DeYoung R , Flannery MJ , Lang WW , Sorescu SM. . 2001; The information content of bank exam ratings and subordinated debt prices. J. Money Credit Bank. 33 4 900 25
    [Google Scholar]
34. Dincer NN , Eichengreen B. . 2012; The architecture and governance of financial supervision: sources and implications. Int. Finance 15 3 309 25
    [Google Scholar]
35. Eber M , Minoiu C. . 2016 How do banks adjust to stricter supervision? SSRN Work; Pap. 2662502
    [Google Scholar]
36. Eisenbach T , Haughwout A , Hirtle B , Kovner A , Lucca D , Plosser M. . 2017; Supervising large, complex financial institutions: What do supervisors do?. Econ. Policy Rev. 23 1 57 77
    [Google Scholar]
37. Eisenbach TM , Lucca DO , Townsend RM. . 2016; The economics of bank supervision: so much to do, so little time. Liberty Street Econ Blog, Fed. Reserve Bank New York, April 12
    [Google Scholar]
38. Eisenbach TM , Lucca DO , Townsend RM. . 2021 Resource allocation in bank supervision: trade-offs and outcomes Staff Rep. 769 Fed; Reserve Bank New York:
    [Google Scholar]
39. Fed. Dep. Insur. Corp 2021 Annual Report 2020 Fed. Dep. Insur. Corp.; Washington, DC: https://www.fdic.gov/about/financial-reports/reports/2020annualreport/2020ar-final.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
40. Fernandes M , Igan D , Pinheiro M. . 2020; March madness in Wall Street: (What) does the market learn from stress tests?. J. Bank. Finance 112 105250
    [Google Scholar]
41. Fischer S. . 1990; Rules versus discretion in monetary policy. Handb. Monet. Econ. 21990 1155 84
    [Google Scholar]
42. Flannery M , Hirtle B , Kovner A. . 2017; Evaluating the information in Federal Reserve stress tests. J. Financ. Intermed. 29 1 18
    [Google Scholar]
43. Fraccaroli N. . 2019 Supervisory governance, capture and non-performing loans Staff Work. Rep. 820 Bank of England; London:
    [Google Scholar]
44. Gaul L , Jones J. . 2021 CAMELS ratings and their information content Work. Pap. Off. Comptrol. Curr.; Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
45. Goldstein I , Sapra H. . 2014; Should banks’ stress test results be disclosed? An analysis of the costs and benefits. Found. Trends Finance 8 1 1 54
    [Google Scholar]
46. Gopalan Y , Kalda A , Manela A. . 2021; Hub-and-spoke regulation and bank leverage. Rev. Finance 25 5 1499 1545
    [Google Scholar]
47. Grossman SJ , Hart OD. . 1986; The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econ. 94 4 691 719
    [Google Scholar]
48. Hagendorff J , Lim I , Armitage S. . 2017 Does bank supervision matter? Evidence from regulatory office closures Work. Pap. Univ. Edinburgh; UK:
    [Google Scholar]
49. Hanson SG , Kashyap AK , Stein JC. . 2011; A macroprudential approach to financial regulation. J. Econ. Perspect. 25 1 3 28
    [Google Scholar]
50. Hart OD. . 1995 Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press;
    [Google Scholar]
51. Hart OD , Moore J. . 1990; Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Political Econ. 98 6 1119 58
    [Google Scholar]
52. Haselmann R , Singla S , Vig V. . 2019 Supra(national) supervision Work. Pap. Goethe Univ. Frankfurt; Ger.:
    [Google Scholar]
53. Hirschhorn E. . 1987; The informational content of bank examination ratings. Banking Econ. Rev. July/Aug. 6 11
    [Google Scholar]
54. Hirtle B , Kovner A , Plosser M. . 2020; The impact of supervision on bank performance. J. Finance 75 5 2765 2808
    [Google Scholar]
55. Hirtle B , Lehnert A. . 2015; Supervisory stress tests. Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 7 339 56
    [Google Scholar]
56. Hirtle B , Lopez J. . 1999; Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations. Econ. Policy Rev. 5 1 19
    [Google Scholar]
57. Hirtle B , Schuermann T , Stiroh K. . 2009 Macroprudential supervision of financial institutions: lessons from the SCAP Staff Rep. 409 Fed; Reserve Bank New York:
    [Google Scholar]
58. Ivanov I , Ranish B , Wang J. . 2019 Banks’ strategic responses to supervisory coverage: evidence from a natural experiment SSRN Work; Pap. 2921453
    [Google Scholar]
59. Ivanov I , Wang J. . 2022 Bank supervision and corporate credit supply SSRN Work; Pap. 2929670
    [Google Scholar]
60. Jackson HE , Roe MJ. . 2009; Public and private enforcement of securities laws: resource-based evidence. J. Financ. Econ. 93 2 207 38
    [Google Scholar]
61. Johnson MS. . 2020; Regulation by shaming: deterrence effects of publicizing violations of workplace safety and health laws. Am. Econ. Rev. 110 6 1866 904
    [Google Scholar]
62. Kahn CM , Santos JAC. . 2005; Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. Eur. Econ. Rev. 49 8 2107 36
    [Google Scholar]
63. Kandrac J , Schlusche B. . 2021; The effect of bank supervision and examination on risk taking: evidence from a natural experiment. Rev. Financ. Stud. 34 6 3181 212
    [Google Scholar]
64. Kane EJ. . 1989a; Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 3 2 265 74
    [Google Scholar]
65. Kane EJ. . 1989b The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? Washington, DC: Urban Inst. Press;
    [Google Scholar]
66. Kim S , Plosser MC , Santos JAC. . 2018; Macroprudential policy and the revolving door of risk: lessons from leveraged lending guidance. J. Financ. Intermed. 34 17 31
    [Google Scholar]
67. Kiser EK , Prager RA , Scott JR. . 2016; Supervisory ratings and bank lending to small businesses during the financial crisis and great recession. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 50 2 163 86
    [Google Scholar]
68. Kocherlakota N. . 2016; Rules versus discretion: a reconsideration. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. Fall 1 36
    [Google Scholar]
69. Kohn D , Liang N. . 2019 Understanding the effects of the US stress tests Work. Pap. Brookings Inst.; Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
70. Krainer J , Lopez JA. . 2009; Do supervisory rating standards change over time?. Econ. Rev. 2009 13 24
    [Google Scholar]
71. Kupiec P , Lee Y. . 2012 What factors explain differences in return on assets among community banks? Work. Pap. Fed. Dep. Insur. Corp.; Washington, DC:
    [Google Scholar]
72. Leuz C , Granja J. . 2020 The death of a regulator: strict supervision, bank lending and business activity Work. Pap. 610, Goethe Univ. Cent. Financ. Stud. Frankfurt am Main, Ger.:
    [Google Scholar]
73. Liberti JM , Petersen MA. . 2019; Information: hard and soft. Rev. Corp. Finance Stud. 8 1 1 41
    [Google Scholar]
74. Lucca D , Seru A , Trebbi F. . 2014; The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. J. Monet. Econ. 65 17 32
    [Google Scholar]
75. Masciandaro D , Quintyn M. . 2016; The governance of financial supervision: recent developments. J. Econ. Surv. 30 5 982 1006
    [Google Scholar]
76. Merton RC. . 1978; On the cost of deposit insurance when there are surveillance costs. J. Bus. 51 3 439 52
    [Google Scholar]
77. Mishkin FS . 2001; Prudential supervision: Why is it important and what are the issues?. Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't F Mishkin 1 30 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press;
    [Google Scholar]
78. Morgan DP , Peristiani S , Savino V. . 2014; The information value of the stress test. J. Money Credit Bank. 76 7 1479 500
    [Google Scholar]
79. Morrison AD , White L. . 2013; Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance. J. Financ. Econ. 110 642 58
    [Google Scholar]
80. Off. Comptrol. Curr 2021 The OCC and federal banking system at a glance Key Data and Statistics, accessed Dec. 15, 2021. https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/key-data-and-statistics/index-occ-and-federal-banking-system-at-a-glance.html
    [Google Scholar]
81. Passalacqua A , Angelini P , Lotti F , Soggia G. . 2021 The real effects of bank supervision: evidence from on-site bank inspections SSRN Work; Pap. 3967149
    [Google Scholar]
82. Peek J , Rosengren E. . 1995; Bank regulation and the credit crunch. J. Bank. Finance 19 3–4 679 92
    [Google Scholar]
83. Pereira J , Malafronte I , Sorwar G , Nurullah M. . 2019; Enforcement actions, market movement and depositors’ reaction: evidence from the U.S. banking system. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 55 2–3 143 65
    [Google Scholar]
84. Petrella G , Resti A. . 2013; Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?. J. Bank. Finance 37 12 5406 20
    [Google Scholar]
85. Quintyn M , Taylor M . 2007; Robust regulators and their political masters: independence and accountability in theory. Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance D Masciandaro, M Quintyn 3 40 Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Press;
    [Google Scholar]
86. Repullo R. . 2018; Hierarchical bank supervision. SERIEs 9 1 26
    [Google Scholar]
87. Rezende M , Wu J. . 2014 The effects of supervision on bank performance: evidence from discontinuous examination frequencies SSRN Work. Pap. 2135017
    [Google Scholar]
88. Sahin C , de Haan J , Neretina E. . 2020; Banking stress test effects on return and risk. J. Bank. Finance 117 105843
    [Google Scholar]
89. Swindle CS. . 1995; Using CAMEL ratings to evaluate regulator effectiveness at commercial banks. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 9 2 123 41
    [Google Scholar]
90. Tirole J. . 2013 Rethinking macro policy II: first steps and early lessons Paper presented at the Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons Conference International Monetary Fund; Washington, DC: April 16–17
    [Google Scholar]
91. Warburton C. . 1950; Co-ordination of monetary, bank supervisory, and loan agencies of the federal government. J. Finance 5 2 148 69
    [Google Scholar]
92. White EN . 2011; Lessons from American bank supervision from the nineteenth century to the Great Depression. Macroprudential Regulatory Policies: The New Road to Financial Stability? S Claessens, D Evanoff, G Kaufman, LE Kodres 41 61 Hackensack, NJ: World Sci. Publ. Co;.
    [Google Scholar]
93. Yellen J. . 2011; Macroprudential supervision and monetary policy in the post-crisis world. Bus. Econ. 46 3 12
    [Google Scholar]
94. Yilla K , Liang N. . 2020; What are macroprudential tools?. Brookings Blog, Febr. 11. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/11/what-are-macroprudential-tools/
    [Google Scholar]