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Annual Review of Resource Economics

Volume 11, 2019

Spatial Models, Legislative Gridlock, and Resource Policy Reform

Abstract

This review evaluates the use of spatial models for the analysis of policy making. First, we examine spatial theory and its applications in a variety of institutional settings. We discuss how the preferences of the actors involved in political processes, the steps in those processes, and the locations of the reversion policies affect the policies that emerge from the processes. To illustrate this and analyze how the rights of political actors determine the extent of policy reform and the occurrence of gridlock, we use a spatial model of European Union (EU) policy making. We apply the model to major EU reforms in two resource policy areas: the Common Agricultural Policy reforms of the past two decades and the recent reforms of the Emissions Trading System.

Keyword(s): European Union, gridlock, JEL C72, JEL Q18, JEL Q58, policy reform, resource policy, spatial models
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2019-10-05
2024-04-19
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-022958
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Spatial Models, Legislative Gridlock, and Resource Policy Reform
Annual Review of Resource Economics 11, 83 (2019); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-022958
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-022958
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-022958
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