1932

Abstract

The post-Second World War liberal trade order has been a driver of global economic growth and rising average per capita incomes. This order confronts increasing opposition, reflecting concerns about adjustment costs and distributional effects of globalization and the ability to pursue national policy goals. At the same time, the development of complex production relations distributed across many countries calls for cooperation on a variety of regulatory policies. Contrary to what is argued by opponents of globalization, this does not imply one-size-fits-all rules that constitute a threat to national sovereignty and democratic legitimation. There remains an important traditional integration agenda that centers on rule making by major trading powers on policies that generate negative international spillovers. But the core challenge for the political economy of twenty-first-century trade agreements is to support regulatory cooperation to better govern international production and address the nonpecuniary externalities associated with greater economic integration.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-023057
2018-10-05
2024-03-29
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/resource/10/1/annurev-resource-100517-023057.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-023057&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Abbott K, Snidal D 2010. International regulation without international government: improving IO performance through orchestration. Rev. Int. Organ. 5:315–44
    [Google Scholar]
  2. Adler E, Haas P 1992. Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program. Int. Organ. 46:367–90
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Antràs P 2016. Global Production: Firms, Contracts and Trade Structure Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  4. Antràs P, Staiger R 2012. Offshoring and the role of trade agreements. Am. Econ. Rev. 102:73140–83
    [Google Scholar]
  5. Autor D, Dorn D, Hanson G, Majlesi K 2016.a Importing political polarization? The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure NBER Work. Pap22637
  6. Autor D, Dorn D, Hanson G 2016.b The China Shock: learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annu. Rev. Econ. 8:205–40
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Baccini L, Urpelainen J 2014. International institutions and domestic politics: Can preferential trading agreements help leaders promote economic reform?. J. Politics 76:195–214
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Bagwell K, Staiger RW 2016. Handbook of Commercial Policy Amsterdam: North Holland
  9. Baldwin R 2014. WTO 2.0: governance of 21st century trade. Rev. Int. Organ. 9:261–83
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Baldwin R 2016. The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
  11. Balsvik R, Jensen S, Salvanes KG 2015. Made in China, sold in Norway: local labor market effects of an import shock. J. Public Econ. 127:Suppl. C137–44
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Beverelli C, Fiorini M, Hoekman B 2017. Services trade restrictiveness and manufacturing productivity: the role of institutions. J. Int. Econ. 104:166–82
    [Google Scholar]
  13. Bhagwati J 1988. Protectionism Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  14. Bhagwati J, Hudec R 1996. Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  15. Bhagwati J, Krishna P, Panagariya A 1999. Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  16. Blanchard EJ 2015. A shifting mandate: international ownership, global fragmentation, and a case for deeper integration under the WTO. World Trade Rev 14:187–99
    [Google Scholar]
  17. Blyth M 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  18. Borchert I, Gootiiz B, Mattoo A 2014. Policy barriers to international trade in services: evidence from a new database. World Bank Econ. Rev. 28:162–88
    [Google Scholar]
  19. Brou D, Ruta M 2013. A commitment theory of subsidy agreements. B.E. J. Econ. Anal. Policy 13:1239–70
    [Google Scholar]
  20. Caporaso JA, Tarrow S 2009. Polanyi in Brussels: supranational institutions and the transnational embedding of markets. Int. Organ. 63:593–620
    [Google Scholar]
  21. Card D 2009. Immigration and inequality. Am. Econ. Rev. 99:1–21
    [Google Scholar]
  22. Card D, Peri G 2016. Immigration Economics by George J. Borjas: a review essay. J. Econ. Lit. 54:1333–49
    [Google Scholar]
  23. Colantone I, Stanig P 2017. The trade origins of economic nationalism: import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe BAFFI CAREFIN Cent. Res. Pap2017–49 Milan:
  24. Cooper R 1987. Trade policy as foreign policy. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy RM Stern 291–322 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
    [Google Scholar]
  25. Desjonqueres T, Machin S, Van Reenen J 1999. Another nail in the coffin? Or can the trade based explanation of changing skill structures be resurrected?. Scand. J. Econ. 101:533–54
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Dür A, Baccini L, Elsig M 2014. The design of international trade agreements: introducing a new database. Rev. Int. Organ. 9:3353–75
    [Google Scholar]
  27. Ederington JM 2016. Nontariff measures and the world trading system. See Bagwell & Staiger 2016 211–77
  28. Eichengreen B 2007. The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  29. Emmenegger P, Häusermann S, Palier B, Seeleib-Kaiser M 2012. The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  30. Ethier WJ 1998. Regionalism in a multilateral world. J. Political Econ. 106:1214–45
    [Google Scholar]
  31. Finger JM 2002. Institutions and Trade Policy Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
  32. Finlayson JA, Zacher MW 1981. The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers: regime dynamics and functions. Int. Organ. 35:561–602
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Francois J, Hoekman B 2010. Services trade and policy. J. Econ. Lit. 48:642–92
    [Google Scholar]
  34. Freund C, Ornelas E 2010. Regional trade agreements. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2:139–66
    [Google Scholar]
  35. Goldstein J, Kahler M, Keohane RO, Slaughter A-M 2001. Legalization and World Politics Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  36. Goos M, Manning A, Salomons A 2014. Explaining job polarization: routine-biased technological change and offshoring. Am. Econ. Rev. 104:2509–26
    [Google Scholar]
  37. Haas E 1956. Regionalism, functionalism, and universal international organization. World Politics 8:238–63
    [Google Scholar]
  38. Haas P 1997. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination Columbia: Univ. S.C. Press
  39. Habermas J 1975. Legitimation Crisis Boston: Beacon
  40. Hall PA, Soskice D 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  41. Hegel G 1967. Hegel's Philosophy of Right Oxford, UK: Clarendon
  42. Hix S, Høyland B 2013. Empowerment of the European Parliament. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 16:171–89
    [Google Scholar]
  43. Hoekman B 1996. Assessing the general agreement on trade in services. The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries W Martin, LA Winters 327–64 Washington, DC: World Bank
    [Google Scholar]
  44. Hoekman B 2014. Supply Chains, Mega-Regionals and Multilateralism: A Road Map for the WTO London: CEPR
  45. Hoekman B 2016. The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and rulemaking in the WTO: milestone, mistake or mirage?. The World Trade System: Trends and Challenges J Bhagwati, P Krishna, A Panagariya 149–92 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
    [Google Scholar]
  46. Hoekman B, Mattoo A 2013. Liberalizing trade in services: lessons from regional and WTO negotiations. Int. Negot. 18:1131–51
    [Google Scholar]
  47. Hoekman B, Mavroidis P 2015.a Embracing diversity: plurilateral agreements and the trading system. World Trade Rev 14:1101–16
    [Google Scholar]
  48. Hoekman B, Mavroidis P 2015.b WTO à la carte or WTO menu du jour: assessing the case for plurilateral agreements. Eur. J. Int. Law 26:2319–43
    [Google Scholar]
  49. Hoekman B, Mavroidis P 2017. MFN clubs and scheduling additional commitments in the GATT: learning from the GATS. Eur. J. Int. Law 28:2387–407
    [Google Scholar]
  50. Hoekman B, Özden C 2010. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Trade in services as an alternative to migration?. J. Common Market Stud. 48:4835–58
    [Google Scholar]
  51. Hoekman B, Sabel C 2017. Trade agreements, regulatory sovereignty and democratic legitimacy Work. Pap. 2017/36, Eur. Univ. Inst RSCAS, San Domenico di Fiesole Italy:
  52. Hofmann C, Osnago A, Ruta M 2017. Horizontal depth: a new database on the content of preferential trade agreements Policy Res. Work. Pap. 7981 World Bank Washington, DC:
  53. Hooghe L, Marks G 2018. Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. J. Eur. Public Policy 25:109–35
    [Google Scholar]
  54. Hooghe L, Marks G, Wilson CJ 2002. Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?. Comp. Political Stud. 35:965–89
    [Google Scholar]
  55. Horn H, Mavroidis PC, Sapir A 2010. Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements. World Econ 35:1565–88
    [Google Scholar]
  56. Hudec R 1987. Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System London: Gower
  57. Ikenberry GJ 2011. The future of the liberal world order: internationalism after America. Foreign Aff 90:56–68
    [Google Scholar]
  58. Inglehart R 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  59. Irwin DA 2011. Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  60. Iversen T, Cusack TR 2000. The causes of welfare state expansion: Deindustrialization or globalization?. World Politics 52:313–49
    [Google Scholar]
  61. Jacks DS, Meissner CM, Novy D 2008. Trade costs, 1870–2000. Am. Econ. Rev. 98:529–34
    [Google Scholar]
  62. Jafari Y, Tarr DG 2017. Estimates of ad valorem equivalents of barriers against foreign suppliers of services in eleven services sectors and 103 countries. World Econ 40:3544–73
    [Google Scholar]
  63. Jensen CS 2007. Neo-functionalism. European Union Politics M Cini, N Pérez-Solórzano Borrogan 85–98 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  64. Jensen JB, Quinn DP, Weymouth S 2017. Winners and losers in international trade: the effects on US presidential voting. Int. Organ. 71:423–57
    [Google Scholar]
  65. Johnson RC, Noguera G 2012. Proximity and production fragmentation. Am. Econ. Rev. 102:407–11
    [Google Scholar]
  66. Jones RW, Scheinkman J 1977. Relevance of 2-sector production model in trade theory. J. Political Econ. 85:909–35
    [Google Scholar]
  67. Jupille J, Mattli W, Snidal D 2013. Institutional Choice and Global Commerce Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  68. Keohane RO, Nye JS 1977. Power and Interdependence Boston: Little Brown
  69. Kindleberger C 1986. The World in Depression, 1929–1939 Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
  70. Krasner SD 1983. International Regimes Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
  71. Krugman P 2008. Trade and wages, reconsidered. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 2008:103–37
    [Google Scholar]
  72. Lavenex S 2015. The external face of differentiated integration: third country participation in EU sectoral bodies. J. Eur. Public Policy 22:6836–53
    [Google Scholar]
  73. Lawrence RZ 1996. Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration Washington, DC: Brookings Inst
  74. Lawrence RZ 2006. Rulemaking amidst growing diversity: a ‘club of clubs’ approach to WTO reform and new issue selection. J. Int. Econ. Law 9:4823–35
    [Google Scholar]
  75. Limão N 2016. Preferential trade agreements See Bagwell & Staiger 2016 279–367
    [Google Scholar]
  76. Maggi G 2014. International trade agreements. Handbook of International Economics G Gopinath, E Helpman, K Rogoff 317–90 Amsterdam: Elsevier
    [Google Scholar]
  77. Maggi G 2016. Issue linkage. See Bagwell & Staiger 2016 513–64
  78. Majone G 1996. Regulating Europe London: Routledge
  79. Malgouyres C 2017. The impact of Chinese import competition on the local structure of employment and wages: evidence from France. J. Reg. Sci. 57:411–41
    [Google Scholar]
  80. Mann M 1993. The Sources of Social Power. Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760–1914 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  81. Mansfield ED 2009. The concentration of capabilities and international trade. Int. Organ. 46:731–64
    [Google Scholar]
  82. Mansfield ED, Milner HV 2012. Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  83. Mearsheimer JJ 2010. The gathering storm: China's challenge to US power in Asia. Chin. J. Int. Politics 3:381–96
    [Google Scholar]
  84. Müller JW 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press
  85. Naughton BJ 2017. The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  86. Nelson DR 2015. Prospects for constitutionalization of the WTO. World Trade Rev 14:135–53
    [Google Scholar]
  87. OECD (Organ. Econ. Co-op. Dev.). 2017. International Regulatory Co-operation and Trade: Understanding the Trade Costs of Regulatory Divergence and the Remedies Paris: OECD
  88. Ottaviano GIP, Peri G 2012. Rethinking the effect of immigration on wages. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 10:152–97
    [Google Scholar]
  89. Polanyi K 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time New York: Farrar & Rinehart
  90. Prestowitz CV 1989. Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It New York: Basic Books
  91. Rajan RG, Zingales L 2000. The governance of the new enterprise. Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives X Vives 201–27 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  92. Risse T 2010. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
  93. Rodrik D 2007. The inescapapble trilemma of the world economy. Dani Rodrik's Weblog June 27. http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html
  94. Rodrik D 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy New York: WW Norton
  95. Rodrik D 2017. Populism and the economics of globalization NBER Work. Pap 23559
  96. Ruggie J 1982. International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order. Int. Organ. 36:379–415
    [Google Scholar]
  97. Ruggie J 1998. What makes the world hang together?. Int. Organ. 52:855–86
    [Google Scholar]
  98. Ruggie J 2014. Global governance and “new governance theory”: lessons from business and human rights. Glob. Gov. 20:15–17
    [Google Scholar]
  99. Sandholtz W, Sweet AS 2012. Neo-functionalism and supranational governance. The Oxford Handbook of the European Union E Jones, A Menon, S Weatherill 18–33 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
  100. Schumpeter JA 1943. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy New York: Harper & Row
  101. Swank D, Betz H-G 2003. Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. Socio-Econ. Rev 1215–45
    [Google Scholar]
  102. Tinbergen J 1954. International Economic Integration Amsterdam: Elsevier
  103. Van Reenen J 2011. Wage inequality, technology and trade: 21st century evidence. Labour Econ 8:730–41
    [Google Scholar]
  104. Viner J 1950. The Customs Union Issue New York: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace
  105. Vogel D 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  106. Wren A 2013. The Political Economy of the Service Transition Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  107. Young AR 2015. Liberalizing trade, not exporting rules: the limits to regulatory coordination in the EU's ‘new generation’ trade agreements. J. Eur. Public Policy 22:91253–75
    [Google Scholar]
  108. Young AR 2016. Not your parents’ trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. Rev. Int. Political Econ. 23:3345–78
    [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-023057
Loading
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-023057
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error