1932

Abstract

The dominance of free markets around the world is the defining feature of contemporary globalization. This current state of affairs is historically linked to the Washington Consensus, a coordinated campaign for the global diffusion of market-oriented policies that started more than 30 years ago. In this article, we review scholarship from multiple fields to assess the origins, evolution, and current status of the Washington Consensus: Where did it come from, how did it become dominant, and what happened to it? After laying out historical background, we present three alternative perspectives on the Washington Consensus: its organizational dimension, its ideational aspects, and its relationship to a historical moment of American dominance in world affairs. We then consider current debates on what has happened to the Washington Consensus. Finally, we lay out three directions for future sociological research on global institutional change, before making our concluding observations.

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2021-07-31
2024-03-28
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