Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models

Literature Cited

1. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Agarwal N, Pathak PA 2017a. The welfare effects of coordinated school assignment: evidence from the NYC high school match. Am. Econ. Rev. 107:3635–89
   [Google Scholar]
2. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Angrist J, Dynarski SM, Kane TJ, Pathak PA 2011a. Accountability and flexibility in public schools: evidence from boston's charters and pilots. Q. J. Econ. 126:699–748
   [Google Scholar]
3. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Angrist JD, Narita Y, Pathak PA 2017b. Research design meets market design: using centralized assignment for impact evaluation. Econometrica 85:1373–432
   [Google Scholar]
4. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Che YK, Yasuda Y 2011b. Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: the boston mechanism reconsidered. Am. Econ. Rev. 101:399–410
   [Google Scholar]
5. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Che YK, Yasuda Y 2015. Expanding “choice” in school choice. Am. Econ. J. Microecon. 7:1–42
   [Google Scholar]
6. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Pathak P, Schellenberg J, Walters C 2020. Do parents value school effectiveness. Am. Econ. Rev. 110:51502–39
   [Google Scholar]
7. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Sonmez T. 2003. School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am. Econ. Rev. 93:729–47
   [Google Scholar]
8. Agarwal N. 2015. An empirical model of the medical match. Am. Econ. Rev. 105:1939–78
   [Google Scholar]
9. Agarwal N, Somaini P. 2018. Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism. Econometrica 86:391–444
   [Google Scholar]
10. Ajayi K, Sidibe M. 2017. An empirical analysis of school choice under uncertainty Work. Pap., Boston Univ Boston, MA:
11. Akyol P, Krishna K. 2017. Preferences, selection, and value added: a structural approach. Eur. Econ. Rev. 91:89–117
    [Google Scholar]
12. Allen R, Rehbeck J. 2019. Identification with additively separable heterogeneity. Econometrica 87:1021–54
    [Google Scholar]
13. Allende C, Gallego F, Neilson C 2019. Approximating the equilibrium effects of informed school choice Work. Pap Princeton Univ Princeton, NJ:
14. Artemov G, Che YK, He Y 2017. Strategic mistakes: implications for market design research Work. Pap Melbourne Univ Melbourne, Aust.:
15. Ashlagi I, Nikzad A. 2017. What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design Work. Pap Stanford Univ Stanford, CA:
16. Ayaji K. 2017. School choice and educational mobility: lessons from secondary school applications in Ghana Work. Pap. Boston Univ Boston, MA:
17. Azevedo EM, Leshno J. 2016. A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Political Econ. 124:1235–68
    [Google Scholar]
18. Bayer P, Ferreira F, McMillan R 2007. A unified framework for measuring preferences for schools and neighborhoods. J. Political Econ. 115:588–638
    [Google Scholar]
19. Beggs S, Cardell S, Hausman J 1981. Assessing the potential demand for electric cars. J. Econom. 17:1–19
    [Google Scholar]
20. Berry ST, Levinsohn J, Pakes A 1995. Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econometrica 63:841–90
    [Google Scholar]
21. Berry ST, Levinsohn J, Pakes A 2004. Differentiated products demand systems from a combination of micro and macro data: the new car market. J. Political Econ. 112:68–105
    [Google Scholar]
22. Black SE. 1999. Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education. Q. J. Econ. 114:577–99
    [Google Scholar]
23. Bucarey A. 2018. Who pays for free college? Crowding out on campus Job Mark. Pap., Mass. Inst. Technol Cambridge, MA:
24. Burgess S, Greaves E, Vignoles A, Wilson D 2015. What parents want: school preferences and school choice. Econ. J. 125:1262–89
    [Google Scholar]
25. Calsamiglia C, Fu C, Güell M 2020. Structural estimation of a model of school choices: the Boston mechanism versus its alternatives. J. Political Econ. 128:2642–80
    [Google Scholar]
26. Cassola N, Hortaçsu A, Kastl J 2013. The 2007 subprime market crisis through the lens of European Central Bank auctions for short term funds. Econometrica 81:1309–45
    [Google Scholar]
27. Chade H, Smith L. 2006. Simultaneous search. Econometrica 74:1293–307
    [Google Scholar]
28. Che YK, Tercieux O, Azevedo E, Budish E, Combe J et al. 2019. Efficiency and stability in large matching markets. J. Political Econ. 127:2301–42
    [Google Scholar]
29. Chen Y, Kesten O. 2013. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Discuss. Pap., Wiss. Berl Sozialforschung, Berlin:
30. Chen Y, Sonmez T. 2006. School choice: an experimental study. J. Econ. Theory 127:202–31
    [Google Scholar]
31. Ciliberto F, Tamer E. 2009. Market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets. Econometrica 77:1791–828
    [Google Scholar]
32. de Haan M, Gautier PA, Oosterbeek H, van der Klaauw B 2016. The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice IZA Discuss. Pap. 9118 Inst. Study Labor Bonn, Ger.:
33. Deming DJ. 2011. Better schools, less crime. Q. J. Econ. 126:2063–115
    [Google Scholar]
34. Diamond W, Agarwal N. 2017. Latent indices in assortative matching models. Quant. Econ. 8:685–728
    [Google Scholar]
35. Dinerstein M, Smith T. 2019. Quantifying the supply response of private schools to public policies SIEPR Discuss. Pap 15–019 Stanford Inst. Econ. Policy Res., Stanford Univ Stanford, CA:
36. Dubins L, Freedman D. 1981. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Am. Math. Mon. 88:485–94
    [Google Scholar]
37. Dur U, Pathak PA, Song F, Sonmez T 2018. The Taiwan assignment mechanism NBER Work. Pap. 25024
38. Epple D, Jha A, Sieg H 2018. The superintendent's dilemma: managing school district capacity as parents vote with their feet. Quant. Econ. 9:483–520
    [Google Scholar]
39. Fack G, Grenet J, He Y 2019. Beyond truth-telling: preference estimation with centralized school choice and college admissions. Am. Econ. Rev. 109:1486–529
    [Google Scholar]
40. Featherstone C, Niederle M. 2016. Improving on strategy-proof school choice mechanisms: an experimental investigation. Games Econ. Behav. 100:353–75
    [Google Scholar]
41. Gale D, Shapley LS. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am. Math. Mon. 69:9–15
    [Google Scholar]
42. Guerre E, Perrigne I, Vuong Q 2000. Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68:525–74
    [Google Scholar]
43. Haeringer G, Klijn F. 2009. Constrained school choice. J. Econ. Theory 144:1921–47
    [Google Scholar]
44. Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI 2016. “Strategic” behavior in a strategy-proof environment Work. Pap Bar-Ilan Univ Ramat Gan, Isr.:
45. Hastings JS, Kane TJ, Staiger DO 2009. Heterogeneous preferences and the efficacy of public school choice Work. Pap Yale Univ New Haven, CT:
46. Hastings JS, Weinstein JM. 2008. Information, school choice, and academic achievement: evidence from two experiments. Q. J. Econ. 123:1373–414
    [Google Scholar]
47. He Y. 2014. Gaming the Boston school choice mechanism in Beijing TSE Work. Pap 12–345 Toulouse Sch. Econ Toulouse, Fr.:
48. Hortacsu A, McAdams D. 2010. Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions: an empirical analysis of the Turkish Treasury auction market. J. Political Econ. 118:833–65
    [Google Scholar]
49. Hoxby C. 2003. School choice and school productivity: Could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats?. The Economics of School Choice CM Hoxby 287–342 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
50. Hwang SIM. 2016. A robust redesign of high school match Work. Pap Univ. B. C Vancouver, Can.:
51. Kapor AJ, Neilson CA, Zimmerman SD 2020. Heterogeneous beliefs and school choice mechanisms. Am. Econ. Rev. 110:51274–315
    [Google Scholar]
52. Larroucau T, Rios I. 2019. Do short-list students report truthfully? Strategic behavior in the Chilean college admissions problem Work. Pap Univ. Pa Philadelphia:
53. Li S. 2017. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Am. Econ. Rev. 107:3257–87
    [Google Scholar]
54. Luflade M. 2017. The value of information in centralized school choice systems Job Mark. Pap Duke Univ Durham, NC:
55. Manski CF. 1988. Analog Estimation Methods in Econometrics London: Chapman & Hall
56. McCulloch R, Rossi PE. 1994. An exact likelihood analysis of the multinomial probit model. J. Econom. 64:207–40
    [Google Scholar]
57. McFadden D. 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. Frontiers in Econometrics P Zarembka 105–42 New York: Academic
    [Google Scholar]
58. McFadden D. 1989. A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete response models without numerical integration. Econometrica 57:995–1026
    [Google Scholar]
59. Menzel K. 2015. Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems. Econometrica 83:897–941
    [Google Scholar]
60. Narita Y. 2018. Match or mismatch? Learning and inertia in school choice Work. Pap Yale Univ New Haven, CT:
61. Neilson C. 2013. Targeted vouchers, competition among schools, and the academic achievement of poor students Work. Pap Yale Univ New Haven, CT:
62. Pakes A. 2010. Alternative models for moment inequalities. Econometrica 78:1783–822
    [Google Scholar]
63. Pakes A, Pollard D. 1989. Simulation and the asymptotics of optimization estimators. Econometrica 57:1027–57
    [Google Scholar]
64. Pathak PA. 2017. What really matters in designing school choice mechanisms. Advances in Economics and Econometrics B Honoré, A Pakes, M Piazzesi, L Samuelson 176–214 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
65. Pathak PA, Sethuraman J. 2011. Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result. Theor. Econ. 6: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE816
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
66. Pathak PA, Shi P. 2019. How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice. J. Econom. In press
    [Google Scholar]
67. Pathak PA, Sonmez T. 2008. Leveling the playing field: sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism. Am. Econ. Rev. 98:1636–52
    [Google Scholar]
68. Pennell H, West A, Hind A 2006. Secondary school admissions in London Work. Pap. London Sch. Econ London:
69. Rees-Jones A. 2018. Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match. Games Econ. Behav. 108:317–30
    [Google Scholar]
70. Shi P. 2015. Guiding school-choice reform through novel applications of operations research. Interfaces 45:117–32
    [Google Scholar]
71. Shi P. 2019. Optimal priority-based allocation mechanisms Work. Pap Univ. South Calif., Los Angeles:
72. Shorrer RI, Sovago S. 2017. Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college-admissions environment Discuss. Pap 2017–107/V Tinbergen Inst Amsterdam:
73. Tamer E. 2003. Incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria. Rev. Econ. Stud. 70:147–65
    [Google Scholar]
74. Train KE. 2009. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
75. van der Vaart AW. 2000. Asymptotic Statistics Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
76. Walters C. 2018. The demand for effective charter schools. J. Political Econ. 126:2179–223
    [Google Scholar]