ANNUAL REVIEWS

Annual Review of Anthropology

Language and the Military: Necropolitical Legitimation, Embodied Semiotics, and Ineffable Suffering

Janet McIntosh

Department of Anthropology, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts 02454, USA; email: janetmc@brandeis.edu

Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2021. 50:241–58

The *Annual Review of Anthropology* is online at anthro.annualreviews.org

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-101819-110258

Copyright © 2021 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved

ANNUAL REVIEWS CONNECT

www.annualreviews.org

- Download figures
- Navigate cited references
- Keyword search
- Explore related articles
- Share via email or social media

Keywords

language, discourse, military, war, necropolitics, violence

Abstract

This article augments and complicates Nelson's claim that "we talk our way into war and talk our way out of it" (Dedaić & Nelson 2003, p. 459). Military endeavors require verbal legitimation, but militarizing participants and wide swaths of the civilian population requires more than just a stated rationale. It requires the complex construction of acquiescent selves and societies through linguistic maneuvers that present themselves with both brute force and subtlety to enable war's necropolitical calculus of who should live and who can, or must, die (MacLeish 2013, Mbembe 2003). War also involves vexed, stunted, and deadly forms of communication with perceived enemies or civilian populations. And those who are victims of military deeds, including civilians and sometimes service members themselves, are often left with psychic wounds that they cannot talk their way out of, for such wounds resist semantic expression and may emerge through more complex semiotic forms.

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

INTRODUCTION

Nelson writes that "we talk our way into war and talk our way out of it" (Dedaić & Nelson 2003, p. 459). This article both augments and complicates Nelson's claim. There can be no question that military endeavors require verbal legitimation. But to militarize soldiers, officers, advisors, and wide swaths of the civilian population requires more than just a stated rationale. It requires the complex construction of acquiescent selves and societies through linguistic maneuvers that present themselves with both brute force and subtlety. Acts of war require buy-in to particular models of self and other, past and future, as well as affective investments and refusals that enable war's necropolitical calculus of who should live and who can, or must, die (MacLeish 2013, Mbembe 2003). War involves vexed, stunted, and deadly forms of communication with perceived enemies or civilian populations. And those who are victims of military deeds, including civilians and sometimes service members themselves, are often left with psychic wounds that they cannot talk their way out of, for these wounds resist semantic expression and may emerge through more complex semiotic forms. A discussion of the relationship between language and the military, then, requires attention to discourse's underlying assumptions and ideologies, semiotic and narrative structures, articulations with embodied identity, and failures.

Some of this work requires conceptualizing violent acts in a more intimate relationship with language than we may intuit. War, after all, sometimes looks like an orgy of senseless violence. Yet as Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois (2004, p. 3) remind us, "[M]ost violence is not senseless at all"; it is always mediated by meaning. Similarly, Billig finds it a grave error to "contrast words and war, as if the facts of war stand at a deeper level of reality than the superficiality of rhetoric" (Billig 2003, p. viii; see also Holland 2012, p. 13; O'Connor 1995). Indeed, language imbricates with violence at several levels of scale. Broad (Foucauldian) discourses—those circulating bodies of constructed knowledge—lay the ideological and affective groundwork for military deeds, persuading people of value systems and grievances. At the level of semantics, particular words change the lens through which actors perceive others' personhood, or lack thereof, making certain allegiances unthinkable and certain deaths thinkable. But even beyond laying out worldviews, language produces violence by way of minute verbal interactions and practices that get inside of people, exerting subtle constitutive effects on dispositions, relationships, and bodies (see Bucholtz & Hall 2016), including, arguably, near-tactile effects as such language callouses both military bodies and militarized minds (McIntosh 2020a). And yet those emerging from the confusions of war, sometimes with a sense of mangled moral personhood, find that the language that gets people into war is rarely adequate for extracting their psyches from its effects.

In spite of some excellent anthropological work in militarized contexts, ethnographies of speaking among military personnel and in zones of military violence are almost nonexistent, though scholars who do not focus on language often make helpful reference to it. In this review article, I draw on multidisciplinary sources, focusing on armed forces of nation-states (and not warcraft in small-scale societies). Because my current research focuses on the US military, and because much of the English-language literature is weighted in the same direction, the reader will notice its overrepresentation. My hope is that the coming decades will see a greater breadth of linguistic anthropological work on this subject.

DISCURSIVE LEGITIMATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT

"Wars are born and sustained," writes James Dawes (2002, p. 15), "in rivers of language about what it means to serve the cause, to kill the enemy, and to die with dignity." The legitimizing discourses that precede and bolster military conflict often start with the state but extend their reach across

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

media platforms and into civilian talk. Rhetorical tactics include appealing to national identity and pride—often with the assumption that a somehow-unified people within national borders require their distinctive interests to be prioritized and protected—while demonizing the political motives of the enemy. In the United States, for instance, Hodges (2013) discusses a "generic presidential war schema" in which commanders-in-chief follow certain formulae to legitimize military action, drawing on just war theory to present their violence as ethical and American motives as positive, while projecting a simplistic antipathy between "us" and (a tyrannical) "them."

The military activities of the George W. Bush administration offer a case in point. As many scholars have noted (Hodges 2013, Jackson 2005, Silberstein 2002), the administration rapidly framed the events of September 11, 2001 (referred to hereafter as 9/11) as an "act of war" that demanded reciprocation. In the Bush administration's regime of truth, which operated rather like a marketing campaign (Hodges 2011), the terms "terror" and "war" were brought into rhetorical alignment to justify military retaliation in Afghanistan. With next to no evidence, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were subsequently pulled into a discursive relationship of "adequation" (Bucholtz & Hall 2005 in Hodges 2013), being positioned as if similar and even existentially linked, helping rationalize Congressional approval of action against Iraq. US media narratives about Islam portrayed it as antithetical to "rights," particularly women's rights (Lemons 2007), while talk of "evil," of a faceless Muslim enemy, and of the vague imperative to protect American "freedom" suffused public discourse in the United States, rationalizing violent acts against overseas peoples who had nothing to do with 9/11.

Such renderings of Islam were interdiscursively picked up elsewhere, as in the Balkans, where Serbians adopted discourse representing Islam as backward and violent, using mythical narratives to juxtapose it against Serbian Christianity. Though ethnoreligious atrocities in Bosnia preceded the West's "War on Terror" (I continue to use this phrase without quotation marks, but with skepticism), post-9/11 discourses in the United States created a context in which young Serbs could construct a rhetorical analogy: Serbia is to Muslims as the United States is to terrorists such as Al Qaeda. This formula allowed Serbs to reinterpret their war on Bosnian Muslims as a variation on the theme of the West's putative victimization (Volcic & Erjavec 2007). Note that "terrorism" had already been used as a rationalization for violence elsewhere, as in Russia's 1999 war in Chechnya, which was discursively legitimized by its leaders as a form of "counterterorrism," even though it was marked by extreme violence against civilians in the name of defeating ostensible "Chechen rebels" (Huérou & Regamey 2008).

As Asad (2007) has noted, hypocrisy abounds in discourse about "terrorism" versus "war." States prosecuting violence prefer to frame their own violence in terms of "war" to situate it in a legalistic and rationally superior frame, while applying the term "terrorism" to deeds that inspire a sense of vulnerability and social disorder. Yet, he argues, some actors deemed "terrorists" are in fact pursuing a familiar modern tradition of using violence to defend a political community, while those waging "war" often obfuscate their military's cruelty and violations of international law.

While allied Western nations waging the twenty-first-century War on Terror may have shared some broad discursive tendencies, their foreign policy discourse has not followed precisely the same pattern everywhere. Jack Holland (2012, p. 15) argues that national narratives supporting the initial war effort needed to "achieve resonance" within distinctive cultural milieus. Hence, whereas American discourse drew on notions of frontier justice and Manichean binaries, British foreign policy talk emphasized rationality and British leadership, and Australian discourse foregrounded the shared value of sacrifice in wartime and the exclusion of immigrants.

Imperial exploits among both Western and Eastern powers have often been underpinned by dehumanizing language of racial superiority that implies entitlement to dominate. In the World War (WW) II era, for instance, Germany and Japan used narratives of Aryan and Japanese supremacy,

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

respectively, to justify their aggressive pursuits (see, for instance, Fukurai & Yang 2018). In turn, Anglo-Americans invoked paranoid racist narratives to justify brutal retaliation and the internment of Japanese Americans (Thiesmeyer 1995). The Hindu Indian state has sometimes justified its military occupation of Kashmir through a discourse of racio-religious purity, portraying Kashmiri Muslims as converts or immigrants who brought "ruinous Islamic practices" while contrasting them with the Brogpa people living in the region, supposedly "pure Aryans" (Bhan 2018, p. 77).

National discourse can also justify military maneuvers by stoking affective anxiety. Dunmire (2011), for instance, draws on critical discourse analysis to examine how the Bush administration recurrently projected terrifying futures while suppressing alternative views, thus sanctioning their preemptive military posture in Iraq. Masco (2014) describes how Americans have been persuaded to support the unlimited expense of US military infrastructure through discourses of invisible threat, stoking collective fear of imagined catastrophes.

It is one thing to discursively rationalize military conflict or arms build-up, but it is quite another to persuade civilians and military personnel to accept the devastating personal losses they may incur. In some neoliberal contexts with volunteer forces, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, language used for recruiting appeals to personal wishes for "altruism" or "self-fulfillment," thus relying on the dynamics of governmentality to engineer self-placement into harm's way (Strand & Berndtsson 2015). Ethnographic work by MacLeish (2013) and Lutz (2001, 2002) and Fussell's [2013 (1975)] analysis of WWI describe the affective discourses of heroism that have historically legitimated the toll of wars in the West, as well as the contemporary American presumption that war, in some perverse way, reflects "the health of the nation" (Lutz 2002, p. 724). In some cases, language indirectly supports war simply by failing to convey its dreadful cost; Fussell [2013 (1975)] contends, for instance, that a literary climate of "gentility and optimism" (p. 184) meant that the English populace never came to grips with the horrors of WWI. According to Dawes (2002, p. 31), the memoirs of US Civil War Generals William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant, while stylistically different, shared a tendency to contain and order the war through an "actuarial" approach to casualty counts, one that could "disable [the reader's] imaginative and sympathetic capacities" (see also Frank et al. 2011).

Blows may also be softened by religious faith or fervor for the cause. Marvin & Ingle (1999) and Kertzer (1988) explain that dying for the nation tends to be semiotically sacralized, while Edwards's (2017) historically informed ethnography on martyrdom examines a related dynamic among suicide bombers in Afghanistan. Faust's (2008) account of the American Civil War explains the vital roles that the notions of Christian sacrifice and memorialization played in helping people make sense of mass death. And Shohet (2021, p. 48) describes the rote discourses of sacrifice and obeisance that legitimated the terrible suffering of the North Vietnamese Army during the US war in Vietnam. Horrors such as Agent Orange, phosphorus bombs, steel ball mines, and hunger and malaria in military units exemplified "the united determination of the Vietnamese people" to achieve independence. Veterans and their families drew heavily on stock phrases, including inspirational quotations from Ho Chi Minh about collective sacrifice, to give meaning to dreadful loss.

An almost refreshing counterpoint to inspirational nationalism in military talk is the Chinese discourse about military unreadiness traced by retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Blasko (2019). Under Xi Jinping as chairman of the Central Military Commission, numerous reports have cast doubt about the competence of the People's Liberation Army's ability to fight "a modern enemy." The official Chinese language media furnishes content from these critical reports to Chinese people, often abbreviated in short, entextualized slogans such as "the Two Incompatibles," "Five Incapables," "Two Big Gaps," and "Two Inabilities." Blasko suggests that this vividly expressed lack of confidence may contribute to "Beijing's preference to achieve China's national objectives

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

through deterrence and actions short of war." If language can incite national enthusiasm for war, presumably it can sometimes provide a check as well.

MILITARIZING SERVICE MEMBERS

New military personnel must be resocialized, physically, affectively, and linguistically (cf. Duranti et al. 2012), if they are to become effective members of military institutions. In many nations, military service starts with a training period that not only inculcates technical skills and fitness, but also functions as a kind of rite of passage into full manhood, full cultural citizenship, or both (cf. Agelopoulos 2000; note that I discuss gender and experiences of female military personnel below). Recruits' former identities are semiotically stripped away as recruits are issued uniforms and new terms of address to mark them as military property while placing them into the liminal or interstitial status so common to neophytes [cf. Van Gennep 2004 (1909), Turner 1967]. They may be semiotically denigrated during training through verbal and physical debasement that indicates their lowly and unformed state, though sometimes, depending on the society, semiotic debasement lasts for the duration of military service.

The special lexicon of the Russian Army offers one example. Russian-speaking soldiers draw heavily on a centuries-old register known as "Mat," a semantically rich lexicon of profanity, much of it emerging from word stems designating genitalia, sex, and sex work. Mikhailin (2006) argues that Mat has a ritual history with a deep lineage; in some Indo-European-descended societies, male youth underwent an initiation period connecting them to imagery of unclean wolves or dogs as well as taboo behaviors before they reemerged in the role of a fully mature man. The Mat code, he suggests, semiotically places infantry members into this role for the duration of their service, while its indications of pollution seem connected to their necropolitical abjection, as they lack the rights of ordinary citizens (note that the higher-status officer class tends to eschew Mat). In the era of the Soviet Army, Mikhailin (2006) adds, Mat may have had an additional function in helping to bond peasantry from different ethnolinguistic regions in a kind of "primitive warrior" role (p. 141).

As part of the liminal period in military rites of passage, neophytes are typically required to comply with highly structured new participant frameworks (Goffman 1981) to recondition their sociolinguistic interactions. In the US Marine Corps, for instance, new recruits are informed within hours of arriving at a training depot that they must not use the first-person pronoun "I," a dictum intended to check individualism while increasing unit cohesion. Recruits are also forbidden to use "you" when communicating with their drill instructors (DIs); the pronoun is too intimate and presumptuous in this context where titled roles and chains of command reign supreme. If the recruit has even the simplest query or statement, they must formally open the phatic channel of communication with honorifics, as in, "Sir, Recruit Russell requests permission to speak to Drill Instructor Sergeant Hendricks, Sir" (J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA").

New conscripts or recruits may also be denigrated by their "ritual elders" (drill sergeants or DIs): ground down before being built back up into their new social role. Superior officers may use terms of address that deem the recruits to be polluting, liken them to animals, impugn their masculinity, etc. [see Belkin (2012) on masculinity-impugning during US military training, and see Verrips (2004) for a summary of verbal denigration in US, Canadian, and European military training]. In the US Marine Corps, for instance, some DIs deride recruits using profane, dehumanizing, infantilizing, and feminizing language, including "crybabies," "snowflakes," "weaklings," "maggots," "hogs," "crayon-eaters," "shit-bags," and a raft of gender-troubled insults, including "ladies," "little girls," "faggots," "pussies," "pansies," "buttercups," "cupcakes," and "sweethearts" (McIntosh 2020a, McIntosh 2021).

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Insults, by the way, are disallowed under standard operating procedures, because official military policy insists on "respect" for recruits, but they have been historically abundant and remain so in the mouths of some DIs. They mark neophytes as callow, worthless, and insufficiently masculine during the training phase, but some DIs and Marines alike justify them as a kind of pedagogy. Recruits are supposed to learn to "let insults roll off them," dulling their sensitivity to words, a habituation process I call "semiotic callousing" that is ideologically framed as if bound up with broader psychological and physical hardening (McIntosh 2020a; J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA"). Arguably, use of these denigrating terms by DIs also indirectly instructs recruits, through modeling, on how to dehumanize the enemy in the theater of war (McIntosh 2021).

Like semiotic callousing, other forms of verbal socialization in the military operate through what might be called "semiotic transduction," in which verbal and/or acoustic signs are intended to have forceful or transformative effects on military bodies, with language and sound enlisted in and ontologically bound up with bodily change and action [J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA"; see also Helmreich (2015) on transduction of energy in sound as it traverses media, and Bucholtz & Hall (2016) on embodied sociolinguistics]. The loud yelling of DIs, so intense that it can sound almost inhuman and blow out their vocal cords, is not only intimidating; it is also intended to motivate Marines to action while toughening them up, almost as if the body and mind could be affected in a near-tactile fashion by the sound waves. American veterans of the War on Terror describe using the "sonic barrage" and aggressive lyrics of metal and gangsta rap to "wind," "hype," "amp," or "pump" themselves up before the brute physicality of combat (Pieslak 2009, pp. 50–51, 150). Semiotic transduction is also implicit in Agelopoulos's (2000, p. 7) account of compulsory military training in Greece in the mid-1990s. To impress trainees' new role upon them, drill sergeants required them to exert themselves physically while shouting their name and unit; e.g., "Soldier Georgios Agelopoulos, first battalion, seventh platoon" or "Soldier Georgios Agelopoulos, on your orders sir!" The simultaneity of physical exhaustion and yelling one's subordinate role in the military machine seems designed to impress the new conceptual identity on a person too physically depleted to resist it. In US military branches, call-and-response participant frameworks often require recruits to respond in unison with others in their unit; the individual thus hears their voice merge with hundreds of others, as if losing themselves, body and soul, to this larger military entity.

In a related vein, British military sociologist Anthony King (2006) argues that successful military socialization involves densely loading verbal signs with bodily memories. Soldiers are put through numerous collective drills that establish social cohesion in combat and also connect concise commands to rapid physical responses. Simple instructions during an assault, such as "final position" or "break down," evoke complex embodied actions that have been rehearsed and internalized by the group in advance.

More broadly, military acculturation always involves specialized military lexicons that encapsulate a world view. Service members must learn official technolects and "brevity codes" of abbreviations, acronyms, and word substitutions created by senior military officials (Saber 2018). They will also pick up the logistically important and affectively loaded jargon emergent from each branch and specialty, some of which carries out the irreverent, rapport-building functions of slang. Indeed, slang that derogates other military personnel and institutional dynamics—e.g., referring to Marine Corps or Army cooks as "death from within" or payday as "the day the Eagle [the US government] shits"—may function as a kind of safety valve for discontent (see Axelrod 2013, Reinberg 1991, Saber 2018). The contextually bound disjuncture between official military designations and coarse, wry military slang could be construed as a kind of diglossia (Levy 2012).

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Yet formal and informal military lexicons alike tend to downplay human suffering, both that of one's own force and that of the enemy, thus advancing the state's necropolitical agenda. Cohn (1987, 2020), for instance, has explained how US nuclear defense intellectuals learn a desensitizing "technostrategic" set of idioms, which include a chilling combination of formal euphemisms, snappy acronyms for deadly weaponry and maneuvers, and hypersexualized metaphors for nuclear explosions (see also Gusterson 1996). While this register makes the prospect of mass killing more thinkable for this group of critical decision makers, says Cohn (2020), "the language . . . has no words for the potential suffering of people in the targeted societies, and certainly none for grappling with the moral implications of possessing or using such weapons of massive, total destruction" (pp. 180–81).

During basic training, similarly, service members in all branches absorb a lexicon devoid of empathy—classics include the phrase "collateral damage" as a term that obfuscates civilian deaths and lighthearted language for weapons (e.g., "bouncing betty" or "toe popper" as nicknames for mines common in WWII and Vietnam). In my explorations of combat language, I have also noted a pattern of what I call "register perversion," in which the depredations of violence are entertained in ludic form, overlain with jocular or friendly registers, or otherwise semiotically minimized (J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA"). Such verbal patterns seem to acclimate military personnel to their necropolitical mandate of killing and being offered up to be killed (cf. MacLeish 2013).

Killing is often facilitated by the derogation of the enemy through slurs and other negative epithets. The Third Reich framed Jews as insidious and contaminating, a polluting alien race, in its propaganda to justify the Holocaust (Bartov 1998). During the infamous 1990s genocide in Rwanda, state radio encouraged Hutu people to refer to Tutsi with dehumanizing terms such as "inyenzi" (cockroach) and "inzoka" (snake), laying the conceptual groundwork for their extermination (Tirrell 2012). Basic training in Europe and the United States has historically tended to reduce the enemy to "mad dogs," "vermin," and other animalistic categories (Verrips 2004). In the American war in Vietnam, service members notoriously referred to Vietnamese using racist slurs such as "dinks," "gooks," "zipperheads," and "slants" (Reinberg 1991), terms left over from the conflicts in the Pacific of WWII. These were often used in the context of outrageous essentialisms, such as "gooks don't feel pain" (McIntosh 2021). Similarly, the War on Terror has seen the widespread American military use of derogating terms such as "raghead," "sand jockey," and "hajj." By selectively reducing humanity to dehumanizing terms that cast their net indiscriminately, entire populations—often including civilians—become more killable on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, geographic location, and the like (McIntosh 2021).

As service members adopt their military identities, they often take on a speech style that goes beyond lexicon alone. Marcellino finds that Marine Corps officers tend to use expressions of extreme certainty while avoiding hedges, taking an overall stance of "epistemic superiority" [Marcellino (2013, p. 391); compare with Kiesling (2001) on epistemic certainty in American masculinity]. Other features include intense speech and confident, future-oriented talk, much of it about military readiness. Kirtley (2011) used a matched-guise test to find that civilian listeners in the United States associate a southern accent (indicated through fronting of /u/ and the monophthongization of the /ay/ diphthong) with military membership, perhaps based on popular stereotypes of conservative southern white males. Kirtley's respondents report that some people take on a Southern accent upon entry into the military; indeed, one DI I spoke to at Parris Island told me that another DI suggested that he adopt one to better fit the part.

National militaries vary—and many have changed over time—in their gender composition and in whether women are allowed to serve in combat roles. There can be no doubt that variations on the theme of masculinity play out differently across military societies and that the status conferred

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

by military masculinity may elude some men because of their minority status (Eichler 2012). However, certain patterns tend to recur. Distinctive semiotic performances common in the military are recurrently linked (indexed) to men; these can include the epistemic certainty noted above, including boasting, competitive talk, aggressive language, and homophobic discourse (see Kiesling 1997, 2001; Lawson 2020). In some nations, military talk becomes tightly linked to general national manhood. In Israel, for instance, where military service is compulsory for most citizens, the slang people pick up from the Israeli Defense Forces becomes a point of national bonding (Dworsky 2019). According to Kaplan (2005, p. 577), the verbal patterns that include professional military terms and rough, "dirty" talk contribute particularly strongly to the "homosocial lingo" of Israeli men even when outside the force.

In many nations, including the United States (Eastman 2009, Eichler 2012, Enloe 2000, Young 2003), South Korea (Moon 2005), Sierra Leone and Liberia (Hoffman 2011), and beyond, the status associated with masculine personhood is discursively framed in terms of aggressively protecting the nation—including its vulnerable women or patriotic mothers. Military service is often considered, more or less, the equivalent of "becoming a man," a widespread concept in post-Soviet Russia (Eichler 2011) and a phrase explicit in training in the US Marine Corps [see also Eichler (2012) on the presumption across many societies that "masculine" traits can be acquired or proven through military service, especially combat]. While it is easy to locate hypermasculinity in military semiotics, Belkin (2012) has made a nuanced argument that American military life tends to place male recruits into a state of perpetual gender contradiction, as they are semiotically cast into debased feminine or gender-ambiguous roles through insults and decidedly queer, sometimes sexually violent hazing rituals. They are thus, Belkin argues, more willing to obey superiors as they seek to resolve their gender stability and enact military masculinity: tough yet obedient. It should be added that in Belkin's formulation, military masculinity is a flexible form of status available to nonmales willing to play along with its semiotics.

Still, the perpetual mapping of militarism onto manhood can pose dilemmas of language and power for women in military contexts. Disler's (2008, p. 97) interactional sociolinguistic study of military discourse among US Air Force officers found that subordinates frequently show deference to male superior officers with the tag "sir" in the sentence-final position, often upwardly intoned to mark a question. Yet sentence-final "ma'am" to female officers, with or without question intonation, was far less common, suggesting less deference to female officers overall. In the US Marine Corps, prior to the repeal of the ban on gay service members, female drill instructors were at pains to designate themselves "feminine" or "lady-like," in part to avoid connotations of (then disallowed) homosexuality (Hicks Kennard 2000). Furthermore, when using the sharp and efficient "command voice" to direct recruits, female DIs could not afford to sound as loud as males without risking sounding shrill and thus deemphasized volume in favor of sounding "confident" or "intense" (p. 95). Military masculinity can also create limits on acceptable gender expression among male service members. In 2018, a DI at Parris Island told me he knew of a couple of gay male DIs, but, he added approvingly, "they're still alpha males." When nurturance does appear in the US military, e.g., as part of unit cohesion and support, it may be accompanied by denial of femininity so as to retain the prestige of masculinity (Disler 2008, p. 191).

In some military contexts, masculine heterosexuality is semiotically tied to killing. In the US Marine Corps, for instance, Marines are enjoined to give their rifles a female name. One Marine explained that "before the PC monster reared its ugly head," DIs would explain that the M-16 rifle's parts were equivalent to female anatomy; the trigger, for instance, was "the clitoris," and recruits were instructed to "stroke her rear (charging handle) with authority" (Burns 2003). The notorious phrase, "This is my rifle, this [holding or pointing to one's penis] is my gun" has appeared in both the Marine Corps and the Army over the decades. As increasing numbers of countries lift

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

combat bans on women while attempting gender integration in training, there can be little doubt that verbal military cultures will shift as well, though perhaps unpredictably.

An underexplored theme in military language is the recurrent tension between speech registers. There are diglossic situations of official terminology versus informal slang (Levy 2012); related to this juxtaposition, there are contradictions between the politeness that sustains military hierarchy (Halbe 2011) and high levels of profanity in off-the-record practice (McIntosh 2020c). Official military contexts tend to be saturated with official "values talk" (cf. Marcellino 2013), juxtaposed with brutal casual discourse that contravenes human dignity. At institutions such as West Point, there is a disjuncture between rigorous conventions of formality in official fora, and creative insulting nicknames for other cadets when they are off the radar of authorities (Potter 2007). It seems that many military institutions prefer to wear a public face of respectability, which they hope will lend an unimpeachable quality to their reputation and the nation they represent; however, the ugliness of informal military language may mirror the perverse realities of military life and violence that national administrations would rather keep concealed from public view. It is perhaps no wonder that the Pentagon's top-down efforts to encourage more empathic military workplace climates have sometimes been derided as hypersensitive "political correctness," a sign of weakness (cf. McIntosh 2020a,b). Some of those who serve as boots on the ground seem invested in what they feel to be an ontological connection between aggressive linguistic style and the possibility of untrammeled military action.

COMMUNICATION GAPS

The exigencies of wartime communication have a way of bringing both language ideology and linguistic innovation to the surface. Historically, European and many other armies have managed to coordinate maneuvers among multilingual personnel (Footitt & Kelly 2012a, Mutonya & Parsons 2004), but US rhetoric has tended to play into the myth of a monolingual nation in spite of linguistic diversity in its fighting forces [Peterson (2003); see also examples of ethnolinguistic essentialism playing into ethnic violence in Kenya in McIntosh (2009, p. 66)]. In some cases, language gaps—whether between enemies or within cooperating fighting forces—can feel threatening, posing logistical difficulties and political dilemmas. How, for instance, should infantry be taught to communicate with locals in the theater of war—and what aspects of linguistic competence tend to be left out of the thin manuals furnished to them? Should military interpreters be one's own citizens, perhaps specially trained military personnel, or vastly more linguistically competent foreigners whose allegiances may be in doubt, given that linguistic facility is often treated as an index of affiliation and, in a context of war, as a weapon potentially in the wrong hands (cf. Inghilleri & Harding 2010; Rafael 2016, p. 125)?

The last two decades have seen a surge of interest in translation studies in military contexts (see, for instance, collections by Footitt & Kelly 2012a,b; Pillen 2016). Some scholars focus on how translators mediate between cultural systems, inevitably adopting certain positions and interpretations with their semantic choices and broad narratives. Baker (2010), for instance, describes how translators at the Middle East Media Research Institute, a pro-Israel advocacy group, posit their own objectivity, yet their translations selectively appropriate events and elements from Arab and Iranian media, foregrounding and framing politically partial narratives about terrorism and security.

Rafael (2016) has examined the US Department of Defense's efforts to weaponize language during its War on Terror, framing language as an "essential war fighting skill" that can be mastered by training its own soldiers—even if superficially—in language learning (especially Arabic), controlling native interpreters, and engaging in overhyped efforts to develop automatic

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

translation software (pp. 101, 123). American soldiers learn to speak a modicum of Arabic so as to give orders, search homes, eavesdrop, coax information out of children, etc. Yet, he argues, many Iraqi nationals who served as US military interpreters have been treated as ontologically ambiguous and destabilizing, caught on a razor's edge of suspicion from both sides. The US *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, furthermore, seems to encourage a fantasy of an idealized interpreter, a nearly invisible mediator who can somehow provide "exact" equivalents for words, rather like a "mechanized prosthetic" of the US service member (Rafael 2016, pp. 135, 137). Interpreters are formally forbidden to use the word "I," dissolving themselves into a kind of ghost, even as the American service member is meant to address their interlocutor directly, as if the interpreter does not exist (p. 138). Meanwhile, the *Field Manual* directs American speakers to avoid distracting colloquialisms, humor, or ambiguous terms—as if there were some perfectly clear English that could ensure stable translation (p. 141).

While militaries often invest in language learning and translation, these tools frequently lapse into attenuated comprehension and indeterminate, illegible state messaging to civilians. On the Gaza strip, for instance, the twenty-first-century Israeli military has communicated ostensible warnings by way of SMS (text) messages and air-dropped leaflets in transliterated Arabic flanked by English. While this practice allows the state to position itself as a moral actor, the messages come across as ambiguous and untrustworthy, their intended audience indeterminate, while their directives position civilians "in a space somewhere between noncombatant and participant" (Cotter 2017, p. 67; see also Das 2004 on the illegibility and instability of the state). Meanwhile, the question of who constitutes a legitimate target ("Hamas elements") is kept semantically unstable [see also the semiotic indeterminacies of how the US military determines the "signature" of terrorist activity that would legitimate a drone strike (Benjamin 2013, Kaag & Kreps 2014)].

Military forces sometimes use the bodies of "enemy" dead to engage in nonverbal semiotic communication. In Mozambique's late-twentieth-century civil war, for instance, soldiers often cut off the ears, noses, and lips of the dead in a symbolic silencing effort. "With these actions," writes Nordstrom (1997, p. 165), "the message is powerfully articulated not only to the victim, but to all who 'see' the war: 'you will not hear, you will not speak out against the violence. But you will see the spectacle.'" American GIs in Vietnam, and, eventually, North Vietnamese fighters, took body parts as "trophies," left "calling cards" from specially printed decks in the hands or mouths of the dead, and posed bodies in positions to mock and intimidate their enemies. Such grotesque signaling seems designed in part to obliterate the personhood of the dead, indexing the killer's total dominance.

In Faudree's (2012) discussion of the *Requerimiento* (or "Requirement"), a sixteenth-century Catholic document read aloud to indigenous peoples during the Spanish conquest, we see a staggering example of linguistic arrogance. The document asserted Spain's authority and beseeched them to submit to the Crown and Christian rule under penalty of violence. Yet in the absence of translators, the Castilian Spanish text was impossible for natives to understand—indeed, it was sometimes read aloud to empty beaches and villages. According to Faudree's analysis of the text's participant framework, the addressees are pragmatically ambiguous (e.g., were they the Indians? The Pope? The Crown? Other European powers?). At the same time, as a speech act, reading the text was "a key part of the process by which Spanish authority [was] simultaneously indexically presupposed and indexically created" (Faudree 2012, p. 189). The *Requerimiento* remains a distressing example of how communication gaps can be exploited in service of imperial dominance.

In a striking historical moment, however, the language of a colonized society was enlisted by the US military to play an invaluable role in a war effort. During WWII, the US Marine Signal Corps recruited members of the indigenous Diné people, known in American English as Navajo, to develop a code in their language for encrypting military messages in the Pacific (Fox 2014,

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Lanigan 2011, Riseman 2007). These "code talkers" generated an alphabet substituting Navajo words for individual letters, as well as a vocabulary of more than 400 Navajo lexemes, many of them using natural terms in place of English military words (e.g., the phrase "iron fish" for submarine, "owl" for observation plane, "egg" for bomb) (Lanigan 2011, Riseman 2007). The language was so unique and the code sufficiently indirect that enemy forces were never able to decipher it, and the US military would go on to enlist other indigenous language speakers' help in the same way. Ironically, these same languages had been literally washed out of their speakers' mouths with soap at Bureau of Indian Affairs boarding schools. Said one participant, "All those years, telling you not to speak Navajo, and then to turn around and ask us for help with that same language. . . . It still kind of bothers me" (Fox 2014). But military communicative dynamics have long tended to prey on structural inequalities more than they have ever resolved them.

HEALING: THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE

War's lived dynamics and details have a way of getting lost to individual, institutional, and state repression. Achugar (2008), for instance, examines the discursive manifestations of the ideological struggle over how to remember Uruguay's military dictatorship of the 1970s–1980s (for other work on conflicted memory after state violence, see Atijondro 2000, Benke & Wodak 2003, Robben 2018, Yong 2006). Discursive amnesia can be facilitated by humanitarian efforts, which sometimes unwittingly render war refugees merely "mute victims," denied the public articulation of experience on their own terms (Malkki 1996). Even the supercitizenship of military service members and veterans, in nations where military service is considered prestigious, seems contingent on the attenuation of their speech. In the United States, for instance, veterans are expected to recite familiar lines about being "proud" to have "served their country" and "fought for our freedom"—and to limit much of their public acknowledgment of military experience to such bromides.

Yet there are many subversive things that war's survivors can say in the aftermath. Veterans, for instance, may be left not only with physical wounds but also with psychological trauma and "moral injury," a recently recognized phenomenon that can be loosely defined as a "soul wound" resultant from an act of perceived moral transgression, whether one's own or that of the people or entities one served (Shay 2010, Sherman 2015). Veterans may have witnessed war crimes, they may be suffused with guilt or shame about their deeds, and they may have grown cynical about their nation's motives for fighting. When conscience and empathy awaken, some turn to activist enunciations (Gutmann & Lutz 2010, Schrader 2019). As Schrader (2019) notes, growing numbers of veterans in the United States have engaged in acts of candor in the face of power—Foucauldian "parrhesia"—by testifying at "Winter Soldier" hearings on war crimes during the Vietnam War and the War on Terror. In so doing, they place themselves in danger from anyone invested in preserving official narratives about military activities, including the state itself.

In some cases, speech about war is attenuated simply because of the limits of language. Many scholars have noted that the effects of violence—on bodies, minds, emotions, and communities—tend to defy or silence linguistic expression (cf. Bulmer & Jackson 2016, Das 2007, Das & Nandy 1985, Dawes 2002, McSorley 2013, Pillen 2016, Scarry 1988, Suarez-Orozco 1990). Language is "maladapted," for instance, to talking about atomic-level explosions and destruction; the uncanny scale of such horrors remains "unspeakable" (Tucker & Prosise 2003, p. 131). In Rafael's (2016) close readings of the translated words of Iraqi family members whose children had been killed by American bombs (pp. 142ff), we notice their flattened tones and aporia and sense that while part of the problem lies in the impossibility of translating horror from one language to another, part of it is also the impossibility of translating horror into language at all. Bulmer & Jackson (2016,

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

p. 27) explain veterans' "struggle to articulate embodied experiences," for, as McSorley (2013, p. 239) puts it, "bodies carry war in ways that are at once intensely felt and intractable, and yet seemingly unstable and unknowable." In some cases, the body may insist on remembering with its own mnemonic devices (Pillen 2016, p. 98), while the violence, having taken a person to "the threshold of humanity" (p. 102), may make coherent narratives about what violence means elusive. When ethnographer Zoe Wool spoke with American veterans injured in the War on Terror, she found their reminiscences fragmented; for them, "the war remains in tiny pieces" (Wool 2015, p. 36). Even those who rue their participation in combat may find that narratives never sew their disjointed experiences together into finality or clarity. During my own fieldwork among American veteran writers who served in Vietnam and the War on Terror, for instance, several individuals at one time or another quoted the line from veteran writer Tim O'Brien: "A true war story is never moral" (O'Brien 1998, p. 174).

Post-traumatic stress disorder—sometimes referred to as simply post traumatic stress, or PTS, to reframe the issue as an injury rather than a disorder—can bring its own discursive politics. The very term "trauma" now has rhetorical power, legitimizing care and resources, while perpetuating humanitarian aid that may in some cases be of dubious value (Fassin 2008, Fassin & Rechtman 2009, Varma 2018, Wool 2015). Yet the question of how to treat PTS continues to be debated. Trauma itself may be experienced as a kind of "referential dissonance" (Han 2004), as is the very experience of homecoming for combat veterans (Gutmann & Lutz 2010). According to Caruth (1996, p. 4), traumatic experiences are never wholly "assimilated"; they defy understanding and, as a result, "knowing and not knowing are entangled in the language of trauma and in the stories associated with it." Conventional psychoanalytic approaches suggest that trauma's ruptures are addressable if incorporated into a meaningful story or personal narrative, but perfect coherence often eludes those with PTS (p. 7). Indeed, it is not always clear which kinds of narratives can and cannot be of help to those traumatized by war. Finley's (2011, p. 4) ethnographic work on PTS among American veterans explores "the active debate on what kinds of trauma stories may help veterans and what kinds of stories may be dangerous."

Some communities prefer to address violence through less talk about it rather than more. Argenti-Pillen (2003), in her ethnography of a rural Sri Lankan community after the 1988–1990 civil war, explores Sinhalese Buddhist women's discursive "containment of violence." In these village communities, people are mindful that perpetrators of civil war violence are intermingled with their victims and consider communication about conflict to require oblique speech, including "zero anaphora," or a kind of vague indexical reference (p. 120). Talk about violence is dangerous in part because it can attract "wild" spirits and make people sick. Thus "words that represent violence and terror have to be used with caution" (p. 93), sometimes being replaced with soft euphemisms—e.g., the word for "torture" may be replaced by a word standing for a child's mischief (p. 105), and someone who committed atrocities might be referred to as "naughty" or "confused" (p. 127). The deeds of perpetrators may be semiotically connected as well to "wild" (inhuman) behavior by members of victims' own household, attenuating a sense of division between "them" and "us."

"Extreme experiences," as Pillen (2016, p. 99) puts it, may sometimes "require a vocabulary outside the realm of ordinary language." In some societies, that can mean drawing on imagery connected to witchcraft and vampirism to process the notion of forces that sap human life and energy (Pillen 2016). In other societies, semiotic modalities such as dance and drama, art, and unconventional uses of language may hold some promise for responding to violence, trauma, and moral injury. In his exploration of the "meaning-defying core" of twentieth-century violence in Sri Lanka, Daniel (1996) contends that a preverbal semiotics may be necessary to understand its effects, whereas art may be central to "making sense out of the senseless" (p. 154).

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

In the United States, a small group of veterans of the War on Terror formed an outfit they called Combat Paper, which brings veterans together to cut up their uniforms and make them into paper, on which they print expressive art or poetry. The uniform, once the very emblem of subordinating the self to the military machine, can release "anger, hate, and resentment" as it is dismantled (Schrader 2019, p. 145; see also J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA"). The physical residues of service—sand, cigarette ash, blood, sweat, and tears—are deliberately left in the fabric, becoming part of the paper medium on which each veteran will "remake sense" of their military experience (Schrader 2019, p. 147) with an affective and verbal candor typically discouraged in military contexts. In fact, Combat Paper also works closely with Warrior Writers, a veteran writing collective that is part of a broader tradition of outspoken veteran poets (cf. Gilbert 2018).

For Iraq veteran Ben Schrader, these two groups were instrumental in his "ontological shift from the militarized mind to more of a demilitarized mind," furnishing him with a "new language" through which to process his experiences and changes (Schrader 2019, pp. 141, 148). My own fieldwork among veteran poets suggests that their art and poetry can allow some to suspend the resolution of self into a coherent narrative, inhabiting instead multiple voices and ambivalent feelings. Even translating this plurality into external form can provide a bodily sense of release, perhaps a kind of semiotic transduction in the opposite direction of military training (J. McIntosh, manuscript in preparation, "Tough Talk: Embodied Language and Military Necropolitics in the USA"). Meanwhile, the powerful art and writing produced by war's victims can provide audiences with a "shock to thought" (Schrader 2019, p. 140) that may contain the seeds of hope in shifting public understanding of just what war means.

Military deeds, while quintessentially physical, cannot be prized apart from language, for language is integral to war's actions and ontologies. Language presents the ideological rationales that make war seem sensible, even ineluctable. It projects the identities that make certain groups seem so alien or despicable that they become killable. Language is tangled into militarized affect and militarized bodies. It offers different registers to mirror and enhance military postures and military experience, from the polished formality a nation might be proud of to the profane amorality that can dehumanize service members and their enemies alike. Even language's failures—its rhetorical erasure of suffering or its occlusion of communication—can be strategically convenient, enabling military violence to proceed without an empathic reckoning that could stay the hand. Far from existing on some independent plane from military deeds, language is a complex and versatile form of action with the dubious honor of building the very realities within which war unfolds.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Edie Disler, Maya Dworsky, Elizabeth Ferry, Graham Jones, Laura Kunreuther, Smita Lahiri, Ben Schrader, Merav Shohet, and Chris Walley for their contributions and comments. Two anonymous reviewers for the *Annual Review of Anthropology* gave exceptionally helpful comments that moved this article forward; I am very grateful to them. And special thanks go to the many veterans and service members who have taken the time to connect with me about their experiences and insights concerning military language.

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

LITERATURE CITED

Achugar M. 2008. *What We Remember: The Construction of Memory in Military Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

Agelopoulos G. 2000. '*You are in the Army now*': *an ethnographic account of military training*. Paper presented at the 6th Biennial EASA Conference, Krakow, July 26–29

Argenti-Pillen A. 2003. *Masking Terror: How Women Contain Violence in Southern Sri Lanka*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press

Asad T. 2007. *On Suicide Bombing*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press

Atijondro G. 2000. Ninjas, Nanggalas, monuments, and Mossad manuals: an anthropology of Indonesian state terror in East Timor. In *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, ed. JA Sluka, pp. 158–88. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press

Axelrod A. 2013. *Whiskey Tango Foxtrot: The Real Language of the Modern American Military*. New York: Skyhorse

Baker M. 2010. Narratives of terrorism and security: 'accurate' translations, suspicious frames. *Crit. Stud. Terror.* 3(3):347–64

Bartov O. 1998. Defining enemies, making victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust. *Am. Hist. Rev.* 103(3):771–816

Belkin A. 2012. *Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Façade of American Empire, 1898–2001*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press

Benjamin M. 2013. *Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control*. London: Verso

Benke G, Wodak R. 2003. Remembering and forgetting: the discursive construction of generational memories. See Dedaić & Nelson 2003, pp. 215–43

Bhan M. 2018. "In search of the Aryan seed": race, religion, and sexuality in Indian-occupied Kashmir. See Duschinski et al. 2018, pp. 74–101

Billig M. 2003. Preface: language as forms of death. See Dedaić & Nelson 2003, pp. vii–xvii

Blasko DJ. 2019. The Chinese military speaks to itself, revealing doubts. *War on the Rocks*, Feb. 18. **https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/**

Bucholtz M, Hall K. 2005. Identity and interaction: a sociocultural linguistic approach. *Discourse Stud.* 7(4–5):585–614

Bucholtz M, Hall K. 2016. Embodied sociolinguistics. In *Sociolinguistics: Theoretical Debates*, ed. N Coupland, pp. 173–97. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Bulmer S, Jackson D. 2016. "You do not live in my skin": embodiment, voice, and the veteran. *Crit. Mil. Stud.* 2(1–2):25–40

Burns RA. 2003. This is my rifle, this is my gun. . .: gunlore in the military. *New Dir. Folk.* 2003(7). **https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ndif/article/view/19886/25956**

Caruth C. 1996. *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press

Cohn C. 1987. Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals. *Signs* 12(4):687–718

Cohn C. 2020. "Cocked and loaded": Trump and the gendered discourse of national security. See McIntosh & Mendoza-Denton 2020, pp. 179–90

Cotter WM. 2017. Gaza at the margins? Legibility and indeterminacy in the Israel-Palestine conflict. *J. Linguist. Anthropol.* 27(1):54–70

Daniel EV. 1996. *Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Das V. 2004. The signature of the state: the paradox of illegibility. In *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, ed. V Das, D Poole, pp. 225–52. Santa Fe, NM: Sch. Adv. Res. Press

Das V. 2007. *Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary*. Berkeley CA: Univ. Calif. Press

Das V, Nandy A. 1985. Violence, victimhood and the language of silence. *Contrib. Indian Sociol.* 19(1):177–95

Dawes J. 2002. *The Language of War: Literature and Culture in the U.S. from the Civil War through World War II*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

Dedaić MN, Nelson DN, eds. 2003. *At War with Words*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter

Disler EA. 2008. *Language and Gender in the Military: Honorifics, Narrative, and Ideology in Air Force Talk*. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Dunmire PL. 2011. *Projecting the Future through Political Discourse: The Case of the Bush Doctrine*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Duranti A, Ochs E, Schieffelin BB, eds. 2012. *The Handbook of Language Socialization*. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell
Duschinski H, Bhan M, Zia A, Mahmood C, eds. 2018. *Resisting Occupation in Kashmir*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press
Dworsky M. 2019. *Soldier-speak: military language as a temporal dialect in Israel*. Paper presented at Semiotic Sensitivities, 1st Annual MIT Colloquium on Linguistic Anthropology, Cambridge, MA, April 17
Eastman C. 2009. Fight like a man: gender and rhetoric in the early nineteenth-century American peace movement. *Am. Ninet. Century Hist.* 10(3):247–71
Edwards DB. 2017. *Caravan of Martyrs: Sacrifice and Suicide Bombing in Afghanistan*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Eichler M. 2012. *Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription, and War in Post-Soviet Russia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
Enloe C. 2000. *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Fassin D. 2008. The humanitarian politics of testimony: subjectification through trauma in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Cult. Anthropol.* 23(3):531–58
Fassin D, Rechtman R. 2009. *The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Faudree P. 2012. How to say things with wars: performativity and discursive rupture in the *Requerimiento* of the Spanish conquest. *J. Linguist. Anthropol.* 22(3):182–200
Faust DG. 2008. *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War*. New York: Knopf
Finley EP. 2011. *Fields of Combat: Understanding PTSD Among Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Footitt H, Kelly M, eds. 2012a. *Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation, and Peace Building*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan
Footitt H, Kelly M, eds. 2012b. *Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan
Fox M. 2014. Chester Nez, 93, dies; Navajo words washed from mouth helped win war. *New York Times*, June 6. **https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/us/chester-nez-dies-at-93-his-native-tongue-helped-to-win-a-war-of-words.html**
Frank DA, Slovic P, Vastfjall D. 2011. "Statistics don't bleed": rhetorical psychology, presence, and psychic numbing in genocide psychology. *JAC* 31(3–4):609–24
Fukurai H, Yang A. 2018. The history of Japanese racism, Japanese American redress, and the dangers associated with government regulation of hate speech. *Hastings Const. Law Q.* 45(3):533–76
Fussell P. 2013 (1975). *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Gilbert A. 2018. *A Shadow on Our Hearts: Soldier-Poetry, Morality, and the American War in Vietnam*. Amherst: Univ. Mass. Press
Goffman E. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press
Gusterson H. 1996. *Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Gutmann M, Lutz C. 2010. *Breaking Ranks: Iraq Veterans Speak Out Against the War*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Halbe D. 2011. Language in the military workplace—between hierarchy and politeness. *Text Talk* 31:315–34
Han C. 2004. The work of indebtedness: the traumatic present of late capitalist Chile. *Cult. Med. Psychiatry* 28(2):169–87
Helmreich S. 2015. Transduction. In *Keywords in Sound*, ed. D Novak, M Sakakeeny, pp. 222–31. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
Hicks Kennard C. 2000. Redefining femininity: female drill instructors in the United States Marine Corps. *Texas Linguist. Forum* 43:87–98
Hodges A. 2011. *The "War on Terror" Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Hodges A. 2013. The generic US presidential war narrative: justifying military force and imagining the nation. In *Discourses of War and Peace*, ed. A Hodges, pp. 47–68. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Hodges H, Nilep C, eds. 2007. *Discourse, War and Terrorism*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Hoffman D. 2011. *The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia*. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
Holland J. 2012. *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
Huérou AL, Regamey A. 2008. Russia's war in Chechnya: the discourse of counterterrorism and the legitimation of violence. In *Democracies at War against Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. S Cohen, pp. 211–32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Inghilleri M, Harding S-A. 2010. Translating violent conflict. *Translator* 16(2):165–73
Jackson R. 2005. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism*. Manchester, UK: Manchester Univ. Press
Kaag J, Kreps S. 2014. *Drone Warfare*. Malden, MA: Polity
Kaplan D. 2005. Public intimacy: dynamics of seduction in male homosocial interactions. *Symb. Interact.* 28(4):571–95
Kertzer DI. 1988. *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
Kiesling SF. 1997. Power and the language of men. In *Language and Masculinity*, ed. S Johnson, UH Meinhof, pp. 65–85. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Kiesling SF. 2001. "Now I gotta watch what I say": shifting constructions of masculinity in discourse. *J. Linguist. Anthropol.* 11(2):250–73
King A. 2006. The word of command: communication and cohesion in the military. *Armed Forces Soc.* 32:493–512
Kirtley J. 2011. *Speech in the U.S. military: a sociophonetic approach to identity and meaning*. MA Thesis, Linguist., Univ. Hawai'i, Manoa
Lanigan RL. 2011. Familiar frustration: the Japanese encounter with Navajo (*Diné*) "code talkers" in World War II. In *Languages in Contact 2011*, ed. Z Wąsik, PP Chruszczewski, pp. 47–69. Wrocław, Pol.: Philol. Higher Educ.
Lawson R. 2020. Language and masculinities: history, development, and future. *Annu. Rev. Linguist.* 6:409–34
Lemons K. 2007. Discourses of freedom: gender and religion in US media coverage of the war on Iraq. See Hodges & Nilep 2007, pp. 89–103
Levy E. 2012. Upper echelons and boots on the ground: the case for diglossia in the military. In *Warrior Ways: Explorations in Modern Military Folklore*, ed. EA Eliason, T Tujela, pp. 99–115. Boulder: Univ. Press Colo.
Lutz C. 2001. *Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century*. Boston: Beacon Press
Lutz C. 2002. Making war at home in the United States: militarization and the current crisis. *Am. Anthropol.* 104(3):723–35
MacLeish KT. 2013. *Making War at Fort Hood: Life and Uncertainty in a Military Community*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Malkki LH. 1996. Speechless emissaries: refugees, humanitarianism, and dehistoricization. *Cult. Anthropol.* 11(3):377–404
Marcellino WM. 2013. Talk like a Marine: USMC linguistic acculturation and civil-military argument. *Discourse Stud.* 16(3):385–405
Marvin C, Ingle DW. 1999. *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Masco J. 2014. *The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
Mbembe A. 2003. Necropolitics. *Public Cult.* 15(1):11–40
McIntosh J. 2009. *The Edge of Islam: Power, Personhood, and Ethnoreligious Boundaries on the Kenya Coast*. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
McIntosh J. 2020a. Crybabies and snowflakes. See McIntosh & Mendoza-Denton 2020, pp. 74–88
McIntosh J. 2020b. Introduction: the Trump era as a linguistic emergency. See McIntosh & Mendoza-Denton 2020, pp. 1–44
McIntosh J. 2020c. Maledictive language: obscenity and taboo words. In *The International Encyclopedia of Linguistic Anthropology*, ed. J Stanlaw, pp. 1–9. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. **https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118786093.iela0248**

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

McIntosh J. 2021. "Because it's easier to kill that way": dehumanizing epithets, militarized subjectivity, and American necropolitics. *Lang. Soc.* 50(4). **https://doi.org/10.1017=S0047404521000324**. In press
McIntosh J, Mendoza-Denton N, eds. 2020. *Language in the Trump Era: Scandals and Emergencies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
McSorley K. 2013. Rethinking war and the body. In *War and the Body: Militarisation, Practice and Experience*, ed. K McSorley, pp. 233–44. London: Routledge
Mikhailin V. 2006. Russian Army *Mat* as a code system controlling behaviors in the Russian Army. In Dedovshchina *in the Post-Soviet Military: Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. F Daucé, E Sieca-Kozlowski, pp. 121–43. Leipzig, Ger.: Deutsche Bibl.
Moon S. 2005. Trouble with conscription: entertaining soldiers, popular culture, and the politics of militarized masculinity in South Korea. *Men Masc.* 8(1):64–92
Mutonya M, Parsons TH. 2004. KiKAR: a Swahili variety in Kenya's colonial army. *J. Afr. Lang. Linguist.* 25:111–25
Nordstrom C. 1997. *A Different Kind of War Story*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press
O'Brien T. 1998. How to tell a true war story. In *Postmodern American Fiction: A Norton Anthology*, ed. P Geyh, FG Leebron, A Levy, pp. 174–83. New York: Norton
O'Connor PE. 1995. Discourse of violence. *Discourse Soc.* 6(3):309–18
Peterson MA. 2003. American warriors speaking American: the metapragmatics of performance in the nation-state. See Dedaić & Nelson 2003, pp. 421–48
Pieslak J. 2009. *Sound Targets: American Soldiers and Music in the Iraq War*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press
Pillen A. 2016. Language, translation, trauma. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 45:95–111
Potter TM. 2007. USMA nicknames: naming by the rules. *Names* 55:445–54
Rafael VL. 2016. *Motherless Tongues: The Insurgency of Language amid Wars of Translation*. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
Reinberg L. 1991. *In the Field: The Language of the Vietnam War*. New York: Facts on File
Riseman NJ. 2007. 'Regardless of history'?: Re-assessing the Navajo Codetalkers of World War II. *Australas. J. Am. Stud.* 26(2):48–73
Robben ACGM. 2018. *Argentina Betrayed: Memory, Mourning, and Accountability*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press
Saber A. 2018. Lexicogenic matrices and institutional roles of U.S. military jargon. *Lexis* 11. **http://journals.openedition.org/lexis/1179**
Scarry E. 1988. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Scheper-Hughes N, Bourgois P. 2004. Introduction: making sense of violence. In *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. N Scheper-Hughes, P Bourgois, pp. 1–32. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Schrader B. 2019. *Fight to Live, Live to Fight: Veteran Activism after War*. Albany: SUNY Press
Shay J. 2010. *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. New York: Simon and Schuster
Sherman N. 2015. *Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Shohet M. 2021. *Silence and Sacrifice: Family Stories of Care and the Limits of Love in Vietnam*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Silberstein S. 2002. *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11*. New York: Routledge
Strand S, Berndtsson J. 2015. Recruiting the "enterprising soldier": military recruitment discourses in Sweden and the United Kingdom. *Crit. Mil. Stud.* 1(1):233–48
Suárez-Orozco MM. 1990. Speaking of the unspeakable: toward a psychosocial understanding of responses to terror. *Ethos* 18(3):353–83
Thiesmeyer L. 1995. The discourse of official violence: anti-Japanese North American discourse and the American internment camps. *Discourse Soc.* 6(3):319–52
Tirrell L. 2012. Genocidal language games. In *Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech*, ed. I Maitra, MK McGowan, pp. 174–221. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Tucker RE, Prosise TO. 2003. The language of atomic science and atomic conflict: exploring the limits of symbolic representation. See Dedaić & Nelson 2003, pp. 127–48
Turner V. 1967. Betwixt and between: the liminal period in *rites de passage*. In *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual*, pp. 93–111. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18[illegible]
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34

Van Gennep A. 2004 (1909). *The Rites of Passage*. London: Routledge
Varma A. 2018. From "terrorist" to "terrorized": how trauma became the language of suffering in Kashmir. See Duschinski et al. 2018, pp. 129–52
Verrips J. 2004. Dehumanization as a double-edged sword: from boot camp animals to killing machines. In *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*, ed. G Baumann, A Gingrich, pp. 142–57. Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books
Volcic Z, Erjavec K. 2007. Discourse of war and terrorism in Serbia: "We were fighting the terrorists already in Bosnia. . . ." See Hodges & Nilep 2007, pp. 185–204
Wool Z. 2015. *After War: The Weight of Life at Walter Reed*. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press
Yong KH. 2006. Silences in history and nation-state: reluctant accounts of the Cold War in Sarawak. *Am. Ethnol.* 33:462–73
Young IM. 2003. The logic of masculinist protection: reflections on the current security state. *Signs* 29(1):1–25

Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org.
Guest (guest)
IP: 18.206.160.129
On: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:11:34