

Political Effects of International Migration

Devesh Kapur

Center for Advanced Study of India, Political Science Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104; email: dkapur@sas.upenn.edu

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Abstract

What are the political consequences of international migration on the migrant's country of origin? To help understand this question, this review article first examines data and measurement issues that have hampered empirical analysis. It then lays out an analytical framework outlining four channels through which migration's political consequences play out: the prospective, absence, diaspora, and return channels. The article next delineates the variables that attenuate or amplify these effects and argues that unobservable characteristics, in particular who leaves and why, have an important influence on the type and intensity of political effects. Subsequently, the article examines some key political consequences of international migration: its political economy consequences; its impact on conflict; and its institutional effects, focusing on political institutions as well as nationalism and citizenship. The penultimate section points out the importance of temporality in understanding the political effects of international migration. The article concludes with some questions for future research.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the literature on the drivers of globalization has focused on trade and financial flows. The third driver—international migration—has until recently received relatively little attention, and much of this has focused on immigration (driven by the concerns of developed countries). Most of the current research on migration focuses on three broad areas: (a) the social, economic, and political effects on the destinations (cities, societies, countries); (b) the variegated and complex effects on migrants and their families; and (c) the social and cultural effects on sending communities and the economic effects of financial remittances. One area, however, that has received less attention is the political effects of migration on migrants' places of origin—their villages, towns, and countries. The present article addresses this lacuna.

The article examines the political consequences of international migration on the migrant's country of origin. It first discusses some data and measurement issues regarding international migration. The next section lays out an analytical framework outlining four key channels through which migration's political consequences play out. The (independent) variables that attenuate or amplify these effects are then described. Subsequently, the article examines some key political consequences of international migration: its effects on political economy, its impact on conflict, and its institutional effects, focusing on political institutions as well as nationalism and citizenship. The penultimate section points out the importance of temporality in understanding the long-term effects of international migration. The article concludes with some questions for future research.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES

Compared with data on trade and capital flows, international migration data are more limited. Accurately measuring global migration flows has challenged researchers and policy makers for years. The past decade has seen new efforts to build internationally comparable datasets. The first such effort (resulting in the *International Migration Outlook*) came from the OECD, which was not surprising because immigration was emerging as a major political issue for many of its members. Two recent initiatives followed, one from the World Bank and the other from the United Nations. The World Bank's Bilateral Migration and Remittances database built global matrices of bilateral migrant stocks (from 1960 to 2000) based primarily on the foreign-born definition of migrants from decade-end census and population register records (for details, see Özden et al. 2011). The UN Global Migration Database provides data on the stock of international migrants by country of birth and citizenship as well as sex and age. Both databases are built on population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys, and other official statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories.

At the aggregate level, these data reveal that the global migrant stock increased from 92 million in 1960 to 215 million in 2010. Of the 215 million international migrants in 2010, 34% both originated from and were living in the south. Another 35% of the global migrant stock were born in the south but resided in the north. Furthermore, one-quarter of all international migrants in the world were born and living in the north. The percentage of international migrants who were born in the north and living in the south was only 6%.

Between 1960 and 1990, migration among developing countries was relatively stable after one accounts for the partition of India and border shifts in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, there have been substantial changes since 1990. The number of migrants born in the south and residing in the north has increased by 85%—more than double the increase in the global migrant stock as a whole (38%). South-south migration increased by 22%, followed by north-north migration (26%); north-south migration underwent little change. Thus, in 1990,

international migrants who were both born and residing in the south (60 million) outnumbered international migrants born in the south and residing in the north (40 million) by 50%; by 2010, this picture had reversed, with south-north migrants (74 million) outnumbering south-south migrants (73 million) (United Nations 2012).

Although the information provided by these databases is a considerable improvement from the virtual absence of comparable cross-national migration data, many variables of interest are still missing. The data captured are almost entirely from the destination country, with virtually nothing from the country of origin (sending countries find it harder to capture data on migrants because they are no longer in the country). Better data are available for the destination countries of the north than for those of the south.

However, these datasets have limited utility in analyses of the political effects on sending countries (for a good overview of what needs to be done on international migration data, see Santo Tomas et al. 2009). Comparative cross-country data on the type of migrant (e.g., an asylum or job seeker) are available only for very select categories. For example, data are collected on refugees because a specific international organization, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was created for this task. (The UNHCR reports that in 2010, 87% of the 13.5 million refugees in the world were hosted by developing countries.) Important variables on the selection characteristics of migrants are only sporadically available; for example, some countries (e.g., France) do not ask questions about ethnicity, and others (e.g., the United States) refuse to gather information on religion. Another crucial selection characteristic is the education of the migrants, but datasets track only levels of education—data on the type or quality of education, or even whether education was obtained in the country of origin or destination (in the case of the many migrants who come as children), are available only in rare cases. Equally (if not more) significant may be the unobservable characteristics of the migrant, such as whether the individual is a risk taker or an institution builder, has leadership qualities or is a trouble maker.

FRAMEWORK

Kapur & McHale (2005) and Kapur (2010) develop a framework that identifies four channels by which international migration affects the country of origin: prospective, absence, diaspora, and return.

Prospective Channel

The prospective channel focuses on how expectations affect current behavior. For instance, at the individual level, the possibility of emigration leading to a higher expected return to skills in specific areas could lead to greater human capital investments in those areas, such as the nursing profession in the Philippines, manicurist training in Vietnam (about half of manicurists in the United States are of Vietnamese origin), the information technology sector in India, soccer in Senegal (driven by the opportunity to play in lucrative European soccer leagues), or baseball in the Dominican Republic (to play in US baseball leagues).

However, the possibility of emigration has other behavioral effects with political implications. For example, if people expect to leave, how likely are they to invest in local relationships or the nature of their political participation? When migration from Mexico was increasing, individuals in high-migration municipalities appeared less politically engaged than their counterparts in towns with a smaller incidence of migration. The high-migration town residents had lower voter turnout rates and less participation in politics, even as they participated in local community groups with transnational links to the Mexican diaspora (Goodman & Hiskey 2008).

The possibility of migration may even lead to strategic behavior in identity formation. In recent decades, several groups in India's northeast (especially from the states of Mizoram and Manipur) have pressed their claim that they are one of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel (the tribe of Menasseh) and, accordingly, have formally converted to Judaism from Christianity. On that basis, many have emigrated to Israel (Parfitt 2007). At the margin at least, the prospect of emigrating to Israel may have accelerated the change in identity among these tribal groups.

The most significant political effects of the prospect channel may, however, occur if elites see the future of their children outside, rather than within, their country of origin. "Naked official" (or *luo guan*) describes Chinese officials who have moved their family abroad, often taking assets with them. Countries that do not have an extradition treaty with China are particularly popular among corrupt officials. For senior officials, the first step to "getting naked" usually is to send children overseas to study (*Economist* 2012). Transferring assets abroad is often a hedging strategy, a call option on the future. Such behavior may, for instance, mute elite support for the sort of public goods that are particularly important for parents, such as the quality of domestic higher education.

Absence Channel

What happens to those who are left behind? The most obvious effect of the migrants' absence is a decline in the sending country's labor supply, a trend that should result in increased wages for those left behind. The great transatlantic migrations of the late nineteenth century were the single most important factor in wage convergence between Europe and the United States (O'Rourke & Williamson 1999). In that case, however, the migration was predominantly of low-skilled labor. By contrast, when skilled labor leaves, as occurred in many developing countries in the late twentieth century, the economic effects range from larger skill premiums to fiscal losses, diminished scale economies, and greater income inequality (Kapur & McHale 2009).

The effects of the absence channel are strongly mediated not only by the characteristics of who leaves but also by where they go. The late nineteenth century witnessed two large-scale international migrations: one from Europe and the other, of comparable absolute numbers, from China and India. However, the former was much larger relative to origin country populations, and its destinations were other temperate countries (whereas Chinese and Indian migrants mainly went to other tropical countries). The consequences, as Lewis (1984) argued in his classic essay, were starkly different for the sending countries and set the path for the evolution of the international economic order in the twentieth century.

Acemoglu et al. (2002) identified the critical role of institutions in explaining large differences in living standards across countries, but their explanation raised two questions. First, were institutions the main driver, or was migration, given that the latter preceded the former? And second, if international migration to certain destinations can have major long-term institutional effects on the receiving countries, could the institutional effects on the origin countries also be substantial? Does the absence of talented individuals affect the supply of institution builders? Does lower institutional quality in a country make it more likely that potential institution builders will leave, resulting in a low-equilibrium institutional trap? Drawing on the case of Yugoslavia, Hymans (2011) argues that the Atoms for Peace program—an international civil nuclear cooperation program that has been criticized for unintentionally fostering nuclear weapons proliferation in developing countries—sometimes undermined developing countries' nuclear weapons ambitions by facilitating a "brain drain" to the developed world.

In addition, does absence also impact the demand for better institutions? Historically, though not universally, the middle class—professionals and intellectuals—has played an important role in democratization (Kurzman & Leahey 2004). The more educated (and internationally marketable)

citizens are often better positioned to exercise “voice” and press for changes in the status quo (although it is certainly possible that highly talented individuals have a stake in the continuation of bad institutions that allow them to extract rents). Emigration can thus rob a country of potential reformers, especially those with internationally marketable talents and those who are not in the business of rent extraction at home.

Researchers have long accepted that governments consider emigration a useful safety valve to relieve political tensions (Castles & Miller 2009). Japan began encouraging emigration in the nineteenth century and began providing subsidies during the interwar period. Although official explanations focused on the need to relieve demographic pressures, Endoh (2009) found that migrants came disproportionately from a handful of regions in the southwest, such as Kyushu and Yamaguchi, with the most political unrest and where the marginalized Burakumin population is largely clustered. By providing an exit for these problem groups, Endoh (2009, p. 138) contends, emigration ultimately served as a “political decompressor” that helped maintain the stability of the authoritarian regime.

Exit (voluntary or involuntary) of dissidents and disaffected people, including the exile of high-profile individuals and larger groups, has been a strategy employed by various governments. Examples include the Soviet Union’s exile of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and China’s exile of Chen Guangcheng. Once absent, nettlesome prisoners of conscience almost invariably lose their ability to grab headlines in the West and to command widespread sympathy both at home and abroad. Why some authoritarian governments imprison dissidents (e.g., South Africa’s treatment of Nelson Mandela), whereas others send them to exile, and with what political consequences, is an open analytical question.

In recent decades, the pressures of exit and exit’s political signaling effects precipitated the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (Grix 2000). In other cases, such as in Cuba and Zimbabwe, authoritarian regimes have sought to maintain political stability through a strategy of “venting disgruntled groups” through emigration. In East Germany, mass exit had a triggering effect, leading to the demise of the regime. By contrast, in the latter cases, it has had a sustaining effect, keeping the regimes in power. The contrast may reflect institutional differences and the degree of residual regime support. Russia provides another case of mass exit: an estimated 1.1 million left Russia in the 1990s, in the aftermath of the lifting of communist-era travel restrictions and the economic shocks afflicting the country. Another 1.25 million left during Vladimir Putin’s presidency in the 2000s, reflecting the alienation of professionals and entrepreneurs—the core of a country’s middle class. Because emigrants tend to be not only more educated, but also relatively young, there are dual negative demographic effects for a country with negative population growth. But the “Kremlin couldn’t care less if the most talented, the most active Russians are emigrating, because their exodus lifts the social and political tension in the country and weakens the opposition” (Loiko 2011).

Absence can also have direct and important political effects by simply creating new political spaces. If elites leave—often the case in the aftermath of revolutions—the political space opens up for new elites, as has occurred in Cuba and Iran. Thus cross-national spatial mobility affects vertical political and social mobility. It also affects domestic spatial mobility. External migration drives internal migration, and in a multiethnic society, this has ramifications for subnational political dynamics.

Diaspora Channel

The diaspora channel captures the effects of the nation (conceived as a people) in multiple political settings on the country of origin. Although there are many definitions of diasporas, the

central idea is of communities living in one country that retain certain connections to another putative “home” country and consequently should not be viewed by the home country as “just another foreigner.” Brubaker (2005) identifies three core characteristics of a diaspora: dispersion in space (across countries); orientation to a “homeland”; and boundary maintenance, that is, the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society (or societies) over generations. Unfortunately, the term diaspora has become so capacious as to undermine its analytical utility. There are “catastrophic,” “victim,” “trading,” and “mobilized” diasporas. Diasporas can comprise immigrants, expatriates, preachers, guestworkers, students, exiles, asylum seekers, refugees, victims of human trafficking, and ethnic minorities who have physically crossed national boundaries as a result of ethnic cleansing. Diasporas may encompass labor migration, family unification, trading networks, population transfers due to partitions, and ethnic groups stranded in another country after an empire breaks up (e.g., Ottoman, Soviet, Austro-Hungarian).

Because diasporas reside outside their kin state yet often claim a legitimate stake in it, they challenge the traditional boundaries of nation-states. As actors that straddle national boundaries, they have recourse to autonomous resources and values. Moreover, relative to most domestic actors, they can more easily interact with other actors across state boundaries and therefore facilitate international financial and technology flows. The diaspora can be a direct source of advantage to the country of origin when its members have the desire and ability to trade with, invest in, and outsource to domestic businesses. The persistence of “home bias” (the result of international trade costs) observed in international macroeconomics may also indirectly explain the behavior of diasporas, especially if social or ethnic proximity can compensate for distance (Obstfeld & Rogoff 2000).

The principal focus of research on the economic effects of diasporas on the country of origin has been on their substantial financial contributions through remittances (discussed below), but remittances are just one mechanism through which the diaspora channel has a political impact on the country of origin. Members of diasporas participate in the politics of their country of origin in a variety of ways. In some cases, they have the right to vote (whether as dual citizens or as citizens residing abroad). Perhaps more importantly, they influence the voting preferences of kin in the country of origin, an influence that is amplified if they send financial remittances. They may return and run as candidates themselves. Where direct participation is ruled out, diasporas may attempt to influence politics in the country of origin through financial contributions to political parties, candidates, or activist and advocacy groups. What are the effects of international migration on nation building? When and how are diasporas used as political resources by origin and destination countries?

Another mechanism through which a diaspora can affect the politics of its country of origin is by providing a channel for the flow of ideas. These less visible, nonquantifiable, and intangible cognitive remittances may even have a more critical impact than the flow of money. For instance, diasporas may influence policy changes in their country of origin. They can do so directly, particularly on issues where they have strong economic interests, or by reshaping policy preferences of elites. But how important are the different mechanisms, and how does this importance vary with the characteristics of the diaspora, the host country, and the country of origin?

Diasporas also affect their countries of origin as key drivers of global criminal networks.¹ Many criminal networks rely on expatriated populations to help facilitate their activities abroad.

¹According to UN estimates, international crime generates \$1–1.5 trillion annually. Drug trafficking, the illegal arms trade, human trafficking and smuggling (especially women and children for prostitution and servitude), and money laundering constitute the principal activities.

Like any business, international criminal activity requires enforcement mechanisms and trust, which diasporic networks can more easily internalize. Increased migration—much of which stems from states with weak economies and political instability—has created a large demand for both financial support and larger global networks. In many cases, the strength of such networks is compounded by diasporas' weak integration into host societies. Virtually all international criminal networks rely upon their diaspora networks, but their relative prominence among some groups needs explanation.

A key political effect of the diaspora channel is the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism. Indeed, nationalism as a modern phenomenon of imagined communities is one that often grows in the minds of diasporic elites. The acts of migration and living abroad affect identities, attenuating some and amplifying others. Diasporic identities range from the cosmopolitan to virulent ethnic nationalism. What factors shape the nature and strength of these identities?

Most arguments that seek to explain why diasporas engage in long-distance nationalism recognize cognitive explanations centering on identity issues as the driving force. However, these theoretical explanations are of little help in understanding the intensity of nationalism in a diaspora relative to that in its country of origin; the intensity of one diaspora's nationalism relative to others; or the forms this long-distance nationalism takes, especially whether it manifests as ethnic or civic nationalism. Diasporas engage in civic nationalism, ranging from lobbying the government of their adopted country on foreign policy to sending funds during a natural calamity, yet they also support (to varying extents) ethnic nationalism, whose consequences can be deeply inimical but can also be easily exaggerated. An important factor explaining the variance in outcomes is the degree of cleavage between a diaspora and its governing regime—which in turn is a function of why the members of a diaspora emigrated in the first place. However, what mechanisms, both micro and macro, activate migrant identity formation and facilitate collective action is an open research question that needs to take into account precipitating factors such as state policies, institutional arrangements (especially labor markets), economic crises, international contexts, and political opportunity structures.

The factors that affect the likelihood, form, and intensity of diasporic long-distance nationalism—fine-grained characteristics of the diaspora and the countries of origin and settlement—need to be understood better. The conventional wisdom is that diasporic nationalism is a consequence of the failure of immigrants to identify with the host society: nationalism fills their identity “needs” in the host society primarily because of low levels of assimilation and is amplified if they experience discrimination (Gellner 1983). Thus, Portes (1999) argues that preoccupation with the country of origin is greatest among those immigrants who intend to return (e.g., political exiles and migrant laborers) and least among those immigrants who have made a long-term commitment to the host society (e.g., professionals and immigrant entrepreneurs). Jones-Correa (1998) argues that loss of status is a driving force behind diasporic transnational political activity, in explaining why Latino males are more likely to participate in political activities in the country of origin. Whereas these theories argue that diasporic nationalism is linked to assimilation, Kenny (2000) argues that support for diasporic nationalism is strategically adopted by particular groups within an immigrant community as a means of generating support for their own local goals in the host society.

These questions have become more salient owing to the growing size, visibility, and impact of diasporas within the international system. Diasporic communities now have more mechanisms to call attention to issues of interest in their home countries. The ongoing communications and information technology revolution allows nonstate actors to more easily fundraise, mount international public relations campaigns, or exert pressure on governments in host countries. Global banking nets make it easier, faster, and cheaper to move money than ever before. For better or

worse, diasporas have emerged as one of the most important nonstate actors in the international system, and consequently, the diaspora channel represents a key mechanism by which international migration impacts sending countries.

Return Channel

The return channel works when those who left arrive back home with augmented human capital, financial capital (savings), foreign connections, ideas, and, perhaps critically, changed expectations. As with the absence effect, the impact of return depends on the selection characteristics of those who return. Data on return migration are particularly weak because destination countries do not capture data when people leave (at least not data that are publicly available, e.g., airport departures), nor do source countries gather relevant data when their own citizens return. Although some return migrants may be negatively selected, i.e., those who did not “make it,” elites often have greater incentives to return than those lower down in the social and income hierarchies. Some may simply prefer to be a big fish in a small pond rather than a small fish in a big pond. Others may be motivated by expectations, as seen in the increase of return migration to South Korea, Taiwan, Ireland, China, and India when their economies began to grow rapidly. A smaller subset of those who return may be more intensely nationalist and more committed to nation building—exemplified by the leaders of anticolonial nationalist movements, many of whom studied and lived abroad.

Going abroad reshapes attitudes, expectations, and identities. One of America’s worst race riots, the Tulsa riot in Greenwood, Oklahoma, in 1921, resulted in part from the participation of the town’s African American soldiers in World War I. The cognitive dissonance between the rhetoric about fighting for freedom abroad and its lack at home made Greenwood residents who had served in the war, as well as their friends and relatives, more assertive in pressing for freedom and equality (Brophy 2002). Returning African American soldiers played a similar role after World War II. “For black Southerners, service in the military exposed them to people, places and circumstances that perpetual civilians never encounter. [These] experiences also provided black servicemen with a fresh perspective on their station in American society. While serving overseas, many black veterans were often treated by the dominant racial group with a measure of respect to which they were unaccustomed” (Parker 2009, p. 11).

Returnees have also played a critical role in the development of “Africa” as a consolidated political and cultural space. “The idea of Africa as a single place and of the African—the person of color, the Negro—as a single kind of person was conceived in the diaspora These conceptions, which were to become the Pan-Africanism of Nkrumah and his generation of African leaders, came back to Africa with the returnees” (Appiah 2007).

Foreign education, especially in Western universities, has been a key mechanism in the transmission of ideas of modernity, whether in the form of political regimes or economic systems. International education has been growing by leaps and bounds [there were an estimated 3.6 million international students in 2010, up from 2 million in 2000 (<http://stats.uis.unesco.org>)], and the mechanisms and effects of this increase are poorly understood. Although foreign-educated individuals are a very small fraction of their native populations, there is evidence that they promote democracy in their country of origin, but this is conditional on their foreign education having been acquired in democratic countries (Spilimbergo 2009). From the nationalist leaderships of newly emerging countries following decolonization to the economic technocrats of the 1990s, who were the stewards of economic reforms in many developing countries, returning elites have played a singular role in shaping the destinies of their countries. This finding highlights the role of migration in developing new skills and changing preferences and expectations, particularly through higher education abroad. Examples include the “Chicago boys” in Chile (Valdés 1995), a set of

elite universities in Mexico whose alumni trained in elite US universities and returned to spearhead neoliberal reforms (Babb 2001), and the “Berkeley mafia” in Indonesia (Ford Foundation 2003).

But for all the positive stories, there are enough counterexamples to caution against any linear extrapolation from foreign education in a democracy to support for democracy upon return. Pol Pot, who studied in Paris, and Sayyid Qutb (the spiritual leader of Islamic fundamentalism), who studied in Colorado, are two examples of precisely the opposite. Bringing home new skills is not always positive: returning migrants might bring home new agricultural techniques or they might bring home new methods of organizing and carrying out acts of violence. Pakistanis and Yemenis who migrated to Afghanistan to fight in the wars there and have since returned have brought with them a set of new ideas that are unlikely to be beneficial to their countries.

The variation in deportation policies across countries (Ellermann 2009) complicates the return channel. Between 2007 and 2012, the United States deported more than 2.1 million people. Nearly half (0.95 million) were convicted criminals, whose capacity to wage violence had been considerably augmented by the liberal access to (and use of) firearms in the United States. Their deportation appears to have increased the levels of violence in their home countries when they returned and strengthened transnational criminal networks (Funes 2008).

Unsurprisingly, the economic environment returnees find at home mediates their impact. In 1939, as a young journalist, Albert Camus traveled to report from the drought-stricken region of Kabylia in Algeria. Kabylia was a populous province that, like many other underdeveloped areas, derived a large proportion of its income from the remittances of émigré workers. During the Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment soared in France, many Algerian immigrants were sent home and new emigration was discouraged. Kabylia was already economically depressed when the drought hit, and the results were devastating, laying the groundwork for the Algerian liberation movement. As this example demonstrates, any analysis of the political consequences of international migration must be founded on a deep understanding of the independent variables that constitute migrant characteristics, which are discussed next (Table 1).

WHICH SELECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MATTER AND WHY?

The scope, magnitude, and duration of the political effects of migration are strongly mediated by the selection characteristics of international migration.

How Many Leave?

The size of the migration obviously matters, but the implications are different if size is measured as a stock or flow variable, and if it is measured in absolute or relative terms. Whereas the large

Table 1 Independent variables in the study of international migration

Who? (migrant characteristics)	Age, gender, education, ethnicity, religion, income/class, nonobservable characteristics (integrity, talent, drive, etc.)
Where? (destination characteristics)	South-north, south-south, north-north, north-south; colonial link; neighboring country; assimilation and citizenship policies
When?	Time horizon: temporary, circulatory, or permanent; vintage (generational effects)
Why? (origin country policies)	Ethnic cleansing, border changes, economic opportunities, education
How?	Illegal, legal, trafficking, single- or multiple-step migration, family reunification, adoption, asylum, empire

stock of Irish migrants amplified the diaspora effect for Ireland's emergence as the "Celtic Tiger" in the 1990s, the sudden surge of migration out of East Germany in 1989 precipitated the collapse of the regime. Relative numbers matter more for the absence effect, and absolute numbers matter more for the diaspora effect. Thus, even though migration from India is small in relative terms, the absolute number matters much more in creating transnational networks and political muscle in the receiving countries (Kapur 2010). By contrast, although migration from small Pacific islands may be modest in absolute numbers, it is large in relative terms and makes these islands particularly vulnerable to the "brain drain."

Who Leaves?

The selection effects of who leaves are crucial. The more demographically concentrated migrants are in characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, religion, and ethnicity, the greater the consequences. The political effects are likely to be quite different if migrant streams are from the upper tail of a social distribution or the bottom [e.g., those who left Cuba after the revolution in the late 1950s versus those who left a few decades later (Eckstein 2009)]. When spiritual leaders exit their countries—the Dalai Lama from Tibet, Ayatollah Khomeini from Iran, or Pope John Paul II from Poland—the political consequences are profound, even though their numbers are literally a handful. More generally, as discussed above, critical dimensions of this variable (e.g., leadership or entrepreneurial potential, institution building ability, or political beliefs) are unobservable, which makes causal analysis analytically challenging.

Why Do They Leave?

The relative importance of political and economic factors underlying migration decisions will affect the nature and intensity of engagement with the country of origin after departure. Political and refugee diasporas are likely to have quite different relationships with their country of origin from those who left for economic reasons. If there are sharp political and ethnic cleavages in the country of origin and the diaspora was forced out for political reasons, then it is likely to leverage its role to undermine the political regime in the country of origin. Cuban Americans, East European immigrants in North America prior to 1990, Sri Lankan Tamil immigrants in Canada, and Irish Americans for most of the twentieth century are all examples of this phenomenon. Breakdowns of empires and partitions have frequently led to ethnic cleansing, and migrants who leave to escape this have a long-lasting bitter attitude toward their country of origin, in contrast to those who leave to seek better economic opportunities (Brubaker 1995, Kaufmann 1998).

When Do They Leave?

Although the intensity of the links between a diaspora and its country of origin may wane with time, this relationship may not be linear in the short and medium term. Vintage effects are likely to be mediated by age effects. Migrants are often young, but even if their ties to the country of origin are strongest immediately after they leave, their potential influence often increases with time as they acquire more material and symbolic resources. Moreover, this variable is affected by technological changes, which have made it much easier to travel and maintain communication and cultural links. Another way this variable matters is via the cohort effect. For instance, early waves may be more positively selected in their human capital compared with subsequent migrant streams. A different mechanism may work through a generational effect.

Where Do They Go?

The destination country is important because the assimilation policies of the country of settlement appear to have considerable effects on migrants' transnational political action (Guarnizo et al. 2003). The destination country affects not only the occupations and economic well-being of the migrants but also their likelihood of settlement or return. Migrants to countries with authoritarian regimes are more likely to be temporary compared with those who migrate to democratic regimes, a distinction that affects migrant behavior within the destination country. Furthermore, in a democratic regime, the diaspora can more openly engage in political activities affecting its country of origin. Indeed, the possibility of emulation by diasporas means that over time they tend to learn about political practices in the destination country, such as forms of political participation and organization.

How Do They Leave?

Even after controlling for other migrant characteristics, the manner of entry affects a migrant's prospects and, therefore, the impact on the country of origin. This is most obvious in comparisons of legal versus illegal migrants. However, even among the former, those who enter as students have much better labor market prospects than those who come in through asylum or family reunification, even though both may have similar levels of education.

What Are the Characteristics of the Country of Origin?

The difference between the potential importance of a diaspora and its realized influence will depend principally on the origin country's institutions. For instance, to whatever extent the Chinese diaspora has played a role in China's economic miracle, its influence became possible only after China opened up its economy (Ye 2013). Contrasting this Chinese experience with that of Africa, we see that the country of origin has to be prepared to make use of the remittances and/or investments of the diaspora by ensuring political stability and economic policies conducive to economic development (Catrinescu et al. 2009). Domestic political cleavages will mediate any ethnic selection effects of migration. A diaspora's attitude is likely to change along with the evolution and prospects of the country of origin. Moreover, the influence of the diaspora is likely to be greater when the formal institutional structures in the country of origin are weaker. For example, the Haitian diaspora is likely to have a greater impact on Haiti than the British diaspora has on the United Kingdom.

CONSEQUENCES AND OUTCOMES

Although there are a range of possible effects of international migration on sending countries (Table 2), it is important to highlight two issues related to the selection effects of migration. The first point is that selection effects are associated not only with exit but also with return.

Table 2 Dependent variables in the study of international migration

Levels of analysis	Household, subnational, national, international
Economic effects	Human capital, poverty, inequality, entrepreneurship, macroeconomic stability, financial flows
Political effects	Institutional effects, regime effects, clientelism, public services, voting behavior, conflict (intra- and interstate)
Social effects	Family, gender relations, fertility

If those who leave Central America are mostly honest strivers, but those forced to return are felons deported by the United States, the combined selection effects can have serious long-term consequences. Second, because migrants are so often self-selected, identification strategies are a challenge. Clingingsmith et al. (2009) exploit a lottery that Pakistan uses to allocate Hajj visas to compare successful and unsuccessful applicants and find that exposure to Muslims from all over the world makes Hajjis more tolerant of diversity. They also find that exposure to Muslims with more progressive gender norms has a positive impact on how Pakistani pilgrims think about gender relations but not on how they think about the West. Another identification strategy uses exogenous shocks (e.g., when millions of overseas workers had to leave the Gulf during Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait), but the relevant data are much harder to come by.

Political Economy Effects

The literature on economic development in recent years has focused on the centrality of institutions and governance as the *sine qua non* of long-term growth. Consequently, if international migration affects institutions and governance, its economic impact could be large as well. Offering a framework to disentangle causal pathways, Hirschman (1970, p. 76) argues that “exit has [been] shown to drive out voice” and “voice is likely to play an important role in organizations only on condition that exit is ruled out.” In this framework, societal groups that exit through migration would lose voice and their political influence would wane. However, when migrants “exit,” they usually continue to contribute to the household, village, or country from which they migrated. Migration provides greater access to resources, including remittances, skill transfer through returns, and networks, which can “buy” voice. Migration can consequently amplify rather than attenuate voice, depending on the selectivity characteristics of the migration.

The prospect of exit has been seen as a restraint on rulers, who have to compete with other jurisdictions for potentially mobile subjects. But global experience suggests that this is valid under restrictive conditions of voluntary migration and not in cases of forced migration, such as the African slave trade (see below) and ethnic cleansing.

In Hirschman's formulation, exit and voice are exclusive binary choices that act as substitutes. Absence can also have direct and important political effects by simply creating political space for new groups. If elites leave—as is often the case in the aftermath of revolutions—the political space opens up for new elites, as occurred in Cuba and Iran. External migration drives internal migration, which in a multiethnic society has political economy ramifications at the subnational level. Kapur (2010) finds that in today's world, in the case of international migration, exit and voice can act as complements, reinforcing rather than undermining each other.

As mentioned above, the principal focus of research on the economic effects of diasporas on the country of origin has been their substantial financial contributions through remittances. Given both the massive absolute magnitude of financial remittances (which quadrupled from \$132 billion in 2000 to \$529 billion in 2012) and their large relative share of GDP in many developing countries,² analysis of their domestic political economy consequences has been limited in contrast to the large literature on the other sources of financial flows (such as foreign direct investment). Kireyev (2006) examines the example of Tajikistan and finds that, where remittances are a high proportion of GDP, they appear to act as natural resource rents. When the money goes directly to households, the pressure for change may be even less.

²In relative terms, remittances in 2011 accounted for 47% of GDP in Tajikistan, 31% in Liberia, 29% in the Kyrgyz Republic, 27% in Lesotho, 23% in Nepal, and 21% in Samoa.

The flows need not be financial; they can be in kind. In 2000, Prime Minister Fidel Castro and President Hugo Chávez signed an agreement for Cuba to send 20,000 medics to Venezuela and in return receive 53,000 barrels of oil per day at preferential rates. In 2004, this trade was stepped up, with Cuba sending 40,000 medics and Venezuela providing 90,000 barrels per day. This agreement and Kireyev's (2006) work show how migration and remittances can weaken pressure for structural domestic reform and maintain the political status quo, rather than the other way around.

The exercise of voice across borders via remittances is examined by Fox & Bada (2008), who find that migration from Mexico to the United States has increased public accountability. Though migrants chose exit, they continue to express loyalty by exercising cross-border pressures on local governments for accountability and greater voice in their home communities. This construction of a transnational public sphere is the result of migrants organizing themselves politically in the destination country and using that experience to effect political change in their country of origin. However, Adida & Girod (2011) show that governments may claim credit for the creation of public goods that resulted from remittances, which may reduce accountability.

Another voice mechanism involves the role of financial remittances in loosening patronage systems. Using data from municipal elections in Mexico, Pfutze (2012) finds that remittances significantly increase the probability that an opposition party will win a municipal election. He argues that the nontaxability of remittances reduces an incumbent government's ability to maintain political patronage systems, resulting in more competitive elections. The effect is statistically significant only for first-time victories and does not affect outcomes in places with a history of competitive elections.

Remittances can have direct political effects if they are used to fund political parties, extremist groups, or subnational movements. Although more subtle, their indirect political effects are arguably at least as important. Chaudhry (1989) investigated the process of institutional development and business-government relations in cases of reliance on two types of external capital in the Middle East. She found that financial flows into Yemen in the form of labor remittances from temporary migration initially weakened the Yemeni state by bypassing both state institutions and the formal banking system and going directly to Yemeni households. By contrast, oil rents strengthened the Saudi state by creating a huge, financially autonomous distributive bureaucracy. Thus, the different sources and channels of external financial inflows differentially affected state-society relations.

Alternatively, to the extent that strong selection effects (by ethnicity and religion) determine who migrates, remittances can induce differentials in income and consumption, thereby rapidly reorienting social and political hierarchies in the sending country. This is especially the case if migrants come from lower status groups. Whereas traditional elite groups may view labor migration with disdain, lower- or middle-class groups may have a more mixed or positive opinion. In Guatemala, for instance, the migration and return of Mayan residents have permitted them to slowly challenge ethnic roles that have developed over the past five centuries (Taylor et al. 2006).

The rise of voting rights for expatriates is creating another political channel. The nearly 1 million Taiwanese living in China, known as Taishang, provide a good example: an estimated 200,000 Taishang returned to Taiwan for the 2012 elections to vote for the incumbent president and ensure that his principal opponent, who advocated formal independence, did not win (Jacobs 2011). Taiwan's elections show how significant business and personal interests are undermining the political underpinnings of the historic break between the two countries (Rosen & Wang 2011). With their livelihoods yoked to the Chinese economy, Taishang executives have urged their compatriots to return home to vote, bought discounted plane tickets, pressed airlines from China and Taiwan to add hundreds of additional flights, and offered their employees paid holidays coinciding with Election Day. Although their absolute numbers were not large, they were potentially pivotal: the

winner in 2004 was reelected by a margin of fewer than 30,000 of the 13 million votes cast. Even in countries, such as Haiti, that do not allow their diasporas to vote, candidates campaign heavily in the emigrants' places of domicile, whether to raise campaign finance or to persuade them to influence their families' voting decisions "back home."

Conflict: Intranational

The large literature on ethnic violence and civil wars identified diasporas as a new actor (e.g., Shain & Sherman 1998). More than half of all insurgencies since World War II have been conducted by rebel groups operating from outside the target state (Gleditsch 2007, Salehyan 2009). When insurgents can flee to neighboring states that provide sanctuaries (if not more active help) to insurgents, the conflicts are much more protracted. In other cases (such as the Albanian, Palestinian, Irish, and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas), the principal mechanism of diaspora support has been financial. Not just the extent of support but its reliability matters, as financial flows from the diaspora are less susceptible to the rapid changes that frequently characterize state support. Nonetheless, systematic data on such financial flows are nonexistent. Hence, despite suggestive evidence that diasporas are an important factor in fueling domestic conflict, their importance relative to other factors needs more empirical evidence.

The role of diasporas in civil wars appears less significant in initiating conflict than in sustaining and particularly in restarting it. However, many of the findings of this literature concern the conflicts that grew in the aftermath of the Cold War. One survey of insurgent movements covering 74 active insurgencies between 1991 and 2000 found that about a fourth received significant support from diasporas (Byman et al. 2001). However, even this literature lacks precision in specifying the importance of diasporas relative to other factors. Following 9/11 and the crackdown on international terrorism financing (especially in Western countries), the role of diasporas based in Western countries appears to have abated. However, diasporas located in neighboring countries (such as the countries of the Great Lakes region in Africa or Afghanistan and Pakistan), where rebel organizations frequently find sanctuaries and insurgencies give rise to disputes between states (Salehyan 2009), continue to contribute to conflicts.

Over the past three decades, transnational jihadists have become a new factor in international conflict, whether in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Yemen, or, most recently, Syria. Some die on the battlefield, some move on to fight elsewhere, and some intermarry and settle (as Arabs did in Bosnia). Although most of the rest return to their country of origin and settle back to their former lives (perhaps with enhanced prestige), a few may return radicalized and ready to strike. Hegghammer (2013) examined variation in conflict theater choice by Western jihadists between 1990 and 2010 and estimated the recruit supply for each theater, foreign-fighter return rates, and returnee impact on domestic terrorist activity. Tentative data indicate that jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority (about one in nine) launch attacks at home (in the West) after returning. Such plots are more likely to succeed and twice as likely to kill people than those planned by terrorists who have never fought abroad. This suggests that overseas exposure may enhance both motivation and expertise, although separating the two is analytically difficult.

More recently, the literature has shifted focus from the role of migrants in fueling conflicts to their role as peacemakers (Smith & Stares 2007). Historically, as with Greek, Polish, Irish, and Slovak diasporas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or with the communities of Russian socialists throughout Western Europe at the start of the twentieth century, the long-distance nationalism of diasporas has been portrayed positively as "freedom fighting." Whether an ideology appears threatening depends in part on context. Whereas earlier diasporas were fighting multinational nondemocratic empires, today they are battling democratic states and so are perceived

as more threatening. When they are not (e.g., in Cuba and Iran), they appear to enjoy greater international forbearance.

A different research question centers on why certain diaspora-fueled conflicts ebb whereas others continue to simmer. Is it differences in the geographical and political reach of their diasporas or changes in the domestic context (Fair 2005)? Or instead is it largely changes in the international context, such as the post-September 2001 sharp decline in the Irish diaspora's support for militant groups, which helped the peace agreement in Northern Ireland? A key analytical problem in identifying the role of diasporas in fueling conflict in their country of origin is reverse causality, since they can be both cause and consequence of conflict.

Ideas and Institutions

The transmission of ideas through international migration, especially studying and working abroad, has had a significant impact on sending countries, both historically and recently. Those who have studied or worked abroad have shaped not only political and economic institutions but also social institutions, with likely long-term political implications, especially in terms of gender relations and fertility. Of course, it is one thing to acknowledge that ideas and influence arising from international migration matter, and quite another to measure how much they matter. Developing countries have certain structural characteristics, such as a narrow middle class, weak higher-education institutions, "thin" markets for talent, and few organized interest groups (which constitute the pluralist vision of democratic politics). Above all, an intrinsic feature (indeed, one may say the very definition) of a developing country is that it has weak institutions. Consequently, individuals, leaders, and elites simply matter more, particularly in designing and shaping the institutional landscape.

Returning and circulatory elites embedded in international "epistemic communities" have long served as conduits for the diffusion of new ideas and paradigms within both domestic and international spheres.³ For example, Richmond (2003) argues that the more than 50,000 Soviet cultural, scientific, and intelligence elites who came to the United States between 1958 and 1988 as part of cultural exchange programs (and an even larger number of Americans who went to the Soviet Union) were an important source of influence and persuasion that paved the way for Gorbachev's *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) and the end of the Cold War.

Foreign education, especially in Western universities, has been a key mechanism for the transmission of the ideas of modernity, such as political regimes or economic systems. Although foreign-educated individuals are a very small fraction of their native populations, evidence suggests that they promote democracy in their home countries, but only if their foreign education is acquired in democratic countries (Spilimbergo 2009). Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow (2010) argue that international migrants are agents of democratic diffusion because they spread attitudes and behaviors absorbed from democratic host countries to their less democratic home countries through return migration, cross-border communication between migrants still abroad and their friends and family back home, and migrant information networks in high-volume migration-producing communities.

However, these mechanisms could as easily spread more authoritarian ideas, for instance, in the case of migrants working in Saudi Arabia. In the history of Islamic radicalism, prominent figures in the movement spent time in the United States. The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, who became the most influential philosopher of jihad against the West, visited the United States through an educational

³Epistemic communities are networks of professionals and experts who have an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge and who share a set of normative beliefs, causal models, and notions of empirical validity.

exchange program from 1948 to 1950, where he developed a deep-seated revulsion for what he saw as American materialism and immorality. In the 1980s, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who went on to plan the 9/11 attacks, spent four years earning an engineering degree in North Carolina. His American sojourn did not stop him from devoting the next two decades to plotting against Western and American targets. And the main icon of Tunisian Islamism, Rachid Ghannouchi, lived for many years in exile in London.

Historically, countries that have sought to “catch up” with the West have looked to educational exchanges as channels for new ideas and knowledge flows. In opening to the West in the late nineteenth century, both China and Japan sent their citizens there to study. In 1872, the Qing Empire sent young men to the United States to learn about Western ideas and innovation. Despite being forced to return by anti-Chinese fervor and faced with an imperial court deeply resistant to change, they played a pivotal role in reshaping China’s economy, diplomacy, and government (Leibovitz & Mille 2011). Early in the twentieth century, Chinese students who had studied at US universities again played key roles in institutional transformations in China (Ye 2001). And a century later, the reemergence of Chinese science has been attributed to the return of overseas scholars: 81% of the members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and 54% of the Chinese Academy of Engineering are returned overseas scholars (Zhou & Leydesdorff 2006).

Migration to Western Europe appears to have led to major changes in Polish society, bringing about a move away from the powerful Catholic Church toward a more secular state, in step with Western Europe. As the founder of the new Palikot Movement put it, “There is a growing culture of change in Poland thanks to the fact that millions of Poles work in the European Union” (Kulish 2011), and thousands more study abroad in European countries.

Ideas matter. But which ideas, from where, and at what stage of one’s life? Is it graduate or undergraduate education that matters? Does the field of study matter? Is it the top tier of students that matters, or those from wealthy and connected families? Does the surge in the numbers of Chinese students obtaining Western educations in recent years (annual flows exceeding 250,000 and stock estimated at more than 1.25 million in 2010) presage fundamental shifts in values as they return home? Does the experience of meeting people from other cultures make the students more cosmopolitan and hence less hostile to other cultures? Will overseas exposure make young Chinese more critical of their own country after returning from university overseas—or will it make them more nationalist? Drawing on surveys of returnees from Japan and Canada over the past 15 years, Han & Zweig (2010) find that returning Chinese students are both more “internationalist” than the middle class and less nationalistic. The authors further argue that these students are likely to support China’s increasing international role and perhaps constrain China’s growing nationalist sentiment.

The ideational effects of international migration on decision-making behavior have also been manifest in the transformation of economic institutions. The migration and education abroad of Latin American elites, for instance, have contributed to the sharp shift in macroeconomic policies in that region (Babb 2001). Using dynamic-panel regressions for a large sample of developing countries, Docquier et al. (2011) find that unskilled emigration has a positive impact on institutional quality, whereas the impact of skilled emigration is more ambiguous. Apart from the limitations of cross-country regressions, the causal channels, however, are ambiguous.

One weakness of many studies that seek to make a causal link between migration and some outcome is their inability to disentangle the effects of migration and remittances from more general processes of social and cultural change affecting migrant-sending communities. The latter are often more important, although migration may play an accelerating or reinforcing role in such processes.

In recent years, international migration has forced countries to grapple with seemingly settled assumptions about national identity. In 1930, the League of Nations proclaimed, “All persons are

entitled to possess one nationality but one nationality only.” Today dual citizenship has grown substantially (Faist & Kivisto 2007, Sejersen 2008), as countries react to international migration and seek to maintain ties with their migrants, presumably to reap economic and political benefits. There is some evidence suggesting that dual citizenship generates larger remittances at the macro and micro levels and is associated with a higher likelihood of return migration (Leblang 2013). However, the political effects of dual citizenship are still underanalyzed (see Lafleur 2012) because they are more likely to be indirect than direct and perhaps play out over a longer time horizon.

The “diaspora option” is becoming a significant component of the development strategies of countries with large migrant populations across much of the developing world. With an increased reliance on migrant populations to shoulder the investment risks associated with social transformation, countries are putting together new institutions to engage and leverage their diasporas (Gamlen 2006, Kuznetsov 2013, Pellerin & Mullings 2013). Brand (2006) examines the emergence of government institutions charged with managing the changing relationship between expatriates and their home state and argues that these provide evidence both of state resilience and of new trends in the practice of sovereignty. Iskander (2010) examines the policies of Morocco and Mexico toward their expatriate populations and argues that these were initially devised to strengthen the state’s domestic hold on power rather than strengthen the links between emigration and better development outcomes. The transformation resulted from thick ongoing exchanges between migrants and their governments, through multiple iterative and improvisational processes that neither the governments nor their migrant constituencies ever predicted, much less intended. These exchanges gradually but fundamentally redefined both development and citizenship.

The increase in dual citizenship around the world might paradoxically be resulting in a subtle shift from civic and territorial nationalism to ethnic nationalism. This raises both normative and positive questions. What economic and political rights should dual citizens have? Should they be able to vote? Should they be permitted to run as candidates, and if so, up to what level of office? What is their relationship with the core duties of citizenship, namely military service and taxation? Finally, what explains the variations in these rights both across countries and over time?

TEMPORALITY

When we examine the consequences of international migration, causal inference is severely shaped by aspects of temporality, such as duration, acceleration, and timing. Explicitly specifying the role of temporality can help improve our understanding of political mechanisms, sequences, and the processes they constitute (Grzymala-Busse 2011). Additionally, although a wide range of historical work has illustrated how international migration results in subtle but important changes to the ideas that are at the heart of nationhood—citizenship and the basis of a political community—the time horizon over which these changes occur affects the causal inferences.

The “British” identity was formed by its empire as the subjugated Welsh, Scots, and Irish became the Empire’s ruling class, especially through service in the army. By the early nineteenth century, both Ireland and Scotland were sending disproportionately large numbers of soldiers to fight Britain’s colonial wars. As a result, one-third of colonial governors between 1850 and 1939 were Scots (Paxman 2011).

Historical studies of great waves of European immigration into the United States in the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century suggest that the overwhelming majority of immigrants did not have a developed national identity. Polish peasant immigrants in the United States arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with a sense of belonging that extended no further than the local countryside. Only in the United States, after they began to create organized immigrant networks for mutual assistance and to establish group boundaries as they encountered an ethnically pluralistic

and often hostile environment did they gradually develop translocal national identities with their ideological fatherland (Greene 1975, Morawska 2011). Broadly similar processes unfolded with Italians (Gabaccia 2000).

By the interwar period, nearly two million Polish peasant immigrants lived in the United States, most of them in tight-knit Polish colonies where they created hundreds of national (ethnic) organizations. The majority of them also maintained regular contact with their home villages. Their transnational activities contributed to the emergence during that era of modern national consciousness in the Polish countryside.

Historical evidence of large-scale migration to the “New World” from four regions—Africa and Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and China and India in the nineteenth century—provides insights into the long-term effects of international migration on sending countries. The great migrations from Europe to the New World (especially from 1870 to the beginning of World War I) were largely for economic reasons and contributed to a convergence of wages between origins and destinations, particularly between the countries of Western Europe and the United States. Between 1870 and 1910, emigration raised wages in Western Europe by 9% and lowered them by 8% in the United States (Williamson & Hattton 2005).

In contrast, the large migrations of millions of Africans carted off to slavery had a very different impact on Africa. Historians have argued that one major consequence was a reduction in the supply of labor. Unlike Western Europe, which had low land-to-labor ratios when migration began (one reason why it was voluntary), Africa had a high land-to-labor ratio. Consequently, control over a factor that became increasingly scarce—labor—emerged as the key to power. Kings and village headmen, bound to their followers by complicated networks of mutual obligation and exchange, fell from dominance. External conflicts centered primarily on the various struggles to exercise control over a people, and captives became the principal spoils of war. The deep social disruption led to the increased practice of holding slaves in Africa, thereby intensifying their exploitation and exemplifying what has come to be known as the “transformation thesis.”

The institutional effects were manifold. Slaves were used by political elites to increase their power, which led to the development of increasingly centralized but also more autocratic states. Household dynamics changed as well. High fertility regimes became institutionalized to ensure large families of potential workers. Women married young and were valued by the number of children they bore. The social status of men was similarly based on the number of wives and children to whom they held claim (Inikori 1982, Iliffe 1995, Thornton 1998).

Recently, economists have begun examining forced migration. Nunn’s (2008) study of the impact of the slave trade finds significant negative long-term political and economic effects for Africa. The parts of Africa from which the largest numbers of slaves were taken are today the poorest parts of Africa. This finding cannot be explained by selection effects: the least developed societies were not the ones selected into the slave trade. Instead, the more developed and more densely populated societies supplied the largest numbers of slaves.

If the deep determinants of long-term economic growth are indeed domestic institutions, then how does migration affect them? The causal chain posited by Nunn (2008) is that the slave trade led to a deterioration of domestic political institutions, which in turn had a long-term adverse impact on the provision of public goods. Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) examine whether the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades were responsible for a culture of mistrust within Africa and find a very strong negative relationship between an individual’s reported trust in others and the number of slaves taken from the individual’s ethnic group during the slave trade. The slave trade appears to have adversely affected trust both by altering the cultural norms of the ethnic groups exposed to the trade, making them inherently less trusting, and by weakening legal and political institutions, with the former effect having approximately twice the magnitude of the latter.

The complex long-term political effects of migration are evident in Wood's (2000) analysis of democratic transition in El Salvador. The landed oligarchy had long suppressed democratization, nearly leading to civil war in the 1980s. The resulting political instability led to a large outflux of uprooted peasants (especially to the United States). Agricultural exports dropped, and by 1991, remittances exceeded export earnings. The burgeoning foreign exchange inflows resulted in Dutch disease effects. Upward pressure on the exchange rate also undermined the competitiveness of Salvadoran exports, which further propelled elites out of agriculture. Increasingly over the decade, El Salvador's political economy was driven not by export agriculture and its processing, but by international assistance and overseas remittances. The shift in elite interests reshaped Salvadoran politics. The new winners were sectors that controlled significant shares in courier companies that transferred remittances, foreign exchange financial intermediaries, retail sectors that provided consumption goods, and real estate and construction companies. The broad shift in elite economic interests from agriculture to services, in turn, abated the severity of rural repression and caused elites to adopt a bargained, instead of a coerced, resolution toward conflict.

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: AN EXAMPLE FROM INDIA

Although Indians have been migrating to other lands for thousands of years, large-scale migration began only after the end of slavery in the 1830s. Most migrants went to South or Southeast Asia: about 42% settled in Burma; 25% in Ceylon; 19% in British Malaya; and the rest in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The vast majority went as indentured laborers.

International migration from independent India was initially driven by the large demand for unskilled and semiskilled workers in the United Kingdom following the end of World War II. These labor shortages drew large numbers of Indians, mainly from Punjab and Gujarat. A modest number of professionals and traders also migrated during this period. These numbers were considerably supplemented by "twice migrant" East African Asians (especially of Gujarati origin) into the United Kingdom in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Two unrelated events sparked the next major flow of emigration from the late 1960s onward. First, a sharp increase in oil prices and the resulting economic boom created a large demand for overseas labor in the Middle East. The majority of the emigrants were unskilled or semiskilled, although in comparison with earlier migration waves, there were considerable numbers of skilled migrants as well. Because the policies of Middle East countries have made permanent settlement extremely difficult, Indian migration to this region has been inherently temporary. Although most eventually returned home, some skilled migrants moved on to other countries such as Australia and Canada.

Second, the liberalization of US immigration law in 1965 led to a large migration of highly skilled professionals and students seeking to study in, and eventually settle in, the United States. The large demand for information technology workers in the United States in the late 1990s led to another wave of young professional immigrants. However, because most came with temporary work visas, a relatively larger, though still modest, fraction returned home. This migrant stream has been the most highly educated, both compared with other immigrants into the United States and compared with other waves of emigrants out of India.

On the basis of extensive original data, Kapur (2010) argues that international migration has had two significant positive impacts on Indian politics: first, it has influenced the commitment to liberal democratic politics among Indian elites, and second, it has promoted India's democratic durability and stability through elite exit. (Each of these effects is discussed in more detail below.) Kapur's analysis also points to less salubrious effects on India, arising from support for extremist nationalist

and separatist groups by members of the Indian diaspora. However, the evidence indicates that the systemic effects of this support are relatively modest compared with domestic variables.

First, the international exposure and return migration of Indian elites have contributed to key ideas that have shaped India: its commitment to a democratic form of government at the time of independence and its more recent commitment to economic liberalization. This is not to say that these two critical characteristics of contemporary India have been primarily shaped by international migration, but international migration has certainly played an important role in shaping the sensibility of Indian political and policy elites. Drawing on a database on India's business, intellectual, political, and scientific elite over half a century, with information on the extent and nature of these elites' overseas experience, Kapur (2010) points to the subtle and dynamic effects of migration's "social remittances" on reshaping political understandings, expectations, and norms, particularly those of national elites. The distinctively elite character of modern Indian emigration has amplified these social remittance effects, both because of the diaspora's overseas success and because of its access to influential institutional channels to transmit these ideas.

Second, international migration has had a key political impact on the endurance of India's democracy. Exit opportunities have reduced the insecurity of India's upper-caste elites, making them less implacably opposed to the political ascendancy of hitherto marginalized social groups. This attenuation of elite opposition has made Indian politics less contentious, providing greater stability than might have been the case without the possibility of elite exit (Kapur 2010).

The role of international migration in minimizing political conflict between extant upper-caste elites and rising elites from lower castes has been overshadowed by the role of the diaspora in religious conflict. Although the diaspora has played only a limited role in religious conflict, this form of long-distance nationalism has been more visible and, hence, appears more significant. Nonetheless, the analysis presented by Kapur (2010) indicates that, in fact, migration's less visible impact on India's democratic traditions may far outweigh its more visible impact on religious tensions in India.

Indian emigrants are positively selected from the social and economic elite, whether measured by caste, class, or education and skills. The introduction of the universal franchise in India following independence signaled the waning of the political hegemony of India's high castes. In recent decades, as the inexorable logic of numbers has reshaped the political landscape of India, and lower and middle castes have gained a greater share of political power, they have sought to redistribute economic resources. The question was not whether this vast social churning would happen, but when and at what cost. No group gives up its privileges without a fight, and the "silent social revolution" (Jaffrelot 2003) in India could have been much more contentious were it not for the possibility of exit open to India's elites.

This contribution to the strengthening of India's democracy, even if inadvertent, may be international migration's greatest impact on India. However, the elite basis of Indian emigration has also had implications for the quality of Indian democracy. Exit has implied a reduced incentive to exercise voice, particularly for public goods such as health and education—goods that have been the very basis for mobility of Indian elites (i.e., human capital).

CONCLUSION

The history of humanity, starting from its antecedents in Africa, is a history of migration. Although the transformative effects of migration are most apparent on the individual migrant, they can also be substantial on the communities of origin and destination, reflecting the interplay between "roots and routes." This review has argued that research on the political impacts of international migration on sending countries needs to focus on selection effects (who leaves?) and on the

cleavages and conflicts in the country of origin. People leave for specific reasons—and understanding those reasons is critical to assessing their implications.

A major challenge in identifying causal channels is disentangling structure and agency, which are inextricably linked in all migrations. The complex interactions and linkages between “macrostructures” (e.g., global economic developments, interstate relationships, state policies, and demographic changes), individual agency, and changes over time, both in driving migration and as a consequence of migration, make it hard to tease out precise causal mechanisms and come up with generalizable conclusions.

Future research may fruitfully draw on advances in network theories coupled with the “large data” amassed by border bureaucracies as countries seek to capture detailed data on anyone who enters or leaves a country. The rise of dual-citizenship policies (with much variation across countries) and their interactions with variances in naturalization policies offer other promising avenues for research. Climate change is likely to become another factor driving international migration; currently, its effects are minor relative to other factors, but it is likely to modify underlying causal dynamics. The study of international migration could gain much from new research on identity formation—and in turn offer a new platform for research, as students of identity formation could take advantage of data on different forms of migration (e.g., adoption) coupled with the different ages at which the migration event occurred. All in all, the comparative analysis of emigration and its political impact is likely to become more important as political scientists focus increasing attention on the political consequences of the world’s population flows.

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