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Embracing Complexity: A Review of Negotiation Research

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Abstract

In this review, we identify emerging trends in negotiation scholarship that embrace complexity, finding moderators of effects that were initially described as monolithic, examining the nuances of social interaction, and studying negotiation as it occurs in the real world. We also identify areas in which research is lacking and call for scholarship that offers practical advice. All told, the existing research highlights negotiation as an exciting context for examining human behavior, characterized by features such as strong emotions, an intriguing blend of cooperation and competition, the presence of fundamental issues such as power and group identity, and outcomes that deeply affect the trajectory of people's personal and professional lives.

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INTRODUCTION

We negotiate daily with employers, coworkers, merchants, friends, romantic partners, children, and more. The outcomes of these negotiations affect the prices we pay, the salaries we earn, where our next vacation will be, and whether our children will finish their vegetables.

Although certainly practiced for as long as humans have lived in groups, negotiation—a social interaction with the goal of reaching an agreement that improves the status quo—has only been studied empirically since the 1960s (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992). Since then, the field has developed many fundamental insights that are unique to negotiation itself, such as the importance of first offers or how to logroll issues to create value. Negotiation, however, also affords a ready context in which to study phenomena from across psychology. Reflecting this, negotiation scholarship is characterized by waves of influence from popular fields, such as judgment and decision making, emotion, and culture (Bazerman et al. 2000, Thompson et al. 2010).

In this review, we provide an update on negotiation scholarship, situating the current research in the context of what has come before and what might come after. Overall, the negotiation literature reflects an increased tendency to embrace complexity in three main ways: (*a*) finding important moderators of effects that were once seen as monolithic (e.g., gender differences in negotiation outcomes), (*b*) taking seriously the nuances of social interaction (e.g., analyzing the dynamics of turn-by-turn conversation), and (*c*) studying negotiation as it occurs in the real world (e.g., with real stakes, across different relationship types, etc.).

Even as scholarship has advanced to embrace greater complexity, the overwhelming majority of existing scholarship remains paradigm bound. We cannot separate what we know from how we have come to know it. This is true for all scientific endeavors, but it remains a significant issue for the empirical study of negotiation, which often relies on simplified simulations among strangers and paradigms that take social behavior out of context for the ease and experimental control that this affords.

One important consequence of the focus on simplified simulations is that for an applied field, much of the research on negotiation remains surprisingly hard to apply. For example, strategies that research has proven to be effective in one situation (e.g., a dyadic interaction) often do not work in another (e.g., a group interaction); a tactic that might work with one type of counterpart (e.g., a stranger) fails on the next (e.g., a friend); or an advantageous behavior that has been isolated experimentally (e.g., the strategic use of anger) can be difficult to implement in a contextualized way (e.g., when should someone be angry, for how long, and what words should they use?). Ultimately, this paradigm-bound research has significantly limited the practical guidance of existing research.

Despite these limitations, the literature on negotiation has yielded many notable insights and has considerable potential, owing to its fascinating object of inquiry. After all, negotiation is a rich social interaction characterized by a rare blend of cooperative and competitive social cognition, strong emotions, and deeply held concerns about status, power, and group identity. Negotiation also occurs at critical junctures in people's personal and professional lives, with considerable consequences for their economic and psychological well-being. Negotiation is and will remain an exceptional context for examining human behavior.

NEGOTIATION FUNDAMENTALS

Every subfield has its own specialized concepts, acronyms, and jargon. In negotiations, this list is mercifully brief and remarkably useful: It includes concepts such as BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), ZOPA (zone of possible agreement), aspiration and reservation prices, and first offers. While these concepts are long established, recent scholarship has further explored their nuances, largely centering on first offers and BATNAs.

First Offers

Substantial research has demonstrated the benefits of making the first offer, which can anchor the discussion, causing the final deal to be surprisingly close to the value of the initial offer (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler 2001; cf. Jeong et al. 2020). On the other hand, negotiators who make a first offer with little knowledge of the size of the bargaining zone can also make a mistake—either by making a low offer that leaves value on the table or by making an excessive offer that damages trust.

Though people intuitively use round numbers when making offers (e.g., $10,000 instead of $10,200), precise first offers tend to elicit more advantageous counteroffers (Janiszewski & Uy 2008, Mason et al. 2013). Precise offers signal to counterparts that negotiators are more informed, deliberate, well-reasoned, and competent (Mason et al. 2013, Loschelder et al. 2017). As a counterpoint, however, research has shown that precise first offers can actually signal incompetence to experts in a particular domain (Loschelder et al. 2016); they can also signal inflexibility, inhibiting potential counterparts from negotiating in the first place (Lee et al. 2018). As a result, in some cases negotiators may gain a tactical advantage by making a range offer (e.g., $7,200–$7,800) (Ames & Mason 2015). Finally, although appearing prepared and offering reasons for a first offer is typically beneficial, providing explicit justification for a first offer can backfire if counterarguments come readily to a counterpart's mind (Maaravi et al. 2011).

In short, negotiators should make first offers to anchor the discussion if they have a good sense of the bargaining zone, taking special care when dealing with experts and carefully crafting reasons for the offer to avoid an argument spiral.

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

Having an alternative deal is one of the greatest sources of power in a negotiation, setting into motion a cascade of benefits, such as more favorable aspiration and reservation prices and more advantageous first offers (e.g., Buelens & Van Poucke 2004). The past decade of research has added nuance to these findings, for example, by showing that, in some cases, having no BATNA, rather than a weak BATNA, can enable people to negotiate better deals because they do not focus on a low anchor (Schaerer et al. 2015). Uncertain BATNAs have also been shown to have a positive effect; for example, a possible job offer from one company has been shown to boost outcomes in a negotiation with a second company (Pinkley et al. 2019). This might not seem terribly surprising, since uncertain offers still carry a potential payoff, but intriguingly, negotiators with uncertain BATNAs often feel they have just as much power and achieve just as good of an outcome as negotiators with certain BATNAs, despite being objectively worse off. Indeed, just imagining an attractive alternative can help one negotiate a better deal for themselves (Schaerer et al. 2018), and the same is true for having had an alternative at some point in the past, even if it is no longer viable by the time they negotiate (Brady et al. 2021). In essence, it would appear that under certain conditions, having no BATNA, an uncertain BATNA, or even an imagined BATNA can create beneficial psychological conditions for negotiation.

Future Directions

Negotiation fundamentals have been studied extensively, but there remains room for additional investigation, such as elucidating the psychological mechanisms supporting first offers or addressing practical questions such as the timing of first offers (e.g., do first offers that occur too early in the conversation constrain the discussion and lead to less creative solutions?) (Sinaceur et al. 2013b). Finally, field studies have the potential to deepen our understanding of how negotiation fundamentals operate in real life, when the stakes, reputations, and experience of negotiators are significant.

POWER

Relationships are characterized by power hierarchies. People with low power are dependent on those with high power to achieve their desired outcomes. Negotiation scholars have conceptualized power in negotiations in several different ways, such as having a good alternative deal, more information than one's counterpart, or high social status (Galinsky et al. 2017, Schaerer et al. 2020).

Power as Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

The most common approach scholars have used to manipulate power in negotiations is to give negotiators better or worse alternatives to the current deal (i.e., a better or worse BATNA). For example, a small supplier negotiating to sell its products through a large retailer, such as Walmart, may often have poor alternatives, and the strength of a negotiator's alternative profoundly influences their outcome.

Future work should continue to explore specific pathways through which power exerts itself, such as improved first offers (Schaerer et al. 2015), dominance displays (Belkin et al. 2013, Wiltermuth et al. 2018), and even strategic gambits, such as dropping a phantom anchor (e.g., a negotiator asserting that they were originally going to ask for $10,000 but could take $8,000) (Bhatia & Gunia 2018). Another intriguing direction for future work is to expand our understanding of the difference between actual and perceived power. For example, even after controlling for actual power in negotiation (i.e., the strength of one's alternatives), perceived power differentials can still produce less cooperative deal making (Wolfe & McGinn 2005).

Power as Social Status

Power associated with status is quite different from power associated with a strong BATNA. Status is based on people's interpersonal qualities that command respect, admiration, and deference.

Similar to the effects of having a good BATNA, having high status can also lead to better negotiation outcomes, as individuals defer to higher-status counterparts (Magee & Galinsky 2008). The exact processes through which status leads to deference have not been thoroughly investigated in negotiations, although research from adjacent subfields provides some suggestive evidence: A negotiator might defer to a higher-status counterpart's financial analysis during a negotiation because their counterpart seems highly competent (Fiske et al. 2002); status may be associated with various deal-lubricating traits, such as trust (Portes 1998); or, finally, low-power negotiators may make concessions to a high-status counterpart, hoping that their generosity will be rewarded with access to future lucrative opportunities to which high-status individuals are believed to have access (Benjamin & Podolny 1999).

Some of the most interesting unanswered questions are related to how status is communicated in a negotiation. For example, the main effect of anger on power and status is moderated by gender

(Brescoll & Uhlmann 2008) as well as by the intensity of the anger, with extreme anger actually decreasing perceived status (Gaertig et al. 2019). This is just one example of an area in which we think there is much work to be done as the black box of the negotiation interaction is increasingly pried open with new attention and tools.

Additional work could also be built around the fact that it would be highly adaptive for a negotiator to be able to (*a*) effectively communicate (or exaggerate) their social status to derive corresponding benefits, and (*b*) accurately perceive the other's status in order to facilitate maneuvering, alliance building, and appropriate conversational behavior. Such research on perceptions of status exists in the networks literature (e.g., Kilduff & Krackhardt 1994), but negotiation-specific research is lacking.

Future Directions

Power, in the form of both high social status and control over valued resources, transforms people's psychology, clearly impacting negotiation outcomes. Two additional areas seem particularly ripe for future work. The first is examining how to negotiate from a position of powerlessness. This work can build on recent findings showing the promise of certain strategies, such as forming detailed plans before entering a negotiation (Jager et al. 2017). Second, future research might fruitfully study power in real-world settings, as there are considerable nuances regarding how power is expressed and received. For example, consider how the power associated with BATNA or status does not fully capture certain salient cases of power in the real world, such as when someone is negotiating with their boss at work, which is not equivalent to having a better outside option in a lab study or dealing with just any other high-status individual.

EMOTION

Early scholarship characterized negotiation as an optimization problem in which agents with competing preferences allocate scarce resources. In this equation, there was little room for emotion—and only over time has negotiation scholarship embraced all of its "social and emotional baggage" (Barry 2008, p. 97).

Emotions not only describe people's internal states (Frijda 1988; see also Elfenbein 2023) but also communicate information and influence interactions. This broader, social functional approach has been quite influential (Morris & Keltner 2000, Van Kleef 2009).

Within a negotiation, emotions (*a*) provide information, (*b*) evoke complementary emotions in others, and (*c*) act as incentives. These three roles help frame the literature.

Anger

The emotion that has received the most scholarly attention is anger, which evokes strong reactions and can substantially change the course of a negotiation.

Anger and concessions. One of the most consistently researched questions for decades has been whether communicating anger can elicit concessions from a counterpart.

In early computer-mediated simulations (Van Kleef et al. 2004), participants received messages over several rounds that expressed anger (e.g., "This offer makes me really angry"), happiness (e.g., "I'm happy with the offer"), or no emotion, and the authors found that participants who were targets of expressed anger consistently made larger concessions. Why? By expressing anger, a negotiator may be providing information that they are near their reservation price. Consequently, this could evoke the complementary emotion of fear in the target of the anger expression, which may motivate a concession in the hope of avoiding an impasse.

Nevertheless, how anger influences the negotiation process is likely to change across negotiation partners and contexts. For example, anger may provide information that someone is simply an angry person, which instead of invoking fear may invoke apathy or even reciprocal anger. In this case, rather than prompting an individual to make concessions, targets of anger may become more likely to deceive, retaliate, or walk away from a deal.

A substantial literature has explored these complexities. For example, anger appears to elicit concessions when the anger is directed at a counterpart's offer, but not if it is directed at the counterpart, an important boundary condition (Steinel et al. 2008). The effect of anger also appears to be U-shaped, with moderate anger extracting the most favorable concessions (Adam & Brett 2018). There is also evidence that if strong values are at stake in the negotiation, anger can actually trigger an escalation of conflict (Harinck & Van Kleef 2012).

Across many experiments, two inputs appear to explain substantial variance: the relative power of the parties involved and the appropriateness of the anger (Van Kleef & Côté 2007). For instance, anger appears to work best when one's counterpart has poor alternatives if no deal is reached (Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006). Having alternatives essentially gives people the power to ignore a counterpart's anger or retaliate if the anger seems inappropriate, such as when standards of fairness are violated (Van Kleef et al. 2008, Adam et al. 2010). A third related factor might be the authenticity of the anger expression. If the target of an anger expression perceives it to be inauthentic and strategic, this may harm trust and relational outcomes (Campagna et al. 2016).

Anger and relationships. Given that research finds that anger expressions can extract concessions, should negotiators start expressing anger during their negotiations?

Recent scholarship has identified several drawbacks to expressing anger. First, someone who is consistently angry loses the emotional variability that makes anger effective (Sinaceur et al. 2013a). Feeling anger can also harm negotiated outcomes because it reduces perspective taking and promotes the risky use of deception (Yip & Schweitzer 2016, 2019; Yip & Schweinsberg 2017; Hunsaker 2017). Among the biggest negative consequences of expressing anger is the direct harm it causes to relationships; anger increases negative feelings and decreases trust during and after the negotiation, and this is true of both the party expressing anger and the target of that anger (Campagna et al. 2016, 2019; Jang & Bottom 2022) (see the section titled Relationships for more).

Overall, while anger may be useful in extracting concessions, caveat emptor, as it can also cloud one's judgment, escalate conflict, decrease trust, increase the likelihood of an impasse, affect deal implementation, and negatively impact one's reputation, which can destroy long-term economic value—all of which are highly important in real-world negotiations.

The Expression of Other Emotions

Though anger remains the most studied emotion in negotiation scholarship, researchers have begun to study a broader set of emotions, such as disappointment (Lelieveld et al. 2011, 2013). Like anger, disappointment (e.g., "I'm disappointed that your last offer doesn't seem to consider my interests; I thought we were working together to find a mutually beneficial deal") can convey disapproval and frustration that one's goals are blocked—but rather than triggering fear, disappointment can elicit the complementary emotion of guilt. As a result, expressing disappointment can help negotiators extract a better deal, so long as their disappointment actually evokes guilt, which is more likely to happen when a negotiation counterpart is an ingroup, rather than an outgroup, member (Lelieveld et al. 2011, 2013). In many cases, disappointment affords the strategic benefits of anger without the relational costs—though the set of circumstances in which negotiators can effectively express disappointment may be limited.

General Affect and Mood

Negotiation scholarship has largely shifted away from the study of general affect or mood (i.e., diffuse positive or negative feeling states). This represents a missed opportunity, since mood can be examined through the same social functional lens that researchers have used to advance our understanding of discrete emotions. To understand the social functions of mood, it is helpful to apply basic principles from the affect literature, such as implicit attributions, mental accessibility, and stop and go signals (Clore et al. 2018).

Early mood scholarship found that moods are often contagious (e.g., Neumann & Strack 2000). Therefore, rather than invoking complementary emotions like anger does with fear, positive affect perpetuates itself in kind, becoming attached to whatever is most mentally accessible, which is often one's own negotiation strategy. Thus, positive affect can spread across counterparts, promoting the use of cooperative strategies (Carnevale & Isen 1986; see Barry et al. 2006 for a review and a discussion of exceptions).

Mood can also convey information, but it often does so implicitly, in contrast with the more overt way that discrete emotions operate. For example, research has shown that negotiators in a positive mood, triggered by stimuli unrelated to the negotiation, engage in more cooperative strategies (Forgas 1998).

Finally, mood may also act as an incentive, serving as a stop or go signal for one's current inclinations. This is particularly important because positive mood may act as a green light at critical junctures, thus lubricating negotiation by promoting creative problem solving (Forgas 1998, Rhoades et al. 2001), making people more likely to disclose information, decreasing equivocal communication (Forgas & Cromer 2004), and even promoting the willingness to implement a final agreement (Mislin et al. 2011).

Because of mood's key features, its social functions remain relatively hidden, which can be a strategic asset. For example, a compliment given at the beginning of the negotiation might be discounted by one's counterpart as a Machiavellian ploy, but expressing a positive mood may not trigger the same skepticism. Even positive moods, however, have potential downsides for negotiators who may become overconfident or make too many concessions (e.g., Barry 2008). Overall, both mood and arousal, the other primary dimension of affective states (along with valence), are empirically underexplored (Brown & Curhan 2013).

Future Directions

Negotiation offers an ideal context for the study of emotion, and substantial work remains to be done. For example, how should negotiators regulate their own emotions? In contrast to most domains, negotiators often up-display their negative emotions (i.e., display more anger than they feel) and down-display their positive emotions (e.g., hide their full happiness after receiving a favorable offer). Future work might explore not only the regulation of one's own emotion but also the regulation of a highly emotional counterpart; such work might draw on related subfields such as crisis negotiation (Rogan et al. 1997).

In addition to focusing on the emotions and moods that negotiators express, we call for additional work to explore how negotiators feel and to broaden the set of emotions scholars investigate. The most common emotion negotiators experience is anxiety, which causes negotiators to make concessions and respond quickly because they seek to exit a negotiation (Brooks & Schweitzer 2011). Alternatively, negotiators may envy their counterpart, which increases the likelihood that they will deceive them (Moran & Schweitzer 2008). An emerging literature has begun to broaden our understanding of emotion in negotiation, but substantial work is needed.

RELATIONSHIPS

In practice, for an investment banker, a member of the school board, or anyone just trying to navigate daily life, building relationships prior to and during a negotiation is critical. Most negotiation research, however, is arelational. Criticism for this oversight (Greenhalgh 1987, Barley 1991) led to greater work on relationships in negotiation, but this area still remains substantially underinvestigated (Cheng et al. 2016).

Scholarship on negotiation and relationships has primarily examined (*a*) how counterparts' relationship type (e.g., whether they are strangers, friends, business associates, etc.) affects negotiation outcomes, (*b*) how personality traits and situational factors impact how relationship-focused people are when negotiating, and (*c*) how specific behaviors during negotiation impact relationships.

Relationship Types

Imagine an MBA graduate who lands a new job, then negotiates with the human resource department about their compensation package, with their romantic partner about whether to move to New York or London, with their team about who will take the lead on a new project, with clients throughout their first year, and then with their boss for a promotion after their annual review. These are all very different relational contexts requiring very different strategies for success—and the negotiation literature has surprisingly little to say about navigating these challenges.

Even basic questions such as how relational closeness impacts negotiation has yielded discrepant findings. Some scholars have found that relational closeness promotes information sharing and greater joint gains (Greenhalgh & Chapman 1998), but other work has found that relational closeness harms joint gains, because people seek to reduce conflict (e.g., Curhan et al. 2008). Valley et al. (1995) proposed a U-shaped model, suggesting that people who are not close (strangers) and people who are very close (romantic partners) have worse joint outcomes compared to people who are moderately close (colleagues). It is unlikely that a simple framework will be sufficient to analyze how the relational context impacts negotiations, but the recent literature is surprisingly silent about this topic.

Relationship Focus

Another way to explore negotiation and relationships is to isolate personality types or specific situational triggers that make people more or less relationship focused. One ambitious attempt by Gelfand et al. (2006) proposed a link between relational self-construal (RSC) and negotiations. RSC aims to capture people's varying tendency to think about themselves as fundamentally interconnected to others, which should lead people to strive to accommodate their counterparts in negotiation. Empirical research is limited, but in one investigation, high-self-construal negotiators achieved lower joint gains, as negotiators aimed to maximize relational capital at the expense of economic capital (Curhan et al. 2008).

Relationship Implications

A third way to think about relationships and negotiation is to consider the relational consequences of negotiation behavior (Brown & Curhan 2012). For example, anger expression is a divergent predictor in that it may improve deal terms but harm relational outcomes. In fact, most prior work has conceptualized economic and relational outcomes as elements of a trade-off. For example, when negotiators have high relational concerns, they are less likely to use coercive tactics and often claim less value in a negotiation (e.g., Greenhalgh & Gilkey 1993, Greenhalgh & Chapman

1998). Although it is undoubtedly true that relational concerns can cause negotiators to agree to less economically advantageous deal terms, typical negotiation paradigms make it difficult to know when that represents a mistake.

After all, better relational outcomes may ultimately yield greater economic outcomes by increasing negotiation opportunities in the future, enhancing a negotiator's reputation, and changing how one's counterpart behaves after a negotiation concludes (Hart & Schweitzer 2022). Single-shot negotiation paradigms that pair anonymous negotiators may find that relational concerns harm economic value, but these findings may fail to reflect the reality for most negotiators (Jang et al. 2018, Hart & Schweitzer 2022).

A few studies have extended the time horizon of negotiations, with intriguing results. One line of inquiry considered multiple rounds of negotiation. This work found that by boosting relational outcomes in early rounds, negotiators achieved greater economic outcomes in later rounds (Curhan et al. 2010; cf. Becker & Curhan 2018). Another set of studies considered post-negotiation behavior, finding that aggressive negotiation tactics can create relationship conflict and lower one's motivation to fulfill obligations to a counterpart after a deal has been reached (Hart & Schweitzer 2020). After aggressively negotiating with a babysitter, cleaning service, or new employee, an individual may secure favorable deal terms but leave their counterpart unmotivated to do their job well. In these cases, did they really negotiate a good deal? Work exploring these aspects is consistent with the broad push to incorporate relational outcomes as a key component of deal making (Olekalns & Brett 2008) and part of the subjective value of a negotiation outcome (Curhan et al. 2006, 2009).

Summary

Key negotiation questions, such as exactly how to value relational outcomes, how to adapt one's behavior across different relationship types, and even how to build effective relationships, remain open. Hopefully, the next decade of scholarship will yield insights capable of making one's overall relationship strategy increasingly evidence based.

GENDER

Early research on gender and negotiations failed to find reliable effects. For example, Rubin & Brown (1975) reviewed dozens of studies, providing evidence—in roughly equal proportion—for greater male cooperativeness, greater female cooperativeness, and no gender differences. Twenty years later, a meta-analysis provided only weak support for increased male competitiveness (Walters et al. 1998). Such conflicting results had a chilling effect on the literature, so much so that subsequent large reviews of negotiation scholarship did not even mention gender (e.g., Bazerman et al. 2000). These contradictory results arose in part because researchers failed to consider the extent to which gender identities—and thus the gender stereotypes activated during negotiation—vary across circumstances.

The key idea behind the recent resurgence of gender research is reflected in two stereotypes: the stereotype that women are expected to be kind, communal, and warm; and the stereotype that negotiators are expected to be tough, agentic, and assertive (for a recent review, see Bowles et al. 2022). Because people internalize these stereotypes, women negotiators face a difficult challenge: They need to act counter-stereotypically, which has a host of downstream consequences (e.g., Eagly & Wood 2012). Notably, the stereotypes that drive gender effects are not always activated, do not have the same strength, and are not applied equally across situations—i.e., they differ along the dimensions that have guided current research on key moderators.

If moderators toggle the basic gender effects, what are the basic effects? There are many, but the literature can be helpfully organized around three key themes: (*a*) how men and women feel

about negotiating, (*b*) how others perceive men and women when they negotiate, and (*c*) men's and women's negotiation outcomes.

Psychological Experience

To negotiate effectively, women often need to act counter-stereotypically, and one salient consequence of contradicting one's prescribed gender role is uncertainty and anxiety. The most well-researched manifestation of this anxiety is the decision about whether or not to negotiate in the first place; and indeed, a 2018 meta-analysis confirmed women's lower likelihood to initiate negotiations compared to men (Kugler et al. 2018). It is important to note that these gender differences are relatively small (Hedge's $g = 0.2$) and attenuated, or even reversed, when negotiations are framed as cooperative versus competitive, or as an opportunity to ask instead of an opportunity to negotiate (Small et al. 2007). Context also matters: When asked about their intentions to negotiate, women reported a greater likelihood of initiating negotiations about mutual living, whereas men reported a greater likelihood of initiating negotiations in other contexts, such as contracts, compensation, or rent (Reif et al. 2019). Again, it is worth reiterating that the factors that moderate women's likelihood to initiate negotiation are exactly those that allow women to feel that they can negotiate without acting counter-stereotypically.

In addition to the initiation phase, future research might examine other phases of negotiation, such as post-negotiation, where negotiators often take stock of how the interaction went. For example, it would be interesting to explore how gender role expectancies and the associated anxiety people feel cause them to form inaccurate and overly pessimistic beliefs about what their counterparts might think of them (e.g., "That was a tough negotiation, does my counterpart hate me now?") (Boothby et al. 2018, Mastroianni et al. 2021).

Finally, it is worth noting that recent data, such as detailed labor market data, have found that women often do initiate negotiations as often as men, such as asking for promotions and raises, but they are less likely to get what they ask for (Artz et al. 2018). This is important, because it suggests a very different prescription than if the problem were simply about asking, and it also hints at some deeper reasons for the anxiety and uncertainty that many women experience.

Others' Perceptions

Not only do women often feel worse about negotiating, but others often judge them harshly for doing so. These effects are related: When women are forced to act counter-stereotypically, this feels bad in part because they expect to be judged harshly for violating gender norms (Amanatullah & Morris 2010). For example, highly assertive women were perceived as more demanding and less nice, compared to men who engaged in identical behavior (Bowles et al. 2007). Similarly, women who negotiated assertively were evaluated as less likable and less suitable leaders, although this effect was attenuated when they negotiated on someone else's behalf (i.e., when adopting an advocacy role) (Amanatullah & Tinsley 2013).

Although there are no meta-analyses of these backlash effects for negotiation specifically, Williams & Tiedens (2016) have compiled the effects for dominance displays in general, finding that women receive backlash that affects everything from their likability to their hireability. One salient moderator—which is underexplored in the negotiation literature—is whether the dominance behavior is displayed explicitly or implicitly, with explicit dominance (e.g., verbal demands) eliciting backlash and implicit dominance (e.g., eye contact) not doing so, ostensibly because implicit behavior is not always encoded as counter-stereotypic.

Taken together, these results are consistent with women being penalized for behaving counter-stereotypically, leaving women in a serious bind when negotiation requires exactly the sort of behavior that is forbidden by their prescribed gender roles.

Outcomes

The incongruity between the stereotypes of woman and negotiator can also impair women's negotiation outcomes compared to men's (e.g., Kray & Thompson 2004). A 2015 meta-analysis revealed that men achieved superior economic outcomes compared to women, on average, but these gender differences were strongly dependent on the context of the negotiation (Mazei et al. 2015). Gender differences were attenuated when negotiators received information about the bargaining range or had even a small amount of experience negotiating, and differences were even reversed under conditions of high role congruity, such as when the issue being negotiated was more traditionally feminine (e.g., negotiating materials for the jewelry industry versus the automobile industry) (Bear & Babcock 2012) or when negotiating on someone else's behalf (Bowles et al. 2005). Indeed, advocating for others (i.e., behaving in line with the feminine stereotype of communality) made women more assertive and even increased their strategic use of deception (Kouchaki & Kray 2018)—and they expected and received less social backlash for doing so (Amanatullah & Morris 2010).

One final moderator of women's outcomes is the gender of their counterpart (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery 2013), although results are mixed. On the one hand, research shows that women sometimes behave more competitively (albeit indirectly so) when they negotiate with men compared to when they negotiate with women (Bowles & Flynn 2010). On the other hand, recent work found that girls as young as 8–9 years of age requested fewer stickers from a male evaluator compared to a female evaluator, whereas boys' behavior did not vary according their evaluator's gender (Arnold & McAuliffe 2021). Across both investigations, women appear to adapt to the gender of their counterpart more so than men, which can either reduce or exacerbate gender differences in outcomes.

Overall Thoughts

The previous three sections on gender tell a consistent story: Early studies highlighted salient examples of gender effects, such as women's reluctance to initiate negotiations, the backlash they receive for assertive bargaining, and their diminished outcomes compared to men's. Research continued, aided by several meta-analyses, which tempered the magnitude of the original conclusions and embraced several important moderators, such as the negotiation topic, the cooperative or competitive framing, and how women's assertiveness is encoded by perceivers. Many of these moderators eliminate or reverse gender effects and reinforce the importance of understanding the nuanced psychology of stereotype activation as a main driver of the observed effects.

One additional interesting observation is that gender's impact on negotiation outcomes appears to be weaker than the links between gender and (*a*) how it feels to negotiate and (*b*) the social judgment incurred for doing so. There are two possible reasons: First, many women know that certain situations require them to display traits such as assertiveness, despite the discomfort and judgment of others they experience for doing so. Second, though acting like a stereotypically assertive negotiator can be beneficial in some contexts, negotiation does not always require this. In fact, we suspect that if negotiation research were less paradigm bound, it would be even more apparent that overly assertive and self-focused negotiating, though perhaps successful in a simulation, does not translate into a good negotiation in the real world.

Building on this idea, recall that gender effects arise not only because of the stereotype about women but also because of the stereotype about what a good negotiator is. Most real-world negotiations require savvy impression management, ability to listen, emotional intelligence, cooperation, consensus building, strong ethics, and a focus on the long-term relationship (Kennedy & Kray

2015, Kray & Kennedy 2017). As a result, acting like a stereotypical, overly assertive negotiator may be more of a hazard than a help.

This may be one underappreciated reason women rapidly improve after taking a negotiation class or with some experience (Mazei et al. 2015). It is often inferred that, with experience, women become more comfortable being assertive. In some cases, this is undoubtedly true; but the process of feeling more comfortable and improving one's outcomes can also stem from realizing that being a good negotiator does not actually require these stereotypic negotiator traits. Good negotiation can often be performed from within one's gender role. And so, while society is slowly changing its outdated stereotypes about women, it is important to remember that progress—perhaps even faster progress—can also come from the other direction, by changing our ill-conceived stereotype of what a good negotiator is.

Future Directions

Gender differences are complex. Consider a recent set of studies documenting a high impasse rate for female negotiators with strong alternatives, a finding that would be difficult to fit into the simpler gender narratives of the past (Dannals et al. 2021). Moreover, to understand the effect of gender on negotiation, it is imperative to focus not just on negotiated salaries, but also on career issues such as work-family arrangements and professional development (Bowles et al. 2019). In addition, there is interesting recent work examining how men's motivation to prove their masculinity, rather than simply women's apprehension, may also play a role in gender differences in negotiation (e.g., Mazei et al. 2021, 2022).

Finally, future work should also investigate the intersection of issues such as gender, race, and culture (e.g., Shan et al. 2016; Toosi et al. 2019, 2020). This is particularly important in light of work showing that culture may moderate gender stereotypes. For example, whereas members of individualistic cultures are more likely to stereotype men as agentic, members of collectivistic cultures are more likely to stereotype men as communal, reflecting the dominant values of that culture (Cuddy et al. 2015). As a result, in more collectivist cultures that privilege group harmony over individual assertiveness, there is evidence that men do not outperform women (Shan et al. 2016). These findings underscore the importance of intersectional analyses to understand gender differences. May the next decade allow for a more nuanced appreciation of the challenges faced by women at the bargaining table and for a swift abandonment of the harmful, simplistic stereotypes of woman and negotiator.

CULTURE

Culture—the characteristic beliefs, norms, and values of a social group—influences the way people negotiate. But how? It seems this should be an easy question to answer, because anyone who has negotiated in Frankfurt, Paris, or Mumbai can appreciate the unique quality of getting a deal done with Germans, French, or Indians.

One challenge, of course, is to reduce a vast amount of cultural nuance into something scientifically meaningful and practically useful. A good analogue is research on personality, which through parsimonious dimension reduction has largely settled on the Big Five. To be fair, sometimes the Big Five become the Big Six (i.e., HEXACO), but that is nothing compared to culture, for which it seems like a rite of passage for scholars to propose their own list of dimensions.

For example, there are Hofstede's four (or five?) dimensions (1980, 2001); Schwartz's value dimensions (1994); the six dimensions of loyal versus utilitarian involvement (Smith et al. 1996); tightness and looseness (Gelfand et al. 2011); the five social axiom dimensions (Leung & Bond

2004); the nine value dimensions examined by the GLOBE Study (House et al. 2004); and practical amalgams, such as the eight dimensions proposed in the book titled *The Culture Map* (Meyer 2014). Which are most helpful for negotiation?

East Versus West

In the 1990s and 2000s, many dimensions that characterize culture were applied to many aspects of negotiation, resulting in an explosion of research (e.g., Gelfand & Brett 2004). Nevertheless, of all the possible dimensions that could characterize culture, negotiation research was dominated by one: individualism versus collectivism, one of Hofstede's four original dimensions, primarily used to capture the difference between Western and East Asian cultures. Collectivism/individualism—and the related distinction between interdependence/independence (Markus & Kitayama 1991)—have been challenged empirically regarding whether they accurately capture the differences between East and West (Oyserman et al. 2002, Vignoles et al. 2016). It is unclear whether such distinctions can be rehabilitated with better theory and measurement (Minkov et al. 2017). At the very least, recent research has sought to correct the disproportionate emphasis on the narrow lens of East versus West.

Face, Dignity, and Honor

One new stream of research focuses on including additional cultures, such as the Middle East and Latin America, by focusing on three cultural prototypes, each reflecting a unique motivational system guiding how people assign self-worth: face, dignity, and honor (Leung & Cohen 2011; Aslani et al. 2013, 2016).

In dignity cultures, self-worth is based on the individual's achievements. This roughly maps onto individualist Western cultures. In face cultures, self-worth is based on whether the individual fulfills their social role obligations, which roughly maps onto collectivist Eastern cultures. In honor cultures, self-worth is based on an individual's reputation. Scholars have postulated that honor cultures tend to emerge in relatively lawless environments where, because institutions are unreliable, individuals must enforce contracts, protect themselves, and punish social transgressors (Nowak et al. 2016); some examples include the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, Spain, and the Southern United States.

A key finding is that negotiators from honor and face cultures rely more heavily on competitive negotiation strategies than do negotiators from dignity cultures. Face and honor negotiators seek to claim more value than their counterparts, and in doing so they apply more pressure, feigned anger, dishonesty, and exaggeration to secure a better deal (e.g., Leung & Cohen 2011, Aslani et al. 2016, Yao et al. 2017a). Negotiators from dignity cultures, on the other hand, engage in more information sharing due to increased trust, resulting in greater joint gains.

It might seem puzzling that face and honor cultures would be associated with aggressive value-claiming strategies, such as deceit and tactical exaggeration. After all, how does this square with the social role obligations that animate face cultures or the reputational concerns of honor cultures? Notably, the effect of culture on negotiation is directly affected by who is participating in the negotiation. For example, Chinese negotiators decrease their use of potentially relationship-threatening strategies when negotiating with ingroup members (Wong & Hong 2005, Liu et al. 2012). This logic extends to honor cultures as well: Reputationally focused negotiating only promotes cooperation when there is sufficient signal to assure both parties that they are unlikely to be exploited.

This insight, that the norms governing relationally focused cultures are sensitive to the identity of the other party, is not new (e.g., Markus & Kitayama 1991, Gelfand & Cai 2004), but

applying this insight requires researchers to examine negotiation across relational contexts and in the field, which is rarely done. For example, in contrast to the aggressive behavior described above, recent work shows that strong relational concerns cause East Asians to be significantly less likely to negotiate their initial salaries (Lu 2022). More research is required.

Another fruitful line of future research is related to the linguistic patterns that characterize successful negotiations, such as the factual, logical approach that promotes creative agreements in the United States but may harm agreement in a place like Egypt, where language that reflects the protection of honor promotes more creative deals (Gelfand et al. 2015). A second area of focus might be on broad principles that explain cultural differences, such as differences in how trust is developed; consider, for example, the rapid emergence of trust in interactions among strangers in the United States, compared to the reluctance to extend trust in a culture like India (Gunia et al. 2011). Such scholarship is of considerable help when thinking about how to bargain in unfamiliar contexts.

Reflections on the Current Frameworks

What is intriguing about a distinction among face, dignity, and honor is that these cultural categories arise in response to specific and long-standing social and economic challenges (e.g., Gelfand et al. 2011); moreover, these distinctions are related to important constructs, such as the psychology of aggression, which dictate the fault lines of human conflict (Severance et al. 2013). On the other hand, although this face/dignity/honor framework may represent an improvement in inclusivity, this trio is likely subject to the same empirical criticism as the collectivism/individualism duo. Indeed, such broad cultural typologies, which are certainly of scientific and historical interest, are often of less practical help.

Practically, it may be more helpful to (*a*) develop cultural frameworks from within negotiation rather than importing outside frameworks, and (*b*) have a more flexible strategy to deal with the inevitable uncertainty and nuances that arise when talking to someone from a different culture. Together we think of these as context-driven and context-free strategies, respectively, to deal with cross-cultural negotiation.

Context-Driven Strategy

Rather than characterizing the world's cultures on three dimensions and then applying these dimensions to negotiation, it may be more promising to start with key inputs that drive negotiation behavior and consider how culture influences these inputs. For example, Brett & Gelfand (2006) started with basic inputs into negotiation: how people persuade, how they make attributions, how they communicate during conflict, how they make group decisions, and on what metrics people judge their negotiation outcomes. They then considered contrasts such as how some cultures persuade using economic reasons whereas others persuade by referencing social norms, how some cultures make group decisions hierarchically in contrast to others that are consensus driven, and so forth. One strength of this approach is that it starts with dimensions that specifically apply to negotiation and then considers cultural variation on those dimensions at the level of granularity that is most useful. After all, one does not negotiate in an "honor culture," one negotiates in India, or with even more granularity, in North India or South India. This approach seems like the natural first step in developing a context-driven strategy for cross-cultural negotiation.

Context-Free Strategy

Recent research has started to investigate what we conceptualize as context-free strategies, which might bypass the need to fully understand the dimensions on which a culture varies. For example,

Ang et al. (2007) introduce the term cultural intelligence (CQ) to reflect an individual's capability to adapt effectively to situations of cultural diversity (see also Liu et al. 2010). In one study, higher CQ individuals engaged in more integrative information behaviors, which facilitated greater joint value creation in cross-cultural negotiation (Imai & Gelfand 2010). Similarly, dynamic awareness adjustment (DAA) reflects the extent to which people dynamically update their assumptions and beliefs (e.g., Tinsley et al. 2022). More research is needed in this line of inquiry, but this approach could lend itself to a flexible context-free strategy that people can deploy in any cross-cultural negotiation, especially in situations where detailed cultural knowledge is lacking.

Future Directions

Returning to one of our central contentions, negotiation research can be surprisingly hard to apply. This is especially true when it comes to negotiation scholarship on culture. We suggest two potential approaches to make cultural research more practical, a context-driven strategy that isolates the most important inputs into negotiation and then examines how these inputs vary across cultures, and a context-free strategy that focuses on flexible communication patterns that apply to any cross-cultural interaction. Ultimately, a promising approach may be to blend context-driven and context-free strategies into something like a context-aware approach, with empirically backed assumptions about a specific cultural context along with a generous dose of cross-cultural openness.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

What traits make someone a highly effective negotiator? For decades, this question has eluded researchers. Barry & Friedman (1998, p. 345) wrote that "the overall legacy of research on personality and bargaining is one of inconsistency and confusion. Few findings have proven replicable, and contradictory results are not uncommon." This pessimism, characterized as the irrelevance consensus (Sharma et al. 2013), has recently been called into question.

Though early evidence suggested that personality plays a small role in bargaining, researchers knew that situational and methodological constraints might be masking the effects of personality (e.g., Thompson 1990). Indeed, to fully appreciate the power of individual differences, it is important to consider how personalities interact (Elfenbein 2021). This prompted a new era of research that embraced complexity.

Three areas of research have emerged as a result of this perspective shift, which (*a*) analyze how counterparts' traits interact to influence negotiation outcomes, (*b*) compare the simple effects of traits with counterpart interaction effects, and (*c*) place an increased focus on how individual differences impact relational, as opposed to strictly economic, outcomes.

Beyond Individual Negotiator Effects

One of the clearest examples of how traits interact to produce negotiation outcomes derives from research on trait similarity. For example, negotiators who have similarly high or low levels of extraversion and agreeableness reach agreements more quickly, perceive less relational conflict, and arrive at more positive impressions of one another (Wilson et al. 2016). These outcomes are thought to be driven by more positive emotional displays while interacting. Critically, however, an individual's own level of extraversion and agreeableness has little bearing on their positive emotional displays; rather, these effects only emerge when considering the similarity of both parties involved and the interaction between them.

There is also trait complementarity, whereby different (and sometimes opposite) traits can interact to influence negotiated outcomes. For example, a dominant negotiator (one person

behaving more dominantly, taking charge of the conversation) paired with a submissive negotiator (someone behaving submissively, speaking softly) can lead negotiators to exchange information more effectively, resulting in superior joint outcomes (Wiltermuth et al. 2015).

Individual Effects Versus Individual × Counterpart Effects

In addition to the focus on how traits interact, scholars have continued to search for stable main effects. Elfenbein et al. (2008) surveyed negotiators on dozens of traits and had individuals engage in a series of negotiations with different counterparts, allowing them to tease apart the unique effect of the individual traits from the effects of the individual × counterpart interaction. Together and independently, these effects helped to account for variance in negotiation performance, negotiators' satisfaction with their outcomes, and negotiators' feelings about their relationship with their counterpart (see also Elfenbein et al. 2018, 2022). Despite the need for further research, such experimental designs show considerable promise, especially when paired with increasing interest in exploring negotiations as turn-by-turn interactions (see the section titled Negotiation as Conversation).

Beyond Economic Outcomes

Historically, it has been difficult to link individual differences with economic outcomes. For example, Kim et al. (2014, 2015) found that emotional intelligence is not associated with higher individual or joint economic gains. However, these same studies found that emotional intelligence is positively correlated with a partner's trust, satisfaction, and desire to work together again. So, quite possibly, emotional intelligence is indeed related to economic gain—just not on the timescale that is typically measured by negotiation paradigms. This is particularly important to remember when studying individual differences, because they are often directly linked to relational outcomes (see the section titled Relationships).

Future Directions

Prior research has focused on characteristics such as personality (e.g., the Big Five), prosocial motivation (e.g., cooperative or individualistic), and expectancies (e.g., negotiation confidence), but significantly less is known about other individual differences, such as age, social class, and education (Kappes et al. 2020; see Elfenbein 2015 for a review). In addition, a recent review of individual differences identified the single best predictor of negotiation performance as having a positive mindset—the belief that negotiation is an appropriate course of action and confidence in one's own efficacy (Sharma et al. 2013). This stands in sharp contrast to what most people fear going into negotiation, that is, that cynical tactics will prevail, which it turns out does not predict negotiation performance. Such findings suggest an important line of investigation into how people might develop a positive mindset. Thus, individual differences may in fact function as a key tool for improving one's ability at the bargaining table.

DECEPTION AND TRUST

Negotiators can often gain a significant advantage, at least in the short term, by engaging in deception. This temptation creates an enduring tension in negotiations between deception and trust.

Deception

Deception is made more likely in negotiation by factors such as liberal norms and information asymmetries (Gaspar et al. 2019). For example, if one thinks deception is normative, they

are more likely to justify their own use of deception in response (Mason et al. 2018). Information asymmetries also create opportunities for deception: After learning that a buyer prefers an early closing date, a seller who also prefers an early closing date can misrepresent their preference (e.g., "I would prefer a later closing date, but for a better price, I would consider an earlier one").

Along with these basic features, research has focused on the proximal psychological factors that make negotiators more likely to engage in deception. These factors include feelings of anger (Yip & Schweitzer 2016), envy (Moran & Schweitzer 2008), competitiveness (Schweitzer et al. 2005), and high confidence (Gaspar & Schweitzer 2021). Certain situational characteristics also increase the likelihood of deception, such as unmet goals, especially when people are close to reaching a goal (Schweitzer et al. 2004). Negotiators are also particularly likely to deceive when they are representing a group (Aaldering et al. 2020). Finally, negotiators have been shown to justify their own use of deception when they lack power (Koning et al. 2011), they fear exploitation (Steinel & de Dreu 2004), or their counterpart has a dishonest reputation (SimanTov-Nachlieli et al. 2020). Future work should build on recent scholarship that has begun to organize these moderators into useful frameworks (see Gaspar et al. 2019).

Trust

Deception may be tempting, but when it is revealed, it can cause enduring harm to trust, a fundamental currency of negotiation (Schweitzer et al. 2006). Indeed, the more negotiators trust one another, the more likely they are to share information, rely on the information they receive, collaborate with their counterparts, continue talking in the face of crisis, and reach mutually beneficial outcomes (Druckman & Olekalns 2013, Kong et al. 2014, Yao et al. 2017b; see Lewicki & Polin 2013 for a review). Trust, however, is fragile, and violations—especially early in a negotiation—can substantially harm outcomes and ruin reputations (Croson et al. 2003, Lount et al. 2008). In light of trust's benefits and its fragility, trust scholarship has focused on (*a*) how to build trust, (*b*) how to repair it when it is broken, and (*c*) how trust is conveyed, perceived, and misperceived.

In terms of building trust, scholars have found that people are more trusting when they feel positive affect, even if those feelings are only incidental (Dunn & Schweitzer 2005, Lount 2010); that small talk helps builds trust (Mislin et al. 2011); and that it is easier to build trust in face-to-face settings (Damen et al. 2020).

Although not always in the context of negotiation, researchers have explored strategies to repair trust (e.g., Lewicki & Brinsfield 2017). Apologies help to repair trust, with promises to change representing a particularly important component (Schweitzer et al. 2006, Lewicki et al. 2016). Compensation for past wrongs also helps repair trust (Desmet et al. 2011, Druckman et al. 2019). Repairing trust is also easier if transgressors can blame incompetence rather than having to acknowledge an integrity violation (Kim et al. 2004). Given its importance and the frequency with which transgressions occur, more research investigating trust repair is needed, but the existing literature offers the beginnings of some very practical advice.

Less researched is in whom we should actually place our trust (see Levine et al. 2018), the accuracy of people's trustworthiness judgments (Schilke & Huang 2018, Schweitzer et al. 2018), whether people know if they themselves are trusted (Brion et al. 2015), and the effect of initial trust judgments on future interactions (Campagna et al. 2022). Moreover, although there is considerable research on how trust judgments are formed—such as through perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI)—many open questions remain, such as how trust cues might be related to trust's central functions in negotiation: the accurate transfer of information and the good faith implementation of a final agreement (e.g., Lewicki & Polin 2013, van der Werff & Buckley 2017).

Future Directions

The deception and trust literatures have considerable room to develop. For example, deception is often conceptualized as a dichotomy (honest versus deceptive) rather than a continuum, including phenomena such as paltering—the use of truthful statements to mislead a counterpart (Rogers et al. 2017)—or deflection—answering a question with another question that shifts the focus of the conversation (Bitterly & Schweitzer 2020). In light of this new research on different kinds of unethical behavior, it would be interesting to integrate this work with prior work that has attempted to organize unethical behavior into broad types (e.g., Lewicki & Robinson 1998; see also Robinson et al. 2000).

The existing literature has also focused on informational lies, with less attention to the common misrepresentation of emotion—that is, people exaggerating the intensity of an emotion or displaying an emotion they are not actually feeling (Fulmer et al. 2009, Côté et al. 2013; see also Methasani et al. 2017). Moreover, deception is often conceptualized as an act within a negotiation interaction, but recent work examines insincere negotiation in which the whole negotiation is premised on a lie; for example, rather than seeking to reach a deal, negotiators may enter a negotiation with ulterior motives, such as to stall for time, gain information, or manage impressions (Kang et al. 2020).

We see a surprising lack of cross-pollination between the deception literature in negotiation and the lie detection literature (e.g., Levine 2019). For example, related scholarship has found that even small changes in question wording can systematically influence the veracity of people's answers (Minson et al. 2018). Similarly, the use of deception may be influenced by physical and temporal cues (e.g., reminders of time, money, etc.), which is likely to have implications for negotiations (Gunia 2019).

In addition to detecting lies, how people deliver lies is also underexplored. Consider capitulation risk, that is, the risk that by misrepresenting a common interest, one's counterpart might capitulate and give them what they pretended they wanted. Now the original party is stuck. This risk can be mitigated by closely monitoring how people respond to an initial deception attempt (Schweitzer et al. 2002), with emotional intelligence being one predictor of people's success (Gaspar et al. 2022).

Finally, although trust remains an active area of inquiry, the literature on trust in negotiation remains underdeveloped, and there is significant psychological nuance that has yet to be fully explored: how trust is built, how it can be repaired, and whether people have insight into their own and others' trustworthiness as they negotiate (Lewicki & Polin 2013, Lu et al. 2017).

TEAMS AND MULTIPARTY

Team negotiation (i.e., team versus team) and multiparty negotiation (i.e., three or more parties, which can be individuals or teams) are far more complex than individual or dyadic negotiation. They produce many psychological dynamics that are as intriguing as they are understudied.

Early research on team negotiation focused on basic effects that are broadly consistent with the small group performance literature. For example, teams of negotiators tend to outperform solos by discovering more compatible issues, engaging in more mutually beneficial trade-offs, and increasing joint profit—benefits that appear to flow from increased information exchange (Thompson et al. 1996, Morgan & Tindale 2002; for a broad discussion, see Brodt & Thompson 2001). Recent research has continued to elucidate some of the benefits of groups, such as the ability to reach an impasse when an impasse is optimal (Cohen et al. 2014), weaker fixed pie perceptions, and a tendency to engage in more integrative bargaining (Kern et al. 2020). In short, teams seem to have cognitive and motivational advantages over individuals, which can lead to better deals when

information transfer and creative problem solving are critical (see the section titled Intergroup Conflict on the more competitive tendencies of groups).

Just as team negotiation is understudied, so too is multiparty negotiation (Kramer 1991, Gray 2011; for review, see Polzer et al. 1995; for a different interdisciplinary perspective, see Crump 2006, Crump & Glendon 2003). This represents a missed opportunity, because interacting in groups is categorically different from interacting in dyads—in terms of information processing, strategy, conversational mechanics, and interpersonal dynamics.

A basic outline of a framework was developed in older work (e.g., Mannix et al. 1989, Pruitt & Carnevale 1993, Weingart et al. 1993), which inspired work in the 2000s, a decade that saw sustained interest in groups before it waned in recent years (e.g., Gillespie et al. 2000, Beersma & de Dreu 2002, Weingart et al. 2007). Consider several fundamental properties of multiparty interaction: First, for every issue raised, there are now more people who have a preference about it. Second, there are not only more preferences but also more personalities. Moreover, how people act in a group is a function of many things, such as how people respond to status and hierarchy, their impression management motives, and whether they are cooperatively oriented or more individualistically oriented in relation to their groups. Third, and finally, in contrast to the less structured decision-making style of dyads, groups interact and make decisions in more structured ways, often involving things like pre-meetings of key stakeholders, formal opening statements, and procedures for registering preferences such as voting.

Preferences, personalities, and procedures are three main factors that animated the older literature on multiparty negotiation. Together, these factors give rise to the complex psychology of coalitions and coalition building. Whenever three or more parties work to reach a decision—whether a business consortium or a family meeting—it is likely that at least two parties will try to combine forces to their advantage; and in doing so, even basic tasks like calculating one's BATNA or keeping track of the value of the deal becomes quite complex, especially in light of shifting coalitions. Unfortunately, coalitions are underexplored in contemporary psychology and negotiations (for an interdisciplinary review, see Kahan & Rapoport 2014).

Finally, although almost everything discussed in this review has the potential to operate differently in the multiparty context, one prime candidate for study is conversational mechanics, such as how turn taking, speaking time, eye contact, and mutual comprehension differ in groups (e.g., Polzer et al. 1998, Cooney et al. 2020, Stivers 2021); or, at a high level, how social goals and norms change in groups, along with the prevalence of certain group emotions (e.g., Moreland 2010).

In sum, team negotiation can be radically different from solo negotiation, and multiparty negotiation can be radically different from dyadic negotiation. However, we know surprisingly little about how negotiation operates in these contexts, and there are significant opportunities to make an impact in this area.

INTERGROUP CONFLICT

In the previous section, we saw how the psychology of groups can create benefits in negotiation, such as the increased information sharing and more constructive problem solving that occurs in teams. However, in many contexts, people's deep concern about their membership in social groups can easily lead to intergroup conflict.

Unfortunately, although intergroup negotiation is surrounded on all sides by relevant research, direct empirical work is more limited (Demoulin & de Dreu 2010). For example, there is a large amount of work in psychology on intergroup perception, but this work has not been directly applied to negotiation. Similarly, negotiation itself has been studied extensively, but it remains unclear how much of this work applies in an intergroup setting. These challenges are compounded by the sheer variety of intergroup contexts.

Indeed, over the past decade, research has begun to explore topics such as how membership in a disadvantaged racial or ethnic group affects the negotiation process. This work has found that disadvantaged groups experience rejection rates for offers at higher rates (Kubota et al. 2013), experience greater backlash for negotiating a job offer (Hernandez et al. 2019), engender less trust when negotiating with majority groups (Gilin Oore et al. 2013), and display less willingness to come to the bargaining table (Kteily et al. 2013). This may count as intergroup negotiation in the sense that ingroup/outgroup dynamics are activated, but there are broad differences across different types of intergroup negotiations. For example, intergroup negotiation may encompass labor and management negotiations as well as negotiations between representatives of different countries to end an armed conflict.

Ultimately, intergroup negotiation may prove to be too broad an umbrella. Instead, scholars may default to study specific intergroup contexts (e.g., interracial tension, cultural conflict, interdepartmental strife in organizations, etc.). That said, there may be considerable value in thinking about intergroup negotiations broadly, across many contexts, with common principles, insights, and underlying processes. For example, based on classic research in industrial relations and international relations (Walton & McKersie 1965, Druckman 1977, Putnam 1988), intergroup negotiations tend to involve high stakes (e.g., failure can lead to a strike or a war); they are often characterized by a two-level structure, in which negotiators represent their own group's interests to their counterpart but also their counterpart's interests to their group (Folmer et al. 2012); and they possess a distinct element of accountability whereby ingroup and outgroup members can observe, reward, and punish the negotiator.

From these features emerges a key driver of intergroup dynamics: increased pressure to cooperate with the ingroup and compete with the outgroup (for a review, see de Dreu et al. 2015), which can lead to exploitation of the outgroup or costly impasses—temptations that may become magnified as people identify more strongly with their groups (Moore et al. 1999, Polzer 1996, Howard et al. 2007; see also Adair et al. 2001, Adair 2003, Wildschut et al. 2003).

To go along with a limited empirical literature, building frameworks for intergroup negotiation is difficult due to the complexity involved on account of (*a*) people's various (and sometimes intersecting) group identities—professional, political, etc.; (*b*) the extent to which different situations make group identity salient (Demoulin & Teixeira 2010, Trötschel et al. 2010); (*c*) the interplay between people's individual interests and the interests of the group; (*d*) the conflict that can arise within a group (e.g., Halevy 2008), and related questions such as why competitive hawkish views seem to dominate more cooperative, dovish views (Steinel et al. 2009, Aaldering & Kopelman 2022); (*e*) how intergroup processes affect various stages of bargaining, such as the willingness to initiate a negotiation, the actual turn-by-turn interaction, and people's perceptions of their counterpart; and, finally, (*f*) the various mechanisms and moderators involved, such as differential power (Saguy & Kteily 2014), stereotypes and prejudice (e.g., Kubota et al. 2013), social value orientation (de Dreu 2010), preferential ingroup cooperation (Aaldering et al. 2018), people's mental models of conflict (Halevy et al. 2012), and an individual's status as a prototypical or peripheral member of a group (Van Kleef et al. 2013).

The literature has started to explore all these aspects of intergroup negotiation, but limited empirical work leaves the major fault lines of intergroup negotiation still buried and eager negotiators still searching for practical strategies when intergroup dynamics are at play.

NEGOTIATION AS CONVERSATION

Negotiation, like any conversation, is a complex symphony composed in real time. The nuance of this performance has been studied within negotiations, but historically, the focus has been on a very specific set of features, such as opening offers, concession making, and asking questions.

Across the negotiation literature, much of the conversational process has been treated as a black box. Only recently have scholars started to peer into this box.

One of the richer areas of recent exploration has been mimicry (Huffaker et al. 2011, Swaab et al. 2011, Ireland & Henderson 2014, Richardson et al. 2019, Muir et al. 2021). Typically, this is studied by instructing participants to strategically mimic their counterpart's nonverbal behavior (e.g., gestures, posture, mannerisms) or verbal behavior (e.g., language, sentences, words). Such research generally suggests that mimicking promotes affiliation, leading to increased rapport and trust. For instance, Maddux et al. (2008) instructed negotiators to mimic their counterparts' physical mannerisms (e.g., crossing arms, leaning forward), which enabled mimickers to secure more value for themselves and achieve higher joint gains compared to controls. Similarly, the joint ritualistic act of a handshake has also been shown to increase cooperation (Schroeder et al. 2019).

New Tools

In studying negotiation as conversation, researchers have incorporated concepts and strategies from a diverse range of subfields. For example, borrowing from social psychology, researchers have explored thin slices of conversation, showing that the interactional dynamics (e.g., speaking time, speech prosody) of the first 5 minutes of a negotiation predicted a substantial portion of the variance in negotiation outcomes (Curhan & Pentland 2007). Scholars have also borrowed tool kits from conversation analysis (Glenn & Kuttner 2013), face theory (Brett et al. 2007), and machine learning methods such as natural language processing (Sokolova & Szpakowicz 2007, Sokolova & Lapalme 2012, Twitchell et al. 2013, Jeong et al. 2019).

The study of conversational dynamics has been accelerated by the increased availability of text, audio, and video recordings, which allow scholars to pursue new lines of inquiry, such as the under-researched link between prosody dynamics and negotiation outcomes (Ko et al. 2015, Michalsky et al. 2019). Recently, Curhan et al. (2022) examined silence during negotiation, which was effective not for its potential intimidation factor or its ability to signal power, but rather because it gave people a moment to pause, think, and generate creative ways to move the conversation forward.

Particularly exciting is the emergence of new conversation frameworks that try to characterize the main goals of conversation, which could be extended to the negotiation context (Reece et al. 2022, Yeomans et al. 2022). Along with new frameworks, scholars may also revisit old concepts with new methods. For example, conversational turning points reflect how negotiators respond to each other's moves and countermoves over the course of their interaction (Olekalns & Smith 2005, Druckman 2020). An important finding is the difficulty of shifting conversational gears, for example, when people get stuck arguing their points back and forth. Often there is a moment when this counterproductive exchange yields. Understanding why and how these turning points emerge in negotiation requires a nuanced analysis of the interaction, and new methods, such as machine learning, may allow researchers to detect and analyze such complex phenomena at scale.

Going Digital

Negotiation, once primarily a face-to-face interaction, is now increasingly computer mediated. One basic finding is that negotiators often reach more efficient agreements when they have greater access to visual and nonverbal cues (e.g., negotiating face-to-face versus email; see Geiger 2020 for a review). An intriguing new line of research explores the ways in which communication

technologies can aid negotiators, such as software designed to help negotiators prepare, translate others' messages, and read others' emotions (Johnson et al. 2017, Johnson et al. 2019, Dinnar et al. 2021). New technologies can even support negotiators by altering their appearance or changing their speaking style (Baten & Hoque 2021), which will become increasingly important as virtual and augmented reality see mass adoption.

Summary

The growing stream of research on conversation represents one of the most exciting areas of future scholarship. As conversation research develops, scholars will have access to new frameworks, larger data sets, and increasingly advanced analytic tools to analyze negotiation interactions with high conversational fidelity. Moreover, the trend toward digital communication and associated technologies will continue, presenting significant opportunities for those interested in mining and analyzing the rich multimodal interactions that lie at the heart of every negotiation.

CONCLUSION

Negotiation scholarship has made great strides in the last decades. It has increasingly embraced complexity in three main ways, by (*a*) finding important moderators of effects that were once seen as monolithic; (*b*) taking seriously the nuances of social interaction, the medium through which all negotiation occurs; and (*c*) studying negotiation as it occurs in the real world.

Despite this progress, the complexity of negotiation remains difficult to fully embrace. For example, (*a*) although moderators have been studied within subfields, such as the factors that moderate gender's influence on negotiation, exploring moderators that cross subfields, such as the study of gender together with culture, is still relatively new; (*b*) researchers have only begun to embrace the full interactional richness of negotiation, especially given the increased availability of text, audio, and video data; and, finally, (*c*) there is still a heavy reliance on hypothetical paradigms and laboratory simulations. These limitations apply to research across the social sciences, but in the case of negotiations they are particularly important, because one major goal of negotiation research should be to help eager negotiators make effective decisions in real social interactions.

A key ingredient in ensuring the utility of negotiation research is developing frameworks at the intersection of theory and practice. Throughout this review, we noted areas of success, such as the resurgence of gender research guided by a basic conflict between the stereotypes of woman and negotiator. We also identified opportunities for new frameworks, such as context-driven and context-free strategies for navigating cultural differences. Finally, we noted areas that seriously lack sufficient frameworks, such as team and multiparty negotiations. We look forward to what future scholarship will bring.

Over the past decade, the negotiation literature has produced many important insights, and, as we hope this review makes clear, the potential for scholarship on negotiation is considerable, owing to its fascinating object of inquiry. Negotiation is an incentive-rich context, characterized by both cooperation and competition, and influenced by deep structural factors such as status, power, and group identity. Negotiation is and will remain a unique context for examining human behavior, with the potential to dramatically improve the trajectories of people's personal and professional lives.

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