



Mirra Komarovsky

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP IN SOCIOLOGY

Mirra Komarovsky

Department of Sociology, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027

KEY WORDS: feminism, feminist scholarship in sociology, precursors of feminist sociology, feminist theory

Abstract

The emergence of the women's movement in the 1960s presents two challenges to sociology. The more obvious task is the analysis of a social movement: How did private problems get transformed into a collective protest at that particular historical moment? This article, however, addresses itself to the contribution of a social movement to the sociology of sociology. Feminist sociologists, in representing a disadvantaged group, claim to look at society from a new angle of vision. What was the impact upon the discipline of sociology of this new perspective? Feminist criticism of mainstream sociology revealed not only vast lacunae in our knowledge but flawed interpretations of social phenomena. Feminist theoreticians have extended their criticism to some epistemological positions of contemporary American sociology.

The purpose of this article is two-fold. It illustrates some contributions to sociology by feminist scholars (including a few precursors). Secondly, some changing trends in feminist orientations are discerned and analyzed from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge.

INTRODUCTION

The resurgence of the women's movement since the 1960s has been accompanied by a considerable flow of publications by feminist scholars in the

social sciences, history, and the humanities. In addition to these disciplinary contributions, and associated with the proliferation of "Women's Studies" in colleges and universities, this period witnessed an increase in interdisciplinary publications on gender. This literature is generally described by sympathetic writers as the "new feminist scholarship" or "the new feminist theory" to distinguish it from earlier feminist writings.

The purpose of this essay will be clarified by a statement of its boundaries. Its theoretical thrust is not an analysis of the women's movement but a description of contributions to sociology that have emerged from feminist concerns. This focus rules out the interdisciplinary literature with its hope of eventually transcending individual disciplines within some single integrative paradigm.

Even restricted to sociology, however, no single article can do justice to the vast new literature. Writings on feminist epistemology and its implications for methods of research fall outside the scope of this chapter. Likewise, the diversity of political orientations within the feminist movement—liberal, radical, neo-marxist, and others—surely would require a chapter of its own. My focus is on a few feminist contributions that refute an accepted sociological generalization, fill a lacuna in our discipline, or chart an original theoretical direction.

What is a "feminist" sociological contribution? How does one distinguish it from other exogenous and endogenous changes in a discipline? After all, the resurgence of the women's movement since the 1960s occurred in response to various economic, social, and cultural changes in American society. These changes have had a direct influence upon the discipline of sociology, unmediated by the women's movement. The engine of change may be even more complex. Once aroused, the women's movement may have triggered societal changes which in turn affected the field of sociology. To illustrate this complex nexus of changes, let us assume that Blau & Duncan were to publish a new edition of their 1967 *American Occupational Structure*. It is likely that the new edition would contain, unlike the original, some reference to women in the labor force. If so, would this revision be a response to feminist articles on intellectual sexism in current approaches to social stratification (Acker 1973) or to the fact that for the first time women hold the majority of professional jobs in the country (an increase that in some degree may itself be attributable to the women's movement)—or to all these influences combined?

I have followed a pragmatic strategy that comes close, I believe, to solving this problem. I have limited myself to a content analysis of contributions by self-styled feminists or sociologists who avow a general support for the women's movement.

Finally, some fluctuating perspectives of feminist theory are not exempt here from a scrutiny of their possible existential roots and, as an independent

issue, their validity. The latter question inevitably confronts current polemics about models of verification.

THE MISSING PROBLEM

Put in the most general terms, the feminists made manifest a social problem that was invisible in mainstream sociology prior to the 1960s. This is not to disregard some historical precursors. The few scattered forerunners, writing between the 1930s and 1960s, are presently to be acknowledged here. But the overriding fact remains that neither the general sociology textbooks nor books on social problems or the family registered any concern with the "women's problem" before the rise of new feminism in the 1960s.

Merton reminds us that "popular perceptions are no safe guide to the actual magnitude of a social problem. Ill-understood but partly known processes of social perception involve patterned omitting, supplementing, and organizing of what is selectively perceived as the social reality" (Merton & Nisbet 1971:811). It is now apparent that sociologists, whose function as scientists is to discern what Merton termed "latent" social problems, failed in this case to transcend popular perceptions. Apparently scientific objectivity with its "value free" ethic cannot always be depended upon to portray social reality accurately.

The latent social problem here is one of social disorganization—the dysfunctions of current social arrangements and accepted beliefs for other, still more central, values of our society. What is at issue is no longer some isolated legal or other inequity suffered by women, but the total system of gender stratification. The persistence of traditional differentiation of the social roles of men and women gives men more benefits, authority, power, and prestige. Leaving aside our historical past, such gender stratification which violates democratic ideals is no longer defensible or functional for contemporary society. As Merton observed: "Those occupying strategic positions of authority and power . . . carry more weight than others" as judges of what constitutes a social problem (Merton & Nisbet 1971:803). Male sociologists dominate the discipline, and they did not escape the distortions inherent in their superior status in the profession and in the society at large. Their indifference need not, at least at the beginning of the women's movement, be explained merely by vested interests. As W. J. Goode observed (1982:137), men, as other dominant groups, tend to assume that their superior accomplishments are not the result of social advantages but of inborn superiority. Moreover, as is generally the case, human beings take for granted the benefits derived from some social arrangement but are aware of its costs for them. It is likely that men viewed women as the more sheltered sex, free from male pressure to provide and to achieve.

If sociologists did not regard gender stratification as a social problem, some disadvantages women suffered were recognized. But mere recognition does not suffice for remedy if the disadvantages are relegated to the private domain or considered to be inherent in the human condition.

Violence against women, in and outside the family, is one of the more dramatic and familiar cases in point. That physical abuse of women existed was generally acknowledged, but even the victims accepted their fate as an individual problem, to be handled without invoking social sanctions. As to family sociology, O'Brien (1971) noted that in the index for all editions of the *Journal of Marriage and the Family* from its inception in 1939 through 1969, not a single article can be found that contained the word "violence" in the title. The imperative to protect family privacy could not account for this omission since sexual and other sensitive aspects of family relations were widely studied.

The present concern with rape and other forms of physical abuse of women extends far beyond academic publications to national media and has led to some legal reforms. Absent the feminist movement, such developments would hardly have taken place. "In less than ten years, wife beating has been transformed from a subject of private misery and shame to an object of public concern" (Tierney 1982:210).

Feminist criticism does not stop with identifying the failure of mainstream sociology to perceive the status of women as a *social* problem. Sociologists were equally blind to gender as a *sociological* problem. In a society in which men dominate the major institutions and make the critical decisions, it is all too easy to assume that the behavior of men, and not of women, is the more significant object of study. Hence, concerns of women tended to be either invisible to male sociologists or to appear trivial. Insofar as this criticism is valid, such a one-sided perspective was bound not only to leave lacunae but to result in actual distortions in the sociological analysis of society.

Sociology textbooks on social problems and general sociology or on the family were slow to include gender issues even after the few precursors might have alerted their authors to these. The lag between the precursors and the standard textbooks can be inferred from the dates of some illustrative publications. I shall first illustrate the invisible problem. No reference to women's problems can be found in the following books: Merton, Broom, & Cottrell, eds., *Sociology Today* (1959); Lipset & Smelser, eds., *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade* (1961); Merton & Nisbet, eds., *Contemporary Social Problems* (1961, 2nd ed 1966); Gouldner & Gouldner, *Modern Sociology* (1963); Faris, ed., *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (1967); and Horton & Hunt, *Sociology* (1968).

Equally silent on such issues were the following family texts: Bernard, *American Family Behavior* (1942); Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family* (1947); Winch, *The Modern Family* (1953); Kephart, *The Family, Society,*

and the Individual (1961); Christenson, *Handbook of Marriage and the Family* (1964); and Kenkel, *The Family in Perspective* (1966). Burgess, Locke, & Thomes, *The Family From Institution to Companionship* (1963), continued to celebrate the allegedly egalitarian type of American marriage. But the text did not question whether the traditional division of labor was compatible with equality between the sexes. As we shall see in the following pages, some family sociologists not only failed to initiate any concern with the women's problems, they criticized the few feminist precursors.

THE PRECURSORS: 1930–1960

Feminist literature has a long history, but for our purposes the immediate precursors of the “new” feminist scholarship are the writers between 1930 and 1960.

Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935)

Franz Boas in anthropology and William F. Ogburn in sociology battled against the prevailing biological determinism. In accounting for racial and class differences they were on the side of culture. But it was the student of both, Margaret Mead, who dramatized the thesis of cultural explanation of psychological sex differences in her description of three societies. In the preface to the 1950 edition of *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* Mead states:

I found in one [society], both men and women act as we expect women to act—in a mild, parental, responsive way; in the second, both act as we expect men to act—in a fierce, initiating fashion; and in the third, men act according to our stereotype for women—are ‘catty’, wear curls and go shopping; while women are energetic, managerial, unadorned partners. (1950:1)

I shall leave open the question of the reliability of the evidence. That all three logical options of psychological sex-typing should be discovered on a single field trip appears incredibly lucky. All the same, unfreezing biological determinism had profound theoretical implications. It opened up for social and cultural analysis a new problematic. How to account for the differences in definitions of femininity and masculinity and in sex roles across different societies and historical periods? How are men and women socialized to accept the prescribed patterns? What, if any, are the social provisions for the deviants? More broadly, what are the costs and benefits of these various arrangements for the society and the individuals?

These issues have challenged and will continue to challenge sociologists whatever the fluctuating popularities of the nature vs nurture debates.

In her 1949 book *Male and Female*, Mead moved away from the earlier

position of cultural determinism toward a modified view suggested by the very title of the concluding chapter: "To Both Their Own." This book was written at the height of what I termed the post-World War II "new-antifeminism" (Komarovsky 1953). *Male and Female* certainly reflects the influence of psychoanalytic theories. Its author seems to be torn by ambivalences. On the one hand, she recognizes that insofar as women are barred from "the great structures of law and government, religion, art, and science . . . women become less human" (1949:381). She acknowledges the existence of overlap in psychological abilities of men and women. And yet, she writes of the risks of "bringing women into fields that have been defined as male . . . (because) this frightens the men, unsexes the women" (1949:379). This warning confuses short-range with long-range effects of changes in women's status. Ultimately, Mead's emphasis in this book falls upon the need to acknowledge and cultivate the unique talents of each sex. The evidence for the existence of these unique gifts is presented excursively, drawn in a general way from psychology, psychoanalysis, and conventional wisdom.

Viola Klein, The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology (1946)

This book is less widely known than Mead's contributions and requires a somewhat fuller treatment. With an introduction by Karl Mannheim, the book is undertaken as a study in sociology of knowledge. It examines the views of the feminine personality that were developed by eight authorities representing various disciplines, beginning with Havelock Ellis and Otto Weininger and ending with Margaret Mead and W. I. Thomas.

All but the most recent writers conceived of human personality in bipolar terms; hence, they convey their views of both the female and the contrasting male personality. It is a salutary reminder for contemporary readers to review the long periods when women were thought to lack the essential qualities of humanity.

The author concludes that as to the typical feminine personality "there are almost as many opinions as there are minds." This diversity of opinions is grist for the mill of any sociologist of knowledge. Klein makes a valiant effort to ground an author's view of femininity in the social context of the author's time and life. The introductory chapter on the historical background notwithstanding, Klein is more successful in establishing cultural than institutional roots of the eight conceptions of femininity. By cultural I mean the philosophical and scientific currents accessible to a given author. Similarly, this cultural climate is, admittedly, explored more fully than the idiosyncratic personality of the writer.

In addition to describing the nature of femininity as expounded by eight authorities, Klein raises more general epistemological issues.

The first concerns the question of objectivity in the social sciences. The book demonstrates, in the tradition of sociology of knowledge, that there can be no study free of a conscious or unconscious partial perspective on the part of the knower. The very choice of the subject, the formulation of the problem, the concepts in terms of which experience is perceived—all are affected by the scholar's position in a specified society, as well as by the scholar's more personal life experience.

This being the case, can we ever arrive at the "truth"? Total relativism, which might appear as the inevitable end result of this analysis, is rejected by Klein. We come closest to "objective" truth when we lay bare the social and psychological roots of diverse perspectives and seek an ever richer integration of their partialities (Klein 1946:3).

Another general conclusion is Klein's recognition of a shift away from the dominant bipolarity of sex stereotypes toward diversity. The industrial revolution shifted hitherto familial economic functions to outside agencies and women entered the labor force. The general differentiation of society led to the recognition of diversity of influences shaping personality, apart from sex: "Social class, religious background, age, race, vocation, family relationships, early training, opportunities for development, social tradition, individual, physical and psychological dispositions, and others." The logical inference . . . is "the view that individual differences prevail over differences between whole groups" (Klein 1946:170).

But what of the organic, biologically determined sex differences? Klein does not deny their reality. She proposes a sociological strategy. Let sociology continue to concentrate on sociopsychological sex differences. Biological determinants will fall into place as residual differences, those sociology cannot account for. Such a direction still strikes me as the primary sociological agenda. Nevertheless, biological sciences today provide more reliable methods of studying hormonal and other organic differences and similarities between the sexes. As reliable evidence accumulates, its relevance to sociological issues must be examined.

Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure" (1942)

Parsons in his famous article, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure" (1942), can hardly be called a precursor of feminist scholarship. He is included here as the prime target of feminist criticism in the 1960s and the 1970s.¹

¹Not all challenges to Parsons' theory came from the feminist camp. Among others, Slater in 1961 questioned the universality of role differentiation in the nuclear family along the instrumental-expressive axis. Moreover, he argued that parental role differentiation, far from facilitating the child's identification with same-sex parent, tends to be dysfunctional for child development.

Contrary to some critics, this article did refer to women's role strains. But there is no denying that its central thesis was the congruence of sex role differentiation with the functional prerequisites of our social system. Parsons makes no reference to possible alternative social institutions. The very description of women's role strains confirms this judgement. He states, "In a society where such strong emphasis is placed on individual achievement, it is not surprising that there should be a certain romantic nostalgia for the time (that is prior to her marriage) when the women's options were still open" (p. 610). Doesn't the expression "romantic nostalgia" suggest a view of this problem as one of the inevitable pains of the human condition?

To the best of my knowledge, however, the earliest radical departure from Parson's reference to women's "romantic nostalgia" was published in my article, "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles" (1946:184–89). The theme of that article had germinated in my mind long before I ever read Parsons and was not originally conceived as a critique of him. I am not sure that I generally endorse Dorothy Smith's (1979:163) notion of a distinctively feminist epistemology, but this article *did* have its origin in my personal experience of conflicts. So grounded, my minihypotheses were subsequently tested in interviews with women undergraduates.

That college women "played dumb" on dates, generally taken to be the import of that article, is not an adequate summary. I called attention to a distinction between two sets of values to which young women were exposed and by which they had to judge themselves. In an academically demanding women's college, students were rewarded for intelligence, initiative, independence, articulateness, self-confidence, creativity, persistence—indeed, many of the valued human attributes expected also of men. However, in interaction with men women had to display these qualities cautiously and only so far as "the traffic will bear." Their male partners were spared the strain on dates of suppressing their proudest achievements.

This 1946 article also identified the discontinuities in socialization of girls within the family and some cross-pressures from agents of socialization. Returning to Parsons—my final position was a sharp repudiation of his. I held that the dominant definition of sex roles, far from being functional, presented a case of social disorganization produced by the lead-lag pattern of social change. I quote my conclusion: "The problems set forth in this article will persist until the adult sex roles are redefined in greater harmony with socio-economic and ideological character of our society" (Komarovsky 1946:189).

Mirra Komarovsky, Women in the Modern World: Their Education and Dilemmas (1953)

This book was written at the height of what I termed the antifeminist wave that swept the country after World War II. It was not the women's movement

that motivated its writing but the conservative backlash. In 1945 Helene Deutsch developed, in a two-volume work, the Freudian thesis that "anatomy is destiny." In 1947, the psychiatrist Marynia Farnham described the plight of women as one of "overwhelming emotional catastrophe" and held the feminist movement responsible for the tragedy. In 1950, Lynn White, president of Mills College, in *Educating our Daughters*, accused women's colleges of educating women as if they were "men in disguise." My book was written as a counterattack. Its core, however, was a portrayal in depth of a variety of role strains and of the serious discontent of college-educated, full-time homemakers, as well as the costs in our society of combining family life and a career. These social problems, I maintained, were not inescapable dilemmas of life, but problems potentially amenable to social control. The theoretical underpinnings of the book combined Ogburn's theory of social lag and Merton's variety-of-role theory.

Reviewing *Women in the Modern World* in *The Journal of Marriage and Family Living* (February 1955:75) Kephart writes, "The women that Mirra Komarovsky has written about . . . seem to have little in common with the often-taunted, often-endearing, often-devoted women who comprise our wives, mothers, and daughters . . . (But) the clarity and vigor of presentation give the reader the overall impression that a fair-sized Social Problem is involved." In his own 1961 textbook on the family, Kephart gives short shrift to this particular social problem. If it exists at all, it is caused, Kephart claims, by the unwarranted low status accorded the housewife: "even though it may take a high level of skill to run a house properly" (Kephart 1961:238).

Another family sociologist, writing as late as 1966, also failed to perceive any problematic features in full-time homemaking. William Kenkel asserts in his textbook that "from the standpoint of equipment and the time available for caring for children and a home, the American woman should be the envy of her sisters around the world" (Kenkel 1966:446).

To the best of my knowledge only three exceptions to the treatment of this issue appeared in the family textbooks of the period. Folsom (1934) and Baber (1939) each included chapters on the changing status of women. The most extended discussion was in Kirkpatrick. He presented an extensive analogy between women and blacks, an analogy first noted by G. Myrdal (1944) and developed by Hacker (1951). Above all, Kirkpatrick explored social inventions that might reduce the costs of combining work and family life. His early concern with women's issues was manifested in his book *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life*, published in 1938.

In 1936 Kirkpatrick published "The Measurement of Ethical Inconsistency in Marriage" in which he distinguished three sets of marital roles, each implying a distinctive cluster of privileges and obligations. Kirkpatrick was a pioneer in describing a completely egalitarian relationship in his "partner"

option. Radical as he was on this score, he would be faulted by the feminists in his description of the traditional “wife-and-mother” role. Despite the enumerated costs incurred by wives, his reference to the “ethical consistency” of the traditional marriage carried the implication of a fair balance of privileges and obligations—a conclusion that feminists challenged (Kirkpatrick 1936:444–46).

Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein, Women’s Two Roles: Home and Work (1956)

This is the first of the “precursor” works that provides a comparison of the status of women in four industrialized countries in the 1950s: United States, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England and Wales). The wealth of demographic and economic data assembled here will continue to serve historians. The book’s most significant contribution lies in the analysis both of the similarities and the differences in the status of women in the four countries. In each of the four countries women constitute about one third of the labor force despite differences in ideologies.

The authors’ acknowledged purpose was to address what they perceived to be a social problem: “Under present conditions, with an average family of only slightly more than two children . . . an average housewife can be considered to be employed full-time on tasks which are necessary for home-making during only one quarter to one third of her normal adult life” (p. 12). The solution they advocated is not “blind alley” part-time jobs but a sequential pattern of returning to full-time employment when children no longer require their mothers’ full-time care.

Simone De Beauvoir’s ground breaking *The Second Sex* falls outside this review of sociology books.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP SINCE 1960

The body of feminist writings in sociology since the 1960s covers a vast range of substantive areas—women in economic, familial, legal, academic, political, and religious institutions, dual-career families, sexuality, mothering, housework, widowhood, divorce, stages in women’s life cycle, violence against women, women and crime, comparative and historical studies of women’s lives, and others. Apart from such substantive contributions, the more theoretical feminist literature deals with issues of epistemology and methodology, including both a critique of mainstream sociology and outlines of alternative philosophical and methodological positions.

A sense of this voluminous literature is conveyed by the sheer size of bibliographies in recent overviews of the field. Epstein (1988:241–89) cites

over 500 authors, some with several books or articles. Hess & Ferree (1987) is second in the number of listed references.

Given the limits of this paper I have chosen to select those feminist writings that reveal flaws in mainstream sociology. In some cases feminist scholarship raised significant theoretical questions previously missing from the sociological agenda. For example, insofar as the very phenomenon of gender stratification had been muted prior to the emergence of the women's movement, related theoretical problems were understandably neglected. One of them was the complex set of social mechanisms that maintained and reproduced that system.

We now recognize that these mechanisms range from rules of intersexual social interaction (so taken for granted that only careful field observation, if not ethnomethodology, can bring them to light) to institutional controls, and, ultimately, to force.

Equally scarce were comparative studies of class and other differences within our society or between nations that could account for differences in gender stratification.

Other failings in mainstream sociology stemmed not from ignoring certain issues but from uncritically accepting others. Traditional stereotypes of female and male personalities were too frequently unquestioned. Consequently, whenever sex differences in social behavior appeared to fit those stereotypes, the curiosity of mainstream sociologists rested. By contrast, some feminist studies directed the explanatory analysis toward social structural differences, achieving more valid results.

The general area within which the foregoing issues are examined is women in the labor market, more specifically, at the frontiers of change—the resistances to women's entry into male-dominated occupations. The major contribution of feminist scholars in this area lies in the analysis of forces undergirding gender inequality in the labor market.

By and large the expansion of women's paid employment since the 1960s took place in a labor market strongly segregated by sex. Despite some penetration by women into male-dominated occupations, the range of women's occupations is much narrower than that of men's. Male occupations continue to be higher in prestige, pay, and power (Ferree 1987:325).

The civil rights legislation of the 1960s and the 1970s and the women's movement exerted pressure to open up opportunities for women (and, of course, for blacks and other minorities). The depth of male resistance and the strategies employed to circumvent this pressure became the focus of feminist studies.

A preliminary task for feminist scholars was a critical analysis of some theories in mainstream economics and sociology that attempted to account for gender inequalities in the labor market on grounds *other than discrimination*.

It can hardly be an accident that these "defensive" theories developed with the emergence of the civil rights and the women's movements.³

One of these explanatory theories is the neoclassical economic theory of "human capital." It postulates that women (and men) make economic choices rationally in order to maximize their utility. Given women's roles as homemakers, it is rational for women to select occupations that do not require much training or mobility, do not penalize part-time or intermittent work, or do not require the total commitment that male providers can make to their jobs.

Another explanation stresses personality differences between the sexes. Some trace these differences to biological antecedents—many more see psychological gender differences as the result of differential socialization of the sexes. According to this interpretation, the resultant strengths, deficiencies, and, indeed, preferences of women, in contrast to those of men, account for gender segregation and inequalities in the labor market.

The human capital theory has been tested by comparison of male and female subgroups who share the same capital status, i.e. the same education, training, work experience, attitude toward work, and continuity of employment. Bergmann summarizes the results of such statistical analyses. They account for about one half of the gender gap. Bergmann concludes, "Women who make heavy investments in human capital receive a reward for that investment far inferior to the rewards men get" (1986:765).⁴

The second theory, that of the differential socialization of the sexes, no doubt plays a part in their occupational segregation, but the problem is too complex for precise evaluation. I return to it in a later section.

The human capital and the socialization theories take as a given the existing social system. The question they implicitly address is narrow: Can occupational stratification in our society be explained by factors other than discrimination against women *solely* on the grounds of gender? Such frozen parameters limit the scope of the theories. By contrast, feminist scholarship advanced our knowledge beyond those limits. Microsociological investigations located social mechanisms and deliberate strategies that maintain (or change) the extent of occupational and, more generally, gender stratification. Macrosociological comparisons between nations study the effects of various structural and cultural factors upon the status of women. I shall presently use Ruggie's (1984) comparison between Britain and Sweden to illustrate such a macrosociological approach.

³The recency of these "defensive" theories may be inferred from the fact that of 170 books and articles cited in Bergmann's critique, only 7 were published prior to the 1960s (Bergmann 1986).

⁴See also England & McCreary (1987:286-320) for a fuller treatment of "Gender Inequality in Paid Employment."

Some feminist sociologists went further in challenging the frozen assumptions of the standard theories. One of them is the identification of "work" with paid work, thus excluding much work done by women. Ferree cites recent statistics showing that both housework and child care "remain overwhelmingly the women's responsibility" (1987:338). Acker suggested that expanding the concept of work to the presently excluded categories of housework and volunteer work would raise new theoretical questions applicable to both sexes. For example, "the workloads of all individuals could be described in terms of . . . movement (between) paid and unpaid activities . . . We might speculate that those who are denied the experience of both realms would have a narrower view of human capacity . . ." (Acker 1978:141).

Turning to recent feminist works on women's penetration into male-dominated occupations, we find analyses of barriers to change. These works include corporate business (Kanter 1977), law (Epstein 1981), medicine (Lorber 1984), the academy (Chamberlain 1988), blue-collar jobs (Hess, Marx, & Ferree 1987), and a general overview (Bergmann 1986).

My first illustration of the social mechanisms that reinforce the prevailing male advantages is drawn not from the workplace but from the college classroom—in a sense, preparatory to employment. The study, directly stimulated by the women's movement (Hall & Sandler 1982), reports behavior rooted in such deep-seated attitudes that its findings would probably surprise the subjects of the study.

Following are some excerpts:

Men students are more likely to be called upon, thus communicating more interest in what they have to say and increasing their visibility in the classroom.

Faculty interrupt women students more than male students, displaying a lack of interest in what women have to say.

Male students tend to be "coached" more than women by professors who probe for a more elaborate answer, with questions such as . . . "Can you explain that more fully?" This not only gives men students more encouragement and opportunity to develop their ideas, but also implies the expectation that they know the answer and just need to work at it a little harder . . .

What men say carries more weight. A suggestion or point made by a man is more likely to be . . . credited to him ('as Jim said'), developed further in discussion . . . than when the same suggestion is made by a woman. (1982)

It is hard to imagine that such behavior on the part of the faculty would not reinforce the self-confidence of male and the self-devaluation of female students.

Epstein's *Women in Law* (1981) provides an incisive analysis of the processes that retard sex desegregation in male-dominated professions. The core problem takes us back to Merton's analysis of status-sets as the array of social statuses occupied by an individual. In a differentiated modern society,

status-sets are likely to be complex. Thus, a male lawyer may be a husband, a father, a member of military, religious, charitable, political, and other institutions.

The complexity of status-sets tends to generate conflicts for the individual. The demands of role partners in various statuses may not only compete for time and energy but may be intrinsically contradictory. Merton identified social mechanisms that assist an occupant of a given status to accommodate conflicting and contradictory demands (Merton 1968:422–38).

One mechanism of articulating the various statuses is the accepted practice of activating the status appropriate to the situation. Two lawyers may be adversaries in the courtroom, but collaborators in the Bar Association, and friends in a social club. What, then, makes it so difficult for the men to activate the role of a colleague in relation to a woman lawyer and makes them likely instead to focus on her femaleness?

Citing Merton, Epstein quotes: “ ‘Sex-typing’, the labeling of social roles as appropriately performed by men or by women, creates ambiguity and ambivalence for those who choose a profession traditionally associated with the other sex” (Epstein 1981:276). This, however, is only a starting point. The interpretation appears to center around three elements. Sexual identity is a deeply internalized component of personality, linked to changing but still powerful stereotypes of female and male personalities as well as to sex roles.

The second element is the difference between the professional role of a lawyer, on the one hand, and the feminine role, on the other. Epstein points out the woman-lawyer’s double bind. Should she exhibit some traditional feminine trait, such as a lack of assertiveness, her male colleague will be the first to point out her unfitness for the profession of law. But a woman who is capable of the self-assurance and aggressiveness demanded and admired in a male colleague cannot win either. In violating the male ideal of femininity, she is judged to be hard, humorless, competitive—in a word, “masculine.” Possibly, femaleness is a “master status” overshadowing any other in a woman’s status set. If so, the woman colleague is seen first and foremost as a *woman*, thus activating a male-to-female orientation. I am inclined to think that the sexual component is not the primary element at work here. Despite risks of sexual harassment, women in subordinate positions have long been accepted.

The third element is the male socialization for superiority over women in the workplace. The sentiment that makes collegiality difficult is the hostility toward women who threaten male self-esteem and power as a colleague. In a competitive society, male colleagues expect to cope with the usual strains of competition. But a superior (indeed, even an equally good) performance of a female colleague is experienced by the male colleague as a more crushing defeat. Moreover, while the competition of other men is taken for granted, the

danger signal is sounded when a group defined as “the other” invades the turf, creating a larger pool of competitors. In the words of a college senior in my study (Komarovksy 1976:26): “When I went to take the law boards, I felt shocked to see all those girls . . . It’s a threat to the security of all men in the profession.”

The deep roots of male resistance surfaced in my study of Columbia College seniors (Komarovksy 1976). The cultural milieu was liberal with sanctions against sexism. Possibly their youth made the seniors particularly vulnerable to perceived threats to self-esteem. On the other hand, they were yet to experience the full advantages of the superior power of male adulthood and could still afford to be idealistic.

Whatever the assumptions, the interesting findings were not only a few direct expressions of sexism but the more prevalent ambivalence. Egalitarian pronouncements coexisted with a deeper layer of traditional attitudes. These inconsistencies occasionally caused guilt but much more frequently were not recognized. A senior declared full support for equal opportunities for women in professions and in business, adding a qualification in the course of the interview:

A woman should not be in a position of firing an employee. It is an unpleasant thing to do. Besides, it is unfair to the man who is to be fired. He may be a very poor employee, but he is still a human being and it may be just compounding his unhappiness to be fired by a woman (p. 36).

Some men endorsed goals for women while censuring the means necessary for their attainment. One such senior upheld the principle of free choice of professions for women, specifically including medicine. In a subsequent interview, in answer to our standard question about unfeminine behavior, he cited “too great a concern with grades.” He found such concern repugnant also in a man. But he made allowances for a male premed student, anxious about admission to a good medical school, who would go to see a professor about a C on a chemistry test. In a girl, such an act would be “obnoxious” and he would be completely “turned off” by a girl who was similarly concerned about a poor grade (p. 27).

I might add, parenthetically, that my follow-up studies of Columbia and Barnard students (Komarovksy 1985) testify to shifts in attitudes in the direction of egalitarianism.

The early concentration on white professionals and the relative neglect of class, race, and ethnicity in feminist writings have been justly criticized, and there are signs of a more balanced future orientation. Ferree (1987:333–35) demonstrates that between 1960 and 1985 women had little success in penetrating skilled blue-collar jobs, traditionally dominated by men—much

less success than was the case in professions. The author goes beyond statistical facts and presents an illuminating interpretation of the differences between the two occupational categories. Who controls the access to elite professions as against skilled blue-collar jobs, how widely visible are the resistances, and consequently, how susceptible to public pressures, what are the differences in the ideological legitimation of sex segregation—these and other elements enter the interpretation of the relative failure to desegregate skilled blue-collar jobs.

Another type of feminist contribution corrects a flaw in mainstream sociology referred to in the introduction to this section. A gender difference in the workplace was dismissed as unproblematical since a familiar “common sense” explanation was readily at hand.

Many past studies attested to sex differences in attitudes toward work. The familiar results indicated that men were more task-oriented, work involved, and ambitious. Women, on the other hand, cared more about congenial social relations at work and were less motivated to seek advancement. These differences fitted gender stereotypes so closely that the curiosity of the researchers was satisfied.

Going beyond the psychological stereotypes, Kanter examined social structural settings of work (1977:129–63). Drawing on past investigations, she cites findings that in production as well as in clerical jobs, women tend to have “shorter chains of opportunity” (p. 159). Opportunity structure, in turn, shapes behavior. People on “high mobility tracks” tend to develop work commitment and upward orientations. Conversely, cycles of disadvantage are also perpetuated: Lack of opportunity to advance limits or depresses aspirations and enhances the values of sociability of peer groups at work.

This social structural interpretation is strengthened by studies of deviant situations. These are male workers with little chance of promotion and, conversely, women in jobs offering strong professional opportunities. The opportunity structure and not the sex of the worker proves the stronger determinant of behavior and attitudes on the job.

The contributions of feminist scholarship in the foregoing pages (with the exception of the comparison between professional and blue-collar occupations) were microsociological in scope. Mary Ruggie’s book, *The State and the Working Woman*: (1984), serves as an illustration of a macrosociological study of differences in the status of women in two societies. This study is rich in descriptive data on women’s employment and on the availability of social services such as child care, parental leaves, pay equity, occupational training, job sharing, and job placement in the two countries. More significantly, it offers a convincing interpretation of the differences.

In principle, both Britain and Sweden attest to their goal of achieving sex equality. In fact, however, Britain lags strikingly behind Sweden. The un-

precedented increase in paid employment of mothers with young children failed to generate policies such as those enumerated above. By contrast, in Sweden the coalition of government, business, and labor resulted in a commitment to facilitate the entry of women into the labor force and to cope with its consequences.

Ruggie sees the proximate causes of the differences between Britain and Sweden in the state-society relations. Ostensibly similar as these two "welfare" states are, the author spells out their differences. She defines Britain as closer to the "liberal welfare" model of the state in contrast to the Swedish "corporatist" welfare model. In the liberal state, market forces are given freer play and the state intervenes only when the market forces result in what society defines as intolerable inequities. "In the corporatist welfare model, the instruments of state interventions are designed to transform the market so as to avoid such imperfections" (Ruggie, p. 13). As Ruggie amplifies the distinctions, "a corporatist welfare state intervenes to lead the market and to institutionalize social equality, not simply to compensate for inequality" (p. 14).

Probing deeper into the state-society relations, the author examines the position of labor in the two countries. Labor has become more strongly integrated into the governing coalition of Sweden, whereas the interests of labor in Britain are not on a par with other economic considerations (p. 18) (See also Epstein & Coser 1981).

The foregoing section dealt with a small subfield of the now vast area of feminist scholarship. My purpose was to demonstrate the contribution this scholarship can make to the discipline by challenging the superficiality of some accepted answers and by posing significant new questions.

FLUCTUATING PERSPECTIVES IN FEMINIST THEORY

In this final section I discuss some shifting perspectives in feminist theory and examine some current polemics.

Until the 1970s feminist writings stressed the impact of differential socialization upon adult personalities of men and women. Whether drawing upon the existing literature or charting new research, the underlying feminist quest was explicit: "What in socialization of children and adolescents might account for traits that are generally regarded as feminine deficiencies in comparison with men?" One example of such research is the study of prize-winning picture books for preschool children. The study revealed that "women are greatly underrepresented in the titles, central roles, and illustrations. Where women do appear, their characterization reinforces traditional sex-role stereotypes: Boys are active while girls are passive; boys lead and rescue others while girls follow and serve others. Adult men and women are

equally sex-stereotyped: men engage in a wide variety of occupations while women are presented only as wives and mothers" (Weitzman et al 1972:1-2). Little girls receive attention and praise for their attractiveness, while boys are admired for their achievements and cleverness.

It is hard to escape the conclusion, comment the authors of the article, that such rigid sex role portraits in the children's books have a deleterious effect on the self-image and aspirations of women. Several other studies are cited showing that even young children know and express sex stereotypes.

This preoccupation with differential socialization was no doubt motivated by the felt need to expose the social roots of "feminine deficiencies" and, more generally, the mechanisms of maintaining gender inequality. The political message was clear: "It is not in our genes." A related feature was the emphasis on considerable overlapping of scores on male and female psychological tests. This overlapping was thought to be all the more significant given the tendency to publish positive rather than negative results in studies of group differences (for an early reference to overlapping, see Komarovsky 1953:20-24).

With the passage of time we note, if not the muting of references to childhood and adolescent socialization, at least the emergence of a new theme. Feminist writers began to highlight the existing literature that confirmed the new theme and also to undertake research specifically oriented to new hypotheses. "Yes," states the underlying new message: "Personality is shaped by early socialization, but let us not succumb to the doctrine of rigid determinism. It is time to recognize the potential for change as people move through life and encounter new opportunities and new rewards. This is especially applicable to women at a time of such rapid transformation in conditions and values affecting their lives."

I do not claim that this emphasis on malleability of human personality had its origin in the women's movement. Too many investigators, unaffiliated with feminism, were working in this area, perhaps as a reaction against theories that regarded childhood experiences as lasting determinants of adult personality. This reaction may reflect a familiar pattern of intellectual development in behavioral sciences. A line of theory and investigation grows, becomes accepted, and eventually induces criticism.

But if the controversy over relative consistency of lifetime behavior did not originate in the women's movement, the side taken by a number of feminist scholars in this debate appears to have an ideological component. It is not by chance that Epstein summarizes at length investigations that report changes in some personality traits with changes in social conditions (1988:137-40). This interpretation shifts the emphasis from negative socialization to blocked opportunities as the major problem for women. Epstein records the rising professional aspirations of women lawyers as changing conditions and their

own success served to stimulate their ambitions (see also Gerson 1985). I referred to an ideological component in the rejection of a doctrine of a rigidly fixed personality. The doctrines of rigidity, after all, serve to bolster the discrimination against women. Male gatekeepers could all too easily claim that reforms must await the emergence at some future time of a generation of women properly socialized to assume new challenges. The imputation of this political motivation in no way detracts from the potential scientific contribution which must be assessed on its own merits.

The emphasis on malleability of personality fits into a larger theme of recent feminist writings in history and sociology. The broader purpose is to correct the invisibility of women's activities and to highlight the extent to which women, though subordinate, were nevertheless active agents in shaping their lives and in the making of history (Thorne 1987:88–9).

Finally, still another current of feminist theorizing is represented by such works as Rae Carlson, "Sex Differences in Ego Functioning: Exploratory Studies of Agency and Communion" (1971); Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978); Jessie Bernard, *The Female World* (1981); Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (1982), Alice Rossi, *Gender and Parenthood* (1984), and Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (1985).

Whereas the previous writers attacked the traditional stereotypes of femininity, used to legitimize women's subordinate status, the third wave abandoned this defensive strategy. Instead, it challenged the value system of the dominant group and, in the redefinition of values, found much to honor in some distinctively feminine attributes.

This feminist orientation is exemplified by Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* (1982). I shall assume the reader's familiarity with Gilligan's groundbreaking distinction between the "ethic of justice," based upon abstract principles, and the "ethic of care," based upon a sense of care and responsibility for the protection of relationships. "The morality of rights differs from the morality of responsibility in its emphasis on separation rather than connection, in its consideration of the individual rather than the relationship as primary . . ." (Gilligan 1982:18).

Despite her statement that the "different" voice in the title was deliberate and was not intended to mean the "women's" voice, it is difficult to accept this disclaimer. After all, Gilligan attributes the previous invisibility and devaluation of the "ethic of care" to Piaget, Kolberg, and others who regarded male moral development as the norm. Moreover, Gilligan turns to women in order to illustrate an ethic that differed from the "ethic of justice."

Gilligan accuses her critics of simultaneously declaring her evidence inadequate and her conclusions obvious (1986:325–26). Ironically, she may be right. As to evidence, her book does little more than *illustrate* the "ethic of

care." Nevertheless, the depiction of women as superior to men in empathy, nurturance, capacity and wish for close relationships—all resonate in our experience.

But is this resonance anything more than our familiarity with the traditional stereotype of feminine virtues? And, apart from truth claims, does the wide appeal of Gilligan's book lie in a moral vision that promises some surcease from our conflict-ridden competitive society of self-centered, alienated individuals? There are some policy implications in this celebration of feminine morality. It fosters a familiar appeal to women to improve our imperfect world through the exercise of the distinctively feminine virtues. In contrast to the nineteenth century, in the twentieth this moral redemption can no longer be located in the domestic sphere but must include the public spheres of the professions and politics. I wonder whether this redemptive mission can be assigned to the relatively powerless segment of the population.

One parenthetical and somewhat ironic reminder: Talcott Parsons was a major target of feminist criticism. Parsons approached the distinction between instrumental and expressive roles from the point of view of the functional requirements of a social system. The family, as any social system, must solve the instrumental problems of adaptation to the environment on the one hand and of internally maintaining cohesion, solidarity, and integration, on the other. Within the family the instrumental functions are typically performed by men and expressive functions by women. It would appear that the psychology of Gilligan's women, however different in formulation, would uniquely equip them to perform Parson's expressive function.

Leaving aside broader issues of moral and political theory, Gilligan's insight points to two directions of investigation. The first requires the testing of the insight in a broad variety of class, racial, ethnic, and other groups—a program Gilligan endorses.

Optimally, the tests should be culturally equivalent. Kerber pointed out that the moral reasoning of women facing abortion must be compared to an equivalent struggle in men's lives; for example, one over draft resistance (Kerber 1986:305). Absent such comparisons, we cannot know whether an ethic of care is gender specific. Moreover, tests of moral reasoning should ideally be supplemented by tests of behavior.

This is one direction of research. Equally intriguing and complex is the search for an explanation of such gender differences in moral orientations as might be confirmed. Two brilliant recent contributions suggest two different explanatory frameworks. Chodorow (1978) presents a psychoanalytical theory of identity formation of the sexes that could lead logically to their distinctive moral perspectives. Hochschild's (1983) theory might also account for the two types of moral reasoning. The root cause of her explanation,

however, is the powerlessness of women. ("On Reproduction of Mothering: a Methodological Debate," *Signs* 1981:482–514).

To remind the reader, the foundation of Chodorow's argument is the fact that mothers mother both sons and daughters. Girls, in identifying themselves as female, fuse the experience of attachment with the process of identity formation. For girls the self is "delineated through connection," and they are threatened by isolation. Moreover, "Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's own . . ." (Chodorow 1978:167). By contrast, boys define themselves through separation from their mother. Their development entails greater individuation, which is threatened less by isolation and more by intimacy.

Hochschild (1983) defines "emotion labor" as an instrumental use of one's emotions in work or in private life. Using as basic data her study of flight attendants, Hochschild shows that it is what the author terms the "emotion labor" that is emphasized in selection and training of flight attendants. This labor must induce in the passengers "a sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place" (p. 7). It demands on the part of the attendants "emotion work" in suppressing some feelings and expressing others in a manner that appears sincere.

"Both men and women do emotion work in private life and at work . . . But in the whole realm of emotional experience, emotion work" (p. 162) plays a greater part in women's lives. To begin with, the author estimates that about one half of women but only a quarter of men are employed in jobs requiring a substantial use of emotional labor (p. 236). In both public and the private spheres women carry the heavier share. The major contribution of the analysis lies in linking women's larger share of emotion work to their subordinate status.⁵

Lacking the resources of money, power, authority, and status, women offer to men extra emotion work in exchange for sharing other resources: "They affirm, enhance, and celebrate the well-being and status of others" (p. 165). This may well include not only spontaneous feeling but "feminine wiles," the managed expression of feelings for instrumental purposes. Women may acquire thereby the "secondary gains" of greater sensitivity to nonverbal communication and greater skills of manipulation in interpersonal relations.

Chodorow and Hochschild open up new directions for inquiry. If women are indeed more empathetic than men, is it Chodorow's or Hochschild's kind of "empathy"? Chodorow claims that women tend to experience "another's needs or feelings as their own . . ." (Chodorow: 167). Hochschild sees

⁵Gilligan in an earlier publication also hinted at women's lack of power as a possible element in the abortion study (Tronto 1987:649).

empathy as attentiveness to another's feelings developed by a subordinate group as a survival skill. And, again, is women's alleged tendency to negotiate conflicts based on care or on the acquired habit of the weak to "master anger—in the service of 'being nice' " (Hochschild:163)? Safeguarding human relationships is more important the more one's welfare depends on them.

These seemingly competing interpretations are derived from different bodies of theory. But the issue need not remain a matter of individual preferences. Strategically designed studies may eventually yield much more complex patterns of interweaving psychoanalytic and social structural processes. Theoretical interest is exemplified by Chodorow (1989) and Alexander et al (1987). One recent line of investigation is promising. I refer to studies of "men who mother," being divorced or separated, (Risman 1987) or fathers who share caretaking of young children (Coltrane 1988 and appended bibliography). The characteristics and consequences of shared parenting are, of course, also a major issue of social policy.

AFTERWORD

The shifts and varieties of feminist thought sketched above give rise to theoretical polemics. One such debate is between the maximalists and the minimalists. Among the maximalists some see psychological sex differences as rooted in biology; others claim that, whatever their origin, the differences are wide, significant, and resistant to change. The minimalists, on the other hand, point to wide variations of personality types within male and female groups and tend to attribute many existing differences to the structural and cultural characteristics of patriarchy.

One element in this debate may be the underlying time frame. The present and the near future constitute the background of the maximalist position. In 1953 I stated: "To be born a woman means to inhabit, from early infancy to the last day of life, a psychological world which differs from the world of men" (Komarovsky 1953:18). Much has changed since that time, but it is still unrealistic to deny that men and women continue to live in different worlds. Sociologists who undertake to study the distinctiveness of the female worlds (since these differ by class, race, ethnicity, sexual preference, and other features) make important contributions.

The minimalists, I suspect, pose a different question, a narrower and a policy-oriented one. They do not cover the whole range of possible gender differences. Instead they inquire: "What particular differences tend to perpetuate women's narrower life choices and their subordinate status in the public sectors?"

I have taken a two-fold position on this issue. Equal opportunity for women in public spheres cannot be realized as long as we maintain gender-role

differentiation within the family with no options for individual preferences. Secondly, in order to provide real options for men and women we shall have to reorganize economic and other institutions in a profound way, more profound, in my opinion, than would be necessary, for example, to solve the problems of the black minority in the United States.

We can glean the difficulties ahead by looking back at the zig-zag pattern of changes in women's status. Demographic, economic, and cultural social changes resulted in a series of lead-lag dislocations. Instead of moving toward a new equilibrium, the social reaction has repeatedly been a call for retrenchment. The pressure to return to the past, idealized in retrospect, can be illustrated in the sphere of women's education. Higher education for women was a progressive move against much resistance: "The more abstract and severe branches of collegiate study will put too heavy a strain upon female health and vitality" (cited by Komarovsky 1953:37). Women met the challenge of higher education, but neither the ideal of femininity nor the options for life-style patterns changed sufficiently to solve some problems for this group of women.

Instead of a movement toward social innovations we witnessed a strong conservative post-World War II backlash. The backlash was fed by many influences, but higher education of women was a strong target of criticism. President of Mills College, Lynn White advocated a "distinctly feminine college curriculum." It was certainly not "women's studies" that White had in mind: "Would it be impossible to present a beginning course in foods as exciting and as difficult to work up after college, as a course in post-Kantian philosophy would be?" (1950:49).

Turning to the future, it is still an open question whether pregnancy and lactation require that the nurturant function be performed exclusively by mothers and for what duration in infancy. As to men's capacity to share in the nurturance of infants, we will know only if society allows men, as ours does not, to develop whatever potential for nurturance they possess. The present chilly climate for such male functions was reported in a recent newspaper article. Several male kindergarten teachers found it expedient to describe themselves as elementary school teachers, fearing that the truth would arouse scorn and suspicion in encounters with strangers.

Social investments in child care, maternity and paternity leaves, flexible work hours, job sharing, and other changes will be required to balance the private and the public worlds for both men and women.

Such a vision would seem utopian were it not for the need of most women, single, married, divorced, with or without children, to work, and were it not for the social need for women workers. For a smaller segment of women in the labor force the non-economic rewards of an occupation are the major incentive.

It is true, that given the current political climate, a problem must reach crisis proportion before the state begins to respond. The recent failure of the state to provide parental leave and adequate childcare exemplifies such delayed action.

The long-range outlook, I believe, is more optimistic. The demographic, economic, and cultural trends that are changing women's lives and power are not likely to be reversed. In the long run, the persistence of traditional roles will create such stress and contradictions as to generate an irresistible pressure for social reorganization in the direction of sex equality.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the support for this study provided by the National Science Foundation grant SES-8601214.

(Pages 8 and 9 of this article were reprinted from the *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, Volume 50, August 1988, pp. 586–87. Copyrighted 1988 by the National Council on Family Relations, 1910 West County Road B, Suite 147, St. Paul, Minnesota 55113. Reprinted by permission.)

Literature Cited

- Acker, J. 1973. Women and social stratification. *Am. J. Sociol.* 78:936–45
- Acker, J. 1978. Issues in the sociological study of women's work. In *Women Working*, ed. A. H. Stromberg, S. Harkess. Palo Alto, Calif: Mayfield
- Alexander, J. C., et al. 1987. *The Micro-Macro Link*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Baber, R. E. 1939. *Marriage and the Family*. New York: McGraw Hill
- Bergmann, B. R. 1986. *The Economic Emergence of Women*. New York: Basic
- Bernard, J. 1942. *American Family Behavior*. New York: Harper
- Bernard, J. 1981. *The Female World*. New York: Free Press
- Blau, P. M., Duncan, O. D. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure*. New York: Wiley
- Burgess, E. W., Locke, M. J., Thomes, M. M. 1963. *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*. New York: American
- Carlson, R. 1971. Sex differences in ego functioning: exploratory studies of agency and communion. *J. Consulting Clin. Psychol.* 37:267–77
- Chodorow, N. 1978. *The Reproduction of Mothering*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Chodorow, N. J. 1989. *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
- Christensen, H. T. 1964. *Handbook of Marriage and the Family*. Chicago: Rand McNally
- Coltrane, S. 1988. Father-child relationship and the status of women: A cross-cultural study. *Am. J. Sociol.* 93:1060–95
- Deutsch, M. 1945. *The Psychology of Women*. New York: Grune & Stratton
- England, P., McCreary, L. 1987. Gender inequality in paid employment. In *Analyzing Gender*, ed. B. Hess, M. M. Ferree, pp. 286–320. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage
- Epstein, C. 1981. *Women in Law*. New York: Basic
- Epstein, C. 1988. *Deceptive Distinctions: Sex, Gender, and the Social Order*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
- Epstein, C., Coser, R. 1981. *Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites*. London: G. Allen & Unwin
- Faris, R., ed. 1964. *Handbook of Modern Sociology*. Chicago: Rand McNally
- Farnham, M. 1947. Battles won and lost. *Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.* May: p. 118
- Ferree, M. M. 1987. She works hard for a living. In *Analyzing Gender*, ed. B. Hess, M. M. Ferree, pp. 322–47. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage
- Folsom, J. K. 1934. *The Family and Democratic Society*. New York: Wilcy
- Gerson, H. 1985. *Hard Choices*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press

- Gilligan, C. 1982. *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
- Gilligan, C. 1986. *Signs* 11:304-31
- Goode, W. J. 1982. Why men resist. In *Rethinking the Family*, ed. B. Thorne, M. Yalom, pp. 131-47. New York: Longman
- Gouldner, A. W., Gouldner, X. 1963. *Modern Sociology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World
- Hacker, H. M. 1951. Women as a minority group. *Soc. Focus*. 30:60-69
- Hall, R. M., Sandler, B. R. 1982. The classroom climate: a chilly one for women? In *Women in Academics*, ed. M. K. Chamberlain, (1988), pp. 27-28. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Hess, B. B., Marx, M., Ferec, M. M., eds. 1987. *Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of Social Science Research*. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage
- Hochschild, A. R. 1981. On Reproduction of mothering: a methodological debate. *Signs* 6:482-514
- Hochschild, A. R. 1983. *The Managed Heart*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Horton, D. B., Hunt, L. 1968. *Sociology*. New York: McGraw Hill
- Kanter, R. M. 1977. *Men and Women of the Corporation*. New York: Basic
- Keller, E. F. 1985. *Reflections on Gender and Science*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
- Kenkel, W. F. 1966. *The Family in Perspective*. New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts
- Kephart, W. M. 1955. Review of *Women in the Modern World*. *J. Marriage Fam.* 17:75
- Kephart, W. M. 1961. *The Family, Society, and the Individual*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
- Kerber, L. K. 1986. On a different voice. *Signs* 11(2):304-10
- Kirkpatrick, C. 1936. The measurement of ethical inconsistency in marriage. *Int. J. Ethics*. 46:444-60
- Kirkpatrick, C. 1938. *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill
- Kirkpatrick, C. 1955. *The Family as Process and Institution*. New York: Ronald
- Klein, V. 1946. *The Feminine Character*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul
- Komarovsky, M. 1946. Cultural contradictions and sex roles. *Am. J. Sociol.* 52:184-89
- Komarovsky, M. 1953. *Women In The Modern World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
- Komarovsky, M. 1976. *Dilemmas of Masculinity: A Study of College Men*. New York: W. W. Norton
- Komarovsky, M. 1985. *Women in College: Shaping New Feminine Identities*. New York: Basic Books
- Lipset, S. M., Smelser, N. 1961. *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
- Lorber, J. 1984. *Woman Physicians: Careers, Status and Power*. New York/London: Tavistock
- Mead, M. 1935. *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*. New York: William Morrow
- Mead, M. 1949. *Male and Female*. New York: William Morrow
- Merton, R. K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free
- Merton, R. K., Broom, L., Cottrell, L. S., eds. 1959. *Sociology Today*. New York: Basic
- Merton, R. K., Nisbet, R. 1961. *Contemporary Social Problems*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Merton, R. K., Nisbet, R. S. 1971. *Contemporary Social Problems*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Myrdal, G., 1944. *An American Dilemma*, Vol. 2, appendix 5. New York: Harper
- Myrdal, A., Klein, V. 1956. *Women's Two Roles: Home and Work*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Nimkoff, 1947. *Marriage and the Family*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
- O'Brien, J. E. 1971. Violence in divorce-prone families. *J. Marriage Fam.* 33:692-98
- Parsons, T. 1942. Age and sex in the social structure. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 7:604-16
- Tierney, K. J. 1982. The battered women movement and the creation of the wife beating problem. *Soc. Probl.* 29:207-20
- Risman, B. J. 1987. Intimate relationships from a microsociological perspective. *London & Soc.* 1:6-32
- Rossi, A. S. 1984. Gender and parenthood. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 49:1-19
- Ruggie, M. 1984. *The State and the Working Woman*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press
- Slater, P. E. 1961. Parental role differentiation. *Am. J. Sociol.* 67:295-308
- Smith, D. 1979. The Prism of Sex. In *A Sociology for Women*. J. A. Sherman, E. T. Beck. pp. 151-87. Madison: Univ. Wis. Press
- Thorne, B. 1987. Revisioning women and social change. *Gender Soc.* 1:85-109
- Tronto, J. C. 1987. Beyond gender difference to a theory of care. *Signs* 12:644-63
- Weitzman, L. et. al. 1972. Sex role socialization in picture books for preschool children. *Am. J. Sociol.* 77:1125-50
- White, L. Jr. 1950. *Educating Our Daughters*. New York: Harper
- Winch, R. F. 1953. *The Modern Family*. New York: Holt