



Sheldon Stogher



ANNUAL REVIEWS **Further**

Click [here](#) for quick links to Annual Reviews content online, including:

- Other articles in this volume
- Top cited articles
- Top downloaded articles
- Our comprehensive search

From Mead to a Structural Symbolic Interactionism and Beyond

Sheldon Stryker

Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 34235;
email: strykers@indiana.edu

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2008. 34:15–31

The *Annual Review of Sociology* is online at
soc.annualreviews.org

This article's doi:
[10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134649](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134649)

Copyright © 2008 by Annual Reviews.
All rights reserved.

0360-0572/08/0811-0015\$20.00

Key Words

frames, theories, multiple identities, bridging

Abstract

This review discusses the continuing value of and problems in G.H. Mead's contributions to sociology from the standpoint of the contemporary discipline. It argues that the value is considerable and the problems largely avoidable with modifications to Mead's framework; it also offers necessary modifications via structural symbolic interactionism. Permitting the development of testable theories such as identity theory is a major criterion in evaluating a frame, and capacity to bridge to other frames and theories inside and outside sociology is another. The review examines bridges from the structural symbolic interactionist frame and identity theory to other symbolic interactionist theories, to other social psychological frames and theories in sociology, to cognitive social psychology, and to structural sociology.

In my (sociological) beginning, there was Mead. Introduced via cursory allusions to the “I” and “me” in undergraduate social psychology, I became intrigued, then enamored by *Mind, Self, and Society* (Mead 1934). My initial intrigue arose from the insight Mead’s analyses gave me into interactional processes that led to a major in sociology on my return to the University of Minnesota after service in World War II. I moved from intrigue to fascination as I read as much of Mead as I could lay hands on. What fascinated me as an undergraduate and graduate student was in part the dignity accorded humans by seeing them as important determiners of their lives rather than the pure product of conditioning. This, said Mead, was accomplished through the development of self and self-reflection made possible by communication with others. I undertook a dissertation examining accuracy in role-taking and adaptation in and to social relationships, drawing inspiration from Mead (Stryker 1956, 1957).

My training led me to envision sociology as social science, not by emulating physical science but by having the capacity to rigorously test theories of human social behavior. I recognized that sociology was a historical discipline and could not anticipate timeless laws, but I believed then (and now) that it could sensibly aspire to and research proposed general explanations of social life that would hold for reasonable periods of time. As a student, I also read a number of authors asserting or implying that their work tested Mead’s social psychological theory. I came to believe that most of what I read did not test anything; rather, it illustrated Mead’s concepts, doing so on the basis of post hoc application. I believed that Mead deserved the respect of thorough test. What I hoped to do was show that his thinking could be used to frame a theory, from which theory hypotheses could be derived. I believed that meaningful operational measures of concepts of the theory could be developed, the derived hypotheses could be empirically examined, and decisions about the validity of the hypothe-

ses (and so the underlying theory) could be reached.

Among the important things I learned from the dissertation work was that testable hypotheses from Mead’s work could be developed only by drawing on knowledge about specific interactional relationships and the settings that served as the contexts for person’s interactions with others. In general terms, the fundamental lesson learned was that Mead’s social psychological work constituted a conceptual/theoretical frame, not a theory per se. Sociology has a long history of confounding the distinction between the two.¹ Though the distinction is often recognized now, contemporary discussions often ignore or blur it (anyone wishing to follow up on this point should read the essays in Turner 2001 and Burke 2006).

The general utility of recognizing the difference between the two kinds of theoretical work is important to the evaluation of each: The criteria are different. The specific utility in drawing the distinction is that it makes clear what can legitimately be compared to what. The value of a sociological or social psychological theory² lies in its demonstrated ability to account for empirically discovered regularity in social or personal life, and only theories that make the same explanatory claims can be competitively evaluated. The value of a frame is commonly understood to be found in its fertility in generating researchable theory (I suggest below an expansion of the criteria underlying evaluation of theories); frames are not subject to direct tests of “truth.” Obviously, the propriety of these

¹See virtually every text labeled “sociological theory” from the 1930s to the present. A reminder for those whose memories—or reading—do not go back before the turn of the present century (if that far): Before World War II, there was little in the literature of sociology that required the distinction I am insisting on.

²A radical distinction between sociology and (sociological) social psychology is unjustified. Every sociological frame incorporates some social psychological frame, if only by assuming equivalence of the human beings entering interaction and relationships. Rather than using language suggesting a radical distinction, I use only the term social psychology with the warning that its meaning extends to sociology and reflects my commitment to a sociologically informed social psychology.

assertions rests on the meanings assigned to frame and theory. Equally obviously, to argue a difference between the two does not denigrate either Mead's work or the theoretical significance of a frame. Theory development depends on the conceptual frames available and used, and as a practical matter no theory can incorporate all conceivable concepts of potential import in explaining some social phenomenon or event. A frame specifies a manageable set of general assumptions and concepts assumed important in investigating particular social behaviors. It tells the researchers what concepts (or, in operational terms, what variables) are likely important in studying what may be of interest to them, but it does not specify the connections between or among the concepts/variables. It is, in short, the basis on which theorists justify their confidence that the relationships among the frame's concepts will be a significant part of the explanation(s) for investigated behaviors. In contrast, a theory provides a testable explanation of empirical observations, making use of relationships among the concepts provided by the frame. This understanding implies that frames necessarily focus on and emphasize a relatively small subset of concepts on which research bets are placed; other, alternative, sets remain out of focus and deemphasized.

My dissertation led me to believe that Mead's work had problems taken either as frame or explanatory theory. Still, I believe it is of utmost import to an adequate contemporary social psychology. What problems and why my belief?

MEAD'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

A quick review of Mead's central theses³ underwrites an equally quick review of the problems

they give rise to. For Mead, humans' distinctive characteristic is their development of "minds" and "selves" in the course of evolution: Humans have the capacity to resolve blocks to ongoing activity by internally manipulating symbols to review and choose among potential solutions. They also have the capacity to respond reflexively to themselves, treating themselves as objects akin to any object in their experience; indeed, reflexivity defines self. Mind and self arise out of ongoing social interaction made necessary when solutions require cooperating with others; cooperation is based on taking the attitude or role of the other to anticipate responses to projected lines of action. Role-taking is enabled by communication, and communication rests on the development in interaction of common meanings among those engaged in the ongoing social process that constitutes society.

According to Mead, society is a never-ending process of routinization of solutions to repetitive problems. Both persons (humans with minds and selves) and society are created through social process; each is constitutive of the other, and neither has ontological priority. Society emerges out of interaction and shapes self, but self shapes interaction, playing back on society. Society is continuously created and recreated as humans inevitably meet new challenges. Thus, change is a constant in the social process, as is emergence: the occurrence of new, unpredictable experience that necessitates creative adaptation. Stated differently, novel solutions to problems emerge as persons adapt existing meanings and behaviors to deal with unforeseen contingencies in the social process.

"In the beginning there is social process." This aphorism expresses the assumption underlying Mead's frame as well as his answer to the question of the relation of the social and the individual. It asserts that treating the social as simply the setting for individual experience and behavior is inadequate as a starting point for social psychological analysis. At least implicitly, Mead also asserts the socially organized character of human experience; the constructed nature of social life; the significance of self in mediating the relation of society to behavior and behavior

³This review of Mead's theses is largely adapted from Stryker (1997). I have not always used Mead's language here, hoping to simplify, albeit without distortion, what he had to say. Choosing the word "say" rather than "wrote" is deliberate. *Mind, Self, and Society* is an edited compilation of notes taken by multiple generations of students in his classes at the University of Chicago.

to society; self as initially formed on the basis of others' responses to the person; an active agent view of the human being; the importance to social behavior of persons' definitions and interpretations;⁴ and the limitations of determinism in accounts of social behavior. Given these emendations, an expansion of the "in the beginning" aphorism well states Mead's theme: The social process shapes society, self, and social interaction, and each feeds back on the others. Although the foregoing is insufficient as exposition of Mead's thought (but sufficient, I hope, to motivate students and even their elders to really read Mead rather than remain on the level of the typical textbook treatments), it serves reasonably as text for an appraisal of problems in that thought.⁵

Viewing theory as testable explanations of directly or indirectly observable social regularities, Mead's ideas are seriously flawed.⁶ As many (see Stryker 1980/2000) have observed, by and large his ideas are not empirically refutable. Too, key concepts in his work are imprecise and ambiguous and cannot without serious specification serve as the basis for theories that are open to empirical refutation. This is particularly true of arguments implicating the concepts of society and self and the way(s) the two relate.

Mead's conceptualization of society is most open to criticism. Mead understands that social process sometimes solidifies into communities and institutions, and he is aware that conflict sometimes exists between persons and between social units. He is also aware of age, gender, and (especially) a division of labor in society.

Yet his image of society is unsatisfactory from a contemporary point of view. He sees society as differentiated in few ways, with extant conflict and differentiation likely to disappear as social evolution leads to the incorporation of smaller units into more encompassing units. And he sees evolution as ultimately developing a single universe of discourse based on common experience produced by social interaction in attempts to resolve problems of social life. A current sociological view of society is very different, premised on experiences that include depression; two world wars and multiple more local wars; brutal dictatorships; genocides; widely destructive tribal loyalties; and virulent class, racial, and ethnic conflicts, etc. Too, Mead's concept of "generalized other" erases distinctions among social structures within societies, despite variations consequential for social interaction. That is, collectivities are all (at least potentially) generalized others, all serving equivalently as representatives of society in an internal I-me dialogue that is the self.

Correlative with viewing society as relatively homogeneous and with the dominant view of personality in the psychology of his time and even today (Smith 2005), Mead visualizes self as singular, internally relatively undifferentiated and (ideally) coherent. This humanistic sense of self makes it difficult to theorize effectively about many issues, e.g., the evident impact of social structural and situational variables on social behaviors and when and how apparently disparate roles result in intrapersonal conflict.

Other problems lie in a model of human social behavior as the scientist rationally choosing among alternative hypotheses by testing each against the empirical world. The model, deriving from an evolutionary perspective and a pragmatic philosophy, visualizes emotion and reason as antithetical, with emotion destined to disappear. Such ideas fail to do justice to the import of emotion in directing behavior, individual or social. What is more, this model accentuates the role of self-consciousness in human behavior. Consequently, the focus carries limitations with respect to a wide range of social behaviors in which self-consciousness is absent

⁴"[T]he world to which humans react and on which they act is a symbolized world, a world specified by meanings attached to the objects comprising it. . . . The point of view of participants in social interaction must enter decisively into satisfactory accounts or explanations of that interaction" (Stryker 1997, p. 320).

⁵Remember that I start this discussion with an assumption that something reasonably approximating a sociology-as-science is both possible and desirable.

⁶Mead's fundamental task was to develop a naturalistic account of the development of self in human beings, that is, to present an account of that development without assuming the presocial existence of self. In meeting that task, he was eminently successful.

(however, noting this “limitation” in Mead does not deny the import of self-consciousness in human social behavior).

Given these problems, other than that Mead supplies many of the conceptual bases for my work, what justifies a belief in his importance to social psychology? His emphasis on meanings as critically important to social interaction and social behavior is solidly reinforced by research in both social psychology and the cognitive social psychology of the past half century. He makes humans something other than automata bending to intractable social forces while recognizing the potential of social forces to overwhelm them. He insists on the priority of society in the emergence of self, a stance sociologists must appreciate. He provides a principled way of understanding limits on science in anticipating futures from pasts that fits a view of sociology as a historical discipline operating in a world not fixed by nature. He provides grounds for recognizing what human beings bring to the histories that produce them, yet avoids a subjectivism that rejects science. Furthermore, with but a few significant modifications grounded in his own ideas, he offers a view that has virtues important to contemporary social psychology. The modified view can accommodate both social stability and change, both social production and reproduction, both the inherent possibility of the new in social life and the differing possibilities of novelty emerging under various conditions. And it allows the possibility of explaining such antinomies within a single, consistent frame.

STRUCTURAL SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND IDENTITY THEORY

The necessary modifications in Mead’s view lead to a consideration of structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker 1980/2000). This frame revises Mead’s aphorism. Although society emerges from social process, organized society exists before the appearance of all new members. Thus, the basic premise of the perspective can be rewritten: Society shapes self

shapes social interaction. The frame then takes as its starting point sociology’s sense of social structures as patterned interactions and relationships, emphasizing the durability of such patterns, resistance to change, and capacity to reproduce themselves. This view sees social differentiation as a continuous process countering homogenization of interactional experience and the structures within societies. It sees society as composed of organized systems of interactions and role relationships and as complex mosaics of differentiated groups, communities, and institutions, cross-cut by a variety of demarcations based on class, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. It sees the diversity of parts as sometimes interdependent and sometimes independent of one another, sometimes isolated and insulated from one another and sometimes not, sometimes cooperative and sometimes conflicting, sometimes highly resistant to change and sometimes less so. It sees social life as largely taking place not within society as a whole but within relatively small networks of role relationships, many—perhaps most—local.⁷

This image of societies carries with it several implications. It suggests that greater significance should be placed on the impact of social structures on social interaction than Mead’s frame allows, and it suggests the utility in thinking of structures as social boundaries making it more or less probable that persons with differing backgrounds and resources will enter particular social relationships. In this view, social structures on various levels and of various kinds operate as facilitators of and constraints on entrance into and departures from networks of interpersonal relationships.

Taking seriously Mead’s dictum that self mirrors society, the frame also adopts a multifaceted sense of self, envisioning the parts of self as sometimes conflicting and sometimes independent of one another. Finally, structural

⁷As this suggests, a structural symbolic interactionism adopts a role-theoretic sense of social structure, albeit more in the vein of Robert Park’s or Ralph Turner’s work than, e.g., Talcott Parsons’s.

interactionism sees the effect of social structures as a process by which large-scale structures such as class, age, gender, and ethnicity operate through more intermediate structures such as neighborhoods, schools, and associational memberships to affect relationships in social networks. The latter are proximate structures presumed to shape the content of self and its organization.

Identity theory (Stryker 1968) began by specifying the terms of the premise that society impacts self impacts social behavior. Social behavior is specified by taking “role choice”—the opting by persons to meet expectations of one role rather than another—as that which the theory seeks to explain. The concept of identity salience is a specification of self, elaborated from the multifaceted view of self. Persons are seen as having multiple identities [self is understood to include affective and conative as well as cognitive aspects (Stryker 1968)], with persons having, potentially, as many identities as there are organized systems of role relationships in which they participate. Identities require that persons be placed as social objects by having others assign position designations to them and that persons internalize the designations.⁸ Identities are then self-cognitions tied to roles, and through roles, to positions in organized social relationships. By this usage, identities are cognitive schema (Markus 1977), with the capacity of schema to affect cognitive and perceptual processes (Stryker & Serpe 1994). As cognitive schema, they are not situation specific and can be carried by persons into the many situations they experience, affecting conduct in those situations. Identities are ordered in a salience hierarchy,⁹ defined as the likelihood that an identity will be invoked in a variety of situations. Role choice is hypothesized to be a consequence of identity salience.

⁸Identities are not roles. Eliason et al. (2007) show that variations in objective paths to adulthood lead to variations in the internalization of an adult identity.

⁹A strict hierarchical ordering of identities is not required. Current measurement procedures allow no statement of distances between rankings.

The referent of commitment is in networks of interaction and social relationships. Commitment, conceived as ties to social networks,¹⁰ is a “small” unit of structure and a specification of “society.” To the degree that one’s relationships to a set of others depend on being a particular kind of person and playing out particular roles, one is committed to being that kind of person. Commitment is hypothesized to be the immediate source of salience attached to identities (Stryker 1968, 1980/2000).

Evaluating a frame is first a matter of its utility in producing researchable theory. Identity theory research (Stryker & Serpe 1982, 1994; Serpe 1987; Serpe & Stryker 1987, 1993) tested these hypotheses, finding strong support for them. At the same time, this research examined other issues related to the theory. Stryker & Serpe (1994) examined psychological centrality as an alternative to salience in linking commitment and role choice. Results show that the two self variables are moderately related, that both are predicted by commitment and predict role choice, and that salience’s relationship to role choice is stronger than is centrality’s.¹¹ Serpe (1987) studied the over-time relation between commitment and identity salience, finding that each affected the other, but commitment had a stronger impact on subsequent salience than salience had on subsequent commitment. Tracing the effect of prior identities when students move from home to a new environment, Serpe & Stryker (1987) found that students tried to create in new settings relationships with others that allow them to maintain prior identities. Serpe (1987) factor analyzed the measure of commitment used in early research,

¹⁰This term is intended to refer to what sociologists call both groups and social networks. For sociologists, a group is a unit of social interaction, not simply a set of persons who identify themselves with a social category, as is true for social identity theorists in psychology (see Hogg 2006).

¹¹Psychological centrality (Rosenberg 1979), the subjective importance of identities, entered identity theory when research purportedly examining identity theory’s concept of identity salience used subjects’ rankings of the importance of their identities to measure salience. The cited research used appropriate measures of each.

finding two factors entering later work: interactional commitment (the number of relationships linked to a given identity and ties among networks of relationships) and affective commitment (emotional attachment to others in networks of relationships). Stryker et al. (2005) show racial/ethnic variation in commitment processes, also evidencing the role of large, essentially stratification features of society in channeling persons through intermediate levels of social structure to interpersonal networks as well as directly impacting the latter. Lee (2005) demonstrates that when social relationships change, identity salience, psychological centrality, and role-related behaviors change to meet expectations of those to whom persons become attached. Lee (2002, 2005) also provides evidence of gender similarities and differences in identity change processes.

Much effort has been expended to broaden identity theory to apply to a variety of outcomes. Work on bargaining in a coalition formation setting (Stryker & Psathas 1965) indicates that persons draw inferences about their identities consistent with assigned structural power positions and that emergent identities affect bargaining behavior. Another early study examines the impact of therapists in an adolescent treatment center in reinforcing patients' role and identity based on emotional disturbance (Schwartz et al. 1966). Stryker & Wells (1988) theorize the effect of life-course processes on changes in identities. Stryker (1994) uses symbolic interaction and identity theory as the bases of a theory examining conditions under which structures serve to constrain or facilitate freedom of action in the social arena. Competing identities tied to different social networks are seen as key to varying kinds and levels of participation in social movement activities (S. Stryker 2000). The relationship of emotion to identity is theorized in Ervin & Stryker (2001) and Stryker (2004); the former develops a model integrating self-esteem and identity theory, whereas the latter examines how unanticipated emotional responses to interaction events amplify commitment and identity salience and vice versa.

BRIDGE BUILDING: A CRITERION FOR EVALUATING FRAMES AND THEORIES

If single frames and theories cannot provide full explanations of any social behavior, capacity to bridge to other frames and theories becomes an important criterion in evaluating them. Relating ideas across theoretical and research traditions helps avoid intellectual chaos in a field in which specialized theories dealing with specialized topics seem unrelated to one another. Building bridges requires knowledge of ideas with implications beyond particular segments, implying a need for communication across segments. Communication across segments increases the probability of encountering ideas that can generate novel insights unavailable if communication is limited to persons sharing the same ideas. Do the structural symbolic interaction frame and identity theory bridge to other social psychological frames and theories in sociology, to cognitive social psychology, and to other segments of sociology?

Before dealing with this question, however, three theories with a special relationship to identity theory must be briefly touched on: affect control theory (ACT) (Heise 1979), identity control theory (ICT) (Burke 2004, Burke & Stets 1999), and identity accumulation theory (Thoits 1983). Independently developed, all derive from Mead and structural interactionism and complement identity theory. Both ACT and ICT are concerned with the internal dynamic of selves viewed as cybernetic systems seeking to restore equilibriums when identities are threatened by external events. In ACT, interactions consist of elements—self, other, activity—with affective values reflecting meanings resident in existing culture. If an external event disturbs the affective value of an element, adjustment essentially involves altering one or more of the meanings, and consequently the values, of elements—including identities—in the settings, restoring equilibrium. An identity potentially changes when a disturbance is so great that affective values cannot be brought

into line with one another without changing the identity. In ICT, adjustments essentially involve altering activities to secure responses from others that confirm existing identities, and identities change when disturbing events are so extreme that prior identities cannot be restored. Needed is theoretical effort, starting with internal adjustments and working back to the commitments that organize identities and equivalent theoretical effort in the other direction, specifying when and how changes in commitments impact internal processes aimed at restoring equilibriums. Stryker & Burke's (2000) work is an effort to reinforce the bridge between structural identity theory and ICT's theory of internal adjustments in identity processes.

Smith-Lovin (2007), rooted in ACT and identity theory, challenges the latter. She suggests that interactive situations as described by identity theory (with persons bringing multiple identities to interactive situations) are potentially important sources of cultural and social change. However, she argues, most interactive situations emerge in a social structure that isolates social networks, require only single identities, and involve only weak ties to others, leaving a multi-identity self of little import in mediating relationships between social structure and behavior.¹² Thoits (1983, 2003) sees roles and identities as resources available to deal with life's exigencies; she finds that the number of voluntary roles and identities persons have mitigates stress reactions but that the subjective importance of an identity does not affect the relationship between it and stress. These findings also pose a challenge to identity theory, as does Thoits's argument that in emphasizing structural constraints on identity personal agency is neglected.

¹²This critique may fail to take sufficient account of the transportability or trans-situational character of salient identities; time and future research will tell. Too, an extension of identity theory that incorporates trait-based identities (see the discussion below) may be useful in dealing with such situations.

Bridging to Other Social Psychological Frames and Theories in Sociology

Sociological social psychology offers two frames and related theories that do not derive from Mead: expectation states and exchange. The first¹³ initially sought to explain Bales's (1950, 1970) findings that unacquainted persons working on group tasks quickly show inequalities in interaction and stabilize status structures reflecting the inequalities. The theory centers on performance expectations regarding contributions to group success. It sees expectations as inferences from cultural meanings associated with significant social characteristics such as gender, social rewards such as wealth, and patterns of behavioral interchanges such as speaking first and forcefully (Correll & Ridgeway 2003, Ridgeway 2006). Performance expectations lead to behaviors that reinforce inequalities and to structures that support these inequalities (Berger et al. 1974, 1977).

Similar ideas appear in a symbolic interactionist account of how persons entering a new group without prior information about one another organize to deal with a task that brings them together. To interact effectively, they give meaning to the interaction by specifying who they and others are and what the situation is. Having no experience with or information about each other, they use cues in early interaction and cultural cues, attaching meanings to dress, appearance, speech patterns, etc., to define the situation so as to organize behavior; and they behave toward others in ways that reflect the definitions. Because meanings of the cues tend to be widely shared in a culture, initial behaviors based on the cues also tend to elicit confirming and reinforcing responses, solidifying structures implicit in the meanings of the cues.

That a bridge between the expectation states and interactionist frames exists suggests that

¹³Expectation states theory has parented a family of related theories. The most prominent is status construction theory (Ridgeway 2006, Correll & Ridgeway 2003), which extends the original theory by asking how beliefs about diffuse status characteristics translate into performance expectations.

theories emanating from the frames could benefit from one another's concepts and processes.¹⁴ An example: For identity theories, the meanings of social roles and identities are given by expectations. Identities are transportable cognitive schema, with salience an important determiner of the likelihood an identity will be transported to new situations. How do preexisting salient identities inconsistent with meanings in cultural cues available in task groups affect performance expectations and emergent social structures? Lucas (2003) has shown that negative performance expectations assigned to females by males in mixed gender groups (Pugh & Wahrman 1983) can be reversed and that new positive expectations carry over to subsequent group interactions. Would males with an identity incorporating stereotypical male attitudes toward females respond to information negating such attitudes by reversing performance expectations for females? Would they carry this reversal forward into new group interactions? If males respond in these ways to new information, what is implied for the concept of identity salience and for identity theory more generally?

While recent work on exchange continues to focus on the relations between the structure of exchange networks and power use,¹⁵ it has also concerned itself with a wider variety of social psychological issues including fairness, trust, emotion, cohesion, and commitment (Cook & Rice 2003). In roughly the past decade, Lawler (2001, Lawler & Yoon 1996, Lawler et al. 2000) has developed theory to explain the proclivity of those engaged in exchanges to continue to exchange with others with whom they have exchanged in the past, or commitment. The the-

ory argues that repeated exchanges with the same other(s) generate positive affect for the relationship per se that in turn creates commitment to the relationship sufficient to override self-interest. Recently, Lawler (2003) has made useful contact with structural symbolic interactionist and identity theoretic ideas relevant to this concern, delineating the commonalities (and differences) between the broader interactionist and the more focused exchange perspectives and suggesting that exchange theory meets interactionism's need to contextualize social interaction. He also bridges identity and exchange theory by arguing that, when actors are attached affectively to groups, their commitments to identities in role relationships within the group are strengthened, and, when identity-related role relations in a group are strong, affective ties to the group are strengthened. Lawler's bridges between exchange and structural interactionism principally use the concepts of role identities and identity salience. Good use might be made of the concept of multiple identities. This thought arises from asking the questions, What if exchange theory relaxed the assumption that persons enter exchange relations with a single identity, and what if designs permitted either the prior assessment of entering identities and their relative salience or assessed these in the course of bargaining? Obviously, analysis would be complicated, but equally obviously, experiments would better approximate real-world circumstances.

Bridging to Cognitive Social Psychology (and Personality Theory)

The cognitive revolution in psychology opened the way for dialogue between the sociological and psychological versions of social psychology, largely through their common interest in self. This is an arena in which cross-discipline communication is (almost) institutionalized. Embodied in work published over the past 30 years by both sociologists and psychologists (e.g., Howard & Callero 1991; Yardley & Honess 1987; Hormuth 1990; Owens et al. 2001; Stryker 1977, 1989, 1991; Stryker et al. 2000;

¹⁴They could also benefit from another frame's style of research; for example, the expectation states tradition provides a model of programmatic research that all might hold as an ideal and might approximate to the degree possible.

¹⁵When Richard Emerson's (1981) chapter on this theme appeared, I sent him an appreciative note. He replied, writing that he intended to incorporate into his exchange formulation the interactionists' concern with meanings. Unfortunately, his accidental death prevented him from doing so. It is interesting to speculate on what impact his doing so might have had on later developments in exchange theory.

Stets & Burke 2000; Reid & Deaux 1996; Thoits & Virshup 1997; Kashima et al. 2002), the links are a two-way street, from cognitive theory to identity theory and vice versa. Identity theory received a prime benefit from the work on selves as cognitive schema (Markus 1977).¹⁶ Markus finds that perceptions of schema-related stimuli are quicker and memories more accurate and stronger than are perceptions of stimuli not related to self schema. That identities are schema implies that situations entered are more likely to be interpreted as calling for identity-relevant behavior and that opportunities for identity-related actions are more likely to be recognized. Conceptualizing self and identities as schema strengthens considerably the identity theory argument that salient identities are likely to produce behavior consistent with expectations attached to those identities.

Perhaps the most prominent effect of identity theory on the thinking in cognitive social psychology has been through the concept of multiple identities and the related concept of identity salience. There may be, however, a more important but largely potential contribution of identity theory: Behind cognitive organization lies social organization. As many have said, self (and so identity) is produced by persons' experiences. However, experiences are not distributed randomly through society. Rather, the content of and the meanings derived from experiences are shaped by where the persons are located in the social structures of class, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, etc. Large-scale structures channel persons into social structures on a more intermediate level; the latter then channel persons into interpersonal networks (these, obviously, are probability assertions), and the relationships persons enter will importantly impact their self-concepts, attitudes, and behaviors. Understanding the structural sources of persons' identities will not only remind cognitive theorists of the limitations of purely cognitive explanations of behavior, but

also deepen their understanding of cognitive processes.

One of the more interesting debates currently bridging cognitive social psychology and identity theory involves the distinction between social identity and role identity, the former deriving from Tajfel (1981, 1982) and Turner (1982) and understood as being based on perceived membership in a social category, and the latter being a core concept of identity theory understood as internalization of role expectations attached to positions in social networks. Although there is some tendency to see the two in either-or terms, a fairly typical happening in debates in social psychology, current work now asks about the relationship between the two (Thoits & Virshup 1997, Deaux & Martin 2003, Deaux et al. 1999, Stets & Burke 2000). The undoubted outcome of that debate will be to see that cognitive identification with a category is both precursor to and consequence of involvement in social networks representative of the category. However that may be, the outcome will reflect the bridging of identity theory and social identity theory.

A recent case of the bridging of structural symbolic interaction/identity theory and cognitive social psychology involves personality theory. Personality theorists have generally followed their disciplinary heritage in conceptualizing self and identity as dispositional structures of traits. However, at least a few (e.g., Roberts & Donahue 1994, Wood & Roberts 2006) are open to the idea of role-based traits and have incorporated into their theorizing and research a multiple self conception of the person, specified as a multiple trait conception of self, and the concept of identity salience as a significant characteristic of the organization of self.

A rather fortuitous contact with this literature¹⁷ led to seeing that traits as well as roles can define and organize identities.

¹⁶Schemas are sets of related cognitive elements that are linked in that arousal of one is likely to arouse others.

¹⁷About two years ago, I received an email from Brent Roberts, who was editing a special issue of the *Journal of Personality*, asking if I would present my work to the audience of that journal. Intrigued (and flattered) by an interest in my work I had no awareness of, I agreed to do so. Stryker (2007) resulted.

Persons can build self concepts around traits; these can be internalized and can guide social cognitions and interpersonal behaviors. Recognizing that people can construct identities based on traits brings the panoply of identity theoretic concepts and arguments into play, opening research possibilities for both sociologists and personality theorists. Can traits-based expectations override role expectations, and if so, under what conditions? Can traits underwrite multiple identities? Can they be more salient than specific role identities? Will structural overlap be the basis on which competition between trait identities occur, as for role identities? It is around such questions that sociologists starting with role identities or psychologists starting with traits can theorize and research relationships of trait and role identities.

Bridging to Other Segments of Sociology

A structural symbolic interactionist frame and identity theory have been used by persons working on theoretical and substantive problems in a variety of subareas of sociology. Perhaps of particular current interest is the cognitive invasion of organizational sociology that has opened the way for bridges from Mead, symbolic interactionism, and identity theory to work on organizations.¹⁸ The invasion began with the introduction into organizational theory of new institutionalism's concept of culture, incorporating the idea of cognitive taken-for-grantedness (Zald 1970, Meyer & Rowan 1977, DiMaggio & Powell 1991). It continued in a series of conceptual/theoretical moves that have brought concepts of culture, meaning, multiple selves, and group and role identities into organizational theory. The intervening steps in this succession of moves are well illustrated in a series of publications by Robin Stryker, beginning

with her study of the organizational politics of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (Stryker 1989).¹⁹ That study tied differences in the professional logics, identities, and related attributions of meaning of economists and lawyers employed by the NLRB to organizational and societal conflicts resulting in a re-making of the NLRB.

A second effort (Stryker 1994) extends the reach of the earlier interest in competing professional logics by constructing a general framework tying the legitimacy of law to a mixture of legal and scientific rationalities. Robin Stryker uses that framework to specify how competing scientific and legal rule/resource sets (Sewell 1992)—i.e., social structures—impact legitimacy processes, order, and change in institutions through the cultures, identities, meanings, and behaviors of individual, institutional, and collective actors. The third piece in this series (R. Stryker 2000) makes explicit the implications for new institutionalist theories of organizations of the ideas developed in the first two. She defines the fundamental institutional logics of social institutions, including law and science, noting that the institutional logics can be transposed or extended across situations and arenas of behavior. Observing that the new institutionalism of organizations in American sociology emphasizes cognitive aspects of institutions and often equates institutionalization with cognitive taken-for-grantedness, she argues that the taken-for-grantedness of institutions is fragile in contemporary societies. This is because institutions are highly differentiated, and individual actors and organizations occupy positions simultaneously in multiple institutions with contradictory logics, resulting in contradictory or competing role expectations, creating cognitive and emotional dissonance, ambiguities and role conflicts promoting active choice and institutional innovation. More generally, the institutional logic (rules/schema) and associated practices of law are socially constructed

¹⁸We enter now a bridging arena that provides persons like myself special satisfaction given the past intellectual distance, sometimes disdain and dismissal, that marked the attitudes of many interested in institutional and organizational sociology towards a social psychology inspired by Mead.

¹⁹This series also illustrates the potential benefits of bridging from one set of interests to another, in this case within the broad field of sociology.

and mobilized as resources through interpretive and political processes involving cognitive, normative, and instrumental components. Law helps constitute everyday meanings, identities, roles, relationships and structures, norms, values, ideas, and ideals (R. Stryker 2000).

It is thus only a small step, if any step at all, to explicit considerations of Mead, symbolic interactionism, and identity theory in work on organizations. Rao et al. (2003), in a study of institutional change in French gastronomy from classical to nouvelle cuisine, assert that cultural frame institutionalism has difficulty explaining how existing institutional logics and role identities are replaced by new logics and role identities. The difficulty exists, the authors write, because cultural frame institutionalism holds that institutional logics are belief systems that provide guidelines for action and governance structures by which power and authority are exercised. Thus, institutions are durable, their logics constitute the identities of actors and create obligations, and their governing structures constrain action. Consequently, organizations resemble one another and exhibit little diversity. Further, Rao et al. (2003) assert, cultural frame institutionalism says little about how social movements underwrite reinstitutionalization in the professions, glossing over variations in professional logics and role identities.

They propose that identity-based social movement theory (rather than more instrumental movement theory) enables understanding of how movements foster cultural change in the professions by reshaping logics and redefining individuals' role identities. Basic to change is the introduction of identity-discrepant cues with regard to professional logics and identities. Identity movements, celebrating the differences between new logics and identities and old, create competition between new and old identities that jeopardize the old and lead actors to adopt the new. Although Rao et al. (2003) seem to have a social identity concept most in mind in delineating the processes whereby identity social movements impact cultural change, their discussion makes it clear that initially individual logics and role identities are altered and

in that sense are precursors to identity movements. Specifics of their account of the changes in both the cuisine and in the professionals who altered the cuisine make it evident that it is the meanings of cuisine and chef that are at stake in the competition between old and new logics and role identities. This aligns their frame with that of Mead as well as with a structural symbolic interactionism and identity theory.²⁰

Using academic institutions as a prime illustration of a wide class of organizations, Kraatz & Block (2008) are concerned with institutional pluralism, the case in which organizations operate in multiple institutional spheres and present multiple and varied faces to the multiple audiences in their environment. Constituted by more than one cultural logic, these organizations possess multiple identities conferred by segments of their environments that make different demands and so generate tensions in the organizations themselves. Primarily concerned with the theoretical and practical implications of cognitive or constitutive pluralism—viewing pluralism as constitutive and ideational, infusing and not merely impinging on organizations—Kraatz & Block note that both problems and opportunities are created for institutions in a pluralistic environment. The problems inhere in the potential for incoherence, fragmentation, conflict, goal ambiguity, and instability; the opportunities inhere in the potential for complementarities among identities that hold an organization together. Important features of organizations—organizational legitimacy, governance, and change—structure the discussion.

Kraatz & Block (2008) cite three key sources of their perspective on organizations in pluralistic contexts. Two are conventional in sociological analyses of organizations: the institutionalisms of March (1994, 1999)

²⁰This alignment (or bridging) of the new social movements literature and the literature deriving from Mead on structural symbolic interactionism/identity theory is also seen, in somewhat different terms, in my (S. Stryker 2000) discussion of the concept of identity competition and its relevance to variation in modes and depth of social movement participation.

and Selznick (1949). Both of these see the organization's environment as politically and ideologically heterogeneous; the former, interestingly, embraces a sociological conception of self. The third is not (yet?) conventional, namely, a structural symbolic interactionist frame and identity theory. Specifically, Kraatz & Block (2008) credit identity theory's distinction between self (the whole) and multiple identities (parts of the whole) as especially critical in understanding organizational governance in pluralistic organizations, arguing that it is through governance that organizational self selects, prioritizes, and integrates its various institutionally given identities. They also credit attention given in identity theory to processes of identity expression and verification, the idea that people seek ways to behave that express their salient identities and seek identity-confirming responses from others. They suggest that it is through actors seeking to validate their identities via symbolic exchanges with different segments of their environments that organizations' diverse identities are legitimated or delegitimated. Finally, they argue that individuals' (especially leaders') personal identities have a strong impact on the expressions of organizational identities. For those interested in identity processes themselves, Kraatz & Block (2008) show just how fertile multiple identity organizations are as grounds within which actors' personal identities mesh with organizational identities (or fail to do so).

Pratt & Foreman (2000) are concerned with the management of multiple organizational identities and not individual-level identities; they nevertheless explicitly borrow the logic and insights of Mead, the structural interactionist frame, and identity theory in their effort in that realm. I add only that managing organizational identities necessarily involves managing

individual-level identities as well; that is, while distinguishable analytically, organizational and individual-level identities are not independent of one another.

SUMMARY AND CODA

The first part of this review is addressed to those who may know little or nothing about the sociological tradition inspired by Mead, symbolic interactionism, or the modification of that frame labeled structural symbolic interactionism, and to those who may find a refresher course on this subject matter useful. A second part focuses on identity theory, a major derivation from the modified interactionist frame, chosen because it has been at the center of my interests for roughly the past 50 years. The third part argues that beyond fertility in producing a strong tradition of research, the value of a theoretical frame and derived theory lies in their capacity to bridge from their own foci to other theoretical and research foci, both inside and outside of sociology per se. In proposing the value of a structural interactionist frame and identity theory in those terms, the review discusses bridges to theories and research that also have ties to Mead, each with a strong theoretical and research base; to two other pairings of frames and theories in sociological social psychology, expectations states and exchange; to cognitive social psychology; and to structural sociology. I hope that the utility of a structural symbolic interactionist frame and of identity theory has been demonstrated successfully. More importantly, I hope that I have succeeded in demonstrating the value to sociology of seeking bridges across its own specialized concerns as well as bridges to cognate disciplines to which we have much to contribute and from which we have much to learn.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Robin Stryker was immensely helpful to me by reading drafts of this essay and suggesting changes.

LITERATURE CITED

- Bales RF. 1950. *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
- Bales RF. 1970. *Personality and Interpersonal Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston
- Berger J, Connor TL, Fisek MH. 1974. *Expectation States Theory: A Theoretical Research Program*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop
- Berger J, Fisek MH, Norman R, Zelditch M. 1977. *Status Characteristics and Social Interaction*. New York: Elsevier
- Burke PJ. 2004. Identity and social structure: the 2007 Cooley-Mead award address. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 67:5–15
- Burke PJ, ed. 2006. *Contemporary Social Psychological Theories*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
- Burke PJ, Stets J. 1999. Trust and commitment through self-verification. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 62:347–66
- Cook K, Rice E. 2003. Social exchange theory. See DeLamater 2003, pp. 53–76
- Correll SJ, Ridgeway CL. 2003. Expectation states theory. See DeLamater 2003, pp. 29–52
- Deaux K, Martin D. 2003. Interpersonal networks and social categories: specifying levels of context in identity processes. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 66:101–17
- Deaux K, Reid A, Mizrahi K, Cotting D. 1999. Connecting the personal to the social: the function of social identification. In *The Psychology of the Social Self*, ed. TR Taylor, R Kramer, O John, pp. 91–113. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
- DeLamater J, ed. 2003. *Handbook of Social Psychology*. New York: Kluwer Acad./Plenum
- DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW, eds. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Eliason S, Mortimer JT, Vuolo M, Tranby E. 2007. *Pathways to adulthood, subjective timing, and adult identity: normative age grading revisited*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc., New York, Aug.
- Emerson RM. 1981. Social exchange theory. In *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives*, ed. M Rosenberg, R Turner, pp. 30–65. New York: Basic Books
- Ervin LH, Stryker S. 2001. Theorizing the relationship between self-esteem and identity. See Owens et al. 2001, pp. 29–55
- Hargraves TH. 2005. *That's (not) how we do things: integrating neoinstitutional and sensemaking perspectives to explain strategic responses to global warming change*. PhD Diss., Univ. Minn.
- Heise DR. 1979. *Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Hogg M. 2006. Social identity theory. See Burke 2006, pp. 111–36
- Hormuth S. 1990. *Ecology of Self: Relocation and Self-Concept*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Howard JA, Callero P, eds. 1991. *The Self-Society Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion, and Action*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Kashima Y, Foddy M, Platow M, eds. 2002. *Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
- Kraatz MS, Block ES. 2008. Organizational implications of institutional pluralism. In *The Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, ed. R Greenwood, C Oliver, R Suddaby, K Sahlin-Andersson, pp. 243–75. London: Sage
- Lawler EJ. 2001. An affect theory of social exchange. *Am. J. Sociol.* 107:321–52

- Lawler EJ. 2003. Interaction, emotion, and collective identity. In *Advances in Identity Theory and Research*, ed. PJ Burke, TJ Owens, RT Serpe, PA Thoits, pp. 135–50. New York: Kluwer Acad./Plenum
- Lawler EJ, Thye SR, Yoon J. 2000. Emotions and group cohesion in productive exchange. *Am. J. Sociol.* 106:616–57
- Lawler EJ, Yoon J. 1996. Commitment in exchange relations: test of a theory of relational cohesion. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 61:89–108
- Lee JD. 2002. More than ability: Gender and personal relationships influence science and technology involvement. *Sociol. Educ.* 75:349–73
- Lee JD. 2005. Do girls change more than boys? Gender differences and similarities in the impact of new relationships on identities and behavior. *Self Identity* 4:131–47
- Lucas JW. 2003. Status processes and the institutionalization of women as leaders. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 68:464–80
- March JG. 1994. *A Primer on Decision-Making*. New York: Free Press
- March JG. 1999. *The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence*. Malden, MA: Blackwell
- Markus HR. 1977. Self-schemata and processing information about self. *J. Personal. Soc. Psychol.* 35:63–78
- Mead GH. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Meyer JW, Rowan B. 1977. Institutional organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony. *Am. J. Sociol.* 83:340–63
- Owens TJ, Stryker S, Goodman N, eds. 2001. *Extending Self-Esteem Theory and Research: Sociological and Psychological Currents*. London/New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Pratt MG, Foreman PO. 2000. Classifying management responses to multiple organizational identities. *Acad. Manag. Rev.* 25:18–42
- Pugh MD, Wahrman RW. 1983. Neutralizing sexism in mixed sex groups: Do women have to be better than men? *Am. J. Sociol.* 88:746–62
- Rao H, Monin P, Durand R. 2003. Institutional change in Toque Ville: nouvelle cuisine as an identity movement in French cuisine. *Am. J. Sociol.* 108:795–843
- Reid A, Deaux K. 1996. Relationship between social and personal identities: segregation or integration. *J. Personal. Soc. Psychol.* 71:1051–91
- Ridgeway C. 2006. Status construction theory. See Burke 2006, pp. 301–23
- Roberts BW, Donahue EM. 1994. One personality, multiple selves: integrating personality and social roles. *J. Personal.* 62:200–16
- Rosenberg M. 1979. *Conceiving the Self*. New York: Basic Books
- Schwartz M, Fearn GFN, Stryker S. 1966. Self-concepts and the emotionally disturbed role. *Sociometry* 29:300–5
- Selznick P. 1949. *TVA and the Grass Roots*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Serpe RT. 1987. Stability and change in self: a symbolic interactionist explanation. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 50:44–55
- Serpe RT, Stryker S. 1987. The construction of self and the reconstruction of social relationships. In *Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research*, ed. EJ Lawler, B Markovsky, 4:41–82. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press
- Serpe RT, Stryker S. 1993. Prior social ties and movement into new social relationships. In *Advances in Group Processes*, ed. EJ Lawler, B Markovsky, J O'Brien, K Heimer, 10:283–304. New York: Kluwer Acad./Plenum
- Sewell WH Jr. 1992. A theory of structure: duality, agency and transformation. *Am. J. Sociol.* 98:1–29
- Smith MB. 2005. Personality and social psychology: retrospections and aspirations. *Personal. Soc. Psychol. Rev.* 9:334–40

- Smith-Lovin L. 2007. The strength of weak identities: social structural sources, situation, and emotional experience. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 70:106–24
- Stets JE, Burke PJ. 2000. Identity theory and social identity theory. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 63:224–37
- Stryker R. 1989. Limits on technocratization of law: the elimination of the National Labor Relations Board's Division of Economic Research. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 54:341–58
- Stryker R. 1994. Rules, resources and legitimacy processes: some implications for social conflict, order and change. *Am. J. Sociol.* 99:847–910
- Stryker R. 2000. Legitimacy processes as institutional politics: implications for theory and research in the sociology of organizations. *Res. Sociol. Organ.* 17:179–223
- Stryker S. 1956. Relationships of married offspring and their parents: a test of Mead's theory. *Am. J. Sociol.* 62:308–19
- Stryker S. 1957. Role-taking accuracy and adjustment. *Sociometry* 20:286–96
- Stryker S. 1968. Identity salience and role performance: the relevance of symbolic interaction theory for family research. *J. Marriage Fam.* 30:558–64
- Stryker S. 1977. Developments in two social psychologies: toward an appreciation of mutual relevance. *Sociometry* 40:145–60
- Stryker S. 1980/2000. *Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version*. Menlo Park, CA/Caldwell, NJ: Benjamin-Cummings/Blackburn
- Stryker S. 1989. The two social psychologies: additional thoughts. *Soc. Forces* 68:45–54
- Stryker S. 1991. Exploring the relevance of social cognition for the relationship of self and society: linking the cognitive perspective and identity theory. See Howard & Callero 1991, pp. 19–42
- Stryker S. 1994. Freedom and constraint in social and personal life: toward resolving the paradox of self. In *Self, Collective Behavior and Society: Essays Honoring the Contributions of Ralph H. Turner*, ed. G Platt, C Gordon, pp. 119–38. Greenwich, CT: JAI
- Stryker S. 1997. In the beginning there is society: lessons from a sociological social psychology. In *The Message of Social Psychology: Perspectives on Mind in Society*, ed. C McGarty, SA Haslam, pp. 315–27. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
- Stryker S. 2000. Identity competition: key to differential social movement involvement? See Stryker et al. 2000, pp. 21–40
- Stryker S. 2004. Integrating emotion into identity theory. In *Theory and Research on Human Emotions*, ed. JH Turner, pp. 1–24. New York/London: Elsevier
- Stryker S. 2007. Identity theory and the trait-situation 'controversy'. *J. Personal.* 75:1083–102
- Stryker S, Burke J. 2000. The past, present, and future of an identity theory. *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 63:284–97
- Stryker S, Owens TJ, White R. 2000. *Identity, Self and Social Movements*. Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press
- Stryker S, Psathas G. 1965. Bargaining behavior and orientations in coalition formation. *Sociometry* 28:122–44
- Stryker S, Serpe RT. 1982. Commitment, identity salience and role behavior. In *Personality, Roles and Social Behavior*, ed. W Ickes, E Knowles, pp. 199–218. New York: Springer-Verlag
- Stryker S, Serpe RT. 1994. Identity salience and psychological centrality: equivalent, overlapping or complementary concepts? *Soc. Psychol. Q.* 57:16–34
- Stryker S, Serpe RT, Hunt MO. 2005. Making good on a promise: the impact of larger social structures on commitments. In *Social Identification in Groups*, ed. SI Thye, EJ Lawler, pp. 93–124. Oxford, UK: Elsevier
- Stryker S, Wells LE. 1988. Stability and change in self over the life course. In *Life Span Development and Behavior*, ed. P Baltes, D Featherman, R Lerner, pp. 191–229. Greenwich, CT: JAI
- Tajfel H. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

- Tajfel H, ed. 1982. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Thoits PA. 1983. Multiple identities and psychological well-being: a reformulation of the social isolation hypothesis. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 48:174–87
- Thoits PA. 2003. Personal agency in the accumulation of multiple role identities. In *Advances in Identity Theory and Research*, ed. PJ Burke, TJ Owens, RT Serpe, PA Thoits, pp. 179–94. New York: Kluwer Acad./Plenum
- Thoits PA, Virshup LK. 1997. Me's and we's: forms and functions of social identities. In *Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues*, ed. R Ashmore, L Jussim, pp. 106–33. New York: Oxford Univ. Press
- Turner JC. 1982. Toward a cognitive redefinition of a social group. See Tajfel 1982, pp. 15–40
- Turner JH. 2001. *Handbook of Sociological Theory*. New York: Kluwer Acad./Plenum
- Wood D, Roberts BW. 2006. Cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of personality and the role identity structural model. *J. Personal.* 74:779–809
- Yardley K, Honess T, eds. 1987. *Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives*. London: Wiley
- Zald M, ed. 1970. *Power in Organizations*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt Univ. Press