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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 11, 2019

Econometrics of Auctions and Nonlinear Pricing

Abstract

This review surveys the growing literature on the econometrics of first-price sealed-bid auctions and nonlinear pricing. The complexity of the economic models has initiated fruitful collaborations between econometrics and empirical research. We review the benchmark models and their extensions, the identification of the model primitives, and their nonparametric and semiparametric estimation. We discuss the future of the field, which goes beyond auctions and nonlinear pricing, as both can be viewed as economic mechanisms for price formation, allocation, and market organization.

Keyword(s): first-price sealed-bid auctions, identification, incomplete information models, JEL C14, JEL C57, JEL D44, JEL D82, nonlinear pricing, nonparametric estimation, semiparametric estimation, structural models
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2019-08-02
2025-02-06
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