1932

Abstract

Market design applies economic principles to the often messy problems of real-world exchange in which goods may not be homogeneous, the identities of trading partners may matter, contracts may not be executed, and even the formulation of trade as balancing supply and demand may be unhelpful. This article recounts the mostly academic research advancing the analysis and design of such markets. Among the highlighted applications are ones involving financial markets, Internet advertising, electricity auctions, spectrum auctions, cryptocurrencies, and combinatorial procurements.

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2019-08-02
2024-05-29
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