1932

Abstract

Should developing countries give all of their citizens enough money to live on? Interest in this idea has grown enormously in recent years, reflecting both positive results from a number of existing cash transfer programs and dissatisfaction with the perceived limitations of piecemeal, targeted approaches to reducing extreme poverty. We discuss what we know (and what we do not) about three questions: what recipients would likely do with the incremental income, whether this would unlock further economic growth, and whether giving the money to everyone (as opposed to targeting it) would be wise.

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2019-08-02
2024-10-03
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