1932

Abstract

In this review, we survey the economics literature on echo chambers. We identify echo chambers as arising from a combination of two phenomena: () the choice of individuals to segregate with like-minded ones, i.e., the creation of chambers, and () behavioral biases that induce polarization when individuals exchange beliefs in these chambers, i.e., the echo. We summarize the literatures on these two phenomena and suggest how to combine the two literatures to gain insights about the effects of echo chambers on economic and political outcomes. We end by suggesting pathways for future research and discussing policy interventions to alleviate echo chambers.

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2019-08-02
2024-06-23
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