Bunching

Literature Cited

1. Allen E, Dechow P, Pope D, Wu G. 2016. Reference-dependent preferences: evidence from marathon runners. Manag. Sci. In press [Google Scholar]
2. Almunia M, Lopez-Rodriguez D. 2015. Under the radar: the effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance Work. Pap., Univ. Warwick [Google Scholar]
3. Bachas P, Soto M. 2016. Not(ch) your average tax system: corporate taxation under weak enforcement Work. Pap., Univ. Calif., Berkeley [Google Scholar]
4. Bastani S, Selin H. 2014. Bunching and non-bunching at kink points of the Swedish tax schedule. J. Public Econ. 109:36–49 [Google Scholar]
5. Bertrand M, Kamenica E, Pan J. 2015. Gender identity and relative income within households. Q. J. Econ. 130:571–614 [Google Scholar]
6. Best M, Brockmeyer A, Kleven H, Spinnewijn J, Waseem M. 2015a. Production vs revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity: theory and evidence from Pakistan. J. Polit. Econ. 123:1311–55 [Google Scholar]
7. Best M, Cloyne J, Ilzetzki E, Kleven H. 2015b. Interest rates, debt and intertemporal allocation: evidence from notched mortgage contracts in the UK Work. Pap., London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
8. Best M, Kleven H. 2013a. Housing market responses to transaction taxes: evidence from notches and stimulus in the UK Work. Pap., London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
9. Best M, Kleven H. 2013b. Optimal income taxation with career effects of work effort Work. Pap., London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
10. Best M, Kleven H. 2016. Housing market responses to transaction taxes: evidence from notches and stimulus in the UK Work. Pap., London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
11. Blinder AS, Rosen HS. 1985. Notches. Am. Econ. Rev. 75:736–47 [Google Scholar]
12. Blundell R, MaCurdy T. 1999. Labor supply: a review of alternative approaches. Handbook of Labor Economics 3 O Ashenfelter, D Card 1559–695 Amsterdam: North-Holland [Google Scholar]
13. Brehm M, Imberman S, Lovenheim M. 2015. Achievement effects of individual performance incentives in a teacher merit pay tournament NBER Work. Pap. 21598 [Google Scholar]
14. Brodeur A, Le M, Sangnier M, Zylberberg Y. 2016. Star Wars: The empirics strike back. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 8:11–32 [Google Scholar]
15. Brown KM. 2013. The link between pensions and retirement timing: lessons from California teachers. J. Public Econ. 98:1–14 [Google Scholar]
16. Burtless G, Hausman JA. 1978. The effect of taxation on labor supply: evaluating the Gary negative income tax experiment. J. Polit. Econ. 86:1103–30 [Google Scholar]
17. Burtless G, Moffitt R. 1984. The effect of social security benefits on the labor supply of the aged. Retirement and Economic Behavior HJ Aaron, G Burtless 135–74 Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
18. Busse M, Lacetera N, Pope D, Silva-Risso J, Sydnor J. 2013. Estimating the effect of salience in wholesale and retail car markets. Am. Econ. Rev. 103:575–79 [Google Scholar]
19. Camacho A, Conover E. 2011. Manipulation of social program eligibility. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 3:241–65 [Google Scholar]
20. Card D, Lee DS, Pei Z, Weber A. 2015. Inference on causal effects in a generalized regression kink design. Econometrica 83:2453–83 [Google Scholar]
21. Chetty R. 2012. Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply. Econometrica 80:969–1018 [Google Scholar]
22. Chetty R, Friedman JN, Olsen T, Pistaferri L. 2010. Adjustment costs, firm responses, and labor supply elasticities: evidence from Danish tax records NBER Work. Pap. 15617 [Google Scholar]
23. Chetty R, Friedman JN, Olsen T, Pistaferri L. 2011. Adjustment costs, firm responses, and micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: evidence from Danish tax records. Q. J. Econ. 126:749–804 [Google Scholar]
24. Chetty R, Friedman JN, Saez E. 2013. Using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the EITC on earnings. Am. Econ. Rev. 103:2683–721 [Google Scholar]
25. Dawkins R. 2011. The tyranny of the discontinuous mind. New Statesman Dec. 19. http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/12/issue-essay-line-dawkins [Google Scholar]
26. Dee T, Jacob B, Rockoff J, McCrary J. 2011. Rules and discretion in the evaluation of students and schools: the case of the New York Regents Examinations Work. Pap., Columbia Univ., New York [Google Scholar]
27. DeFusco A, Paciorek A. 2016. The interest rate elasticity of mortgage demand: evidence from bunching at the conforming loan limit. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy. In press [Google Scholar]
28. Devereux MP, Liu L, Loretz S. 2014. The elasticity of corporate taxable income: new evidence from UK tax records. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 6:219–53 [Google Scholar]
29. Diamond R, Persson P. 2016. The long-term consequences of teacher discretion in grading of high-stakes tests Work. Pap., Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA [Google Scholar]
30. Dwenger N, Kleven H, Rasul I, Rincke J. 2016. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance: evidence from a field experiment in Germany. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy. 8203–32 [Google Scholar]
31. Einav L, Finkelstein A, Schrimpf P. 2015a. Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts Work. Pap., Mass. Inst. Technol., Cambridge, MA [Google Scholar]
32. Einav L, Finkelstein A, Schrimpf P. 2015b. The response of drug expenditure to non-linear contract design: evidence from Medicare Part D. Q. J. Econ. 130:841–99 [Google Scholar]
33. Fack G, Landais C. 2016. The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: evidence from charitable contributions in France. J. Public Econ. 133:23–40 [Google Scholar]
34. Friedberg L. 1998. The Social Security earnings test and labor supply of older men. Tax Policy Econ. 12:121–50 [Google Scholar]
35. Friedberg L. 2000. The labor supply effects of the Social Security earnings test. Rev. Econ. Stat. 82:48–63 [Google Scholar]
36. Garicano L, Lelarge C, Van Reenen J. 2013. Firm size distortions and the productivity distribution: evidence from France Discuss. Pap. 7241, IZA, Bonn, Ger. [Google Scholar]
37. Gelber A, Jones D, Sacks DW. 2014. Earnings adjustment frictions: evidence from the Social Security earnings test Work. Pap., Univ. Calif., Berkeley [Google Scholar]
38. Gerber A, Malhotra N. 2008. Publication bias in empirical sociological research. Sociol. Methods Res. 37:3–30 [Google Scholar]
39. Gillitzer C, Kleven H, Slemrod J. 2016. A characteristics approach to optimal taxation: line drawing and tax-driven product innovation. Scand. J. Econ. In press [Google Scholar]
40. Gourio F, Roys N. 2014. Size-dependent regulations, firm size distribution, and reallocation. Quant. Econ. 5:377–416 [Google Scholar]
41. Grubb M, Osborne M. 2015. Cellular service demand: biased beliefs, learning, and bill shock. Am. Econ. Rev. 105:234–71 [Google Scholar]
42. Harasztosi P, Lindner A. 2015. Who pays for the minimum wage? Work. Pap., Univ. Coll. London [Google Scholar]
43. Hausman JA. 1981. Labor supply. How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior HJ Aaron, JA Pechman 27–72 Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
44. Hausman JA. 1983. Stochastic problems in the simulation of labor supply. Behavioral Simulations in Tax Policy Analysis M Feldstein 47–69 Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
45. Heckman J. 1983. Comment.. Behavioral Simulations in Tax Policy Analysis M Feldstein 70–82 Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
46. Imbens GW, Lemieux T. 2008. Regression discontinuity designs: a guide to practice. J. Econ. 142:615–35 [Google Scholar]
47. Ito K. 2014. Do consumers respond to marginal or average price? Evidence from nonlinear electricity pricing. Am. Econ. Rev. 104:537–63 [Google Scholar]
48. Ito K, Sallee J. 2015. The economics of attribute-based regulation: theory and evidence from fuel-economy standards NBER Work. Pap. 20500 [Google Scholar]
49. Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47:263–92 [Google Scholar]
50. Kleven H, Knudsen M, Kreiner C, Pedersen S, Saez E. 2011. Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark. Econometrica 79:651–92 [Google Scholar]
51. Kleven H, Landais C, Saez E, Schultz E. 2014. Migration and wage effects of taxing top earners: evidence from the foreigners' tax scheme in Denmark. Q. J. Econ. 129:333–78 [Google Scholar]
52. Kleven H, Landais C, Søgaard J. 2016. The breadwinner notch: a bunching approach to estimating reference-dependent preferences Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
53. Kleven H, Schultz E. 2014. Estimating taxable income responses using Danish tax reforms. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 6:4271–301 [Google Scholar]
54. Kleven H, Waseem M. 2012. Behavioral responses to notches: evidence from Pakistani tax records Work. Pap., London School Econ. [Google Scholar]
55. Kleven H, Waseem M. 2013. Using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities: theory and evidence from Pakistan. Q. J. Econ. 128:669–723 [Google Scholar]
56. Kopczuk W, Munroe D. 2015. Mansion tax: the effect of transfer taxes on the residential real estate market. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 7:214–57 [Google Scholar]
57. Koszegi B, Rabin M. 2006. A model of reference-dependent preferences. Q. J. Econ. 121:1133–65 [Google Scholar]
58. Lacetera N, Pope D, Sydnor J. 2012. Heuristic thinking and limited attention in the car market. Am. Econ. Rev. 102:2206–36 [Google Scholar]
59. Le Barbanchon T. 2016. Optimal partial unemployment insurance: evidence from bunching in the U.S.Work. Pap., Bocconi Univ., Milan [Google Scholar]
60. Le Maire D, Schjerning B. 2013. Tax bunching, income shifting and self-employment. J. Public Econ. 107:1–18 [Google Scholar]
61. Liu L, Lockwood B. 2015. VAT notches Work. Pap., Univ. Warwick [Google Scholar]
62. MaCurdy T. 1981. An empirical model of labor supply in a life-cycle setting. J. Polit. Econ. 89:1059–85 [Google Scholar]
63. MaCurdy T, Green D, Paarsch H. 1990. Assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply. J. Hum. Resour. 25:415–90 [Google Scholar]
64. Manoli D, Weber A. 2015. Nonparametric evidence on the effects of financial incentives on retirement decisions. Work. Pap., Univ. Mannheim [Google Scholar]
65. Mirrlees JA. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 38:175–208 [Google Scholar]
66. Moffitt R. 1990. The econometrics of kinked budget constraints. J. Econ. Perspect. 4:2119–39 [Google Scholar]
67. Mosberger P. 2015. Tax optimization responses to the minimum tax scheme: bunching evidence Work. Pap., Central Eur. Univ., Budapest [Google Scholar]
68. Persson P. 2014. Social insurance and the marriage market Work. Pap., Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA [Google Scholar]
69. Pope D, Pope J, Sydnor J. 2015. Focal points and bargaining in housing markets. Games Econ. Behav. 93:89–107 [Google Scholar]
70. Pope D, Simonsohn U. 2011. Round numbers as goals: evidence from baseball, SAT takers, and the lab. Psychol. Sci. 22:71–79 [Google Scholar]
71. Rees-Jones A. 2014. Loss aversion motivates tax sheltering: evidence from U.S. tax returns. Work. Pap., Wharton School Univ. Penn., Philadelphia [Google Scholar]
72. Saez E. 1999. Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? NBER Work. Pap. 7366 [Google Scholar]
73. Saez E. 2002. Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? Work. Pap., Univ. Calif., Berkeley [Google Scholar]
74. Saez E. 2010. Do taxpayers bunch at kink points?. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 2:180–212 [Google Scholar]
75. Sallee JM, Slemrod J. 2012. Car notches: strategic automaker responses to fuel economy policy. J. Public Econ. 96:981–99 [Google Scholar]
76. Seim D. 2015. Behavioral responses to wealth taxes: evidence from Sweden Work. Pap., Stockholm Univ. [Google Scholar]
77. Simonsohn U, Nelson L, Simmons J. 2014. P-curve: a key to the file-drawer. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143:534–47 [Google Scholar]
78. Slemrod J. 1985. An empirical test for tax evasion. Rev. Econ. Stat. 67:232–38 [Google Scholar]
79. Slemrod J. 2010. Buenas notches: lines and notches in tax system design Work. Pap., Univ. Michigan, Ann Arbor [Google Scholar]
80. Yelowitz AS. 1995. The Medicaid notch, labor supply, and welfare participation: evidence from eligibility expansions. Q. J. Econ. 110:909–39 [Google Scholar]