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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 14, 2022

Bureaucracy and Development

Abstract

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in whether and how bureaucratic effectiveness contributes to development. Just what makes for an effective bureaucracy and what are the building blocks of state capacity remain subject to debate. This article reviews the arguments connecting contemporary research using administrative data and field experiments to wider discussions of the origins of state capacity. Most current research has focused on understanding specific features of the environment in which bureaucrats operate. We connect this to discussions of bureaucratic systems, specifically the relationship to politics, citizens, firms, and nongovernmental organizations.

Keyword(s): bureaucracy, economic development, government, JEL D72, JEL D73, JEL H83, JEL L51, JEL O11, JEL O12, political economy, public administration, regulation, service delivery, state capacity
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2022-08-12
2025-06-14
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Bureaucracy and Development
Annual Review of Economics 14, 397 (2022); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080521-011950
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