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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 7, 2015

Political Decentralization

Abstract

I provide a critical overview of the literature on political decentralization. After reviewing first- and second-generation theories of federalism, I describe recent empirical studies focusing mainly on determinants of capture and local government accountability emphasized by second-generation theories. The article concludes by describing emerging new issues that deserve more attention in future research: a wider range of political distortions beyond capture and corruption; effects of decentralization on intercommunity allocations, learning, and experimentation, and on democracy itself; a comparison of decentralization with other organizational alternatives; and issues pertaining to design and implementation raised by first-generation federalism theories, such as interjurisdictional spillovers, vertical fiscal relations, the range of devolution, and the political economy of implementation.

Keyword(s): accountability, capture, corruption, democracy, devolution, federalism
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2015-08-02
2025-04-19
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  • Article Type: Review Article

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