1932

Abstract

Over the past several decades, lab experiments have offered economists a rich source of evidence on incentivized behavior. In this article, we use detailed data on experimental papers to describe recent trends in the literature. We also discuss various experimentation platforms and new approaches to the design and analysis of the data they generate.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-081621-124424
2022-08-12
2024-04-21
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