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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 12, 2020

Empirical Models of Lobbying

Abstract

This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain () how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and () how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.

Keyword(s): JEL D72, JEL P48, lobbying, money in politics, political economy, special interest politics
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2020-08-02
2025-04-29
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
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Empirical Models of Lobbying
Annual Review of Economics 12, 391 (2020); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
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