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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 15, 2023

Antitrust Reform: An Economic Perspective

Abstract

There is widespread dissatisfaction with existing antitrust enforcement. The European Union has enacted comprehensive legislation to address perceived antitrust limitations, and several proposals to amend US antitrust laws have followed its lead. Most of the actual and proposed laws target firms that dominate the digital economy, while others have measures to tighten antitrust enforcement more generally. Market power has increased in the United States and most advanced economies, but it has not been uniformly associated with higher prices or lower productivity. Nonetheless, antitrust reforms can benefit consumers and address concerns about the concentration and exercise of economic power. In the United States, legislation would be desirable to amend rulings that are excessively deferential to antitrust defendants. However, most enacted and proposed reforms include prohibitions or obligations that depart from traditional antitrust principles and create potential risks for consumer welfare.

Keyword(s): antitrust, competition, JEL K21, JEL L12, JEL L13, JEL L41, JEL L42, JEL L44, mergers, monopoly, regulation
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2023-09-13
2024-05-06
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