1932

Abstract

Tech giants' dominance does not confront us with an unpalatable choice between laissez-faire and populist interventions. This article takes stock of available knowledge, considers desirable adaptations of regulation in the digital age, and draws some conclusions for policy reform.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-090622-024222
2023-09-13
2024-06-22
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