Competition and the Industrial Challenge for the Digital Age

Literature Cited

1. Acemoglu D, Makhdoumi A, Malekian A, Ozdaglar A. 2022. Too much data: prices and inefficiencies in data markets. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 14:4218–56
   [Google Scholar]
2. Aghion P, Akcigit U, Bergeaud A, Blundell R, Hemous D. 2019. Innovation and top income inequality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 86:11–45
   [Google Scholar]
3. Allain ML, Rey P, Chambolle C. 2016. Vertical integration as a source of hold-up. Rev. Econ. Stud. 83:11–25
   [Google Scholar]
4. Anderson SP, Bedre-Defolie Ö. 2021. Hybrid platform model CEPR Discuss. Pap. DP16243 Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
5. Bajari P, Chernozhukov V, Hortaçsu A, Suzuki J. 2019. The impact of big data on firm performance: an empirical investigation. AEA Pap. Proc. 109:33–37
   [Google Scholar]
6. Bergemann D, Bonatti A, Gan T. 2022. The economics of social data: an introduction. RAND J. Econ. 53:2263–96
   [Google Scholar]
7. Bisceglia M, Tirole J. 2023. Fair gatekeeping in digital ecosystems Unpublished manuscript Toulouse Sch. Econ. Toulouse, Fr.:
8. Boik A, Corts KS. 2016. The effects of platform most-favored-nation clauses on competition and entry. J. Law Econ. 59:1105–34
   [Google Scholar]
9. Bourguignon H, Gomes R, Tirole J. 2019. Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards, discounts and surcharges. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 63:99–144
   [Google Scholar]
10. Bresnahan T, Orsini J, Yin PL. 2015. Demand heterogeneity, inframarginal multihoming, and platform market stability: mobile apps Unpublished manuscript Stanford Univ. Stanford, CA:
11. Carlton D, Waldman M. 2002. The strategic use of tying to preserve and create market power in evolving industries. RAND J. Econ. 33:2194–220
    [Google Scholar]
12. Chen Z, Rey P. 2012. Loss leading as an exploitative practice. Am. Econ. Rev. 102:73462–82
    [Google Scholar]
13. Choi JP, Jeon DS. 2021. A leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets with non-negative price constraints. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 13:1283–337
    [Google Scholar]
14. Choi JP, Jeon DS, Kim BC. 2019. Privacy and personal data collection with information externalities. J. Public Econ. 173:133–24
    [Google Scholar]
15. Choi JP, Jeon DS, Whinston M. 2022. Tying in markets with network effects Unpublished manuscript Mich. State Univ. East Lansing:
16. Choi JP, Stefanadis C. 2001. Tying, investment, and the dynamic leverage theory. RAND J. Econ. 32:52–71
    [Google Scholar]
17. CMA (Compet. Mark. Auth.) 2019. Online platforms and digital advertising market study Rep. Compet. Mark. Auth. London: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-and-digital-advertising-market-study
18. Combe E, Hyppolite PA, Michon A. 2019a. L'Europe face aux nationalismes économiques américain et chinois (1) Study, Fond. Innov. Politique Paris: https://www.fondapol.org/etude/leurope-face-aux-nationalismes-economiques-americain-et-chinois-1-politique-de-concurrence-et-industrie-europeenne/
19. Combe E, Hyppolite PA, Michon A. 2019b. L'Europe face aux nationalismes économiques américain et chinois (2) Study, Fond. Innov. Politique Paris: https://www.fondapol.org/etude/leurope-face-aux-nationalismes-economiques-americain-et-chinois-2-les-pratiques-anticoncurrentielles-etrangeres/
20. Combe E, Hyppolite PA, Michon A. 2019c. L'Europe face aux nationalismes économiques américain et chinois (3) Study, Fond. Innov. Politique Paris: https://www.fondapol.org/etude/leurope-face-aux-nationalismes-economiques-americain-et-chinois-3-defendre-leconomie-europeenne-par-la-politique-commerciale/
21. Coyle D, Fletcher A, Furman J, Marsden P, McAuley D. 2019. Unlocking digital competition: report of the digital competition expert panel Rep. Digit. Compet. Expert Panel London: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-panel
22. Coyle D, Kay L, Diepeveen S, Tennison J, Wdowin J. 2020. The value of data: policy implications Rep. Bennett Inst. Public Policy, Univ. Cambridge Cambridge, UK: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Value_of_data_Policy_Implications_Report_26_Feb_ok4noWn.pdf
23. Crémer J, de Montjoye YA, Schweitzer H. 2019. Competition policy for the digital era Rep. Eur. Comm. Brussels, Belg: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf
24. Criscuolo C, Martin R, Overman H, Van Reenen J. 2019. Some causal effects of an industrial policy. Am. Econ. Rev. 109:148–85
    [Google Scholar]
25. Cunningham C, Ederer F, Ma S. 2021. Killer acquisitions. J. Political Econ. 129:3649–702
    [Google Scholar]
26. Dewatripont M, Jewitt I, Tirole J. 1999. The economics of career concerns, part II: application to missions and accountability of government agencies. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66:1199–217
    [Google Scholar]
27. Dewatripont M, Tirole J. 1999. Advocates. J. Political Econ. 107:11–39
    [Google Scholar]
28. Edelman B, Wright J. 2015. Price coherence and excessive intermediation. Q. J. Econ. 130:31283–328
    [Google Scholar]
29. Etro F. 2021a. Device-funded versus ad-funded platforms. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 75:102711
    [Google Scholar]
30. Etro F 2021b. Platform competition with free entry of sellers Work. Pap. Econ. 22/2021 Univ. Florence Florence, Italy:
31. Foros Ø, Kind HJ, Shaffer G. 2017. Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses. RAND J. Econ. 48:3673–703
    [Google Scholar]
32. Fudenberg D, Tirole J. 2000. Pricing a network good to deter entry. J. Ind. Econ. 48:4373–90
    [Google Scholar]
33. Geradin D. 2020. Online platforms and digital advertising market study: observations on the statement of scope TILEC Discuss. Pap. DP2020-043 Tilburg Law Econ. Cent., Tilburg Univ. Tilburg, Neth:.
34. Gomes R, Mantovani A. 2022. Regulating platform fees under price parity Work. Pap. 1325 Toulouse Sch. Econ. Toulouse, Fr.:
35. Gomes R, Rey P, Tirole J. 2022. Screening under price constraints Unpublished manuscript Toulouse Sch. Econ. Toulouse, Fr.:
36. Gomes R, Tirole J. 2018. Missed sales and the pricing of ancillary goods. Q. J. Econ. 133:42097–169
    [Google Scholar]
37. Hagiu A, Teh TH, Wright J. 2022. Should platforms be allowed to sell on their own marketplaces?. RAND J. Econ. 53:2297–327
    [Google Scholar]
38. Hagiu A, Wright J. 2020. When data creates comparative advantage. Harvard Business Review Jan–Feb. https://hbr.org/2020/01/when-data-creates-competitive-advantage
    [Google Scholar]
39. Hartford-EmpireCo. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 1945.)
40. Hunold M, Laitenberger U, Thébaudin G. 2022. Bye-box: an analysis of non-promotion on the Amazon marketplace Unpublished manuscript Toulouse Sch. Econ. Toulouse, Fr.:
41. Jeon DS, Rey P. 2022. Platform competition and app development Unpublished manuscript Toulouse Sch. Econ. Toulouse, Fr.:
42. Jiménez Durán R. 2022. The economics of content moderation: theory and experimental evidence from hate speech on Twitter Work. Pap. 324 Booth Sch. Bus., Univ. Chicago Chicago:
43. Johansen B, Vergé T. 2017. Platform price parity clauses with direct sales Work. Pap. Econ. 01/17 Univ. Bergen Bergen, Nor.:
44. Johnson J. 2017. The agency model and MFN clauses. Rev. Econ. Stud. 84:31151–85
    [Google Scholar]
45. Kühn KU, Van Reenen J. 2009. Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case. Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis B Lyons 50–72. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
    [Google Scholar]
46. Laffont JJ, Tirole J. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
47. Laffont JJ, Tirole J. 1994. Access pricing and competition. Eur. Econ. Rev. 38:91673–710
    [Google Scholar]
48. Laffont JJ, Tirole J. 1999. Competition in Telecommunications Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
49. Lee KF. 2018. AI Super-Powers: China, Silicon Valley and the New World Order Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
50. Lerner J, Tirole J. 2014. A better route to tech standards. Science 343:6174972–73
    [Google Scholar]
51. Lerner J, Tirole J. 2015. Standard essential patents. J. Political Econ. 123:3547–86
    [Google Scholar]
52. Liu Z, Sockin M, Xiong W. 2020. Data privacy and temptation Unpublished manuscript Princeton Univ. Princeton, NJ:
53. Maskin E, Tirole J. 2004. The politician and the judge: accountability in government. Am. Econ. Rev. 94:1034–54
    [Google Scholar]
54. Moretti E, Steinwender C, Van Reenen J. 2019. The intellectual spoils of war? Defense R&D, productivity and international spillovers NBER Work. Pap. 26483
55. Motta M, Peitz M. 2021. Big tech mergers. Inf. Econ. Policy 54:100868
    [Google Scholar]
56. Philippon T. 2019. The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
57. Posner E, Scott Morton F, Weyl G 2017. A proposal to limit the anticompetitive power of institutional investors. Antitrust Law J. 81:3669–728
    [Google Scholar]
58. Posner E, Weyl G. 2018. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
59. Rochet JC, Tirole J. 2002. Cooperation among competitors: some economics of payment card associations. RAND J. Econ. 33:4549–70
    [Google Scholar]
60. Rochet JC, Tirole J. 2011. Must-take cards: merchant discounts and avoided costs. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 9:3462–95
    [Google Scholar]
61. Saxenian A. 1994. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
62. Schaefer M, Sapi G. 2020. Learning from data and network effects: the example of internet search DIW Work. Pap. 1894 Ger. Inst. Econ. Res. Berlin:
63. Scott Morton F, Bouvier P, Ezrachi A, Jullien B, Katz R et al. 2019. Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee Report Rep. George J. Stigler Cent. Study Econ. State, Booth Sch. Bus., Univ. Chicago Chicago: https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf?la=en&hash=E08C7C9AA7367F2D612DE24F814074BA43CAED8C
64. Tirole J. 2017. Economics for the Common Good Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
65. Tirole J. 2023. Socially responsible agencies. Compet. Law Policy Debate 7:4171–77
    [Google Scholar]
66. Wang C, Wright J. 2017. Ad-valorem platform fees and efficient price discrimination. RAND J. Econ. 48:2467–84
    [Google Scholar]
67. Wang C, Wright J. 2020. Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses. RAND J. Econ. 51:132–58
    [Google Scholar]
68. Wang C, Wright J. 2022. Regulating platform fees Unpublished manuscript Natl. Univ. Singapore Singapore:
69. Zennyo Y. 2022. Platform encroachment and own-content bias. J. Ind. Econ. 70:3684–710
    [Google Scholar]