1932

Abstract

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and external enforcement, accommodating alternative assumptions regarding how actively the parties initially set and renegotiate the terms of their contract. A progression of theoretical components is reviewed, building from the recursive formulation of equilibrium continuation values in repeated games. A principal-agent setting serves as a running example.

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2021-08-05
2025-02-15
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