1932

Abstract

We review recent evidence and future directions for empirical research on financial contracting in the context of corporate finance. Specifically, we survey evidence pertaining to incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions between financial contracts and other governance mechanisms. We also discuss directions for future research, concluding that the financial contracting approach offers a potentially fruitful perspective for empirical researchers seeking to better understand a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-071808-145241
2009-08-01
2024-06-14
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-071808-145241
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  • Article Type: Review Article
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