1932
0
  1. Home
  2. A-Z Publications
  3. Annual Review of Financial Economics
  4. Volume 16, 2024
  5. Article

Annual Review of Financial Economics

Volume 16, 2024

Nonbank Financial Intermediation: Stock Take of Research, Policy, and Data

Abstract

This article reviews research and policy work on nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI), taking a financial stability perspective. It first documents the growth in NBFI, reviews its possible drivers, and documents recent instability episodes. NBFI now often surpasses traditional bank financing, and research on it has increased, including research on its financial stability characteristics. Given NBFI's many forms and dimensions, the article focuses on its market-based forms. Taking a cross-country perspective, it reviews the benefits of NBFI, in terms of access to finance and economic impact, and its risks, specifically those related to interconnections, interactions between liquidity and leverage, and procyclicality. It describes policy steps—underway and possible—to reduce these risks, highlights outstanding issues, and suggests further analytical work. It also considers the current state of available data and the means to address remaining gaps.

Keyword(s): data gaps, financial stability, interconnections, international standards, JEL E44, JEL F36, JEL F65, JEL G18, JEL G23, JEL G28, liquidity risks, nonbank financial institutions, nonbank financial intermediation, policy actions, procyclicality, vulnerabilities
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416
2024-11-01
2025-04-21
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/financial/16/1/annurev-financial-082123-105416.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Abreu D, Brunnermeier MK. 2003.. Bubbles and crashes. . Econometrica 71:(1):173–204
     [Google Scholar]
  2. Acharya V, Öncü T. 2013.. A proposal for the resolution of systemically important assets and liabilities: the case of the repo market. . Int. J. Cent. Bank. 9:(1):291–351
     [Google Scholar]
  3. Adrian T. 2017.. Shadow banking and market based finance. Speech given at the 33rd SUERF Colloquium , Bank of Finland, Helsinki:, Sept. 14. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/13/sp091417-shadow-banking-and-market-based-finance
    [Google Scholar]
  4. Adrian T, Covitz D, Liang N. 2015.. Financial stability monitoring. . Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 7::357–95
     [Google Scholar]
  5. Adrian T, Jones B. 2018.. Shadow banking and market-based finance. Dep. Pap. 2018/013 , Int. Monet. Fund, Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  6. Adrian T, Shin HS. 2010a.. Liquidity and leverage. . J. Financ. Intermed. 19::418–37
     [Google Scholar]
  7. Adrian T, Shin HS. 2010b.. The changing nature of financial intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. . Annu. Rev. Econ. 2::603–18
     [Google Scholar]
  8. Adrian T, Shin HS. 2014.. Procyclical leverage and value-at-risk. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 27:(2):373–403
     [Google Scholar]
  9. Aikman D, Chichkanov P, Douglas G, Georgiev Y, Howat J, King B. 2019.. System-wide stress simulation. Staff Work. Pap. 809 , Bank Engl., London:. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2019/system-wide-stress-simulation.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Aldasoro I, Doerr S, Zhou H. 2022.. Non-bank lenders in the syndicated loan market. . BIS Q. Rev. March::15–29
     [Google Scholar]
  11. Aldasoro I, Doerr S, Zhou H. 2023.. Non-bank lending during crises. Work. Pap. 1074 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.: https://www.bis.org/publ/work1074.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Aldasoro I, Hoerdahl P, Zhu S. 2022.. Under pressure: market conditions and stress. . BIS Q. Rev. Sept.::31–45
     [Google Scholar]
  13. Aldasoro I, Huang W, Kemp E. 2020.. Cross-border links between banks and non-bank financial institutions. . BIS Q. Rev. Sept.:: 61–74
     [Google Scholar]
  14. Aldasoro I, Huang W, Tarashev N. 2021.. Risk-taking by asset managers and bank regulation. Work. Pap. 933 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/work933.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Allard J, Blavy R. 2011.. Market phoenixes and banking ducks. Are recoveries faster in market-based financial systems? Work. Pap. 11/213 , Int. Monet. Fund, Washington, DC:. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11213.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  16. Allen F, Gale D. 1997.. Financial market, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing. . J. Political Econ. 105:(3):523–46
     [Google Scholar]
  17. Allen F, Gale D. 2000.. Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, MA:: MIT Press
     [Google Scholar]
  18. Andersen L, Duffie D, Song Y. 2019.. Funding value adjustments. . J. Finance 74:(1):145–92
     [Google Scholar]
  19. Aramonte S, Schrimpf A, Shin HS. 2021.. Non-bank financial intermediaries and financial stability. Work. Pap. 972 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/work972.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  20. Avalos F, Huang W. 2022.. Commodity markets: shocks and spillovers. . BIS Q. Rev. Sept.::15–29
     [Google Scholar]
  21. Avalos F, Huang W, Tracol K. 2023.. Margins and liquidity in European energy markets in 2022. BIS Bull. 77 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull77.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  22. Avalos F, Xia D. 2021.. Investor size, liquidity and prime money market fund stress. . BIS Q. Rev. March::17–29
     [Google Scholar]
  23. Banque de France. 2018.. Non-bank finance: trends and challenges. Financ. Stab. Rev. Rep. 22 , Banque de France, Paris:
     [Google Scholar]
  24. Baranova Y, Coen J, Lowe P, Noss J, Silvestri L. 2017.. Simulating stress across the financial system: the resilience of corporate bond markets and the role of investment funds. Financ. Stab. Pap. 42 , Bank Engl., London:
     [Google Scholar]
  25. BCBS (Basel Comm. Bank. Superv.). 2022.. Newsletter on bank exposures to non-bank financial intermediaries. Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  26. BCBS-CPMI-IOSCO (Basel Comm. Bank. Superv., Comm. Paym. Mark. Infrastruct., Board Int. Organ. Secur. Comm.). 2022.. Review of margining practices. Rep. , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  27. BCBS-CPMI-IOSCO (Basel Comm. Bank. Superv., Comm. Paym. Mark. Infrastruct., Board Int. Organ. Secur. Comm.). 2023.. Margin dynamics in centrally cleared commodities markets in 2022. Rep. , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  28. Beck T. 2012.. Legal institutions and economic development. . In Oxford Handbook of Capitalism, ed. DC Mueller , pp. 38–77. Oxford, UK:: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  29. BIS (Bank Int. Settl.). 2023.. Navigating the disinflation journey. . In Annual Economic Report, June, pp. 1–39 . BIS, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  30. BIS (Bank Int. Settl.) Irving Fisher Comm. 2023.. 2022 Irving Fisher Comm. annual report. BIS., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifc_ar2022.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  31. BIS (Bank Intl. Settl.) Mark. Comm. 2019.. Large central bank balance sheets and market functioning. Mark. Comm. Pap. 11 , BIS, Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/mktc11.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  32. BIS (Bank Intl. Settl.) Mark. Comm. 2022.. Market dysfunction and central bank tools. Mark. Comm. Pap., May 11 , BIS, Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/mc_insights.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Boissay F, Borio C, Leonte C, Shim I. 2023.. Prudential policy and financial dominance: exploring the link. . BIS Q. Rev. March::15–31
     [Google Scholar]
  34. Boot A, Ratnovski L. 2016.. Banking and trading. . Rev. Finance 20:(6):2219–46
     [Google Scholar]
  35. Borio C. 2000.. Market liquidity and stress: selected issues and policy implications. . BIS Q. Rev. Nov.::38–51
     [Google Scholar]
  36. Borio C, Claessens S, Schrimpf A, Tarashev N. 2023.. Collateral damage. . VOXEU Column, July 10. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/collateral-damage
    [Google Scholar]
  37. Borio C, Claessens S, Tarashev N. 2022.. Entity-based versus activity-based regulation: a framework and applications to traditional financial firms and big techs. Financ. Stab. Inst. Occas. Pap. 19 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  38. Borio C, Drehmann M, Xia D. 2018.. The financial cycle and recession risk. . BIS Q. Rev. Dec.::59–71
     [Google Scholar]
  39. Borio C, Drehmann M, Xia D. 2019.. Predicting recessions: financial cycle versus term spread. Work. Pap. 818 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  40. Borio C, Farag M, Tarashev N. 2020.. Post-crisis international financial regulatory reforms: a primer. Work. Pap. 859 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/work859.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  41. Borio C, Furfine C, Lowe P. 2001.. Procyclicality of the financial system and financial stability: issues and policy options. Work. Pap. 1 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  42. Breckenfelder J, Hoerova M. 2023.. Do non-banks need access to the lender of last resort? Evidence from fund runs. Work. Pap. 2805 , Eur. Cent. Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Ger.:
     [Google Scholar]
  43. Brunnermeier MK, Nagel S. 2005.. Hedge funds and the technology bubble. . J. Finance 59:(5):2013–40
     [Google Scholar]
  44. Brunnermeier MK, Pedersen LH. 2009.. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 22:(6):2201–38
     [Google Scholar]
  45. Buchak G, Matvos G, Piskorski T, Seru A. 2018.. Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks. . J. Financ. Econ. 130:(3):453–83
     [Google Scholar]
  46. Buiter W, Cecchetti S, Dominguez K, Sánchez Serrano S. 2023.. Stabilising financial markets: lending and market making as a last resort. Rep., Advis. Sci. Comm. 13 , Eur. System. Risk Board, Frankfurt am Main, Ger.:
     [Google Scholar]
  47. Caparusso J, Hardy B. 2022.. Bank funding: evolution, stability and the role of foreign offices. . BIS Q. Rev. Sept.::67–78
     [Google Scholar]
  48. Capponi A, Glasserman P, Weber M. 2023.. Swing pricing: theory and evidence. . Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 15::617–40
     [Google Scholar]
  49. Central Bank of Ireland. 2023.. An approach to macroprudential policy for investment funds. Discuss. Pap. 11 , Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin:
     [Google Scholar]
  50. Cetorelli N. 2012.. Introducing a series on the evolution of banks and financial intermediation. . Liberty Street Economics, July 16. https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/07/introducing-a-series-on-the-evolution-of-banks-and-financial-intermediation/
    [Google Scholar]
  51. Cetorelli N, Duarte FM, Eisenbach TM. 2016.. Are asset managers vulnerable to fire sales?. Liberty Street Economics, Febr. 18:. https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/are-asset-managers-vulnerable-to-fire-sales/
    [Google Scholar]
  52. Cetorelli N, Landoni M, Lu L. 2023.. Non-bank financial institutions and banks’ fire-sale vulnerabilities. Staff Rep. 1057 , Fed. Reserve Bank New York
     [Google Scholar]
  53. CGFS (Comm. Global Financ. Syst.). 1999.. Market liquidity: research findings and selected policy implications. CGFS Pap. 11 , Bank. Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  54. CGFS (Comm. Global Financ. Syst.). 2001.. Collateral in wholesale financial markets: recent trends, risk management and market dynamics. CGFS Pap. 17 , Bank. Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  55. CGFS (Comm. Global Financ. Syst.). 2009.. The role of valuation and leverage in procyclicality. CGFS Pap. 34 , Bank. Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  56. CGFS (Comm. Global Financ. Syst.). 2010.. The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality. CGFS Pap. 36 , Bank. Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  57. CGFS (Comm. Global Financ. Syst.). 2020.. US dollar funding: an international perspective. CGFS Pap. 65 , Bank. Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  58. Chaboud A, Correia Golay E, Cox C, Fleming MJ, Huh Y, et al. 2022.. All-to-all trading in the U.S. Treasury market. Staff Rep. 1036, Fed . Reserve Bank New York:
     [Google Scholar]
  59. Chari A. 2023.. Global risk, non-bank financial intermediation, and emerging market vulnerabilities. . Annu. Rev. Econ. 15::549–72
     [Google Scholar]
  60. Chen Q, Goldstein I, Jiang W. 2010.. Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: evidence from mutual funds. . J. Financ. Econ. 97:(2):239–62
     [Google Scholar]
  61. Cheng G, Cornevin A, Hofmann B. 2023.. Other days, other ways? Fiscal and monetary policy reaction functions over the past seven decades. Unpublished manuscript , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  62. Chernenko S, Erel I, Prilmeier R. 2022.. Why do firms borrow directly from nonbanks?. Rev. Financ. Stud. 35:(11):4902–47
     [Google Scholar]
  63. Čihák M, Demirgüç-Kunt A, Feyen E, Levine R. 2012.. Benchmarking financial systems around the world. Policy Res. Work. Pap. 6175 , World Bank, Washington, DC:. https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/epdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6175
    [Google Scholar]
  64. Cizel J, Frost J, Houben A, Wierts P. 2019.. Effective macroprudential policy: cross-sector substitution from price and quantity measures. . J. Money Credit Bank. 51:(5):1209–35
     [Google Scholar]
  65. Claessens S. 2017.. Regulation and structural change in financial systems. Discuss. Pap. 11822 , Cent. Econ. Policy Res., London:
     [Google Scholar]
  66. Claessens S, Cornelli G, Gambacorta L, Manaresi F, Shiina Y. 2023.. Do macroprudential policies affect non-bank financial intermediation?. Int. J. Cent. Bank. 19:(5):185–236
     [Google Scholar]
  67. Claessens S, Evanoff D, Kaufman G, Laeven L, ed. 2015.. World Scientific Studies in International Economics, Vol. 40: Shadow Banking Within and Across National Borders. Hackensack, NJ:: World Sci.
     [Google Scholar]
  68. Claessens S, Kose MA, Terrones ME. 2012.. How do business and financial cycles interact?. J. Int. Econ. 87:(1):178–90
     [Google Scholar]
  69. Claessens S, Lewrick U. 2021.. Open-ended bond funds: systemic risks and policy implications. . BIS Q. Rev. Dec.::37–51
     [Google Scholar]
  70. Claessens S, Ratnovski L. 2015.. What is shadow banking?. In World Scientific Studies in International Economics, Vol. 40: Shadow Banking Within and Across National Borders, ed. S Claessens, D Evanoff, G Kaufman, L Laeven , pp. 405–12. Hackensack, NJ:: World Sci.
     [Google Scholar]
  71. Cohen BH, Tracol K. 2023.. Market turbulence and soaring margins: lessons from two recent episodes. . BIS Q. Rev. March::5–6
     [Google Scholar]
  72. Converse N, Levy-Yeyati E, Williams T. 2020.. How ETFs amplify the global financial cycle in emerging markets. Int. Finance Discuss. Pap. 1268 , Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst., Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  73. CPMI-IOSCO (Comm. Paym. Mark. Infrastruct., Board Int. Organ. Secur. Comm.). 2012.. Principles for financial market infrastructures. CPMI Pap. 101 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  74. Cunliffe J. 2022.. Letters after UK gilt crisis. https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30136/documents/174584/default/ and https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2022/october/letter-from-jon-cunliffe-ldi-18-october-2022.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  75. Cutura J, Parise G, Schrimpf A. 2020.. Debt de-risking. Work. Pap. 868 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/work868.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  76. Demirgüç-Kunt A, Feyen E, Levine R. 2011.. Optimal financial structures and development: the evolving importance of banks and markets. Policy Res. Work. Pap. 5805 , World Bank, Washington, DC:. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/63f2d03a-86e9-5001-bff4-26c58e4cb7a7/content
    [Google Scholar]
  77. Demirgüç-Kunt A, Feyen E, Levine R. 2013.. The evolving importance of banks and securities markets. . World Bank Econ. Rev. 27::476–90
     [Google Scholar]
  78. Demirgüç-Kunt A, Levine R. 2001.. Financial Structure and Economic Growth, a Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development. Cambridge, MA:: MIT Press
     [Google Scholar]
  79. Duffie D. 2020.. Still the world's safe haven? Redesigning the U.S. Treasury market after the COVID-19 crisis. Hutchins Cent. Work. Pap. 62 , Brookings Inst., Washington, DC:. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WP62_Duffie_updated.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  80. Duffie D. 2022.. Fragmenting Markets: Post-Crisis Bank Regulations and Financial Market Liquidity. Berlin/Boston:: De Gruyter
     [Google Scholar]
  81. Duffie D. 2023.. Resilience redux in the US Treasury market. Paper presented at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, WY:, Aug. 24–26
    [Google Scholar]
  82. Duffie D, Skeel DA. 2012.. A dialogue on the costs and benefits of automatic stays for derivatives and repurchase agreements. Res. Pap. 12-02 , Inst. Law Econ., Univ. Pa., Philadelphia:
     [Google Scholar]
  83. Eren E, Wooldridge P. 2022.. The role of non-bank financial institutions in cross-border spillovers. Work. Pap. 129 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  84. ESMA (Eur. Secur. Mark. Auth.). 2019.. Stress simulation for investment funds. ESMA Econ. Rep., Sept. 5 , ESMA, Paris:
     [Google Scholar]
  85. ESRB (Eur. Syst. Risk Board). 2023.. EU non-bank financial intermediation risk monitor 2023. NBFI Monitor Rep. 8 , ESRB, Frankfurt am Main, Ger:.
     [Google Scholar]
  86. Fache Rousová L, Gravanis M, Jukonis A, Letizia E. 2020.. Derivatives-related liquidity risk facing investment funds. . Financ. Stab. Rev. May::122–32
     [Google Scholar]
  87. Falato A, Goldstein I, Hortaçsu A. 2021.. Financial fragility in the COVID-19 crisis: the case of investment funds in corporate bond markets. . J. Monet. Econ. 123::35–52
     [Google Scholar]
  88. Falato A, Hortaçsu A, Li D, Shin C. 2021.. Fire sale spillovers in debt markets. . J. Finance 76:(6):3055–102
     [Google Scholar]
  89. Feroli M, Kashyap AK, Schoenholtz KL, Shin HS. 2014.. Market tantrums and monetary policy. Chicago Booth Res. Pap. 14-09 , Univ. Chicago
     [Google Scholar]
  90. Fleckenstein Q, Gopal M, Gutierrez G, Hillenbrand S. 2020.. Nonbank lending and credit cyclicality. Work. Pap. , Harvard Bus. Sch., Cambridge, MA:
     [Google Scholar]
  91. Forbes KJ, Friedrich C, Reinhardt D. 2022.. Stress relief? Funding structures and resilience to the Covid shock. Staff Work. Pap. 1003 , Bank Engl., London:. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2022/stress-relief-funding-structures-and-resilience-to-the-covid-shock
    [Google Scholar]
  92. Fostel A, Geanakoplos J. 2008.. Leverage cycles and the anxious economy. . Am. Econ. Rev. 98:(4):1211–44
     [Google Scholar]
  93. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2013.. Policy framework for addressing shadow banking risks in securities lending and repos. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  94. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2017a.. Assessment of shadow banking activities, risks and the adequacy of post-crisis policy tools to address financial stability concerns. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  95. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2017b.. Policy recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities from asset management activities. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  96. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2020.. Holistic review of the March market turmoil. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  97. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2021.. Policy proposals to enhance money market fund resilience: final report. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  98. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2022a.. Enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation. Prog. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  99. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2022b.. Global monitoring report on non-bank financial intermediation. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  100. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2022c.. G20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-2): progress achieved, lessons learned, and the way forward. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  101. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2022d.. Liquidity in core government bond markets. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  102. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2023a.. Addressing structural vulnerabilities from liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds—revisions to the FSB's 2017 policy recommendations: consultation report. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  103. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2023b.. Enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation. Prog. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  104. FSB (Financ. Stab. Board). 2023c.. Global monitoring report on non-bank financial intermediation 2023. Rep. , FSB, Basel, Switz:.
     [Google Scholar]
  105. Fuster A, Plosser M, Schnabl P, Vickery J. 2019.. The role of technology in mortgage lending. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 32:(5):1854–99
     [Google Scholar]
  106. G20 (Group 20). 2009.. G20 leaders’ statement: the Pittsburgh summit. Statement from the G20 Summit, Pittsburgh, PA:, Sept. 24–25
    [Google Scholar]
  107. G30 (Group 30) Work. Group Treas. Mark. Liq. 2021.. U.S. Treasury markets: steps toward increased resilience. Spec. Rep. , G30 Consult. Group Int. Econ. Monet. Aff., Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  108. Gabor D. 2016.. The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets. . Rev. Int. Political Econ. 23:(6):967–1000
     [Google Scholar]
  109. Gai P, Kapadia S. 2010.. Contagion in financial networks. Work. Pap. 383 , Bank Engl., London:
     [Google Scholar]
  110. Gambacorta L, Tsatsaronis K, Yang J. 2014.. Financial structure and growth. . BIS Q. Rev. March::21–35
     [Google Scholar]
  111. Goldstein I, Jaing H, Ng DT. 2017.. Investor flows and fragility in corporate bond funds. . J. Financ. Econ. 126:(3):592–613
     [Google Scholar]
  112. Gopal M, Schnabl P. 2022.. The rise of finance companies and FinTech lenders in small business lending. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 35:(11):4859–4901
     [Google Scholar]
  113. Gorton G, Metrick A. 2010.. Regulating the shadow banking system. . Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. Fall::261–312
     [Google Scholar]
  114. Gorton G, Metrick A. 2012.. Securitized banking and the run on repo. . J. Financ. Econ. 104:(3):425–51
     [Google Scholar]
  115. Greenwood R, Hanson S, Rudolph J, Summers LH. 2014.. Government debt management at the zero lower bound. Hutchins Cent. Work. Pap. 5 , Brookings Inst., Washington, DC:. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/government-debt-management-at-the-zero-lower-bound/
    [Google Scholar]
  116. Hauser A. 2023.. Looking through a glass onion: lessons from the 2022 LDI intervention. Speech given at the Initiative on Global Markets’ Workshop on Market Dysfunction, Univ. Chicago:, March 3
    [Google Scholar]
  117. Höfler P, Schlag C, Schmeling M. 2023.. Passive investing and market quality. SSRN Work. Pap. 4567751
    [Google Scholar]
  118. Huang W, Takáts E. 2020.. Model risk at central counterparties: Is skin-in-the-game a game changer? Work. Pap. 866 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/work866.htm
    [Google Scholar]
  119. IAWG (Inter-Agency Work. Group). 2022.. Enhancing the resilience of the U.S. Treasury market. Staff Prog. Rep. Nov. 10, US Dept. Treas., Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst., Fed. Reserve Bank New York, US Sec. Exch. Comm. , US Commod. Futur. Trading Comm.
     [Google Scholar]
  120. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund). 2021.. Investment funds and financial stability: policy considerations. Dep. Pap. 2021/018 , IMF, Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  121. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund). 2023.. Nonbank financial intermediaries: vulnerabilities amid tighter financial conditions. . In Global Financial Stability Report: Safeguarding Financial Stability amid High Inflation and Geopolitical Risks, pp. 63–84. Washington, DC:: IMF
     [Google Scholar]
  122. Irani RM, Iyer R, Meisenzahl RR, Peydró JL. 2021.. The rise of shadow banking: evidence from capital regulation. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 34:(5):2181–2235
     [Google Scholar]
  123. Jiang H, Li D, Wang A. 2021.. Dynamic liquidity management by corporate bond mutual funds. . J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 56:(5):1622–55
     [Google Scholar]
  124. Jin D, Kacperczyk M, Kahraman B, Suntheim F. 2022.. Swing pricing and fragility in open-end mutual funds. . Rev. Financ. Stud. 35:(1):1–50
     [Google Scholar]
  125. Kashyap A, Stein J. 2023.. Monetary policy when the central bank shapes financial-market sentiment. . J. Econ. Perspect. 37:(1):53–76
     [Google Scholar]
  126. Kempf A, Ruenzi S, Thiele T. 2009.. Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: evidence from the mutual fund industry. . J. Financ. Econ. 92:(1):92–108
     [Google Scholar]
  127. King M. 2016.. The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global Economy. New York, NY:: W.W. Norton Co.
     [Google Scholar]
  128. King M. 2023.. We need a new approach to bank regulation. . Financial Times, May 12. https://www.ft.com/content/43b926a6-b1ba-47a6-91f7-9ad5f776f8f8
    [Google Scholar]
  129. Kruttli MS, Monin PJ, Watugala SW. 2022.. The life of the counterparty: shock propagation in hedge fund-prime broker credit networks. . J. Financ. Econ. 146:(3):965–88
     [Google Scholar]
  130. Laeven L, Levine R, Michalopoulos S. 2015.. Financial innovation and endogenous growth. . J. Financ. Intermed. 24::1–24
     [Google Scholar]
  131. Langfield S, Pagano M. 2016.. Bank bias in Europe: effects on systemic risk and growth. . Econ. Policy 31:(85):51–106
     [Google Scholar]
  132. Levine R, Lin C, Xie W. 2016.. Spare tire? Stock markets, banking crises, and economic recoveries. . J. Financ. Econ. 120:(1):81–101
     [Google Scholar]
  133. Levine R, Loayza N, Beck T. 2000.. Financial intermediation and growth: causality and causes. . J. Monet. Econ. 46:(1):31–77
     [Google Scholar]
  134. Lewrick U, Schanz J. 2023.. Towards a macroprudential framework for investment funds: swing pricing and investor redemptions. . Int. J. Cent. Bank. 19:(3):229–67
     [Google Scholar]
  135. Liang N, Parkinson P. 2020.. Enhancing liquidity of the U.S. Treasury market under stress. Hutchins Cent. Work. Pap. 72 , Brookings Inst., Washington, DC:. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WP72_Liang-Parkinson.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  136. Ma Y, Xiao K, Zeng Y. 2022.. Bank debt, mutual fund equity, and swing pricing in liquidity provision. Work. Pap. , Jacobs Levy Equity Manag. Cent. Quant. Financ. Res., Wharton, Univ. Pa., Philadelphia:
     [Google Scholar]
  137. Manconi A, Massa M, Yasuda A. 2012.. The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007–2008. . J. Financ. Econ. 104::491–518
     [Google Scholar]
  138. Mehrling P. 2012.. Three principles for market-based credit regulation. . Am. Econ. Rev. 102:(3):107–12
     [Google Scholar]
  139. Metrick A, Tarullo DK. 2021.. Congruent financial regulation. . Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. Spring::143–81
     [Google Scholar]
  140. Morris S, Shim I, Shin HS. 2017.. Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers. . J. Monet. Econ. 87::71–87
     [Google Scholar]
  141. Murphy D, Vause N. 2021.. A CBA of APC: analysing approaches to procyclicality reduction in CCP initial margin models. Staff Work. Pap. 950 , Bank Engl., London:. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2021/a-cba-of-apc-analysing-approaches-to-procyclicality-reduction-in-ccp-initial-margin-models.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  142. Nelson B, Pinter G, Theodoridis K. 2018.. Do contractionary monetary policy shocks expand shadow banking?. J. Appl. Econ. 33:(2):198–211
     [Google Scholar]
  143. Perotti E. 2014.. The roots of shadow banking. . VOXEU Column, Jan. 16. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/roots-shadow-banking
    [Google Scholar]
  144. Pinter G. 2023.. An anatomy of the 2022 gilt market crisis. Staff Work. Pap. 1019 , Bank Engl., London:. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2023/an-anatomy-of-the-2022-gilt-market-crisis.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  145. PWG (Pres. Work. Group Financ. Mark.). 2020.. Overview of recent events and potential reform options for money market funds. Rep. , Dec., US Dep. Treas., Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  146. Ricks M. 2016.. The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation. Chicago:: Univ. Chicago Press
     [Google Scholar]
  147. Schrimpf A, Shin HS, Sushko V. 2020.. Leverage and margin spirals in fixed income markets during the Covid-19 crisis. BIS Bull. 2 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz:. https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull02.pdf
    [Google Scholar]
  148. Singh M. 2020.. Collateral Markets and Financial Plumbing. London:: Risk Books
     [Google Scholar]
  149. Sissoko C. 2022.. Financial dominance: why the ‘market maker of last resort’ is a bad idea and what to do about it. SSRN Work. Pap. 4240857
    [Google Scholar]
  150. Stein J. 2012.. Monetary policy as financial stability regulation. . Q. J. Econ. 127:(1):57–95
     [Google Scholar]
  151. Stein J, Greenwood R, Hanson S. 2015.. A comparative-advantage approach to government debt maturity. . J. Finance 70:(4):1683–722
     [Google Scholar]
  152. Tadesse S. 2006.. Innovation, information, and financial architecture. . J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 41:(4):753–86
     [Google Scholar]
  153. Tarullo DK. 2012.. Shadow banking after the financial crisis. Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on Asian Banking and Finance, “Challenges in Global Finance: The Role of Asia,” San Francisco:, June 11–12
    [Google Scholar]
  154. Tissot B, De Beer B. 2020.. Implications of Covid-19 for official statistics: a central banking perspective. Irving Fisher Comm. Work. Pap. 20 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  155. Tucker P. 2014.. The lender of last resort and modern central banking: principles and reconstruction. Work. Pap. 79 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  156. Tucker P. 2019.. Is the financial system sufficiently resilient: a research programme and policy agenda. Work. Pap. 792 , Bank Int. Settl., Basel, Switz.:
     [Google Scholar]
  157. Wagner W. 2011.. Systemic liquidation risk and the diversity-diversification trade-off. . J. Finance 66::1141–75
     [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416
Loading
Nonbank Financial Intermediation: Stock Take of Research, Policy, and Data
Annual Review of Financial Economics 16, 273 (2024); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-financial-082123-105416
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article

Most Cited Most Cited RSS feed

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error