The financial system has undergone far-reaching changes since the global financial crisis of 2008. We cast those changes in terms of shifts in the manner in which financial intermediaries manage their balance sheets. We also discuss the regulatory reform agenda, and we review the impact of regulations on market liquidity and credit availability. Current evidence suggests that the financial system has become safer, at limited unintended cost.


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