1932

Abstract

Causal knowledge plays a crucial role in human thought, but the nature of causal representation and inference remains a puzzle. Can human causal inference be captured by relations of probabilistic dependency, or does it draw on richer forms of representation? This article explores this question by reviewing research in reasoning, decision making, various forms of judgment, and attribution. We endorse causal Bayesian networks as the best normative framework and as a productive guide to theory building. However, it is incomplete as an account of causal thinking. On the basis of a range of experimental work, we identify three hallmarks of causal reasoning—the role of mechanism, narrative, and mental simulation—all of which go beyond mere probabilistic knowledge. We propose that the hallmarks are closely related. Mental simulations are representations over time of mechanisms. When multiple actors are involved, these simulations are aggregated into narratives.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135
2015-01-03
2024-06-17
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/psych/66/1/annurev-psych-010814-015135.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Ahn W, Bailenson J. 1996. Mechanism-based explanations of causal attribution: an explanation of conjunction and discounting effect. Cogn. Psychol. 31:82–123 [Google Scholar]
  2. Ali N, Chater N, Oaksford M. 2011. The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models. Cognition 119:3403–18 [Google Scholar]
  3. Alter AL, Oppenheimer DM, Zemla JC. 2010. Missing the trees for the forest: a construal level account of the illusion of explanatory depth. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 99:3436–51 [Google Scholar]
  4. Barbey AK, Sloman SA. 2007. Base-rate respect: from ecological rationality to dual processes. Behav. Brain Sci. 30:241–54 [Google Scholar]
  5. Barsalou LW. 1999. Perceptions of perceptual symbols. Behav. Brain Sci. 22:4637–60 [Google Scholar]
  6. Bechlivanidis C, Lagnado DA. 2013. Does the “why” tell us the “when”?. Psychol. Sci. 24:1563–72 [Google Scholar]
  7. Bes B, Sloman SA, Lucas CG, Raufaste E. 2012. Non-Bayesian inference: Causal structure trumps correlation. Cogn. Sci. 36:1178–203 [Google Scholar]
  8. Buehner MJ, Humphreys GR. 2009. Causal binding of actions to their effects. Psychol. Sci. 20:101221–28 [Google Scholar]
  9. Buehner MJ, Humphreys GR. 2010. Causal contraction: spatial binding in the perception of collision events. Psychol. Sci. 21:44–48 [Google Scholar]
  10. Buehner MJ, May J. 2002. Knowledge mediates the timeframe of covariation assessment in human causal induction. Think. Reason. 8:4269–95 [Google Scholar]
  11. Cartwright N. 2004. Causation: one word, many things. Philos. Sci. 71:805–81 [Google Scholar]
  12. Chaigneau SE, Barsalou LW, Sloman S. 2004. Assessing the causal structure of function. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 133:601–25 [Google Scholar]
  13. Chance Z, Norton MI, Gino F, Ariely D. 2011. Temporal view of the costs and benefits of self-deception. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108:Suppl. 315655–59 [Google Scholar]
  14. Chandon E, Janiszewski C. 2009. The influence of causal conditional reasoning on the acceptance of product claims. J. Consum. Res. 35:61003–11 [Google Scholar]
  15. Chang W. 2009. Connecting counterfactual and physical causation. Proc. 31th Annu. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc. ed. N Taatgen, H van Rijn 1983–87 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc. [Google Scholar]
  16. Chater N, Oaksford M. 2013. Programs as causal models: speculations on mental programs and mental representation. Cogn. Sci. 37:61171–91 [Google Scholar]
  17. Cheng P. 1997. From covariation to causation: a causal power theory. Psychol. Rev. 104:2367–405 [Google Scholar]
  18. Chockler H, Halpern JY. 2004. Responsibility and blame: a structural-model approach. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 22:193–115 [Google Scholar]
  19. Cummins DD. 1995. Naive theories and causal deduction. Mem. Cogn. 23:5646–58 [Google Scholar]
  20. Cummins DD, Lubart T, Alksnis O, Rist R. 1991. Conditional reasoning and causation. Mem. Cogn. 19:3274–82 [Google Scholar]
  21. Cushman FA. 2013. Action, outcome and value: a dual-system framework for morality. Personal. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 17:3273–92 [Google Scholar]
  22. Cushman FA, Young L. 2011. Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. Cogn. Sci. 35:1052–75 [Google Scholar]
  23. Dehghani M, Iliev R, Kaufmann S. 2012. Causal explanation and fact mutability in counterfactual reasoning. Mind Lang. 27:155–85 [Google Scholar]
  24. Dowe P. 2000. Physical Causation New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  25. Edwards W. 1968. Conservatism in human information processing. Formal Representation of Human Judgment B Klienmuntz 17–52 New York: Wiley [Google Scholar]
  26. Fenker D, Waldmann MR, Holyoak KJ. 2005. Accessing causal relations in semantic memory. Mem. Cogn. 33:1036–46 [Google Scholar]
  27. Fenton N, Neil M, Lagnado DA. 2013. A general structure for legal arguments about evidence using Bayesian networks. Cogn. Sci. 37:61–102 [Google Scholar]
  28. Fernbach PM, Darlow A, Sloman SA. 2010. Neglect of alternative causes in predictive but not diagnostic reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 21:3329–36 [Google Scholar]
  29. Fernbach PM, Darlow A, Sloman SA. 2011a. Asymmetries in causal and diagnostic reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 140:2168–85 [Google Scholar]
  30. Fernbach PM, Darlow A, Sloman SA. 2011b. When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making. Cognition 119:459–67 [Google Scholar]
  31. Fernbach PM, Erb CD. 2013. A quantitative causal model theory of conditional reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 39:51327–43 [Google Scholar]
  32. Fernbach PM, Rogers T, Fox C, Sloman SA. 2013. Political extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding. Psychol. Sci. 24:939–46 [Google Scholar]
  33. Fisher M, Keil FC. 2013. The illusion of argument justification. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 143:425–33 [Google Scholar]
  34. Gerstenberg T, Bechlivanidis C, Lagnado DA. 2013. Back on track: backtracking in counterfactual reasoning. Proc. 35th Annu. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc. M Knauff, M Pauen, N Sebanz, I Wachsmuth 2386–91 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc. [Google Scholar]
  35. Gerstenberg T, Lagnado DA. 2010. Spreading the blame: the allocation of responsibility amongst multiple agents. Cognition 115:1166–71 [Google Scholar]
  36. Goldvarg E, Johnson-Laird PN. 2001. Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 25:565–610 [Google Scholar]
  37. Goodman ND, Ullman TD, Tenenbaum JB. 2011. Learning a theory of causality. Psychol. Rev. 118:1110–19 [Google Scholar]
  38. Griffiths TL, Tenenbaum JB. 2009. Theory-based causal induction. Psychol. Rev. 116:4661–716 [Google Scholar]
  39. Hagmayer Y, Sloman SA. 2009. Decision makers conceive of themselves as interveners, not observers. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 138:22–38 [Google Scholar]
  40. Halpern JY, Pearl J. 2005. Causes and explanations: a structural-model approach. Part I: causes. Br. J. Philos. Sci. 56:4843–87 [Google Scholar]
  41. Hampton JA. 2012. Thinking intuitively the rich (and at times illogical) world of concepts. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 21:6398–402 [Google Scholar]
  42. Hattori M, Oaksford M. 2007. Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation detection in causal induction: model comparison and rational analysis. Cogn. Sci. 31:5765–814 [Google Scholar]
  43. Hayes BK, Rehder B. 2012. The development of causal categorization. Cogn. Sci. 36:61102–28 [Google Scholar]
  44. Hegarty M. 2004. Mechanical reasoning as mental simulation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8:280–85 [Google Scholar]
  45. Heider F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations New York: Wiley [Google Scholar]
  46. Hiddleston E. 2005. A causal theory of counterfactuals. Noûs 39:4632–57 [Google Scholar]
  47. Hilton DJ, McClure J, Sutton RM. 2010. Selecting explanations from causal chains: Do statistical principles explain preferences for voluntary causes?. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40:3383–400 [Google Scholar]
  48. Hilton DJ, Slugoski BR. 1986. Knowledge-based causal attribution: the abnormal conditions focus model. Psychol. Rev. 93:175–88 [Google Scholar]
  49. Holyoak KJ, Cheng PW. 2011. Causal learning and inference as a rational process: the new synthesis. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 62:135–63 [Google Scholar]
  50. Hong L, Chijun Z, Xuemei G, Shan G, Chongde L. 2005. The influence of complexity and reasoning direction on children's causal reasoning. Cogn. Dev. 20:187–101 [Google Scholar]
  51. Joyce J. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  52. Kahan DM, Peters E, Dawson EC, Slovic P. 2013. Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government. Yale Law School, The Cult. Cogn. Proj., Work. Pap. 116 [Google Scholar]
  53. Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  54. Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1982a. The simulation heuristic. See Kahneman et al. 1982 201–8
  55. Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1982b. Variants of uncertainty. Cognition 11:2143–57 [Google Scholar]
  56. Keil FC. 1989. Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  57. Keil FC. 2006. Explanation and understanding. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 57:227–54 [Google Scholar]
  58. Keil FC. 2012. Running on empty? How folk science gets by with less. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 21:5329–34 [Google Scholar]
  59. Kelley HH. 1973. The processes of causal attribution. Am. Psychol. 28:2107–28 [Google Scholar]
  60. Kelley HH. 1983. Perceived causal structures. Attribution Theory and Research: Conceptual, Developmental and Social Dimensions JM Jaspars, FD Fincham, M Hewstone 343–69 New York: Academic [Google Scholar]
  61. Kemp C, Tenenbaum JB. 2009. Structured statistical models of inductive reasoning. Psychol. Rev. 116:120–58 [Google Scholar]
  62. Klein G. 1999. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  63. Knobe J. 2009. Folk judgments of causation. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. 40:2238–42 [Google Scholar]
  64. Kuhn D, Weinstock M, Flaton R. 1994. How well do jurors reason? Competence dimensions of individual variation in a juror reasoning task. Psychol. Sci. 5:289–96 [Google Scholar]
  65. Lagnado DA. 2011a. Causal thinking. Causality in the Sciences PM Illari, F Russo, J Williamson 129–49 New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  66. Lagnado DA. 2011b. Thinking about evidence. Proc. Br. Acad. 171:183–223 [Google Scholar]
  67. Lagnado DA, Channon S. 2008. Judgments of cause and blame: the effects of intentionality and foreseeability. Cognition 108:3754–70 [Google Scholar]
  68. Lagnado DA, Fenton N, Neil M. 2012. Legal idioms: a framework for evidential reasoning. Argument Comput. 4:46–63 [Google Scholar]
  69. Lagnado DA, Gerstenberg T, Zultan R. 2013. Causal responsibility and counterfactuals. Cogn. Sci. 37:1036–73 [Google Scholar]
  70. Lagnado DA, Sloman SA. 2004a. Inside and outside probability judgment. Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making DJ Koehler, N Harvey 157–76 London: Blackwell [Google Scholar]
  71. Lagnado DA, Sloman SA. 2004b. The advantage of timely intervention. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 30:856–76 [Google Scholar]
  72. Lagnado DA, Sloman SA. 2006. Time as a guide to cause. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 32:451–60 [Google Scholar]
  73. Lassaline ME. 1996. Structural alignment in induction and similarity. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22:754–70 [Google Scholar]
  74. Laux JP, Goedert KM, Markman AB. 2010. Causal discounting in the presence of a stronger cue is due to bias. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 17:2213–18 [Google Scholar]
  75. Lawson R. 2006. The science of cycology: failures to understand how everyday objects work. Mem. Cogn. 34:81667–75 [Google Scholar]
  76. Lee HS, Holyoak KJ. 2008. The role of causal models in analogical inference. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 34:51111–22 [Google Scholar]
  77. Lewis CI. 1929 (1956). Mind and the World Order: An Outline of a Theory of Knowledge New York: Scribner's Sons. Reprint ed. [Google Scholar]
  78. Lewis D. 1973. Causation. J. Philos. 70:17556–67 [Google Scholar]
  79. Lewis D. 1986. Causal explanation. Philos. Pap. 2:214–40 [Google Scholar]
  80. Lombrozo T. 2010. Causal-explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. Cogn. Psychol. 61:4303–32 [Google Scholar]
  81. Lucas A, Kemp C. 2012. A unified theory of counterfactual reasoning. Proc. 34th Annu. Meet. Cogn. Sci. Soc. N Miyake, D Peebles, RP Cooper 707–12 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc. [Google Scholar]
  82. Malle BF, Knobe J. 1997. The folk concept of intentionality. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 33:101–21 [Google Scholar]
  83. Mandel DR. 2003. Judgment dissociation theory: an analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual and covariational reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 132:3419–34 [Google Scholar]
  84. Markovits H, Potvin F. 2001. Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: the curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals. Mem. Cogn. 29:5736–44 [Google Scholar]
  85. Mayrhofer R, Goodman ND, Waldmann MR, Tenenbaum JB. 2008. Structured correlation from the causal background. Proc. 30th Annu. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc. BC Love, K McRae, VM Sloutsky 303–8 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc. [Google Scholar]
  86. Mayrhofer R, Hagmayer Y, Waldmann M. 2010. Agents and causes: a Bayesian error attribution model of causal reasoning. Proc. 32nd Annu. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc. S Ohlsson, R Catrambone 925–30 Austin, TX: Cogn. Sci. Soc. [Google Scholar]
  87. Mayrhofer R, Waldmann MR. 2014. Agents and causes: dispositional intuitions as a guide to causal structure. Cogn. Sci. In press [Google Scholar]
  88. McCrea SM, Hirt ER, Hendrix KL, Milner BJ, Steele NL. 2008. The worker scale: developing a measure to explain gender differences in behavioral self-handicapping. J. Res. Personal. 42:4949–70 [Google Scholar]
  89. Michotte A. 1963. The Perception of Causality London: Methuen [Google Scholar]
  90. Mijovic-Prelec D, Prelec D. 2010. Self-deception as self-signalling: a model and experimental evidence. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 365:227–40 [Google Scholar]
  91. Morris MW, Larrick RP. 1995. When one cause casts doubt on another: a normative analysis of discounting in causal attribution. Psychol. Rev. 102:2331–55 [Google Scholar]
  92. Murphy GL, Medin DL. 1985. The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychol. Rev. 92:3289–316 [Google Scholar]
  93. Novick LR, Cheng PW. 2004. Assessing interactive causal influence. Psychol. Rev. 111:455–85 [Google Scholar]
  94. Nozick R. 1969. Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice. Essays in Honor of Carl G Hempel N Rescher 114–46 Dordrecht: Reidel [Google Scholar]
  95. Park J, Sloman SA. 2013. Mechanistic beliefs determine adherence to the Markov property in causal reasoning. Cogn. Psychol. 67:186–216 [Google Scholar]
  96. Park J, Sloman SA. 2014. Causal explanation in the face of contradiction. Mem. Cogn. 425806–20 [Google Scholar]
  97. Paul L, Hall N. 2013. Causation: A User's Guide Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  98. Pearl J. 1988. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann [Google Scholar]
  99. Pearl J. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  100. Pearl J. 2013. Structural counterfactuals: a brief introduction. Cogn. Sci. 37:977–85 [Google Scholar]
  101. Penn DC, Holyoak KJ, Povinelli DJ. 2008. Darwin's mistake: explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behav. Brain Sci. 31:2109–30 [Google Scholar]
  102. Pennington N, Hastie R. 1986. Evidence evaluation in complex decision making. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 51:242–58 [Google Scholar]
  103. Pennington N, Hastie R. 1992. Explaining the evidence: test of the story model for juror decision making. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 62:189–206 [Google Scholar]
  104. Puebla G, Chaigneau SE. 2014. Inference and coherence in causal-based artifact categorization. Cognition 130:150–65 [Google Scholar]
  105. Quattrone G, Tversky A. 1984. Causal versus diagnostic contingencies: on self-deception and on the voter's illusion. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 46:237–48 [Google Scholar]
  106. Ramsey FP. 1929/1990. General propositions and causality. Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics DH Mellor 145–63 London: Humanit. Press [Google Scholar]
  107. Rehder B. 2003. A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29:61141–59 [Google Scholar]
  108. Rehder B. 2006. When causality and similarity compete in category-based property induction. Mem. Cogn. 34:3–16 [Google Scholar]
  109. Rehder B, Burnett RC. 2005. Feature inference and the causal structure of object categories. Cogn. Psychol. 50:264–314 [Google Scholar]
  110. Rips LJ. 2010. Two causal theories of counterfactual conditionals. Cogn. Sci. 34:2175–221 [Google Scholar]
  111. Rips LJ, Edwards B. 2013. Inference and explanation in counterfactual reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 37:1107–35 [Google Scholar]
  112. Rottman BM, Keil FC. 2012. Causal structure learning over time: observations and interventions. Cogn. Psychol. 64:93–125 [Google Scholar]
  113. Rottman BM, Kominsky JF, Keil FC. 2014. Children use temporal cues to learn causal directionality. Cogn. Sci. 38:3489–513 [Google Scholar]
  114. Rozenblit L, Keil F. 2002. The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. Cogn. Sci. 26:5521–62 [Google Scholar]
  115. Russell B. 1913. On the notion of cause. Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 13:1–26 [Google Scholar]
  116. Salmon WC. 1994. Causality without counterfactuals. Philos. Sci. 61:2297–312 [Google Scholar]
  117. Schlottmann A. 1999. Seeing it happen and knowing how it works: how children understand the relation between perceptual causality and knowledge of underlying mechanisms. Dev. Psychol. 35:303–17 [Google Scholar]
  118. Schum DA. 1994. The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning New York: Wiley [Google Scholar]
  119. Schwartz DL, Black T. 1999. Inferences through imagined actions: knowing by simulated doing. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 25:116–36 [Google Scholar]
  120. Shaffer J. 2012. Disconnection and responsibility. Legal Theory 18:399–435 [Google Scholar]
  121. Shafto P, Kemp C, Bonawitz EB, Coley JD, Tenenbaum JB. 2008. Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties. Cognition 109:175–92 [Google Scholar]
  122. Shaklee H, Goldston D. 1989. Development in causal reasoning: information sampling and judgment rule. Cogn. Dev. 4:3269–81 [Google Scholar]
  123. Shaver KG. 1985. The Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and Blameworthiness New York: Springer-Verlag [Google Scholar]
  124. Sirota M, Juanchich M, Hagmayer Y. 2014. Ecological rationality or nested sets? Individual differences in cognitive processing predict Bayesian reasoning. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 21:198–204 [Google Scholar]
  125. Sloman SA. 2005. Causal Models: How People Think About the World and Its Alternatives New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  126. Sloman SA, Fernbach PM, Ewing S. 2009. Causal models: the representational infrastructure for moral judgment. Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50 Moral Judgment and Decision Making DM Bartels, CW Bauman, LJ Skitka, DL Medin 1–26 San Diego, CA: Academic [Google Scholar]
  127. Sloman SA, Fernbach PM, Hagmayer Y. 2010. Self-deception requires vagueness. Cognition 115:2268–81 [Google Scholar]
  128. Sloman SA, Hagmayer Y. 2006. The causal psycho-logic of choice. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10:9407–12 [Google Scholar]
  129. Sloman SA, Lagnado DA. 2005. Do we “do”?. Cogn. Sci. 29:15–39 [Google Scholar]
  130. Sloman SA, Pearl J. 2013. Special issue: 2011 Rumelhart Prize Special Issue honoring Judea Pearl. Cogn. Sci. 37:6969–1191 [Google Scholar]
  131. Spellman BA. 1997. Crediting causality. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 126:4323–48 [Google Scholar]
  132. Spellman BA, Kincannon A. 2001. The relation between counterfactual (“but for”) and causal reasoning: experimental findings and implications for jurors' decisions. Law Contemp. Probl. 64:4241–64 [Google Scholar]
  133. Spirtes P, Glymour CN, Scheines R. 1993/2000. Causation, Prediction, and Search 81 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  134. Strevens M. 2008. Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  135. Taroni F, Aitken C, Garbolino P, Biedermann A. 2006. Bayesian Networks and Probabilistic Inference in Forensic Science Chichester, UK: Wiley [Google Scholar]
  136. Taylor AH, Hunt GR, Medina FS, Gray RD. 2009. Do new Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning. Proc. R. Soc. B 276:1655247–54 [Google Scholar]
  137. Tenenbaum JB, Kemp C, Griffiths TL, Goodman ND. 2011. How to grow a mind: statistics, structure, and abstraction. Science 331:60221279–85 [Google Scholar]
  138. Thompson VA. 1995. Conditional reasoning: the necessary and sufficient conditions. Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 49:11–60 [Google Scholar]
  139. Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 185:1124–31 [Google Scholar]
  140. Waldmann MR, Dieterich JH. 2007. Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb: intervention myopia in moral intuitions. Psychol. Sci. 18:3247–53 [Google Scholar]
  141. Waldmann MR, Hagmayer Y. 2005. Seeing versus doing: two modes of accessing causal knowledge. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 31:216–27 [Google Scholar]
  142. Waldmann MR, Hagmayer Y. 2013. Causal reasoning. Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology D Reisberg 733–52 New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  143. Waldmann MR, Holyoak KJ. 1992. Predictive and diagnostic learning within causal models: asymmetries in cue competition. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 121:2222–36 [Google Scholar]
  144. Walsh CR, Sloman SA. 2008. Updating beliefs with causal models: violations of screening off. Memory and Mind: A Festschrift for Gordon H. Bower MA Gluck, JR Anderson, SM Kosslyn 345–57 Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum [Google Scholar]
  145. Walsh CR, Sloman SA. 2011. The meaning of cause and prevent: the role of causal mechanism. Mind Lang. 26:121–52 [Google Scholar]
  146. Wegner DM. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  147. Weidenfeld A, Oberauer K, Hörnig R. 2005. Causal and noncausal conditionals: an integrated model of interpretation and reasoning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 58:81479–513 [Google Scholar]
  148. Weiner B. 1995. Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of Social Conduct New York: Guilford [Google Scholar]
  149. Wells GL, Gavanski I. 1989. Mental simulation of causality. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 56:2161–69 [Google Scholar]
  150. White PA. 2006. The causal asymmetry. Psychol. Rev. 113:1132–47 [Google Scholar]
  151. White PA. 2013. Singular clues to causality and their use in human causal judgment. Cogn. Sci. 38:38–75 [Google Scholar]
  152. Wiegmann A, Waldmann MR. 2014. Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: a causal model theory. Cognition 131:128–43 [Google Scholar]
  153. Wolff P. 2007. Representing causation. J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 136:182–111 [Google Scholar]
  154. Wolff P. 2013. Representing verbs with force vectors. Theor. Linguist. 38:237–48 [Google Scholar]
  155. Wolff P, Song G. 2003. Models of causation and the semantics of causal verbs. Cogn. Psychol. 47:276–332 [Google Scholar]
  156. Woodward J. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  157. Zultan R, Gerstenberg T, Lagnado DA. 2012. Finding fault: counterfactuals and causality in group attributions. Cognition 125:3429–40 [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135
Loading
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error