1932

Abstract

Experimental games model situations in which the future outcomes of individuals and groups depend on their own choices and on those of other (groups of) individuals. Games are a powerful tool to identify the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal and group cooperation and coordination. Here we discuss recent developments in how experimental games are used and adapted, with an increased focus on repeated interactions, partner control through sanctioning, and partner (de)selection for future interactions. Important advances have been made in uncovering the neurobiological underpinnings of key factors involved in cooperation and coordination, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputations and (in)direct reciprocity. Emerging trends at the cross-sections of psychology, economics, and the neurosciences include an increased focus on group heterogeneities, intergroup polarization and conflict, cross-cultural differences in cooperation and norm enforcement, and neurocomputational modeling of the formation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.

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2021-01-04
2024-05-27
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