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- Volume 2, 2010
Annual Review of Economics - Volume 2, 2010
Volume 2, 2010
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Models of Growth and Firm Heterogeneity
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 547–576More LessAlthough employment at individual firms tends to be highly nonstationary, the employment size distribution of all firms in the United States appears to be stationary. It closely resembles a Pareto distribution. There is a lot of entry and exit, mostly of small firms. This review surveys general equilibrium models that can be used to interpret these facts and explores the role of innovation by new and incumbent firms in determining aggregate growth. The existence of a balanced growth path with a stationary employment size distribution depends crucially on assumptions made about the cost of entry. Some type of labor must be an essential input in setting up new firms.
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Labor Market Models of Worker and Firm Heterogeneity
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 577–602More LessMicroeconomic data on individual firms and employer-employee matches reveal substantial and persistent dispersion in firm size, productivity, and average wage paid and a positive correlation between each pair. To the extent that intrinsic differences in firm productivity explain these facts, there are several important consequences. First, the reallocation of employment from less to more productive firms will yield efficiency gains. Second, workers will find it in their interest to seek out higher-paying employers. Recent research has provided support for both hypotheses. Third, the existence of worker and employer heterogeneity offers possible gains from sorting. However, because the problem of identifying the presence of sorting is model dependent, it is too early for conclusions about its significance.
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The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 603–618More LessThe current financial crisis has highlighted the changing role of financial institutions and the growing importance of the shadow banking system, which grew on the back of the securitization of assets and the integration of banking with capital market developments. This trend has been most pronounced in the United States but has had a profound influence on the global financial system as a whole. In a market-based financial system, banking and capital market developments are inseparable, and funding conditions are closely tied to the fluctuations in leverage of market-based financial intermediaries. Balance-sheet growth of market-based financial intermediaries provides a window on liquidity in the sense of the availability of credit, whereas financial crises tend to be associated with contractions of balance sheets. We describe the changing nature of financial intermediation in the market-based financial system, chart the course of the recent financial crisis, and outline the policy responses that have been implemented by the Federal Reserve and other central banks to counter it.
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Competition and Productivity: A Review of Evidence
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 619–642More LessDoes competition spur productivity? And if so, how does it accomplish this? These have long been regarded as central questions in economics. This article reviews the literature that makes progress toward answering both questions.
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Persuasion: Empirical Evidence
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 643–669More LessWe provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the effects as well as the drivers of persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors, and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does persuasion affect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the response to persuasive communication? Third, what are persuaders' incentives, and what limits their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the way persuasion affects equilibrium outcomes in economics and politics?
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Commitment Devices
Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 671–698More LessWe review the recent evidence on commitment devices and discuss how this evidence relates to theoretical questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, commitment. Several important distinctions emerge. First, we distinguish between what we call hard and soft commitments and identify how soft commitments, in particular, can help with various dilemmas, both in explaining empirical behavior and in designing effective commitment devices. Second, we highlight the importance of certain modeling assumptions in predicting when commitment devices will be demanded and examine the laboratory and field evidence on the demand for commitment devices. Third, we present the evidence on both informal and formal commitment devices, and we conclude with a discussion of policy implications, including sin taxes, consumer protection, and commitment device design.
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