1932
0
  1. Home
  2. A-Z Publications
  3. Annual Review of Economics
  4. Volume 14, 2022
  5. Article

Annual Review of Economics

Volume 14, 2022

The Aftermath of Debt Surges

Abstract

Debt in emerging markets and developing economies is at its highest level in half a century. In about 9 in 10 emerging markets and developing economies, debt is higher now than it was in 2010, and in half of the emerging markets and developing economies, debt is more than 30 percentage points of GDP higher than in 2010. This article reviews a menu of options that in the past have helped lower debt burdens. It examines orthodox options (enhancing growth, fiscal consolidation, privatization, and wealth taxation) and heterodox options (inflation, financial repression, and debt default and restructuring). The mix of feasible options depends on country characteristics and the type of debt. However, none of these options comes without political, economic, and social costs. The challenges associated with debt reduction raise questions of global governance, including to what extent advanced economies can better support emerging market and developing economies in cushioning prospective shocks.

Keyword(s): debt restructuring, financial repression, fiscal consolidation, growth, inflation, JEL E32, JEL E63, JEL F34, JEL F44, JEL F62, JEL H6, JEL H63, wealth taxes
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343
2022-08-12
2024-05-01
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/economics/14/1/annurev-economics-051420-015343.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Abbas SMA, Blattner L, De Broeck M, El-Ganainy A, Hu M. 2021. Sovereign debt composition in advanced economies: a historical perspective Work. Pap. 14/162 World Bank Washington, DC:
  2. Abbas SMA, Rogoff K 2019. A guide to sovereign debt data. Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners A Abbas, A Pienkowski, K Rogoff 405–22 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  3. Abdeldayem MM, Al Dulaimi SH. 2019. Privatization and financial performance in Egypt since 1991. Asian Econ. Financ. Rev. 9:4461–79
     [Google Scholar]
  4. Abiad A, Detragiache E, Tressel R. 2010. A new database of financial reforms. IMF Staff Pap 57:2281–302
     [Google Scholar]
  5. Aguiar M, Amador M. 2021. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  6. Aguiar M, Amador M 2014. Sovereign debt. Handbook of International Economics, ed. G Gopinath, E Helpman, KS Rogoff 647–87 Amsterdam: Elsevier
     [Google Scholar]
  7. Aguiar M, Amador M, Farhi E, Gopinath G. 2013. Crisis and commitment: inflation credibility and the vulnerability to sovereign debt crises NBER Work. Pap. 19516
  8. Aguiar M, Amador M, Farhi E, Gopinath G. 2015. Coordination and crisis in monetary unions. Q. J. Econ. 130:41727–79
     [Google Scholar]
  9. Aguiar M, Chatterjee S, Cole H, Stangebye Z 2016. Quantitative models of sovereign debt crises. Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 2 JB Taylor, H Uhlig 1697–755 Amsterdam: Elsevier
     [Google Scholar]
  10. Aizenman J, Marion N. 2011. Using inflation to erode the US public debt. J. Macroecon. 33:4524–41
     [Google Scholar]
  11. Akitoby B, Binder A, Komatsuzaki T. 2017. Inflation and public debt reversals in the G7 countries. J. Bank. Financ. Econ. 1:728–50
     [Google Scholar]
  12. Alogoskoufis S, Langfield S. 2020. Regulating the doom loop. Int. J. Cent. Bank. 16:4251–92
     [Google Scholar]
  13. Amador M, Phelan C. 2021. Reputation and sovereign default. Econometrica 89:1979–2010
     [Google Scholar]
  14. Asonuma T, Chamon M, Erce A, Sasahara A. 2020. Costs of sovereign defaults: restructuring strategies and the credit-investment channel Work. Pap. 19/69 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  15. Asonuma T, Joo H. 2020a. Sovereign debt overhang, expenditure composition and debt restructurings Discuss. Pap. 1519 Sch. Econ., Univ. Surrey, Guildford, UK
  16. Asonuma T, Joo H. 2020b. Sovereign debt restructurings: delays in renegotiations and risk averse creditors. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 18:52394–440
     [Google Scholar]
  17. Bahaj S, Reis R. 2021. Central bank swap lines: evidence on the effects of a lender of last resort. Rev. Econ. Stud. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab074
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
  18. Baldacci E, Gupta S, Mulas-Granados C. 2012. Reassessing the fiscal mix for successful debt reduction. Econ. Policy 27:71365–406
     [Google Scholar]
  19. Baldacci E, Gupta S, Mulas-Granados C. 2015. Debt reduction, fiscal adjustment, and growth in credit-constrained economies. J. Appl. Econ. 18:171–98
     [Google Scholar]
  20. Bańkowski K, Ferdinandusse M, Hauptmeier S, Jacquinot P, Valenta V. 2021. The macroeconomic impact of the next generation EU instrument on the euro area ECB Occas. Pap. 255 Eur. Cent. Bank Frankfurt, Ger:.
  21. Barnett SA. 2000. Evidence on the fiscal and macroeconomic impact of privatization Work. Pap. Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  22. Barro RJ. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. J. Political Econ. 87:5 Part 1 940–71
     [Google Scholar]
  23. Barro RJ. 2006. Rare disasters and asset markets in the twentieth century. Q. J. Econ. 121:3823–66
     [Google Scholar]
  24. Becker B, Ivashina V. 2018. Financial repression in the European sovereign debt crisis. Rev. Finance 22:183–115
     [Google Scholar]
  25. Bekaert G, Harvey CR, Lundblad C. 2005. Does financial liberalization spur growth?. J. Financ. Econ. 77:13–55
     [Google Scholar]
  26. Bianchi F, Faccini R, Melosi L. 2020. Monetary and fiscal policies in times of large debt: Unity is strength NBER Work. Pap. 27112
  27. Birdsall N, Nellis J. 2003. Winners and losers: assessing the distributional impact of privatization. World Dev. 31:101617–33
     [Google Scholar]
  28. Bitar N, Chakrabarti A, Zeaiter H. 2018. Were Reinhart and Rogoff right?. Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 58:614–20
     [Google Scholar]
  29. Blanchard OJ. 2019. Public debt and low interest rates. Am. Econ. Rev. 109:41197–229
     [Google Scholar]
  30. Blanchard OJ, Felman J, Subramanian A. 2021. Does the new fiscal consensus in advanced economies travel to emerging markets? Policy Brief 21-7 Peterson Inst. Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  31. Bohn H 2008. The sustainability of fiscal policy in the United States. Sustainability of Public Debt R Neck, J-E Sturm 15–49 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
     [Google Scholar]
  32. Bredenkamp H, Hausmann R, Pienkowski A, Reinhart C 2019. Challenges ahead. Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners A Abbas, A Pienkowski, K Rogoff 365–404 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
  33. Buchheit LC, Chabert G, DeLong C, Zettelmeyer J. 2019. How to restructure sovereign debt: lessons from four decades Work. Pap. 19-8 Peterson Inst. Washington, DC:
  34. Buchheit LC, Gulati M. 2021. Avoiding a lost decade—sovereign debt workouts in the post-Covid era. Cap. Mark. Law J. 16:145–55
     [Google Scholar]
  35. Bulow J, Reinhart C, Rogoff KS, Trebesch C. 2020. The debt pandemic. Finance DevSept.:13–16
     [Google Scholar]
  36. Bulow J, Rogoff KS. 1988a. Multilateral negotiations for rescheduling developing country debt: a bargaining-theoretic framework. IMF Staff Pap 35:644–57
     [Google Scholar]
  37. Bulow J, Rogoff KS. 1988b. The buyback boondoggle. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 2:675–98
     [Google Scholar]
  38. Bulow J, Rogoff KS. 1989. A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt. J. Political Econ. 97:1155–78
     [Google Scholar]
  39. Bulow J, Rogoff KS, Bevilaqua AS. 1992. Official creditor seniority and burden-sharing in the former Soviet bloc. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 1992:1195–234
     [Google Scholar]
  40. Bumann S, Hermes N, Lensinck R. 2013. Financial liberalization and economic growth: a meta-analysis. J. Int. Money Finance 33:255–81
     [Google Scholar]
  41. Caballero RJ, Farhi E, Gourinchas PO. 2008. An equilibrium model of “global imbalances” and low interest rates. Am. Econ. Rev. 98:1358–93
     [Google Scholar]
  42. Cagan P 1956. The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money M Friedman 25–117 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
     [Google Scholar]
  43. Calice P, Diaz Kalan F, Masetti O. 2020. Interest rate repression: a new database Work. Pap. 9457 World Bank Washington, DC:
  44. Calvo GA. 1998. Capital flows and capital-market crises: the simple economics of sudden stops. J. Appl. Econ. 1:135–54
     [Google Scholar]
  45. Carvalho C, Ferraro A, Nechio F. 2016. Demographics and real interest rates. Eur. Econ. Rev. 88:208–26
     [Google Scholar]
  46. Catão L, Fostel A, Kapur S. 2009. Persistent gaps and default traps. J. Dev. Econ. 89:2271–84
     [Google Scholar]
  47. Catão L, Kapur S. 2006. Volatility and the debt-intolerance paradox. IMF Staff Pap 53:2195–218
     [Google Scholar]
  48. Chari VV, Dovis A, Kehoe PJ. 2020. On the optimality of financial repression. J. Political Econ. 128:2710–39
     [Google Scholar]
  49. Chatterjee A, Czajka L, Gethin A. 2021. Taxing wealth in a context of extreme inequality legacy: the case of South Africa. VoxEU April 24
    [Google Scholar]
  50. Cole HL, Kehoe TJ. 1998. Models of sovereign debt: partial versus general reputations. Int. Econ. Rev. 39:155–70
     [Google Scholar]
  51. Cole HL, Kehoe TJ. 2000. Self-fulfilling debt crises. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67:191–116
     [Google Scholar]
  52. Constantinescu C, Mattoo A, Ruta M. 2020. The global trade slowdown: cyclical or structural?. World Bank Econ. Rev. 34:1121–42
     [Google Scholar]
  53. Corsetti G, Erce A, Uy T. 2019. Debt sustainability and the terms of official support Paper presented at the Twentieth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference Washington, DC: Nov. 8
  54. Cruces JJ, Trebesch C. 2013. Sovereign defaults: the price of haircuts. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon 5:385–117
     [Google Scholar]
  55. Davis JM, Richardson TJ, Ossowski R, Barnett SA. 2000. Fiscal and macroeconomic impact of privatization Occas. Pap. Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  56. Debrun X, Kinda T. 2016. That squeezing feeling: the interest burden and public debt stabilization. Int. Finance 19:2147–78
     [Google Scholar]
  57. Dell'Ariccia G, Ferreira C, Jenkinson N, Laeven L, Martin A et al. 2018. Managing the sovereign-bank nexus. Work. Pap. 18/16 Monet. Cap. Mark. Dep. Res. Dep., Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  58. di Giovanni J, Shambaugh JC. 2008. The impact of foreign interest rates on the economy: the role of the exchange rate regime. J. Int. Econ. 74:2341–61
     [Google Scholar]
  59. Diaz-Alejandro C. 1985. Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash. J. Dev. Econ. 19:1–21–24
     [Google Scholar]
  60. Dieppe A. 2020. Global Productivity: Trends, Drivers, and Policy Challenges Washington, DC: World Bank
  61. Dooley MP, Garber P, Landau DF. 2004. The revived Bretton Woods system: the effects of periphery intervention and reserve management on interest rates & exchange rates in center countries NBER Work. Pap. 10332
  62. Du W, Schreger J. 2022. Sovereign risk, currency risk and corporate balance sheets. Rev. Financ. Stud https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac001
    [Crossref] [Google Scholar]
  63. Eaton J, Gersovitz M. 1981. Debt with potential repudiation: theoretical and empirical analysis. Rev. Econ. Stud. 48:289–309
     [Google Scholar]
  64. Eggertsson GB, Krugman P. 2012. Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: a Fisher-Minsky-Koo approach. Q. J. Econ. 127:31469–513
     [Google Scholar]
  65. Eichengreen B, Hausmann R. 1999. Exchange rate and financial fragility NBER Work. Pap. 7418
  66. Eichengreen B, Mody A. 2003. Is aggregation a problem for sovereign debt restructuring?. Am. Econ. Rev. 93:280–84
     [Google Scholar]
  67. Ellison M, Scott A. 2020. Managing the UK national debt 1694–2018. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 12:3227–57
     [Google Scholar]
  68. Erce A, Mallucci E. 2018. Selective sovereign defaults. Int. Finance Discuss. Pap. 1239 Board Gov. Fed. Reserve System Washington, DC:
  69. Erce A, Mallucci E, Picarelli M. 2021. A journey in the history of sovereign defaults on domestic law public debt Work. Pap. 14/21 LUISS Sch. Eur. Political Econ. Rome, Italy:
  70. Estrin S, Pelletier A. 2018. Privatization in developing countries: What are the lessons of recent experience?. World Bank Res. Obs. 33:165–102
     [Google Scholar]
  71. Forbes N. 1987. London banks, the German standstill agreements, and “economic appeasement” in the 1930s. Econ. Hist. Rev. 40:4571–87
     [Google Scholar]
  72. Fragoudaki A, Giokas D. 2020. Airport efficiency in the dawn of privatization: the case of Greece. J. Air Transp. Manag. 86::1018–21
     [Google Scholar]
  73. Frankel J, Schmukler SL, Serven L. 2004. Global transmission of interest rates: monetary independence and currency regime. J. Int. Money Finance 23:5701–33
     [Google Scholar]
  74. Fuest C. 2021. The NGEU economic recovery fund. CESifo Forum 22:13–8
     [Google Scholar]
  75. Fukunaga I, Komatsuzaki T, Matsuoka H. 2022. Inflation and public debt reversals in advanced economies. Contemp. Econ. Policy 40:1124–37
     [Google Scholar]
  76. Furman J, Summers L. 2020. A reconsideration of fiscal policy in the era of low rates Econ. Policy Discuss. Draft, Peterson Inst. Washington, DC:
  77. Giovannini A, De Melo M. 1993. Government revenue from financial repression. Am. Econ. Rev. 83:4953–63
     [Google Scholar]
  78. Gordon R. 2016. The Rise and Fall of American Growth Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  79. Ha J, Kindberg-Hanlon G. 2021. Asset purchases in emerging markets: unconventional policies, unconventional times. Global Economic Prospects, January 2021169–98 Washington, DC: World Bank
     [Google Scholar]
  80. Ha J, Kose MA, Ohnsorge F. 2019. Inflation in Emerging and Developing Economies: Evolution, Drivers, and Policies Washington, DC: World Bank
     [Google Scholar]
  81. Hall GJ, Sargent TJ. 2011. Interest rate risk and other determinants of post-WWII U.S. government debt/GDP dynamics. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 3:3192–214
     [Google Scholar]
  82. Hartwell CA. 2017. If you're going through hell, keep going: nonlinear effects of financial liberalization in transition economies. Emerg. Market Finance Trade 53:2250–75
     [Google Scholar]
  83. Hausman J, Wongswan J. 2011. Global asset prices and FOMC announcements. J. Int. Money Finance 30:3547–71
     [Google Scholar]
  84. Hermes N, Meesters A. 2015. Financial liberalization, financial regulation and bank efficiency: a multi-country analysis. Appl. Econ. 47:212154–72
     [Google Scholar]
  85. Hilscher J, Raviv A, Reis R. 2014. Inflating away the public debt? An empirical assessment NBER Work. Pap. 20339
  86. Holston K, Laubach T, Williams JC. 2017. Measuring the natural rate of interest: international trends and determinants. J. Int. Econ. 108:Suppl. 1S59–75
     [Google Scholar]
  87. Honda J, Miyamoto H. 2020. Would population aging change the output effects of fiscal policy? Work. Pap. 20/92 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  88. Horn S, Reinhart CM, Trebesch C. 2020. China's overseas lending NBER Work. Pap. 26050
  89. Huidrom R, Kose MA, Lim JJ, Ohnsorge F. 2020. Why do fiscal multipliers depend on fiscal positions?. J. Monet. Econ. 114:109–25
     [Google Scholar]
  90. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2013. Fiscal Monitor: Taxing Times. Washington, DC: Int. Monet. Fund
  91. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2021a. World Economic Outlook October: Recovery During a Pandemic Washington, DC: Int. Monet. Fund
  92. IMF (Int. Monet. Fund) 2021b. Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Washington, DC: Int. Monet. Fund
  93. Jafarov ME, Maino MR, Pani M. 2019. Financial repression is knocking at the door, again Work. Pap. 19/211 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  94. Jiang Z, Krishmamurthy A, Lustig H. 2021. Foreign asset demand and the dollar exchange rate. J. Finance 76:31049–89
     [Google Scholar]
  95. Kaminsky GL, Reinhart CM. 1999. The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. Am. Econ. Rev. 89:3473–500
     [Google Scholar]
  96. Kaminsky GL, Vega-García P. 2016. Systemic and idiosyncratic sovereign debt crises. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 14:180–114
     [Google Scholar]
  97. Kangave J, Nakato S, Waiswa R, Nalukwago Isingoma M, Lumala Zzimbe P. 2020. Taxing high net worth individuals: a case study of the Uganda revenue authority's approach Paper presented at the Second World Bank Tax Conference: Taxing Personal Income and Wealth in Developing Countries Washington, DC: Sept. 25
  98. Katsoulakos Y, Likoyanni E. 2002. Fiscal and other macroeconomic effects of privatization Work. Pap. Athens Univ. Econ. Bus. Athens, Greece:
  99. Kilic Celik S, Kose MA, Ohnsorge F 2020. Subdued potential growth: sources and remedies. Growth in a Time of Change: Global and Country Perspectives on a New Agenda H-W Kim, Z Qureshi 25–74 Washington, DC: Brook. Inst.
     [Google Scholar]
  100. Klein MW, Shambaugh JC. 2013. Rounding the corners of the policy trilemma: sources of monetary policy autonomy. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 7:433–66
     [Google Scholar]
  101. Koh WC, Kose MA, Nagle PS, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2020. Debt and financial crises Policy Res. Work. Pap. 9116 World Bank Washington, DC:
  102. Kose MA, Kurlat S, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2017. A cross-country database of fiscal space Policy Res. Work. Pap. 8157 World Bank Washington, DC:
  103. Kose AM, Nagle P, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2020a. Global Waves of Debt Washington, DC: World Bank
  104. Kose AM, Nagle P, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2021a. What has been the impact of COVID-19 on debt? Turning a wave into a tsunami Policy Res. Work. Pap. 9871 World Bank Washington, DC:
  105. Kose MA, Ohnsorge F. 2020. A Decade After the Global Recession. Washington, DC: World Bank
  106. Kose MA, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2020b. Benefits and costs of debt: The dose makes the poison Policy Res. Work. Pap. 9166 World Bank Washington, DC:
  107. Kose MA, Ohnsorge F, Sugawara N. 2021b. A mountain of debt: navigating the legacy of the pandemic Policy Res. Work. Pap. 9800 World Bank Washington, DC:
  108. Kotlikoff L. 2019. Social Security just ran a 9 trillion deficit, nobody noticed. The Hill May 14
    [Google Scholar]
  109. Kozlowski J, Veldkamp L, Venkateswaran V. 2020. The tail that wags the economy: beliefs and persistent stagnation. J. Political Econ. 128:82839–79
     [Google Scholar]
  110. Landais C, Saez E, Zucman G. 2020. A progressive European wealth tax to fund the European COVID response. VoxEU April 3
    [Google Scholar]
  111. Lane PR. 2021. The resilience of the euro. J. Econ. Perspect. 35:23–22
     [Google Scholar]
  112. Lian W, Presbitero A, Wiriadinata U. 2020. Public debt and r-g at risk Work. Pap. 20/137 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  113. Lo S, Rogoff K. 2015. Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on BIS Work. Pap. 482 Bank Int. Settl. Basel, Switz:.
  114. Maggiori M, Neiman B, Schreger J. 2020. International currencies and capital allocation. J. Political Econ. 128:62019–66
     [Google Scholar]
  115. Mallucci E. 2015. Domestic debt and sovereign defaults Int. Finance Discuss. Pap. 1153 Board Gov. Fed. Reserve System Washington, DC:
  116. Mauro P, Zhou J. 2020. r – g < 0: Can we sleep more soundly? IMF Work. Pap. 20/52 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
     [Google Scholar]
  117. Mbaye S, Moreno-Badia M, Chae K 2018. Global debt database: methodology and sources IMF Work. Pap. 18/111 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  118. Megginson WL, Netter JM. 2001. From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privatization. J. Econ. Lit. 39:2321–89
     [Google Scholar]
  119. Mendoza EG, Yue VZ. 2012. A general equilibrium model of sovereign default and business cycles. Q. J. Econ. 127:2889–946
     [Google Scholar]
  120. Metelli L, Pallara K. 2020. Fiscal space and the size of the fiscal multiplier Work. Pap. 1293 Bank Italy Rome:
  121. Meyer J, Reinhart CM, Trebesch C. 2019. Sovereign bonds since Waterloo NBER Work Pap. 25543
  122. Mian A, Straub L, Sufi A. 2021. A Goldilocks theory of fiscal policy Work. Pap. Harvard Univ. Cambridge, MA:
  123. Moreno Badia M, Gamboa-Arbelaez J, Xiang Y. 2021. Debt dynamics in emerging and developing economies: Is r-g a red herring? Work. Pap. 21/229 Int. Monet. Fund Washington, DC:
  124. Morgan M, Carvalho P Jr. 2021. Taxing wealth: general principles, international perspectives and lessons for Brazil. Braz. J. Political Econ. 41::44–64
     [Google Scholar]
  125. Mullin J. 2021. A look back at financial repression. Econ Focus First Quart. 22–25
     [Google Scholar]
  126. Obstfeld M. 2013. On keeping your powder dry: fiscal foundations of financial and price stability. Monet. Econ. Stud. 31:25–37
     [Google Scholar]
  127. OECD (Organ. Econ. Coop. Dev.) 2018. The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD Paris: OECD
  128. Ongena S, Popov A, Van Horen N. 2019. The invisible hand of the government: moral suasion during the European sovereign debt crisis. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 11:4346–79
     [Google Scholar]
  129. Ouliaris S, Rochon C. 2021. Pre- and post-global financial crisis policy multipliers. J. Macroecon. 70:103370
     [Google Scholar]
  130. Pempetzoglou M, Patergiannaki Z. 2017. Debt-driven water privatization: the case of Greece. Eur. J. Multidiscip. Stud. 2:5102–11
     [Google Scholar]
  131. Qian R, Reinhart CM, Rogoff K 2011. On graduation from default, inflation, and banking crises: elusive or illusion?. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Vol. 25 D Acemoglu, M Woodford 1–36 Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
     [Google Scholar]
  132. Reinhart CM. 2012. The return of financial repression Financ. Stab. Rev. 16 Banque France Paris:
  133. Reinhart CM. 2021. From health crisis to financial distress Policy Res. Work. Pap. 9616 World Bank Washington, DC:
  134. Reinhart CM, Kierkegaard JF, Sbrancia MB. 2011. Financial repression redux. Finance Dev. 48:123–27
     [Google Scholar]
  135. Reinhart CM, Reinhart V, Rogoff K. 2012. Public debt overhangs: advanced-economy episodes since 1800. J. Econ. Perspect. 26:369–86
     [Google Scholar]
  136. Reinhart CM, Reinhart V, Rogoff K. 2015. Dealing with debt. J. Int. Econ. 96:S1S43–55
     [Google Scholar]
  137. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2008. This time is different: a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises NBER Work. Pap. 13882
  138. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  139. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2010. Growth in a time of debt. Am. Econ. Rev. 100:2573–78
     [Google Scholar]
  140. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2011a. From financial crash to debt crisis. Am. Econ. Rev. 101:51676–706
     [Google Scholar]
  141. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2011b. The forgotten history of domestic debt. Econ. J. 121:319–50
     [Google Scholar]
  142. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2011c. A decade of debt NBER Work. Pap. 16827
  143. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS 2014a. Financial and sovereign debt crisis: some lessons learned and those forgotten. Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses S Claessens, MA Kose, L Laeven, F Valencia 141–55 Washington, DC: Int. Monet. Fund
     [Google Scholar]
  144. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS. 2014b. This time is different: a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises. Ann. Econ. Finance 15:2215–68
     [Google Scholar]
  145. Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS, Savastano M. 2003. Debt intolerance. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 34:11–74
     [Google Scholar]
  146. Reinhart CM, Sbrancia M. 2015. The liquidation of government debt. Econ. Policy 30:82291–333
     [Google Scholar]
  147. Reinhart CM, Trebesch C. 2016. Sovereign debt relief and its aftermath. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 14:1215–51
     [Google Scholar]
  148. Reis Gomes FA, Sakurai SN, Soave GP 2022. Government spending multipliers in good times and bad times: the case of emerging markets. Macroecon. Dyn. 26:3726–68
     [Google Scholar]
  149. Rey H. 2016. International channels of transmission of monetary policy and the Mundellian trilemma. IMF Econ. Rev. 64:16–35
     [Google Scholar]
  150. Ritschl A. 2012. Reparations, deficits, and debt default: the Great Depression in Germany CEPR Discuss. Pap. 1149 Cent. Econ. Policy Res. London:
  151. Rogoff K. 2016. The Curse of Cash Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  152. Rogoff K. 2020. Falling real interest rates, rising debt: a free lunch?. J. Policy Model. 42:4778–90
     [Google Scholar]
  153. Rogoff K, Zettelmeyer J. 2002. Bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns: a history of ideas, 1976–2001. IMF Staff Pap. 49:3471–507
     [Google Scholar]
  154. Roubini N, Sala-i-Martin X. 1992. Financial repression and economic growth. J. Dev. Econ. 39:15–30
     [Google Scholar]
  155. Saez E, Zucman G. 2019. Progressive wealth taxation. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 2019:2437–533
     [Google Scholar]
  156. Sandleris G. 2008. Sovereign defaults: information, investment and credit. J. Int. Econ. 76:2267–75
     [Google Scholar]
  157. Scheuer F, Slemrod J. 2021. Taxing our wealth. J. Econ. Perspect. 35:1207–30
     [Google Scholar]
  158. Schmelzing P. 2020. Eight centuries of global real interest rates, R-G, and the “suprasecular” decline, 1311–2018 Staff Work. Pap. 845 Bank Engl. London:
  159. Schumacher J, Trebesch C, Enderlein H. 2021. Sovereign defaults in court. J. Int. Econ. 131::1033–88
     [Google Scholar]
  160. Seim D. 2017. Behavioral responses to wealth taxes: evidence from Sweden. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 9:4395–421
     [Google Scholar]
  161. Sheshinski E, Lopez-Calva LF. 2003. Privatization and its benefits: theory and evidence. CESifo Econ. Stud. 49:3429–59
     [Google Scholar]
  162. Stock J. 2021. The rate debate: rethinking economics in the age of cheap money. Foreign AffMarch/April174–85
     [Google Scholar]
  163. Straub L. 2019. Consumption, savings and the distribution of permanent income Work. Pap. Harvard Univ. Cambridge, MA:
  164. Sturzenegger F, Zettelmeyer J. 2008. Haircuts: estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings, 1998–2005. J. Int. Money Finance 27:5780–805
     [Google Scholar]
  165. Teeling G. 2018. Debt data transparency Background paper for Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Financing for Development, 2nd Session United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Geneva: November 7–9, 2018. https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/tdb_efd2c03_Teeling_en.pdf
  166. Truman EM. 2002. Debt restructuring: evolution or revolution?. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 1:341–46
     [Google Scholar]
  167. Weidemaier WMC, Gelpern A. 2014. Injunctions in sovereign debt litigation. Yale J. Regul. 31:1189–218
     [Google Scholar]
  168. World Bank 2019a. Addressing Debt Vulnerabilities in IDA Countries: Options for IDA19 Washington, DC: World Bank
  169. World Bank 2019b. Moldova Country Economic Memorandum: Rekindling Economic Dynamism Washington, DC: World Bank
  170. World Bank 2020a. Doing Business Washington, DC: World Bank
  171. World Bank 2020b. EFI—Finance: Insolvency and Corporate Restructuring Washington, DC: World Bank
     [Google Scholar]
  172. World Bank 2021a. Global Economic Prospects, January 2021 Washington, DC: World Bank
  173. World Bank 2021b. How Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Can Help Address Nonperforming Loans Washington, DC: World Bank
  174. World Bank 2022. Global Economic Prospects, January 2022. Washington, DC: World Bank
  175. Yared P. 2019. Rising government debt: causes and solutions for a decades-old trend. J. Econ. Perspect. 33:2115–40
     [Google Scholar]
  176. Zettelmeyer J, Trebesch C, Gulati M. 2013. The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy. Econ. Policy 28:75513–63
     [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343
Loading
The Aftermath of Debt Surges
Annual Review of Economics 14, 637 (2022); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-015343
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article

Most Cited Most Cited RSS feed

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error