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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 15, 2023

Regulating Collusion

Abstract

We attempt to provide a systemic view of the process of regulating collusion, including detection and prosecution as well as bargaining between firms and regulators via consent orders, the production of evidence, and containment measures that may be taken if collusion cannot be addressed with more direct means. In addition, we try to do justice to the peculiarities of the legal system: Modeling the courts as they are, rather than as economists think they should be, is essential for economic analysis to improve the way collusion is regulated.

Keyword(s): artificial intelligence, burden of proof, collusion, consent orders, JEL K2, JEL K4, JEL L4, JEL L5, regulation, safe tests, Twombly
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
2023-09-13
2024-05-04
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
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Regulating Collusion
Annual Review of Economics 15, 177 (2023); https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
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