International policies for mitigation of climate change provide a global public good and thus suffer from “free riding,” i.e., inaction of governments. In 25 years of negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the regime has changed its character from a top-down approach based on mandatory emissions commitments to a bottom-up system of voluntary government pledges. At the same time, various initiatives by governments at all levels and private companies have been established, but most are limited to emissions reporting and exchange of knowledge on mitigation technologies. None of the alternatives has shown a higher mitigation effectiveness than the Kyoto Protocol. Generally, the transition toward a bottom-up regime risks a reduction of transparency and increases in the transaction costs of mitigation. Although it could give rise to a club of countries engaging in strong mitigation that could expand over time, it is unlikely to be ambitious enough to achieve the target of limiting warming to 2°C. On the one hand, carbon prices will be applied in a larger number of jurisdictions, and mitigation technologies diffuse around the world. On the other hand, carbon price levels will remain relatively low, and their mitigation benefits will be more than outweighed by the growth of infrastructure and consumption. Thus, a temperature increase of at least 3°C by 2100 becomes more and more likely.


Article metrics loading...

Loading full text...

Full text loading...


Literature Cited

  1. Stocker T, Qin D, Plattner GK, Tignor MMB, Allen SK. 1.  et al. 2013. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  2. Stavins R, Zou J, Brewer T, Conte Grand M, den Elzen M. 2.  et al. 2014. International cooperation: agreements and instruments. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report O Edenhofer, R Pichs-Madruga, Y Sokona, JC Minx, E Farahani, et al. 1001–82 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressReviews the literature published between 2006 and 2013 on international climate policy regimes. [Google Scholar]
  3. Victor DG. 3.  2001. The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  4. Victor DG. 4.  2009. Global warming: Why the 2 °C goal is a political delusion. Nature 459:909 [Google Scholar]
  5. Fuentes-Albero C, Rubio S. 5.  2010. Can international environmental cooperation be bought?. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 202:255–64 [Google Scholar]
  6. Bréchet T, Eyckmans J. 6.  2012. Coalition theory and integrated assessment modeling: lessons for climate governance. Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms E Brousseau, T Dedeurwaerdere, PA Jouvet, M Willinger 162–79 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  7. Bosetti V, Carraro C, De Cian E, Massetti E, Tavoni M. 7.  2013. Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: an integrated assessment. Energy Policy 55:44–56 [Google Scholar]
  8. Barrett S. 8.  2008a. The incredible economics of geoengineering. Environ. Resour. Econ. 39:45–54 [Google Scholar]
  9. Kroll S, Shogren J. 9.  2008. Domestic politics and climate change: international public goods in two-level games. Camb. Rev. Int. Aff. 21:563–83 [Google Scholar]
  10. Ostrom E. 10.  1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  11. Black J, Kauffmann C. 11.  2013. Transboundary water management. International Regulatory Co-operation: Case Studies 3 Transnational Private Regulation and Water Management OECD 59–102 Paris: OECD Publ. [Google Scholar]
  12. November V, Leanza Y. 12.  2014. Risk, disaster and crisis reduction Berlin: Springer [Google Scholar]
  13. Giddens A. 13.  2009. The Politics of Climate Change Cambridge, UK: Polity [Google Scholar]
  14. Eckersley R. 14.  2012. Moving forward in the climate negotiations: multilateralism or minilateralism?. Glob. Environ. Polit. 12:24–42 [Google Scholar]
  15. Brewer TL. 15.  2014. Climate change ‘clubs’: illustrative issues from international maritime shipping. See Ref. 45 26–30
  16. Fankhauser S. 16.  2010. The costs of adaptation. WIREs 1:23–30 [Google Scholar]
  17. Agrawala S, Carraro M, Kingsmill N, Lanzi E, Mullan M, Prudent-Richard G. 17.  2011. Private sector engagement in adaptation to climate change: approaches to managing climate risks OECD Environ. Work. Pap., OECD, Paris [Google Scholar]
  18. Tol R. 18.  2005. Adaptation and mitigation: trade-offs in substance and methods. Environ. Sci. Policy 8:572–78 [Google Scholar]
  19. Kane S, Shogren J. 19.  2000. Linking adaptation and mitigation in climate change policy. Clim. Change 45:75–102 [Google Scholar]
  20. Klinsky S, Dowlatabadi H, McDaniels T. 20.  2012. Comparing public rationales for justice trade-offs in mitigation and adaptation climate policy dilemmas. Glob. Environ. Change 22:862–76 [Google Scholar]
  21. Seo SN. 21.  2013. Economics of global warming as a global public good: private incentives and smart adaptations. Reg. Sci. Policy Pract. 5:83–95 [Google Scholar]
  22. Helm D. 22.  2010. Climate-change policy: Why has so little been achieved. The Economics and Politics of Climate Change D Helm, C Hepburn 9–35 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  23. Rajamani L. 23.  2010. The making and unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord. Int. Comp. Law Q. 59:824–43 [Google Scholar]
  24. den Elzen MGJ, Meinshausen M, Hof AF. 24.  2012. The impact of surplus units from the first Kyoto period on achieving the reduction pledges of the Cancún Agreements. Clim. Change 114:401–8 [Google Scholar]
  25. Aguirre M, Ibikunle G. 25.  2014. Determinants of renewable energy growth: a global sample analysis. Energy Policy 69:374–84 [Google Scholar]
  26. Stephan B, Lane R. 26.  2014. The Politics of Carbon Markets Abingdon, UK: RoutledgeThis is an edited volume of the criticisms of carbon markets. [Google Scholar]
  27. Haites E. 27.  2000. Proposed rules and the size of the CDM market. Potential and Barriers to the CDM: Proceedings of the IGES International Workshop on the Clean Development Mechanism, Jan. 26–27 IGES 133–37 Hayama, Jpn: IGES [Google Scholar]
  28. Aldrich E, Koerner L. 28.  2012. Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) trades: current market impacts and prospects for the future. Atmosphere 3:229–45 [Google Scholar]
  29. Michaelowa A, Buen J. 29.  2012. The CDM gold rush. Carbon Markets or Climate Finance? A Michaelowa 1–38 Abingdon, UK: Routledge [Google Scholar]
  30. Schneider L. 30.  2009. Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned. Clim. Policy 9:242–54 [Google Scholar]
  31. Michaelowa A. 31.  2009. Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: changes in additionality definitions and regulatory practices over time. Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading D Freestone, C Streck 248–71 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  32. Boyd E, Hultman N, Roberts J, Corbera E, Cole J. 32.  et al. 2009. Reforming the CDM for sustainable development: lessons learned and policy futures. Environ. Sci. Policy 12:820–31 [Google Scholar]
  33. Wara MW. 33.  2008. Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's performance and potential. UCLA Law Rev. 55:1759–803 [Google Scholar]
  34. Korppoo A, Moe A. 34.  2008. Joint implementation in Ukraine: national benefits and implications for further climate pacts. Clim. Policy 8:305–16 [Google Scholar]
  35. Korppoo A, Gassan-Zade O. 35.  2014. Lessons from JI and GIS for post-2012 carbon finance mechanisms in Russia and Ukraine. Clim. Policy 14:224–41 [Google Scholar]
  36. Dormady NC, Englander G. 36.  2015. Carbon allowances and the demand for offsets: a comprehensive assessment of imperfect substitutes. J. Public Policy In press. doi:10.1017/S0143814X14000336 [Google Scholar]
  37. Ervine K. 37.  2014. Diminishing returns: carbon market crisis and the future of market-dependent climate change finance. New Polit. Econ. 19:723–47 [Google Scholar]
  38. Oberthür S, Lefeber R. 38.  2010. Holding countries to account: the Kyoto Protocol's compliance system revisited after four years of experience. Clim. Law 1:133–58 [Google Scholar]
  39. Schiele S. 39.  2014. Evolution of International Environmental Regimes: The Case of Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  40. Barrett S. 40.  2008b. Climate treaties and the imperative of enforcement. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 24:239–58 [Google Scholar]
  41. Froyn C, Hovi J. 41.  2008. A climate agreement with full participation. Econ. Lett. 99:317–19 [Google Scholar]
  42. Carraro C, Massetti E. 42.  2012. Beyond Copenhagen: a realistic climate policy in a fragmented world. Clim. Change 110:523–42 [Google Scholar]
  43. Blaxekjær , Nielsen TD. 43.  2014. Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC. Clim. Policy. In press. doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.965656 [Google Scholar]
  44. Winkler H, Rajamani L. 44.  2014. CBDR&RC in a regime applicable to all. Clim. Policy 14:102–21Two researchers from developing countries argue that developing countries should take up commitments. [Google Scholar]
  45. de Coninck H, Lorch R, Sagar AD. 45.  2014. The Way Forward in International Climate Policy: Key Issues and New Ideas 2014 London: Clim. Strateg. [Google Scholar]
  46. Dellink R, Briner G, Clapp C. 46.  2011. The Copenhagen Accord/Cancún Agreements emission pledges for 2020: exploring economic and environmental impacts. Clim. Change Econ. 2:53–78 [Google Scholar]
  47. den Elzen MGJ, Hof AF, Mendoza Beltran A, Grassi G, Roelfsema M. 47.  et al. 2011. The Copenhagen Accord: abatement costs and carbon prices resulting from the submissions. Environ. Sci. Policy 14:28–39 [Google Scholar]
  48. Peterson E, Schleich J, Duscha V. 48.  2011. Environmental and economic effects of the Copenhagen pledges and more ambitious emission reduction targets. Energy Policy 39:3697–708 [Google Scholar]
  49. Rajamani L. 49.  2011. The Cancun climate change agreements: reading the text, subtext and tea leaves. Int. Comp. Law Q. 60:499–519 [Google Scholar]
  50. Rajamani L. 50.  2012. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the future of the climate regime. Int. Comp. Law Q. 61:501–18 [Google Scholar]
  51. Rajamani L. 51.  2014. The Warsaw climate negotiations: emerging understandings and battle lines on the road to the 2015 climate agreement. Int. Comp. Law Q. 63:721–40 [Google Scholar]
  52. 52. UN Environ. Program. (UNEP) 2014. The Emissions Gap Report 2014: A UNEP Synthesis Report Nairobi, Kenya: UNEPThis is an excellent assessment of the stringency of the country pledges. [Google Scholar]
  53. Höhne N, Taylor C, Elias R, den Elzen M, Riahi K. 53.  et al. 2012. National GHG emissions reduction pledges and 2°C: comparison of studies. Clim. Policy 12:356–77 [Google Scholar]
  54. Aldy JE, Stavins RN. 54.  2010. Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agreement Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  55. Moncel R, van Asselt H. 55.  2012. All hands on deck! Mobilizing climate change action beyond the UNFCCC. Rev. Eur. Community Int. Environ. Law 21:163–76 [Google Scholar]
  56. Keohane RO, Victor DG. 56.  2011. The regime complex for climate change. Perspect. Polit. 9:7–23 [Google Scholar]
  57. Bäckstrand K. 57.  2008. Accountability of networked climate governance: the rise of transnational climate partnerships. Glob. Environ. Polit. 8:74–102 [Google Scholar]
  58. Andonova L, Betsill M, Bulkeley H. 58.  2009. Transnational climate governance. Glob. Environ. Polit. 9:52–73 [Google Scholar]
  59. Molina M, Zaelke D, Madhava Sarma K, Andersen SO, Ramanathan V, Kaniaru D. 59.  2009. Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO2 emissions. PNAS 106:20616–21 [Google Scholar]
  60. Velders GJM, Andersen SO, Daniel JS, Fahey DW, McFarland M. 60.  2007. The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate. PNAS 104:4814–19 [Google Scholar]
  61. 61. EIA 2009. A Global HFC Phase Out: Essential Action for the Montreal Protocol London: EIA [Google Scholar]
  62. Velders GJM, Fahey DW, Daniel JS, McFarland M, Anderson SO. 62.  2009. The large contribution of projected HFC emission to future climate forcing. PNAS 106:10949–54 [Google Scholar]
  63. Branger F, Quirion P. 63.  2013. Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies. Ecol. Econ. 99:29–39 [Google Scholar]
  64. 64. Int. Marit. Organ. (IMO) 2014. Third IMO GHG Study 2014 London: IMO [Google Scholar]
  65. 65. Int. Civ. Aviat. Organ. (ICAO) 2010. ICAO Environmental Report: Aviation's Contribution to Climate Change Montreal: ICAO [Google Scholar]
  66. Haites E. 66.  2009. Linking emissions trading schemes for international aviation and shipping emissions. Clim. Policy 9:415–30 [Google Scholar]
  67. Leal-Arcas R. 67.  2011. Alternative architecture for climate change—major economies. Eur. J. Legal Stud. 4:25–56 [Google Scholar]
  68. Hurrell A, Sengupta S. 68.  2012. Emerging powers, North-South relations and global climate politics. Int. Aff. 88:463–84 [Google Scholar]
  69. Van de Graaf T, Westphal K. 69.  2011. The G8 and G20 as global steering committees for energy: opportunities and constraints. Glob. Policy 2:19–30 [Google Scholar]
  70. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen SI, van Asselt H. 70.  2009. Introduction: Exploring and explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on clean development and climate. Int. Environ. Agreem. 9:195–211 [Google Scholar]
  71. McGee J, Taplin R. 71.  2009. The role of the Asia Pacific Partnership in discursive contestation of the international climate regime. Int. Environ. Agreem. 9:213–38 [Google Scholar]
  72. 72. UN Environ. Program. (UNEP) 2011. Near-Term Climate Protection and Clean Air Benefits: Actions for Controlling Short-Lived Climate Forcers. A UNEP Synthesis Report. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP [Google Scholar]
  73. Weischer L, Morgan J, Patel M. 73.  2012. Climate clubs: Can small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing climate change?. Rev. Eur. Community Int. Environ. Law 21:177–92 [Google Scholar]
  74. Garibaldi J, Arias G. 74.  2014. Enhancing Bold Collective Action: A Variable Geometry and Incentives Regime Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  75. Winkler H, Beaumont J. 75.  2010. Fair and effective multilateralism in the post-Copenhagen climate negotiations. Clim. Policy 10:638–54 [Google Scholar]
  76. Klinsky S. 76.  2015. Justice and boundary setting in greenhouse gas cap and trade policy: a case study of the Western Climate Initiative. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 105:105–22 [Google Scholar]
  77. Kern K, Bulkeley H. 77.  2009. Cities, Europeanization and multi-level governance: governing climate change through transnational municipal networks. J. Common Market Stud. 47:309–32 [Google Scholar]
  78. Román M. 78.  2010. Governing from the middle: the C40 Cities Leadership Group. Corp. Gov. 10:73–84 [Google Scholar]
  79. Sippel M. 79.  2011. Urban GHG inventories, target setting and mitigation achievements: how German cities fail to outperform their country. Greenh. Gas Meas. Manag. 1:55–63 [Google Scholar]
  80. Chavez A, Ramaswami A. 80.  2011. Progress toward low carbon cities: approaches for transboundary GHG emissions' footprinting. Carbon Manag. 2:471–82 [Google Scholar]
  81. Bulkeley H, Andonova L, Bäckstrand K, Betsill M, Compagnon D. 81.  et al. 2012. Governing climate change transnationally: assessing the evidence from a database of sixty initiatives. Environ. Plan. C 30:591–612This is an overview of nongovernment climate mitigation initiatives, albeit to be read carefully (some initiatives do not really focus on mitigation). [Google Scholar]
  82. Knox-Hayes J, Levy D. 82.  2011. The politics of carbon disclosure as climate governance. Strateg. Organ. 9:91–99 [Google Scholar]
  83. Kolk A, Levy D, Pinkse J. 83.  2008. Corporate responses in an emerging climate regime: the institutionalization and commensuration of carbon disclosure. Eur. Account. Rev. 17:719–45 [Google Scholar]
  84. Lovell H, MacKenzie D. 84.  2011. Accounting for carbon: the role of accounting professional organisations in governing climate change. Antipode 43:704–30 [Google Scholar]
  85. Pattberg P. 85.  2010. Public-private partnerships in global climate governance. WIREs 1:279–87 [Google Scholar]
  86. Hare W, Stockwell C, Flachsland C, Oberthür S. 86.  2010. The architecture of the global climate regime: a top-down perspective. Clim. Policy 10:600–14 [Google Scholar]
  87. Bodansky D. 87.  2007. Targets and timetables: good policy but bad politics. Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World J Aldy, R Stavins 57–66 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  88. Hoffmann M. 88.  2011. Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  89. Frankel J. 89.  2010. An elaborated proposal for a global climate policy architecture: specific formulas and emission targets for all countries in all decades. See Ref. 54 31–87
  90. Cao J. 90.  2010. Reconciling human development and climate protection: a multistage hybrid climate policy architecture. See Ref. 54 563–98
  91. Höhne N, den Elzen M, Weiss M. 91.  2006. Common but differentiated convergence (CDC): a new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy. Clim. Policy 6:181–99 [Google Scholar]
  92. den Elzen MGJ, Höhne N. 92.  2010. Sharing the reduction effort to limit global warming to 2°C. Clim. Policy 10:247–60 [Google Scholar]
  93. Böhringer C, Welsch H. 93.  2006. Burden sharing in a greenhouse: egalitarianism and sovereignty reconciled. Appl. Econ. 38:981–96 [Google Scholar]
  94. Baer P, Athanasiou T, Kartha S, Kemp-Benedict E. 94.  2009. Greenhouse development rights: a proposal for a fair global climate treaty. Ethics Place Environ. 12:267–81This is a highly innovative burden-sharing proposal. [Google Scholar]
  95. Chakravarty S, Chikkatur A, de Coninck H, Pacala S, Socolow R, Tavoni M. 95.  2009. Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. PNAS 106:11884–88 [Google Scholar]
  96. Michaelowa A, Butzengeiger S, Jung M. 96.  2005. Graduation and deepening: an ambitious post-2012 climate policy scenario. Int. Environ. Agreem. 5:25–46 [Google Scholar]
  97. Briner G, Kato T, Hattori T. 97.  2014. Built to Last: Designing a Flexible and Durable 2015 Climate Change Agreement Paris: OECD [Google Scholar]
  98. Nishimura N. 98.  2015. A new market-based climate change solution achieving 2°C and equity. WIREs 4:133–38 [Google Scholar]
  99. Cooper R. 99.  2010. The case for charges on greenhouse gas emissions. See Ref. 54 151–78
  100. Bradley R, Baumert KA, Childs B, Herzog T, Pershing J. 100.  2007. Slicing the Pie: Sector-Based Approaches to International Climate Arrangements, Issues and Options Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  101. Branger F, Lecuyer O, Quirion P. 101.  2015. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Should we throw the flagship out with the bathwater?. WIREs 6:9–16 [Google Scholar]
  102. Jotzo F, Löschel A. 102.  2014. Emissions trading in China: emerging experiences and international lessons. Energy Policy 75:3–8 [Google Scholar]
  103. Grubb M. 103.  2004. Technology innovation and climate change policy: an overview of issues and options. Keio Econ. Stud. 41:103–32This was a seminal paper on technology policy. [Google Scholar]
  104. Somanathan E, Sterner T, Sugiyama T, Chimanikire D, Dubash N. 104.  et al. 2014. National and sub-national policies and institutions. See Ref. 2 1141–205
  105. de Coninck H, Fischer C, Newell RG, Ueno T. 105.  2008. International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change. Energy Policy 36:335–56 [Google Scholar]
  106. Hourcade J, Fabert B, Rozenberg J. 106.  2012. Venturing into uncharted financial waters: an essay on climate-friendly finance. Int. Environ. Agreem. 12:165–86 [Google Scholar]
  107. Bodansky D. 107.  2011. Tale of two architectures: the once and future U.N. climate change regime. Ariz. State Law J. 43:697–712 [Google Scholar]
  108. Buhr K, Roth S, Stigson P. 108.  2014. Climate change politics through a global pledge-and-review regime: positions among negotiators and stakeholders. Sustainability 6:794–811 [Google Scholar]
  109. Höhne N, Li L, Larkin J. 109.  2014. Characteristics of Mitigation Commitments Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  110. Briner G, Prag A. 110.  2013. Establishing and Understanding Post-2020 Climate Change Mitigation Commitments Paris: OECD [Google Scholar]
  111. Morgan J, Tirpak D, Levin K, Dagnet Y. 111.  2013. A Pathway to a Climate Change Agreement in 2015: Options for Setting and Reviewing GHG Emission Reduction Offers Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  112. Prag A, Hood C, Martins Barata P. 112.  2013. Made to Measure: Options for Emissions Accounting under the UNFCCC Paris: OECD [Google Scholar]
  113. Dagnet Y, Fei T, Elliott C, Qiu Y. 113.  2014. Improving Transparency and Accountability in the Post-2020 Climate Regime: A Fair Way Forward Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  114. Tuerk A, Mehling M, Flachsland C, Sterk W. 114.  2009. Linking carbon markets: concepts, case studies and pathways. Clim. Policy 9:341–57The is the first and still relevant paper on the linkage of emissions trading systems. [Google Scholar]
  115. Cason T, Gangadharan L. 115.  2011. Price discovery and intermediation in linked emissions trading markets: a laboratory study. Ecol. Econ. 70:1424–33 [Google Scholar]
  116. Ranson M, Stavins R. 116.  2013. A post-Durban climate policy architecture based on linkage of cap-and-trade systems. Chicago J. Int. Law 13:403–38 [Google Scholar]
  117. Flachsland C, Marschinski R, Edenhofer O. 117.  2009. To link or not to link: benefits and disadvantages of linking cap-and-trade systems. Clim. Policy 9:358–72 [Google Scholar]
  118. Metcalf G, Weisbach D. 118.  2012. Linking policies when tastes differ: global climate policy in a heterogeneous world. Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy 6:110–29 [Google Scholar]
  119. Flåm K. 119.  2009. Restricting the import of “emission credits” in the EU: a power struggle between states and institutions. Int. Environ. Agreem. 9:23–38 [Google Scholar]
  120. Nazifi F. 120.  2010. The price impacts of linking the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme to the Clean Development Mechanism. Environ. Econ. Policy Stud. 12:164–86 [Google Scholar]
  121. Biermann F, Pattberg P, Zelli F. 121.  2010. Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012 Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  122. Ostrom E. 122.  2012. Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: Must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?. Econ. Theory 49:353–69 [Google Scholar]
  123. Hovi J, Sprinz DF, Underdal A. 123.  2014. Bottom-Up or Top-Down?. Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance TL Cherry, J Hovi, DM McEvoy 167–80 Abingdon, UK: Routledge [Google Scholar]
  124. Barrett S, Stavins R. 124.  2003. Increasing participation and compliance in international climate change agreements. Int. Environ. Agreem. 3:349–76 [Google Scholar]
  125. Nordhaus WD. 125.  2006. After Kyoto: alternative mechanisms to control global warming. Am. Econ. Rev. 96:31–34 [Google Scholar]
  126. Weitzman ML. 126.  2007. A review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. J. Econ. Lit. 45:703–24 [Google Scholar]
  127. Cole D. 127.  2015. Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate change policy. Nat. Clim. Change 5:114–18 [Google Scholar]
  128. Morgan J, Dagnet Y, Höhne N, Oberthür S, Li L. 128.  2014. Race to the Top: Driving Ambition in the Post-2020 International Climate Agreement Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  129. Rayner S. 129.  2010. How to eat an elephant: a bottom-up approach to climate policy. Clim. Policy 10:615–21 [Google Scholar]
  130. Edenhofer O, Jakob M, Creutzig F, Flachsland C, Fuss S. 130.  et al. 2015. Closing the emission price gap. Glob. Environ. Change 31:132–43 [Google Scholar]
  131. Jotzo F, Pezzey J. 131.  2007. Optimal intensity targets for greenhouse gas emissions trading under uncertainty. Environ. Resour. Econ. 38:259–84This was the seminal paper on intensity targets. [Google Scholar]
  132. Marschinski R, Edenhofer O. 132.  2010. Revisiting the case for intensity targets: better incentives and less uncertainty for developing countries. Energy Policy 38:5048–58 [Google Scholar]
  133. Meckling J, Chung G. 133.  2009. Sectoral approaches for a post-2012 climate regime: a taxonomy. Clim. Policy 9:652–68 [Google Scholar]
  134. Levin K, Rich D, Finnegan R, Dagnet Y. 134.  2014. Ex-Ante Clarification, Transparency and Understanding of Intended Nationally Determined Mitigation Contributions Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  135. Michaelowa A. 135.  2011. Fragmentation of international climate policy—doom or boon for carbon markets?. Progressing Towards Post-2012 Carbon Markets UNEP Riso Cent. 13–24 Roskilde, Denmark: UNEP [Google Scholar]
  136. Lanzi E, Chateau J, Dellink R. 136.  2012. Alternative approaches for levelling carbon prices in a world with fragmented carbon markets. Energy Econ. 34:S240–50 [Google Scholar]
  137. Anderegg WRL, Goldsmith GR. 137.  2014. Public interest in climate change over the past decade and the effects of the ‘climategate’ media event. Environ. Res. Lett. 9:054005 [Google Scholar]
  138. Poortinga W, Spence A, Whitmarsh L, Capstick S, Pidgeon NF. 138.  2011. Uncertain climate: an investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change. Glob. Environ. Change 21:1015–24 [Google Scholar]
  139. Contestabile M. 139.  2014. Americans' views. Nat. Clim. Change 4:86 [Google Scholar]
  140. Schäfer R, Metzger B. 140.  2009. Was macht eigentlich das Waldsterben?. Umweltgeschichte und Umweltzukunft P Masis, O Sparenberg, J Sprenger 201–27 Göttingen, Ger: Göttingen Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  141. Gilaberte-Búrdalo M, López-Martín F, Pino-Otín M, López-Moreno J. 141.  2014. Impacts of climate change on ski industry. Environ. Sci. Policy 44:51–61 [Google Scholar]
  142. Haites E, Yamin F, Höhne N. 142.  2013. Possible Elements of a 2015 Legal Agreement on Climate Change Paris: IDDRI [Google Scholar]
  143. Bodansky D, Diringer E. 143.  2014. Building Flexibility and Ambition into a 2015 Climate Agreement Arlington, VA: Cent. Clim. Energy Solut. [Google Scholar]
  144. Oberthür S. 144.  2014. Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement Washington, DC: World Resour. Inst. [Google Scholar]
  145. Dyer H. 145.  2014. Climate anarchy: creative disorder in world politics. Int. Pol. Sociol. 8:182–200 [Google Scholar]
  146. Levin K, Cashore B, Bernstein S, Auld G. 146.  2012. Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining our future selves to ameliorate global climate change. Policy Sci. 45:123–52 [Google Scholar]
  147. Ngwadla X. 147.  2014. An operational framework for equity in the 2015 agreement. Clim. Policy 18:8–16 [Google Scholar]
  148. Edenhofer O, Pichs-Madruga R, Sokona Y, Agrawala S, Bashmakov IA. 148.  et al. 2014. Summary for policymakers See Ref. 2 1–31 [Google Scholar]
  149. 149. Natl. Res. Counc. Natl. Acad 2015. Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth. Washington, DC: Natl. Acad. Press [Google Scholar]
  150. Millard-Ball A. 150.  2012. The Tuvalu syndrome. Can geoengineering solve climate's collective action problem?. Clim. Change 110:1047–66 [Google Scholar]

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error