1932

Abstract

We explore whether theoretically the target leverage and pecking-order models can be reconciled with payout smoothing. Investment absorbs a significant part of income and asset volatility if the firm follows both a payout target and a net debt ratio (NDR) target. A positive (negative) NDR amplifies (dampens) shocks in assets. Slow adjustment toward the NDR target facilitates payout smoothing. Under strict pecking-order financing, income shocks are absorbed primarily by changes in net debt. More payout smoothing implies a stronger negative relation between debt and net income. Shocks to assets in place need not affect current payout.

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2021-11-01
2024-06-18
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