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Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volume 18, 2022

The Law and Economics of Blockchain

Abstract

This article examines the implications of Distributed Ledger Technology (a.k.a. blockchain) for several areas of law. While cryptocurrencies have received much attention, the implications of DLT are potentially far reaching. DLT raises interesting and important questions relating to rules of evidence, surrounding issues like hearsay and authentication. The advent of initial coin offerings has implications not only for how firms are financed but also for securities law in regulating such offerings. Cryptocurrencies themselves (e.g., Bitcoin) have raised serious issues for tax avoidance and taxation law. Relatedly, the rise of cryptocurrencies raises issues regarding the relationship between private and nationally issued currencies, and even the role and efficacy of monetary policy. Finally, DLT has practical implications for election law and voter turnout, with such technology already begun to be used for security purposes in online voting and permitted in 32 US states.

Keyword(s): blockchain, contracts, distributed ledger, law, regulation
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-011921-060322
2022-10-18
2025-04-21
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