This article discusses recent developments in the study of voting and elections. How people end up voting in an election depends on () how effective voting power is distributed among voters and () the strategic interactions between voters and other interested parties. These are, in turn, affected by institutional arrangements, such as the composition of voting districts, campaign finance laws, and constitutional restrictions on vote dilution. In recent years, new social science–based approaches, both theoretical and empirical, from economists, political scientists, and legal scholars have shed new light on the democratic process.

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